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Preface
This book is inspired by, and dedicated to, Jill Rubery. Jill is a major figure in 
international debates on inequalities in work and employment. Her intellectual 
contributions are renowned for both their critical questioning of mainstream 
theoretical approaches, whether in economics, management, industrial relations 
or comparative systems, and their attention to real-world empirical detail. Jill’s 
intellectual roots are with the influential Cambridge economics group research-
ing labour market segmentation in the late 1970s and 1980s during a period 
when Keynesian economic thought was being eclipsed by neoclassical econom-
ics modelling. The research was inter-disciplinary, grounded in data (mostly 
involving case studies of firms) and driven by an ambitious intellectual agenda 
that developed theory while also illuminating practical matters of relevance to 
policy-makers and practitioners. 
During these Cambridge years, Jill developed a very important network of 
international friends and colleagues who formed the backbone of the International 
Working Party on Labour Market Segmentation, which Jill co-founded in 1979, and 
who provided the impetus for Jill’s intellectual interest in comparative employ-
ment systems. Collaboration was an important characteristic of Jill’s work then 
and continued following her move to Manchester in 1989 where for nearly three 
decades many colleagues have benefited enormously from working with her on 
high-profile research projects, publications and policy advisory work. This book 
has therefore been a rather strange experience for many of us because we are so 
used to talking through ideas and our writing with Jill. Her absence, dictated by 
the tradition of the Festschrift, feels wrong! 
We would like to say thank you to the 33 friends and colleagues of Jill who 
have contributed to this volume. We are very conscious that we were unable 
to invite many others due to MUP page-length restrictions, in particular many 
younger colleagues and ex-PhD students. We were able to expand the numbers 
somewhat by suggesting to several colleagues that they co-authored chapters in 
order to bring a greater number of Jill’s friends into the book. These suggestions 
were generously accepted and we believe they have in fact proven very fruit-
ful, especially in expanding the cross-national comparative scope of chapters. 
 Preface xv
We are also very grateful for the assistance in the production of this book 
by two Manchester colleagues, Nina Teasdale and Helen Norman, Damian’s 
eldest daughter, Helena Grimshaw, Thomas Dark at MUP and an anonymous 
reviewer.
We hope the book serves as a clear expression of Jill’s major research inter-
ests and also looks to the future by outlining the key principles of what we are 
calling a ‘new labour market segmentation approach’. Jill’s career is by no 
means complete and indeed this book will be launched at the 39th International 
Working Party on Labour Market Segmentation conference in Manchester in 2017, 
billed as a ‘mid-way career celebration for Jill Rubery’. We look forward to 
Jill’s criticisms!
Damian, Colette, Gail and Isabel
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A new labour market segmentation 
approach for analysing inequalities: 
introduction and overview
Damian Grimshaw, Colette Fagan, Gail Hebson and Isabel Tavora
There is a real need for a new multi-dimensional approach to understanding 
inequalities in work and employment. Faced with the pressures of globalisation, 
liberalisation of markets and periodic economic crises, many societies around 
the world have forged fragile compromises that are fundamentally incompatible 
with the goals of making the distribution of employment and quality of work 
more equal. Various fiscal, labour market and social policy reforms risk creat-
ing or increasing inequalities, expanding precarious forms of employment and 
exacerbating the social exclusion of vulnerable workforce groups. Such reforms 
include the marginalisation of organised labour through changes to industrial 
relations, the marketisation and outsourcing of public services, the weakening 
of employment rights, cuts to welfare entitlements, and the privatisation of 
responsibilities for family and care provision. Moreover, employers may also 
play a role in constructing and sustaining inequalities, whether by lobbying 
for deregulatory reforms, unbundling production structures in ways that frag-
ment work, or evading rules designed to secure fair and equal treatment and to 
enhance job quality. 
Political and economic actions are thus continuously shaping the trajectory 
and country specificity of work and employment inequalities in the context 
of shifting international patterns of production organisation, industrial rela-
tions, gender relations and demographic changes such as population ageing 
or migration flows. While processes of competitive market allocation and 
technological change matter, as do long-term trends in economic growth, 
these cannot fully explain divergent inequality outcomes (Lee and Gerecke, 
2015). Instead, international research points to labour market institutions (e.g. 
minimum wage rules, collective bargaining, vocational training, immigration 
A new labour market segmentation approach
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rules); organisations and collective movements that can exercise countervail-
ing power (especially trade unions and feminist and civil society organisations); 
the recurring conflict over what constitutes a job (the bundle of tasks and the 
overall quality, value and status); a raft of institutions that interact with labour 
markets (especially social and welfare policy rules and corporate governance 
systems); and changes in the national and global organisation of production 
(e.g. Berg, 2015; Bettio et al., 2013; Gallie, 2007; Gautié and Schmitt, 2010; 
Karamessini and Rubery, 2014; Marino et al., 2017; Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 
2011; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2011, 2016).
This book contributes to this international evidence by proposing a ‘new 
labour market segmentation’ approach for the investigation of work and 
employment inequalities. Our hope is that this meets an intellectual need for a 
multi-dimensional perspective and also confronts the challenge of a resurgent 
neoliberalism that is undermining the models of social citizenship and princi-
ples of labour market inclusion which have been forged through collective bar-
gaining, protective and participative rights, and welfare state regimes. The first 
section identifies the intellectual basis for this approach in contributions from 
three theoretical traditions that inform its distinctive focus on the segmenta-
tion, gender and comparative institutional effects on inequalities. We describe 
a set of propositions, designed to illuminate the main threads of a new labour 
market segmentation approach, and review each in the subsequent sections 
against the rich evidence and arguments presented in Chapters 2 through 17 of 
this volume.
Theoretical elements of a new labour market segmentation 
approach
The proposed new labour market segmentation approach brings together key 
insights from three theoretical traditions that have proven valuable in articu-
lating the causes, characteristics and consequences of inequalities in work and 
employment. Table 1.1 presents a summary with a focus on key forms of ine-
qualities, namely low pay, gender pay inequality and patterns of segmentation 
between standard and non-standard forms of employment.
The first theoretical tradition is the labour market segmentation approach as 
conceived in the 1970s and early 1980s (Craig et al., 1982; Doeringer and Piore, 
1971; Edwards et al., 1975; Gordon et al., 1982; Rubery, 1978; Sengenberger, 
1981; Wilkinson, 1981).1 In a radical break from the economics orthodoxy at 
the time (which still prevails today), segmentation theory rejected the assump-
tion that labour market divisions could be attributed mainly to inadequate levels 
 A new labour market segmentation approach 3
of human capital or differences in productivity. Instead, it placed the demand 
side of the labour market centre stage in its analysis of divisions, inequalities and 
dualisms in capitalist employment structures. As Jill Rubery has argued:
The attraction of segmentation theory is that it focuses on employing organisations, the 
architects of the employment system, in the shaping of labour market  inequalities. … 
The obscuring of the active role of employers in shaping employment outcomes is 
perhaps one of the main legacies of mainstream economics. (2007: 955, 960)
Its long-standing significance lies in its opposition to neoclassical economics, 
which assumes employers automatically adjust to supply-side shifts in education 
and skill so that they utilise all potential productivity in the labour market, albeit 
constrained by institutional ‘imperfections’ (so-called) in the labour market. 
Instead, drawing on empirical case studies of employer practices and worker 
experiences, labour market segmentation theorists argued that employers and 
the wider economic conditions play a key role in shaping inequalities in the 
labour market via selective access to career and training opportunities (as in 
Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) model of primary and secondary labour market 
segments); changing responses to economic conditions that affect workers’ job 
queue prospects (Rubery, 1988; Sengenberger, 1981); under-investment in 
productive structures leading to low-wage, low-skill vicious cycles (Wilkinson, 
1983); and the undermining of worker resistance through divide-and-rule tac-
tics (Edwards et al., 1975; see further discussion in the section ‘Employers as 
architects of inequalities’). The argument is that these practices contribute to 
a continuous regeneration of inequalities through the construction of ‘non-
competing groups’ (Cairnes, 1874), variously based on personal attributes such 
as social class, race, gender, migrant status, age and disability, among others. 
In other words, inequalities are not fostered only on the supply side through 
exogenous societal or cultural rules and conventions but also, and perhaps pre-
dominantly, through formal and informal institutionalised policies and practices 
in labour markets and workplaces. 
The approach thus decidedly breaks with the neat wage-productivity theo-
rising of neoclassical economics, as well as with most econometric models of 
wage formation, since it injects the possibility that many employers who are 
able to pay high wages commensurate with investments in technology and pro-
ductivity performance may nevertheless be unwilling to do so (Craypo, 2003). 
A further important contribution is the critique of simplistic, abstract notions 
of the representative firm and the emphasis instead on the real-world context 
of the uneven development of sectors, supply chains and organisations. Such 
uneven development arises from the unequal distribution of power among 
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capital and which fuels differential opportunities for workers’ pay and employ-
ment prospects that are not determined by their potential productivity charac-
teristics (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2005). Workers may be at the right or wrong 
end of a supply chain, for example, and therefore more or less able to press 
for a decent share of the employer’s rent (Guy, 1999; Perraudin et al., 2013).
The second theoretical tradition summarised in Table 1.1 is feminist socio-
economics. This approach brings an explicit analytic focus on gender inequali-
ties, which both advances beyond some of the inadequacies of the early labour 
market segmentation approach and enriches our understanding of wider soci-
etal processes of inequality generation. It emphasises the ways that women’s 
labour market opportunities are limited and moulded by sex discrimination, 
gender inequalities in domestic labour, and the interplay of household and 
workplace power relations. Three insights are fundamental for our focus here. 
Firstly, feminist socio-economics demonstrates that the interaction between 
the spheres of production and social reproduction is central to the gendered 
structuring of labour market segmentation (Folbre, 1994; Humphries and 
Rubery, 1984). Early labour market segmentation theory usefully veered off 
to the demand side in a rejection of neoclassical economists’ assumed supply-
side logic, but failed to revisit the supply side and thus was criticised for not 
questioning stylised assumptions about the matching of periphery jobs with 
periphery workers.
Feminist research has made major critical advances here and shows how the 
politics of social reproduction and the household division of labour directly 
affects the delineation by employers of work into ‘good jobs’ and ‘bad jobs’. 
Historical investigations exposed the construction of the male breadwinner in 
need of a family wage and the constraints imposed by the associated widespread 
beliefs that women worked for ‘pin money’ (Humphries, 1977). These issues 
still reverberate in contemporary accounts of sex discrimination in many coun-
tries, where women are still too often treated by employers, policy-makers and 
men as secondary rather than dual or equal earners. Sex discrimination takes 
many forms. There is evidence that employers exploit gender profiling and gen-
dered wage practices in the belief that women are less committed to work than 
their male counterparts. Also, many country studies point to the adverse conse-
quences of underdeveloped and gender biased welfare and family support poli-
cies for women’s wage penalties over the life course. Furthermore, employers’ 
exploitative practices towards female workers who are assumed to be locked 
into local labour markets are found to hinder wage prospects and the exercise 
of autonomy at work (Cooke and Xiao, 2014; Figart et al., 2005; Korpi et al., 
2013; Lewis et al., 2008; Merluzzi and Dobrev, 2015; Rubery et al., 1999; 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 Making work more equal
A second insight from feminist socio-economics concerns its critical analysis 
of the wage–skill nexus and an alternative theoretical development of the notion 
of undervaluation. The productive value of jobs done predominantly by women 
is likely to be undervalued because women have historically been less able 
than men to establish high status for those occupations and sectors of female- 
dominated work, such that for the same skill level the jobs occupied by women 
are more likely to be attributed periphery status and paid at a lower level than 
those carried out by men (e.g. Walsh, 1990). These complex gendered pro-
cesses play out over long periods of time and as women make inroads into once 
male-dominated occupations, there is a risk the relative status and wage attached 
to the job falls (Cohn, 1995; Reskin and Roos, 1990). Because skill is a socially 
constructed concept, employers are likely to make a ‘value association’ between 
unpaid work performed in the home by women and similar work performed in 
the wage economy: if the tasks are widely undertaken outside the workplace 
without formal training then it is judged ‘unskilled’. This gendered practice is 
reinforced in societies where ‘cultural ideas deprecate work done by women’ 
(England, 2005: 278), where fathers fail to take on an equal share of domestic 
work (Fagan and Norman, 2013) and where employers deny women discre-
tion in their work (through for example ‘job crafting’, see Leana et al., 2009). 
The archetype example is care work, which remains invisible, low status and 
exploited in most societies (Hebson et al., 2015). For the employer, the out-
come of undervaluation is access to a higher quality of labour for a given wage 
(Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007).
A feminist life course perspective on the labour market experiences of mothers 
brings a third valuable insight to our new labour market segmentation approach. 
Rejecting the neoclassical economics explanations,2 feminist socio-economics 
research finds evidence in many countries of significant ‘motherhood pay gaps’ 
that cannot be explained by human capital depreciation, diminished experience, 
lower skill levels, women’s concentration in jobs that offer family-compatible 
working hours, or measures of employment commitment (for a review, see 
Rubery and Grimshaw, 2015). Instead the feminist research advocates alterna-
tive explanations, including the persistence of traditional sexist stereotyping of 
mothers’ employment commitment, which imposes a kind of ‘negative exter-
nality’ of childbirth to working mothers (Self, 2005), and country differences 
in levels of defamilialisation, such that highly developed childcare services and 
family-oriented working-time arrangements for men and women support wom-
en’s economic activity after motherhood and provide a buffer against employer 
strategies of core–periphery segmentation (Anxo et al., 2007; 2010; Pettit and 
Hook, 2009; see also the section ‘Households, welfare regimes and inequalities 
effects’). In many developing countries, women’s relationship to paid work 
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needs to be understood in terms of the relative stability of family and community 
systems (Abu Sharkh and Gough, 2010) leading to calls for family–work recon-
ciliation policies to be designed around household and neighbourhood activities 
(Beneria, 2007). Overall, the point is not simply that women fall behind men in 
supply-side job queues. Rather there is a continuous restructuring of job, wage 
and skill structures shaped by employer gender bias, alongside family support 
provisions that shape the form and extent of gender inequality over the life 
course.
The third area of literature underpinning our new labour market segmenta-
tion approach is comparative institutionalist theory. This research reveals a rich 
diversity of employment arrangements around the world and a wide variety 
of distributive outcomes in wages, household income, job quality and lifetime 
prospects. Moreover, this theoretical tradition is premised on the ontological 
notion that labour markets are socially constructed, an idea accepted by some 
leading  economists (e.g. Solow, 1990), but mostly forgotten or ignored by 
others. As Jill Rubery articulated in the preface to her well-known interna-
tional textbook:
We take labour markets to be social constructs, shaped and influenced by institutions 
and by social actors. Comparison of labour markets among nation states, where the 
institutional arrangements, the social conditions, the forms of economic organisation 
and the role and attitudes of social actors all vary, provides a very rich field for devel-
oping these concepts and alerting students to the variety of ways in which employ-
ment can be and is organised. (2003: xvii) 
This approach rejects the universalist theorising common to neoclassical econom-
ics, as well as some strands of Marxist theories from the USA. Instead it incorpo-
rates into the analysis both the systemic forces for change that are characteristic of 
advanced capitalist development (such as financialisation, digitalisation, migra-
tion, liberalisation and internationalisation) and the potentially diverse ‘societal 
effects’ associated with institutionalised labour markets and the surrounding 
nexus of product market, innovation, corporate governance, industrial rela-
tions and welfare state arrangements (see Phil Almond’s contribution, Chapter 
3, in this volume for a detailed theoretical discussion). This approach does not 
mean we ought to rule out the possibility of future convergence say around an 
Anglo-American model of employment. Rather, it cautions against applying uni-
versalist theorising about processes of labour market segmentation and inequalities 
(Almond and Rubery, 2000). A comparative institutionalist approach has been 
especially valuable recently in knocking down neoclassical economics claims 
about the inefficiencies of regulated labour markets – including, for exam-
ple, new ideas about ‘regulatory indeterminacy’ (Deakin and Sarwar, 2008; 
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Lee and McCann, 2014) – and confronting universal policy prescriptions of 
the sort associated with Troika interventions seeking to dismantle collective 
bargaining and cut minimum wages (Koukiadaki et al., 2016; Marginson, 2014; 
and Karamessini and Grimshaw, Chapter 17 in this volume). But the onward, 
international assault by neoliberal ideas and practices means important questions 
remain about the balance of societal and global systemic factors in driving change 
in labour market segmentation and the resilience of countries to retain societal 
norms and rules governing inequalities. In her state-of-the-art labour market 
segmentation analysis of challenges facing Italy today, Annamaria Simonazzi (in 
Chapter 14) demonstrates the futility of applying stylised  mainstream econom-
ics ideas of dualism and over-regulation to Italy’s problems of  low productiv-
ity and inequality – as she puts it: ‘No degree of labour  flexibility can provide 
an adequate response to the multiple challenges represented by technological, 
organisational and social changes.’ Instead, Simonazzi argues for a new coordi-
nated response designed around a long-term industrial strategy, joint regulation 
among employers and trade unions, and the recognition that good social policy 
can be a productive factor (see also Rubery et al., 2003a). 
An important insight from the comparative institutionalist tradition for our 
study of inequalities is therefore the need to widen the scope of enquiry beyond 
the narrow frame of supply, demand and price (labour economics) and beyond 
those social actors usually assumed to directly regulate the employment rela-
tionship (industrial relations). This wider lens encompasses the rules and norms 
underpinning education and training systems, welfare state and social protec-
tion systems, gender relations, family and household organisation, industrial 
relations, workplace behaviours and organisational cultures, corporate govern-
ance and innovation systems. Comparative research traces fundamental claims 
regarding a raft of two-way interlinkages with work and employment inequali-
ties, including for example that:
• variation in social protection standards and gaps alters the meaning, experi-
ence and regulation of low-wage and precarious employment across coun-
tries and workforce groups (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Grimshaw et al., 2016);
• shareholder value rules generate stronger pressures on companies towards 
high executive pay, use of temporary contracts and cost competitive sub-
contracting than found under stakeholder rules of corporate governance 
(Gospel and Pendleton, 2014; Lazonick, 2014);
• family and welfare policies shape household composition and members’ 
attachments to paid employment with direct consequences for inequalities 
of socio-economic class and income (Esping-Andersen and Myles, 2009; 
Shildrick et al., 2012);
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• countries with more inclusive labour market institutions and more soli-
daristic trade union strategies have a lower incidence of precarious work 
(Doellgast et al. 2018);
• varied success across countries in sustaining high-innovation performance 
via high-quality jobs relates in part to the degree of fair treatment, job secu-
rity and ‘discretionary learning’ in employment (Holm and Lorenz, 2015);
• more centralised and coordinated wage bargaining on the whole reduces 
wage inequality, the gender wage gap and the incidence of low-wage 
employment (Hayter, 2015; Rubery et al., 2005);
• concern for inequalities among workers needs to be complemented by 
attention to what is happening to the share of aggregate income earned by 
labour relative to capital at national and global levels (Appelbaum and Batt, 
2014);
• education and training systems display a mutual dynamic with the path 
dependent evolution of production models and job structures, whether 
generating the ‘redundant capacities’ of Germany’s diversified quality pro-
duction or the polarised skills and ‘hollowing out’ of jobs in the USA 
(Dwyer and Olin Wright, 2012; Streeck,1991);
• and the feminisation of many areas of non-standard forms of employ-
ment, such as zero-hours contracts, mini jobs and ‘paato’ jobs (low-wage 
part-timers in Japan), coincides with a lowering of employment standards 
reflecting gender-unequal assumptions about employers’ use of women as 
a reserve army of labour (Keizer, 2008; Rubery, 2014).
This wider constellation of institutional interlinkages with work and employ-
ment inequalities undoubtedly generates a complex framework for analysis. 
However, the added complexity is essential for incorporating the range of pres-
sures on the employment relationship that help us explain real-world changes, 
and identify the multiple options available to social actors. The inherent conflict 
of interests between labour and capital goes some way to explaining distribu-
tive outcomes, but this wider comparative institutionalist focus is essential to 
encapsulate the varied pressures, levers and conditions faced in different soci-
etal contexts, with their (still) distinctive forms of inter-capitalist competition, 
welfare states and gender relations, as well as differential structures and power 
resources of the major social actors.
When combined, the insights from the three theoretical traditions reviewed 
above provide a promising foundation for a new labour market segmentation 
approach that is capable of both identifying the changing character of inequal-
ities in work and employment and investigating their associated causes and 
consequences. From this foundation, we derive six propositions listed below 
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and elaborated in the following six sections of this chapter. The purpose of 
each section is to review the relevant literature, especially the contributions 
of Jill Rubery, and to relate the particular proposition to the arguments and 
evidence set out in the relevant chapters of this volume. The chapters were 
carefully selected to reflect contemporary thinking and new findings around 
each of the six propositions, but we have not sought to categorise chapters rig-
idly around propositions because the propositions are interlinked and overlap-
ping. Instead, the chapters are organised into three parts of the book, loosely 
described as addressing conceptual issues (Part I), international evidence (Part 
II) and  convergence/ divergence (Part III). The six propositions are as follows:
1) Employers are major architects in the shaping of inequalities.
2) Participative standards, especially those exercised by trade unions, are an 
essential bulwark against employer (and state) power.
3) Households and welfare systems affect women’s and men’s attachment to, 
and participation in, work, the quality of employment and the gendered 
distribution of resources.
4) Employment and social protection regulations can protect against growing 
dualism in labour markets and precarious employment but it is a question 
of appropriate design.
5) Undervaluation of feminised occupations undermines women’s wage 
prospects.
6) An intersectional approach reveals the causes and consequences of inequali-
ties between and within different social categories.
Employers as architects of inequalities
While the role of employing organisations as key actors shaping employment out-
comes has been underplayed in much of economics, political science and policy 
literature, it is a core plank of a labour market segmentation approach to under-
standing inequalities. Markets, legal and joint regulation and other institutions 
may place boundaries on their actions, but it is the employer who enjoys ultimate 
power in determining who they hire for what jobs and under what conditions.
Also, where women make inroads into male-dominated occupations, such 
as solicitors for example, employers may respond by gradually adapting work 
organisation in ways that enhance managerial control and limit worker auton-
omy (Tomlinson et al., 2013).
Early segmentation theories of the 1970s were important at the time for plac-
ing employing organisations at the centre of labour market analysis. Jill Rubery 
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(1978; 1994; 2007; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994) developed and extended 
this framework in a way that advanced our understanding of not only how bad 
jobs are filled, but also, crucially, how bad jobs are constructed. While dualist 
theorists (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) explained segmentation mostly through 
the technical features of the production process and the strategic importance for 
the firm of the skills they required, Rubery noted the more complex interactions 
between demand and supply side segmentation. In particular, employers’ deci-
sions about the type of jobs they offer and the labour market segment where they 
are placed are not independent from the characteristics of the labour force they 
target (Rubery, 2007). For example, in companies, industries or occupations 
where workers are organised into powerful unions, employers are more likely 
to offer good jobs. In turn, where workers are more vulnerable, lacking voice 
and without alternative job opportunities, employers may decide to offer jobs 
of poorer quality and lower pay irrespective of workers’ skills or productivity 
(Rubery, 1978). Feminised jobs, for example, are often located in secondary 
labour markets not because they do not require skills or commitment from 
workers, but because it is easy for employers to recruit women at low pay to 
do these jobs (Craig et al., 1985). Also, where women make inroads into male-
dominated occupations, such as solicitors for example, employers may respond 
by gradually adapting work organisation in ways that enhance managerial con-
trol and limit worker autonomy (Tomlinson et al., 2013).
This conceptualisation of segmentation provides a more holistic framework 
for labour market analysis that considers the dynamic interactions of the demand 
and supply sides, integrating inter-capital relations and capital–labour struggles, 
as well as the role of gender and societal institutions in shaping employment 
outcomes for different groups of workers, without exonerating employers from 
their responsibility for employment outcomes. In doing so, this approach ena-
bles new understandings about how labour market inequalities are created and 
recreated especially when labour market change increases opportunities for 
employers to take advantage of low-cost labour. Chapter 9 by Agniescka Piasna, 
Brendan Burchell, Kirsten Sehnbruch and Nurjk Agloni draws attention to the 
key role which employers exercise in determining objective job quality, through 
deploying a road safety metaphor which differentiates between the character-
istics and subjectivities of workers (drivers), the job design (vehicles) and the 
societal environment that employers operate in – namely, the legal framework 
(traffic laws) and welfare policy (road traffic safety and infrastructure). Chapter 
10 by Alan Felstead and Francis Green examines trends in working-time and 
work intensity, both of which are central to the concept of job quality. They 
demonstrate that while working hours have declined for some segments of the 
workforce, for example, through the expansion of part-time work, employers 
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have gained from the intensification of work effort while workers contend with 
the negative impact on their health and well-being. 
In addition, as the chapter on Spain (Chapter 7) by Josep Banyuls and Albert 
Recio shows, Rubery’s conceptualisation of labour market segmentation pro-
vides a useful lens to analyse the particular patterns of segmentation in spe-
cific national contexts. Challenging the conventional interpretation of the high 
levels of unemployment and labour market segmentation in Spain as resulting 
from excessively protective employment legislation and collective bargaining, 
Banyuls and Recio provide a compelling alternative argument based on evidence 
from several industries. In their perspective, these divisions result from the spe-
cific features of the Spanish productive system and employer strategies, which 
have been increasingly facilitated by legal changes that have in turn contributed 
to the growth of precarious employment. They discuss the highly intricate pat-
terns of segmentation in Spain that result in inequities between those working in 
large and small firms, between permanent and temporary workers and between 
full-time and part-time workers. They show how temporary and part-time 
employment is used not only as an adjustment mechanism, but also as a way of 
reducing labour costs and in some cases intensifying effort.
The role of the employer in shaping inequalities is further complicated by 
the intersection with changing industrial organisation. Since the 1990s, this has 
been especially associated with the deverticalisation of the large firm, inter-firm 
contracting and the emergence of the networked organisation (Sturgeon, 2002). 
The employment implications of this changed employer role was the object 
of pioneering research by Rubery as part of a Manchester team led by Mick 
Marchington (Marchington et al., 2005a; Rubery et al., 2003b). This major 
project, based on extensive qualitative case studies in the UK, was among the 
first to shed light on how networks of organisations linked together through 
outsourcing, franchising, temporary agency work and public–private partner-
ships were changing the nature of employment relationships and the organisa-
tion of work. The research revealed that intensified and increasingly complex 
inter-organisational relations are associated with the fragmentation of work and 
the blurring of organisational boundaries. These processes diffuse employer 
accountability along the subcontracting chain and confuse power and trust rela-
tions between employers, employees and the self-employed (often in a state 
of ‘false’ self-employment). Moreover, opportunities and mechanisms for col-
lective worker voice are frustrated, so that there are fewer possibilities to 
contest or resist new inequalities and tensions among workers employed in 
interconnected organisations. As Banyuls and Recio argue in Chapter 7, many 
employers use subcontracting to evade labour standards set by collective agree-
ments (see Chapter 5 by Mick Marchington and Tony Dundon). The upbeat 
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rhetoric of much of the management and innovation discourse on the networked 
 organisation obscures tensions and risks for workers in terms of fair treatment 
and voice, as well as for employers who may want to reduce labour costs but still 
need to maintain workers’ cooperation and organisational performance. 
Chapter 4 by Rosemary Batt and Eileen Appelbaum reviews these issues and 
their significance in light of both the original work published by Rubery and her 
Manchester colleagues and subsequent research in the USA and Europe. Batt 
and Appelbaum discuss the problems of an employment policy framework that 
everywhere is based on the assumption of a standard employment relationship 
and equality rights which are bounded by an individual employer. The authors 
emphasise the need to rethink labour market regulation to account for the more 
complex organisational structures and subcontracting relations so that policy 
and practice can better ensure fair pay, conditions and voice for all workers. In 
addition, new approaches to accountability across domestic and global supply 
chain networks are needed to assign responsibility for poor labour standards 
(Barrientos et al., 2011; Wright and Brown, 2013), or to avoid placing it on the 
weakest parties in networks which are often under price pressures and control 
of dominant firms. 
Participative standards as a bulwark
The second proposition is that more robust participative standards – defined as 
statutory support for collective representation at workplace and/or industry 
levels (Sengenberger, 1994) – are an essential bulwark against greater employer 
and (in many countries) state power. The need to promote voice and transpar-
ency has become particularly important in the context of widening protective 
gaps facing workers in both standard and non-standard forms of employment, 
fragmented production networks and, in some countries, the declining power 
resources of trade unions to enforce rights and ensure workers are protected 
against unfair treatment (Doellgast et al., 2018; Marchington et al., 2005b; 
Rubery, 2015). These themes are explored in the chapters by Gerhard Bosch and 
Steffen Lehndorff (Chapter 2), Mick Marchington and Tony Dundon (Chapter 
5) and Maria Karamessini and Damian Grimshaw (Chapter 17). 
Bosch and Lehndorff compare trends in national systems of wage determina-
tion in several European countries to argue that a combination of participatory 
rights and statutory minimum standards is essential for reducing employment 
inequalities. Examining recent developments, the authors show that where par-
ticipatory rights are well-established, such as in Sweden and Germany, protec-
tive institutions are far less vulnerable to pro-cyclical economic pressures or 
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to the withdrawal of state support. In turn, where participatory rights are less 
well embedded and the state withdraws support for collective bargaining, such 
as in Greece during the post-2008 recession, protective labour market institu-
tions can be easily dismantled. For this reason, Bosch and Lehndorff argue that a 
more inclusive regulatory framework needs to be anchored not only to statutory 
protections and minimum standards but also to strong participatory rights and 
discuss the scope for national actors to move towards these goals under the new 
European economic governance framework. 
Marchington and Dundon discuss the societal forces for ‘fair voice’ and the 
challenges workers face in liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the UK, 
Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Due to the weaker legal underpinning of 
worker voice they discuss the greater tendency in LMEs for these mechanisms 
to be shaped mostly by ‘softer’ institutional forces and managerial prerogative 
compared to coordinated market economies (CMEs) in continental Europe. 
Under these conditions, where they are not well embedded with other human 
resource management practices all forms of voice in LMEs are more susceptible 
to pressures from adverse changes in the economic and political context and 
are seldom perceived as fair by employees or unions. These problems are exac-
erbated in the case of workers employed across organisational boundaries who 
enjoy less voice than their in-house counterparts. The authors discuss the limited 
prospects of these challenges being addressed by better forms of regulation in 
LMEs, particularly in a post-Brexit world.
Karamessini and Grimshaw argue that disengagement with participative pro-
cesses of social dialogue has been a notable feature of recent minimum wage 
reforms in Greece and the UK. In Greece, the government actively disman-
tled collective bargaining institutions under pressures from international credit 
bodies represented by the Troika and replaced a long-standing tripartite process 
of minimum wage-fixing with unilateral statutory intervention, characterised 
by a vicious 22 per cent cut in 2012 and subsequent freeze. Post-2016 reforms 
under the Tsipras government promise to reassert tripartite autonomy in mini-
mum wage-fixing in response to evidence that plummeting real wages have done 
nothing to reverse a crisis in falling levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita. In the UK, the minimum wage-fixing process has since its inception only 
had a weak element of tripartite decision-making, represented in the composi-
tion of members of the independent Low Pay Commission, the body that fixes 
the minimum wage each year. However, from 2016 this element of tripartism 
was questioned when the government changed its approach and announced a 
new unilateral approach to fixing an adult ‘premium rate’, reducing tripartite 
influence to workers aged under 25 years old only. The risk is that the mini-
mum wage becomes further isolated from other wage-setting procedures in the 
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economy, diminishing the prospects to address problems of wage inequality 
through social dialogue.
These tendencies of changing modes of state intervention, shaped by contra-
dictory progressive and regressive political tendencies and shifting economic 
conditions and social tensions, are interpreted very well in Chapter 15 by our 
Manchester colleague Miguel Martinez Lucio. He argues there is a need for 
more careful and detailed analysis of the real-world shifts in labour market 
regulations and forms of social dialogue in order to clearly document the fact 
that state interventions are rarely straightforward and instead demand greater 
sensitivity to the historical and societal specific factors shaping the complex role 
of the state in labour markets.
Households, welfare regimes and inequalities effects
The third proposition concerns the interconnections between employment and 
the welfare system and the implications for work and employment inequalities, 
especially gender inequalities. Early theoretical work by Jane Humphries and 
Jill Rubery (1984) on the ‘relative autonomy’ of social reproduction (involving 
long-term transformations in the organisation of family and welfare models) 
was crucial in articulating its role in shaping labour market organisation and the 
rise of female employment. Even more critically, it followed that as women’s 
employment had become a permanent feature of social and economic organisa-
tion, so too the sphere of social reproduction had to become a central feature of 
labour market analysis and employment studies. 
The comparative institutionalist approach described above incorporates wel-
fare state and gender regimes literature (e.g. Duncan and Pfau-Effinger, 2012; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Lewis, 1992) in order to understand the mutual inter-
actions of employment, welfare and family systems as ‘interlocking institutional 
and social arrangements which together determine the social and economic 
organisation in a particular society’ (Rubery et al., 2001: 45). Rubery has used 
this lens to conduct extensive comparative research on gender and employ-
ment, which has contributed to wider knowledge of societal variations in levels 
and patterns of gender inequality especially concerning norms regarding gender 
roles and the division of domestic labour and paid employment (Rubery et al., 
1999). Indeed, the programme of research into women’s relative position in 
employment coordinated by Jill Rubery from 1992 to 2003 for the European 
Commission arguably developed the methodological framework of institution-
alist analysis from its infancy into what is now the established starting point 
for comparative analysis of gender inequalities and gender regimes. This work 
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included, for example, the first systematic comparison of gender segregated 
employment in Europe that used case studies to illuminate processes of exclu-
sion and inclusion among occupations and industries otherwise not captured by 
summary index measures of sex segregation (Rubery and Fagan, 1995).
In light of evidence of the changing heterogeneity of men’s and women’s 
life courses, research has also analysed key life stages when welfare support is 
particularly needed in addition to, or instead of, employment and the family, 
including the transition from education to employment, surviving interruptions 
in employment in prime age due to parenthood, sickness or unemployment, and 
withdrawing from employment into retirement (Anxo et al., 2010; Crompton, 
2006; Stier et al., 2001). Social protection systems play a key role in amelio-
rating or exacerbating work and employment inequalities through inclusive 
or exclusive models of eligibility. Social protection rules differ among coun-
tries and may explicitly discriminate by employment status (standard versus 
non-standard employment forms, for example) and employment continuity 
(biased against women, youth and temporary workers) (Grimshaw et al., 2016). 
Moreover, there are potentially complementary and contradictory interlinkages 
between social protection systems and employment organisation since inclusive 
social protection relies on high quantities of employment organised around 
decent standards in order to provide the fiscal base to fund the welfare state. The 
quality of employment matters, because when employment fails to provide an 
adequate income level and/or security, individuals must rely on support from 
the state or from their family to whom employers are effectively passing on the 
costs of providing a living wage; as such, exclusive labour markets inhibit the 
development of inclusive social protection systems (Rubery, 2015). Inclusive 
labour markets thus go hand in hand with inclusive welfare systems and these in 
turn need to be supported by employment regulations that promote responsible 
pay and employment practices.
These empirical and theoretical contributions are reflected in four chapters in 
this volume. In Chapter 11, Jane Humphries reveals the salience of a framework 
which integrates the relative autonomy of the household through her historical 
analysis of women’s employment during the English plague. Humphries dem-
onstrates the weaknesses of accounts of the economic implications of the Black 
Death because they either assert the absolute autonomy of the family system or 
emphasise its collapse to servicing the needs of the economy. A more nuanced 
analysis of the inter-relationship between family, economy and the state reveals 
a more satisfactory explanation of the agency of women and their families. In 
Chapter 16, Dominique Anxo, Marian Baird and Christine Erhel compare how 
care regimes interact with employment regimes to influence female employ-
ment outcomes across the life course in Sweden, France and Australia. They 
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show that social context also matters, especially attitudes towards motherhood 
and women’s increasing education qualifications in all three countries, as well as 
persistent norms of female caregiving. Fang Lee Cooke, in Chapter 12, questions 
the anticipated positive impact of the ending of the one-child policy in China by 
focusing on its implications for employment opportunities of female university 
graduates. Cooke argues that a lack of welfare state support for childcare com-
bined with the two-child policy will exacerbate the discriminatory responses 
of employers towards mothers. Employers will be less likely to hire female 
graduates who are yet to have children and this will push more women into self-
employment with limited protection and wages. Furthermore, it entrenches a 
model of privatised family support for childcare relying upon gendered caring 
roles, leaving older female grandparents with limited financial support. Cooke’s 
analysis thus demonstrates the interconnections between employment and wel-
fare systems, as well as the importance of bringing the employer back into the 
analysis of inequality.
In Chapter 13, Jacqueline O’Reilly, Mark Smith and Paola Villa elaborate the 
concept of the ‘relative autonomy of social reproduction’ (Humphries and Rubery, 
1984) to explore the labour market prospects of young workers, the influence 
of employment status and family arrangements of their parental households and 
intersections with gender and ethnicity. By applying the conceptual frameworks 
developed by Rubery in new ways, to new problems and in different societal 
contexts, these chapters offer novel insights into how different welfare and family 
systems interact with employment organisation and support our proposition that 
these interactions produce varied patterns of segmentation and inequalities.
Employment and social protection regulations against 
dualism and precarity
While recognising that current employment regulation is failing to protect an 
increasing segment of workers in a myriad of precarious employment arrange-
ments, some important studies are challenging arguments that claim strength-
ened regulations necessarily reinforce within-workforce inequalities and labour 
market dualism (Allen et al., 2016; Crouch, 2015; Dieckhoff et al., 2015; 
Rubery, 2011, 2015). Recent calls from the European Commission to reduce 
the supposed over-protection of workers in standard employment (or ‘insid-
ers’) in relation to those in non-standard arrangements (‘outsiders’) have led to 
measures in several European countries that disproportionally harm workers in 
non-standard forms of employment through freezes and cuts to the minimum 
wage, relaxation of rules governing use of temporary work and the erosion 
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of collective bargaining arrangements (ETUI, 2014; Koukiadaki et al., 2016; 
Karamessini and Grimshaw, Chapter 17 in this volume; Piasna and Myant, 
2017; Rubery, 2015; van Gyes and Schulten, 2015). In several cases, such 
reforms were implemented at the beginning of the 2008–09 economic crisis 
with the consequence, in the case of Spain for example, of a far higher destruc-
tion of jobs in response to falling GDP than would otherwise have been the case 
(Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón, 2015). For Rubery (2015), the problem is not 
the existence of employment regulations but their design, which places certain 
groups of workers at risk of exclusion. As such, policy reforms should be in the 
opposite direction to those advanced by new dualist thinking. Inclusive labour 
markets require the extension of the protections, voice and rights associated 
with standard employment relationships to all workers irrespective of specific 
work arrangements. In addition, better forms of regulation need to increase the 
responsibilities of employers for providing sufficient decent jobs. 
As the analysis by Josep Banyuls and Albert Recio in Chapter 7 illustrates, in 
Spain, as in many countries, non-standard and flexible working arrangements are 
often presented as favourable to workers, especially women, through improved 
opportunities for work–life reconciliation. Yet in practice they are often designed 
to meet employers’ flexibility needs, rather than those of employees, and asso-
ciated with the most precarious conditions, with the most irregular schedules 
often involving unsocial hours (see also Fleetwood, 2007). In the context of an 
ageing population and high levels of employment of women, inclusive labour 
markets require employers to find ways of reconciling their business needs for 
flexibility with those of workers in a way that improves access to good quality 
employment of mothers and carers, older workers and those with disabilities. 
Otherwise, the risk is that societies are exposed to employer-oriented flexibility, 
which as Iain Campbell (Chapter 6) argues, risks a proliferation of ‘fragmented 
time systems’ that feature digital monitoring of minutes worked, minimisation 
of on-the-job periods of inactivity (such as paid breaks or travel time between 
activities), and redrawing of temporal boundaries between social and unsocial 
hours and between work and family life. It is precisely these issues which are at 
stake in debates about how to regulate new forms of worker status associated 
with technology platform firms such as Hermes, Deliveroo and Uber. High-tech 
firms seem to have developed a ‘winner takes all’ business model with enormous 
shareholder dividends paid for by denying basic employment rights to an on-call 
workforce (Newsome et al., 2016). Chapter 8 by Francesca Bettio and Alberto 
Mazzon asks whether service vouchers in Italy herald a radical departure from a 
standard employment model towards a highly commodified, task and time-cen-
tred series of spot-market transactions for work. In fact, they find that the volume 
of use remained low and, therefore, while there is no evidence of substitution of 
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standard employment, there is a possible case for vouchers having regularised 
some forms of informal paid work activities that supplement household income.
Undervalued, feminised work and women’s pay and 
employment prospects
Many jobs traditionally carried out by women are undervalued. What this means 
is that employers (and society) can claim a higher quality of female labour for a 
given wage (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007; Warren et al., 2010). It also means 
that women’s wage and employment prospects are significantly impaired and 
this produces an over-representation of women among low-paid employment in 
all countries for which we have reliable earnings data. The conclusion of many 
years of feminist socio-economics research is that this universal outcome is not 
an efficient allocation driven by competitive market forces, but a clear expres-
sion of labour market failure. The institutional factors shaping undervaluation 
are multiple and complex, in part relating to employer practices, cost-led sub-
contracting, working-time policies and practices, and welfare and family policy 
regimes (discussed above). Here we examine the organisational factors that play 
out in one area of feminised employment, namely care work.
Care work is probably the area of employment where most theoretical 
and empirical research has been undertaken with a view to understanding 
the causes of undervaluation of women’s work. Care work is emblematic of 
the market failure to balance pay with the value of women’s work. Feminist 
economists have directly challenged the related neoclassical economics theory 
of compensating differentials, which takes for granted that the intrinsic rewards 
of the job compensate in part for the low wages on offer (see England et al., 
2002; Folbre, 2012). Of particular interest to our formulation of ideas here 
is Rubery and colleagues’ (2011; 2015) focus on a set of organisational and 
institutional factors that perpetuate the low-paid and low-quality nature of this 
work. In an extensive study of care work, Jill Rubery and several Manchester 
colleagues investigated undervaluation using a novel analytical framework that 
incorporated data on fragmented subcontracting practices, triangular employ-
ment relations (between clients, subcontractors and care workers), cost-
focused human resource management practices, weak employment  regulations 
(especially concerning zero-hours contracts), largely absent trade unions and 
public spending restrictions. This wide analytical lens is important since it shifts 
the analysis of women’s undervalued and low-paid work into a wider critique 
about how the blurring of organisational and work–life boundaries alongside 
weak collective representation creates ambiguities around the employment 
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relationship. These ambiguities perpetuate low- quality jobs, make  worker 
resistance more difficult, and seemingly diminish the capacity and/or willing-
ness of employers (or clients) to address the problems of undervaluation.
The research on care work also confronts stylised assumptions that low-paid, 
feminised work can be presented as a trade-off with family friendly employment 
practices, such as enhanced work–life balance for example. Rubery and colleagues 
(2015) reveal how subcontracting arrangements generate such extreme patterns 
of fragmented working time in the UK context that it is rare to find care workers 
benefiting from working hours that might be construed as family friendly. Overall, 
this wider framing of gender issues shows that improving the value attached to 
care work requires reform and actions on many fronts including developing and 
enforcing employment rights, especially working-time rules (e.g. a new right to 
minimum hours, as found for example in France) and a higher statutory minimum 
wage, as well as subcontracting rules that incorporate social value clauses to force 
subcontractors to pay higher wages, pay for all working time not only so-called 
productive time, provide effective training and make family-friendly schedules 
available to all. This wider agenda is essential to tackle the undervaluation of 
women’s work in terms of its low pay and low job quality generally.
Intersectionality 
The sixth and final proposition argues that an intersectional approach is 
necessary to reveal the causes and consequences of multiple intersections of 
inequalities. For example, a new labour market segmentation approach to the 
analysis of gender inequalities must incorporate an analysis of class, as well 
as age, ethnicity and other variables. Interrogation of the multiple intersec-
tions shaping gender inequalities reveals the processes through which gender 
 inequalities are perpetuated or softened at different rates and via different 
processes for different groups of women. As McBride and colleagues (2015) 
argue, an ‘intersectional sensitivity’ must recognise how multiple dimen-
sions of inequalities can shape workers’ experiences and opportunities. This 
approach brings intra-group differences within social categories to the fore 
and problematises the notion of ‘the’ female experience and ‘the’ male experi-
ence. Significantly, it involves the analysis of intersections of inequalities that 
goes beyond an additive approach that assumes multiple experiences of dif-
ferent dimensions of inequalities simply create more, multiple disadvantage 
(Woodhams et al., 2015). Rather, it explores how the nature of inequalities 
may be reconstructed into something different at the point of the intersec-
tion. An ongoing debate is whether and how to theorise this in ways that 
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recognise that the original inequalities do not become something totally dif-
ferent (Walby, 2012: 235).
An intersectional approach has implicitly provided the backdrop to much of 
Rubery and colleagues’ analysis of gender inequality. It is reflected in the pri-
oritising of the minimum wage as a key mechanism of gender equality, thereby 
identifying the need for a targeted policy approach towards women in low-wage 
jobs (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2011), and also in research on care work that shows 
how educational and family backgrounds shape women’s acceptance of many of 
the poor-quality aspects of low-status jobs (Hebson et al., 2015). The implica-
tions of these and other studies (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; Duffy, 2005; Macdonald 
and Merrill, 2008) are far-reaching. Use of an intersectional lens to theorise how 
class and gender shape women’s working orientations in low-paid work immedi-
ately breaks down some of the stylised assumptions (particularly in the economics 
literature) that women are often satisfied with low pay. Gender relations in soci-
ety provide a partial explanation, but class also shapes low-wage, female work-
ers’ subjective evaluations of their job and how they make sense of their working 
lives. With a combined understanding of the gendered and class-based processes 
of work, research can offer a clearer explanation of gendered disadvantage that 
situates workers’ employment experiences in the social and economic context that 
shapes their opportunities, judgements and norms. Research on ethnic inequalities 
in employment (Duffy, 2005) further supports the value of an intersectional analy-
sis for our understanding of gender inequality and the need to capture the com-
plexity of disadvantage and inequalities for many feminised groups of workers.
An intersectional approach thus recognises multiple sources of disadvantage 
and the reconstitution of multi-layered inequalities (Walby, 2012). Several con-
tributions in this volume highlight this potential. For example, by examining 
social and labour market policies in France, Sweden and Australia, Dominique 
Anxo, Marian Baird and Christine Erhel (Chapter 16) show that family policy 
in France exacerbates class inequality between women by encouraging low-
qualified and low-paid women with two or more children to stop working or 
take part-time work through the parental leave programme. The analysis of job 
segmentation in Chapter 13 by Jacqueline O’Reilly, Mark Smith and Paola Villa 
also presents a fascinating application of labour market segmentation theory in 
a manner that captures intersectionality among youth. They develop an account 
of youth inequality that differentiates between gender, parental households and 
ethnicity in order to identify new lines of labour market segmentation among 
young people. They show how segmentation theory is a powerful tool both 
to interrogate intersectional inequalities and, crucially, to provide robust evi-
dence in  support of targeted employment and social policies for youth that can 
address these specific inequalities. These contributions to the book underline the 
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value of a new labour market segmentation approach as it provides the tools to 
explore and challenge new mechanisms and dimensions of inequalities at work. 
Conclusions
In developing a multi-dimensional analytical framework this introductory 
chapter aimed to contribute to ongoing debates about the nature of work 
and employment inequalities and how to address them. Other contemporary 
accounts of inequalities, dualism and precariousness in employment sometimes 
provide only a partial analysis and risk generating simplistic and/or inappropri-
ate prescriptions for policy and practice. The new labour market segmentation 
approach is distinctive in seeking to place the changing international patterns and 
experiences of labour market inequalities in the wider context of shifting gender 
relations, regulatory regimes and production structures. This volume as a whole 
reflects on contemporary debates and points to various challenges concerned 
with future work and labour market agendas. We conclude here by drawing 
out three key contributions to academic, policy and practitioner debates that 
emerge from the chapters in this book.
The first is one that was always central to Jill Rubery’s intellectual focus, 
namely the need to bring employers back into academic and employment policy 
debates about why labour markets fail in both their allocative and their distribu-
tive functions. Aside from the occasional naming and shaming of rogue employ-
ers, employers hardly appear in employment policy debates – in shaping the 
number of good and bad jobs in the economy, in holding down women’s pay 
and careers relative to men, in refusing to play by the rules, in pushing work-
ers into precarious false self-employment, or in failing to redesign jobs to serve 
higher value-added markets. Moreover, in cutting costs by tapping into global 
value chains (through offshoring for example), or in meeting shareholder (or 
private equity) claims on profits, research shows that organisations risk desta-
bilising necessary labour investments (Goergen et al., 2014; Lazonick, 2014). 
Paradoxically, the push to deregulate labour market institutions in many coun-
tries ought to have raised the profile of individual employers, but instead the 
policy narrative all too often rests on a notion of atomised, competitive markets 
in which organisations and individuals are assumed to respond to push-and-pull 
factors mostly tied up with market prices.
Secondly, the chapters contribute to our understanding of the gendered 
character of work and of the principal social actors – management, unions 
and the state. Gender relations permeate all the big job quality issues such as 
pay, progression, job security, representation, dignity and working time. While 
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research has considerably advanced our knowledge of the patterning of gender 
inequalities, our knowledge of gendered processes is still lacking. The book 
adds further insight into the forms of gender bias shaping employer practices 
and experiences of ‘fairness at work’, the gender impacts of employment and 
welfare policy reforms, and the way the labour of social reproduction (caring for 
children and older people) shapes the gendered nature of jobs and the organi-
sation of the labour market. Furthermore, building on ideas of intersectional-
ity, several chapters explore problems of inequality among women and among 
men – including vulnerabilities associated with youth and ethnicity.
Thirdly, all chapters are united in developing the case for long-term, inter-
ventionist actions for promoting and sustaining productive, dignified and decent 
work. There is growing interest in developed and developing countries in how to 
respond to multiple challenges confronting the world of work today. These chal-
lenges include labour market reforms that are reducing the security of employ-
ment relations in the public, private and informal sectors; the polarising effects 
of many new technologies on occupational differences in job quality; complex 
and uncertain effects of reforms to welfare and citizenship rights when assessed 
for their impact by gender, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, age and generation on 
current circumstances and life course prospects; new forms of conflict, harass-
ment, discrimination and unfair practices in the workplace, especially towards 
vulnerable workers; and new insecurities and inequalities caused by the fragile 
positioning of many businesses in global value chains, particularly those in less 
developed countries. The chapters shed new light on possible courses of action 
and highlight the need for both a multi-level approach (national, sector, supply 
chain, organisation and workplace/job levels) and a multi-stakeholder approach 
that embraces narrow and wide forms of social dialogue and social solidarity 
(trade unions, pan-national governance structures, civil society organisations 
and enforcement bodies among others). 
We designed this volume as a tribute to Jill Rubery’s highly influential theo-
retical and empirical contributions to our understanding of inequalities. With 
the proposed architecture for a new labour market segmentation approach we 
hope this volume inspires further multi-dimensional research and new policy 
approaches towards the ever-changing patterns of inequalities in work and 
employment in countries around the world.
Notes
1 For a comprehensive review of this early period, including its roots in rich case studies 
of the predominantly black urban poor in the USA, see Rosenberg (1989).
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2 Neoclassical explanations include those related to mothers’ depreciated human capi-
tal, reduced commitment to paid employment and employment concentration in less- 
productive jobs – ostensibly involving a trade-off for family-friendly working hours (see 
the review in Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015).
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Autonomous bargaining in the shadow 
of the law: from an enabling towards a 
disabling state?
Gerhard Bosch and Steffen Lehndorff
Introduction
In the years following the Second World War, income inequality in most devel-
oped countries was significantly reduced by strong trade unions and high rates of 
coverage by collective agreement. In 1957, even in the USA, where coverage in 
2011 was only 13 per cent (Visser, 2016), Dunlop could still assume that ‘col-
lective bargaining must be taken as the normal case’ (Dunlop, 1957: 125). Since 
the 1990s, job quality in many countries has deteriorated considerably as a result 
of increasing income inequality, the increase in low-wage work and the constant 
fear of loss of income, even among well-paid workers.1 
Jill Rubery has investigated these processes with us in several joint research 
projects with various thematic focal points (see, among others, Bosch et al., 
2009; Grimshaw et al., 2014; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015; Rubery, 2005). 
Rubery (2015) has concluded, on the basis of her wide-ranging experience, that 
the standard employment relationship must be strengthened and extended if we 
are to draw any closer to the goal of establishing ‘inclusive labour markets’.2 She 
argues in favour of ‘re-regulation’, supported primarily by a ‘proactive state’ 
but combined with a strengthening of ‘opportunities for workers and citizens to 
exercise voice’. In what follows, we elaborate on these thoughts by examining a 
number of European collective bargaining systems.
Earlier research has shown that structural changes, such as the decreasing 
demand for low-skilled workers and the growth of the service sector, and exter-
nal shocks, such as the deregulation of product markets, the privatisation of 
public services or the freedom to provide services in other countries with a com-
pany’s own workforce, are ‘filtered’ through national wage systems, thereby 
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producing different outcomes in different countries. The increase in low wages 
can be almost fully explained by the weakening of these institutions (Bosch et al., 
2010; Salverda and Mayhew, 2009). We also know that a high rate of cover-
age by collective agreements reduces the share of low-wage workers to a much 
greater extent than minimum wages. In the EU the correlation between the 
rate of coverage and the share of low-wage workers is 0.77 (Figure 2.1), while 
it is only 0.34 for minimum wages (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2013; Grimshaw 
et al., 2014). This is hardly surprising, since the pay scales negotiated by col-
lective bargaining are generally higher than the minimum wage and extend into 
the intermediate or even higher pay brackets well above the minimum wage. 
They set not only lower limits but also norms for fair pay that ensure that skills, 
additional responsibilities and, in particular, difficult working conditions and 
unsocial hours attract extra remuneration. Their influence on the income distri-
bution is all the greater the more inclusive they are. Decentralised bargaining at 
company level may even support the growth of dualistic labour markets, since 
negotiations only take place in big companies. National or industry-wide col-
lective agreements are significantly more inclusive than company agreements, 
since the collectively agreed standards are extended to employees in companies 
Figure 2.1 Rate of coverage by collective agreement (2008/09) and share of low-wage 
work (2010)
Source: Bernaciak et al. (2014); Bezzina (2012): share of low-wage workers 2010; ETUI (2015); 
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with weak bargaining power, such as small firms in particular. Minimum wages, 
on the other hand, are generally below the low-wage threshold (less than two-
thirds of the median wage) and therefore compress wages only in the lower 
deciles of the income distribution. 
Research in many countries has produced similar results. In their survey of 49 
studies on collective agreements and wage inequality in recent decades in both 
developed and developing countries, Hayter and Weinberg (2011) show that 
wage inequality in the economy as a whole is reduced by collective agreements.
Certainly it would be desirable if the trade unions were in a position to 
increase the rate of unionisation through active organising to such an extent that 
they were able, through their own autonomous bargaining strength, to bring 
the employers to the negotiating table again and thereby increase the rate of 
coverage by collective agreement. This would seem at present to be more than 
unlikely. Furthermore, completely autonomous bargaining systems without 
state support are very vulnerable. Periods of trade union weakness, such as those 
in which rapid structural change and job losses begin to undermine the bastions 
of trade union power, can be exploited by firms intent on revoking collective 
agreements and setting wages unilaterally. The UK, where coverage by collec-
tive agreement in the private sector was once very high, is an example of such 
a development. The collective bargaining systems in several other European 
countries are currently exposed to similar threats.
The conclusion we draw is that, although trade union organising is important 
and should not be neglected, income inequality cannot be reduced without addi-
tional support from the state. This support can of course take several very differ-
ent forms and is by no means confined to direct interventions in the wage-setting 
process. However, it also follows from this that the reduction or withdrawal of 
this state support can cause serious damage to wage-setting mechanisms. These 
interconnections are examined more closely in the next section.
The role of protective and participative labour standards 
in wage-setting 
The distinction Sengenberger (1994) makes between protective and participa-
tive standards can help us to understand more clearly the differing kinds of state 
influence on wage-setting and other labour standards. Protective standards, 
such as minimum wages or maximum working times, directly establish norms 
governing employment conditions. Participative standards confer consultation 
or co-determination rights on employees or their representatives and organisa-
tions, who are protected from discrimination when they seek to exercise those 
38 Making work more equal
rights or equipped with resources (time and money). By establishing participa-
tive standards, the state can, as it were, enable others to influence working and 
employment conditions in its stead.3 
Table 2.1 presents considerable differences between seven EU member states 
in the mix of these standards. In the two wage systems traditionally described 
as autonomous – those of Germany (before 2007) and Sweden – the state does 
not intervene directly in the wage-setting process with protective standards. 
Rather, the weaker side of the labour market is strengthened by means of strong 
co-determination rights at establishment and company level. 
Sweden is one of the strong autonomous systems, since the state has also placed 
the administration of the unemployment insurance funds in the hands of the trade 
unions. The various funds cover largely the same territories as the unions’ organ-
ising areas, which facilitates member recruitment (Lind, 2007). Consequently, 
trade union density in Sweden is 70 per cent. The parties to collective bargaining 
are able to conclude autonomous industry-level collective agreements that set 
effective wage floors at between 50 and 70 per cent of the average wage (Eldring 
and Alsos, 2012: 78), which is higher than the statutory minimum wages in most 
European countries. Consequently, the share of low-wage workers, at 2.5 per 
cent (2010), is lower than in any other European country.
The main threat to the system’s stability comes from political and legal med-
dling with the union’s power resources. In 2006, the conservative Swedish 
Table 2.1 Statutory protective and participative labour standards in five national  
wage-setting systems (2010)
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 Autonomous bargaining in the shadow of the law 39
government made membership of the unemployment insurance funds and the 
trade unions considerably more expensive. The extent to which contributions 
to the funds and union dues could be offset against tax was reduced and the level 
of contributions was made dependent on the unemployment rate in each sector. 
In Sweden, from 2007 to 2008, when these new regulations were introduced, 
trade union density fell by 6 per cent (Kjellberg, 2009: 502).
Germany used to be one of the weak autonomous systems. Even in the 
heyday of trade union strength in the 1970s, no more than 35.5 per cent of 
employees were trade union members in 1978 (Visser, 2016). Consequently, 
the German system was particularly dependent on the willingness of companies 
to become members of employers’ associations. Until German reunification, 
the rate of coverage by collective agreements was around 85 per cent (Visser, 
2016), several times greater than trade union density, since most companies 
belonged to an employers’ association. The high levels of unemployment after 
reunification and the deregulation of product and labour markets gave com-
panies in sectors and enterprises in which trade union density was low and 
where there were few elected works councils (creating a representation gap) 
an opportunity to change strategy. They left the employers’ associations or, 
in the case of newly founded companies, simply did not join one. The Hartz 
legislation of 2003 was aimed at expanding the low-wage sector. By reducing 
unemployment benefits –  previously means-tested – for the long-term unem-
ployed to the lower social benefit level, and by resetting the ‘reasonableness’ 
criteria, the Hartz reforms stepped up pressure on the unemployed to accept 
work with pay as much as 30 per cent below the going rate for their locality. 
Deregulation of temporary agency work and of so-called mini-jobs made it pos-
sible to replace employees on standard contracts with workers on precarious 
contracts.
Coverage by collective agreement fell to 62 per cent, which led to the emer-
gence of a large low-wage sector. However, the existence of strong works 
councils in key industries prevented the complete collapse of industry-wide 
collective agreements in the private sector, as happened in the UK. In important 
parts of the economy, the old autonomous collective bargaining system is still 
functioning, while in others employers set wages unilaterally. Since the low-
wage sector, through its outsourcing strategies, is also increasingly exerting a 
strong knock-on effect on those segments of the labour market that continue to 
be regulated by collective agreement, in 2006 trade unions in the manufactur-
ing sector joined the service-sector unions in calling for the introduction of a 
minimum wage. The introduction, firstly of industry-wide minimum wages 
(2007) and then a statutory minimum wage (2015), marked the transition from 
an autonomous to a hybrid wage system with direct state interventions in the 
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wage-setting process. The trade unions exerted considerable influence over the 
form taken by the statutory minimum wage that was agreed by the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the coalition talks at the end of 2013. As a 
consequence, the parties to collective bargaining are able to exert greater influ-
ence over the minimum wage than their counterparts in France or the UK, for 
example. The reference points for any proposed increases are to be the col-
lectively agreed wage rises, so that collective bargaining takes precedence over 
political considerations in determining rises in the minimum wage. In the same 
vein, the unions’ objective is to use the minimum wage as an activating minimum 
wage for strengthening free collective bargaining. 
Belgium has a hybrid system with a combination of strong protective and 
high participative standards. The participative rights are based on rights of co-
determination at establishment level and management of the unemployment 
insurance scheme, which is known as the ‘Ghent system’, after the Belgium 
model. In addition, the bargaining power of the Belgian trade unions is further 
strengthened by protective standards in the shape of a statutory minimum wage 
and a process for declaring collective agreements in most industries generally 
binding. The dual protection offered by this hybrid system results in a combina-
tion of high trade union density (50 per cent) and virtually universal coverage 
by collective agreement (96 per cent). In practice, the statutory minimum wage 
plays very little role, since the trade unions in most sectors are able to negotiate 
higher wages which, moreover, apply to all employees in an industry because 
the agreements are declared generally binding. As a result, the share of low-
wage workers in Belgium is very low.
Until well into the 1970s, the UK was one of the countries with autono-
mous pay bargaining systems and had high trade union density and extensive 
coverage by collective agreement. However, there was no state support in 
the form of participative standards. Unlike in Germany, therefore, the unions 
had no legally safeguarded organisational base at establishment level. Further 
weakened by the major structural crisis in manufacturing industry, they had 
little in their armoury to counter the employers’ associations’ withdrawal 
from collective bargaining during the Thatcher years. The abolition in 1993 
of the wages councils, which used to set minimum wages in several low-wage 
industries, shifted the balance of power in wage-setting further in favour of the 
employers. The sharp increase in the incidence of low pay and in-work benefits 
for low earners was the reason for the introduction of the statutory minimum 
wage in 1999, so that today the UK is one of the countries whose wage-setting 
systems are unsupported by statutory participative standards and in which the 
state grants only weak protective rights. However, the share of low earners 
has remained high because of this ‘isolated minimum wage’ (Grimshaw et al., 
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2014). In the private sector, the strong negotiating parties who could have used 
the minimum wage as a starting point for agreeing higher wages simply did not 
exist. Instead, in some sectors, such as retailing, the minimum wage has actu-
ally exerted a downward pull on wages.
In France, on the other hand, the state intervenes very strongly in the wage-
setting process. It not only sets a floor on pay through the statutory minimum 
wage but also declares virtually all collective agreements generally binding. 
Furthermore, the participation of trade unions and works councils has been 
strengthened, although the rights that have been granted are weaker than in 
Germany or Sweden. Unlike in Belgium, where the unions with their high 
membership rates are able to bring the employers’ associations to the table with-
out state intervention, the unions in France are weak, so that pay bargaining is 
usually triggered only when the state raises the minimum wage. Since the lowest 
collectively agreed rates in most industries are close to the statutory minimum 
wage (SMIC), the frequency of collective bargaining and increases in pay rates 
are determined largely by increases in the minimum wage. In November 2011, 
for example, the lowest pay grade in 86 per cent of all collective agreements 
was at the level of the minimum wage or slightly above (>105 per cent of the 
SMIC) and in 9.2 per cent of collective agreements it was actually lower than the 
SMIC. One month after the SMIC was raised, the share of collective agreements 
with pay rates below the minimum wage had risen to 49 per cent. This triggered 
a pay bargaining round in which most rates were again raised above the SMIC 
(DARES, 2012: 351). Thus, as a result of the increases in the lowest collectively 
agreed rates, the entire wage grids, with their percentage differences between 
the individual pay grades, are shifted upwards.
Since 2013 it has been possible, in the event of competitiveness problems, to 
negotiate changes to wages and working time at establishment level, although 
the minimum wage, statutory working-time regulations and industry-level col-
lective agreements must not be undercut. At the same time, employees were 
for the first time granted the right to have a representative on the top-tier body 
(conseil d’administration or conseil de surveillance) of firms with at least 5,000 
employees in France. While it is true that the state grants the unions rights to 
consultation, it has not strengthened the unions’ organisational base by introduc-
ing the Ghent system, in contrast to the situation in neighbouring Belgium or in 
Sweden. Only a small number of employees are union members. Consequently, 
the French unions have little financial power and are unable adequately to sup-
port their representatives at company and establishment level. Thus the French 
unions, unlike their counterparts in Sweden, are very concerned – not without 
justification – that decentralised negotiations on derogation clauses in collective 
agreements or labour legislation would inevitably see them on the losing side. 
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These fears were further fuelled by the passing of a new French labour law in the 
summer of 2016, as we discuss in the next section. 
The dismantling of protective and participative labour 
standards 
The most bitterly disputed clause in the French labour legislation imposed by 
decree in July 2016 stipulates that a company agreement on working-time issues 
takes precedence over the relevant industry-level collective agreement, even 
if its provisions are less favourable for employees. The declared objective of 
abolishing the favourability principle is to create more room for manoeuvre for 
negotiations at company level in order that industry-wide regulations ‘can be 
adapted as closely to possible to conditions at establishment level’ (Assemblée 
Nationale, 2016: 9). 
This new initiative in state support for the decentralisation of collective bar-
gaining marks a paradigm shift. In the year 2000, when the legislation on the 
introduction of the 35-hour week in France was enacted, decentralisation was 
still intended to make it easier for the actors at establishment level to negotiate 
compromises on working-time organisation within the framework of the exist-
ing industry-level collective agreements. This enabling state approach, in which 
industry-level collective agreements continued to take precedence over agree-
ments negotiated at lower levels, was reflected in a sharp increase in working-
time negotiations at company level and a high satisfaction rate among employees 
with the outcomes (Lehndorff, 2014). The new legislation, on the other hand, 
adopts a disabling state approach. It is true that the new policy provides for a 
strengthening of participative standards in the shape of extended bargaining 
rights at company level. However, this explicit reversal of the standards hierar-
chy gives primacy to a bargaining level at which the power imbalance in favour 
of capital is usually at its strongest. This weakens the generalising effect of col-
lective agreements just as much as a decline in coverage by collective agreement, 
but via a different route. 
In principle, trade unions can counter strong pressure from employees or 
the state in favour of decentralised agreements that diverge from those con-
cluded at industry level by massively strengthening their internal coordination 
and central monitoring of decentralised negotiations. This was the route, in 
conjunction with the reactivation of their membership base, that the two larg-
est German trade unions went down with some success at the beginning of the 
2000s (Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2014). The trade unions in Italy have to date 
also successfully resisted government pressure to negotiate similarly divergent 
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company agreements (Cruces et al., 2015; Leonardi 2017). In France, on the 
other hand, the competition between the various trade union confederations, 
whose membership base at company level remains weak, means it is unlikely 
that such courses of action will be adopted in the near future (Pernot, 2017). 
Thus the core of the disabling state approach is to deprive the trade unions of 
the legally guaranteed ‘institutional anchors’ (Grimshaw and Lehndorff, 2010) 
that underpin their negotiating power in the collective bargaining system. Since 
the beginning of the persistent European economic crisis, this approach has been 
taken furthest in several countries in the so-called European ‘periphery’. 
Greece is the most prominent example of those countries whose labour mar-
kets have been deregulated in recent years at the behest of the so-called Troika 
(the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund). In Greece’s case, it was not only the speed and rigidity of 
this process that were remarkable, but also the scale of the attack on protective 
labour standards. 
The Greek collective bargaining system, which since the beginning of the 
1990s and following the economic and political upheavals of the previous decades 
had been shored up by the three main actors involved – the employers’ associa-
tions, the trade unions and the state – was based essentially on just a few pillars 
(on what follows, see Karamessini, 2015; Schulten and Müller, 2015; Koukiadaki 
and Kokkinou, 2016). The most important were the periodic national general 
collective employment agreements, concluded between the employers’ umbrella 
associations and the private-sector trade unions, which stipulated a minimum 
wage for all dependent employees as well as other minimum standards. These 
agreements were given legal power by the government, so that that the statutory 
minimum wage in Greece was in fact the result of a negotiating process involv-
ing the parties to collective bargaining. The second pillar comprised collective 
agreements for individual industries and occupational groups; these could be 
declared generally binding by the government, so that, until the crisis, collective 
bargaining coverage was estimated to be around 65 per cent. The hierarchy of 
standards was safeguarded by the favourability principle. Industry and company 
agreements – the latter being concluded only seldom – could only improve the 
conditions laid down in agreements negotiated at the higher level.
The underdevelopment of company-level bargaining reflects a typical charac-
teristic of the constellation of powers on which the collective bargaining system 
was based. It is true that the multiplicity of company and occupational trade 
union organisations (trade union density was still 24 per cent in 2010) could 
bring their influence to bear in top-level negotiations – supported in disputes 
by general strikes and large demonstrations. However, besides the public ser-
vice (in which there were no pay negotiations), this power base was founded 
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primarily on the public utility companies, the banks and some individual indus-
tries. In an economy in which small companies predominated, therefore, the 
unions’ bargaining power rested on a very small number of supports, which 
were safeguarded essentially by protective labour standards. 
This one-sidedness made the system extremely fragile in a situation in which 
the protective standards were abrogated by diktat in the years from 2010 
onwards. The following changes were of crucial significance for the collective 
bargaining system:
• The statutory minimum wage was cut by 22 per cent (and by 32 per cent 
for the under-25s) and frozen. Moreover, it is no longer negotiated but 
fixed by statute (see Chapter 17).
• Collective bargaining in the large public utility companies was stopped and 
pay throughout the public sector was cut by government decree.
• Industry-level collective agreements were no longer declared generally 
binding and the favourability principle was abolished. Employers have 
the possibility of opting out of the national framework agreement and 
from industry-wide agreements, which now apply only to members of the 
employers’ associations.
• These last measures and the three-month limit on the residual validity of 
collective agreements that are not renewed are intended to encourage the 
negotiation of company agreements that are less favourable (to employees) 
than the industry agreements; such agreements can also be concluded with 
so-called ‘associations of persons’ (i.e. employee representatives without a 
trade union mandate). 
These measures had an immediate and wide-ranging effect. Since 2012, not 
a single national framework agreement has been concluded. The number of 
sectoral and occupational agreements at national level sank from 65 in 2010 
to 12 in 2015, while the number of company agreements concluded in 2012 
shot up from the previous norm of around 200 to almost 1,000 (Koukiadaki 
and Kokkinou, 2016). As a result of this sweeping destruction of the collective 
bargaining system, real wages fell by about 24 per cent between 2010 and 2014 
(Schulten and Müller, 2015).
The importance of declarations of general applicability and the favourabil-
ity principle as protective anchors of last resort is made clear by comparison 
with Spain (on what follows, see Banyuls and Recio, 2015; Köhler and Calleja 
Jiménez, 2017; Schulten and Müller, 2015). National framework agreements 
and regional and sectoral collective agreements became established practice 
there from the 1990s onwards. Besides pay, they also regulated an ever-growing 
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number of minimum labour standards and automatically applied to all employ-
ees in the relevant industry or region (erga omnes principle). This resulted in a 
traditionally high level of collective bargaining coverage of around 80 per cent 
of employees and a smaller share of low-wage workers than in Germany. In a 
similar way to their counterparts in Greece, the trade unions, operating in an 
economy made up primarily of small and medium-sized firms, concentrated 
their bargaining power on disputes over these multi-employer agreements and, 
if the disputes remained unresolved, used their power to mobilise workers to 
call general strikes. The same applied to occasional disputes over trilateral social 
pacts with the government. 
Since these national, regional or industry agreements merely laid down mini-
mum conditions with relatively low wage rates, more favourable agreements 
were agreed in many large companies. The erga omnes rule ensured that the 
favourability principle was upheld. In these circumstances, the favourability 
principle acted not only as a protective standard but also as an important par-
ticipative standard, because it provided crucial support for the trade unions 
and interest representation bodies in medium-sized and larger companies and 
strengthened their bargaining power beyond the rights of co-determination on 
dismissal protection. 
The deregulatory measures introduced in 2010 and, more especially, in 2012 
resembled those introduced in Greece. Besides numerous radical changes, prin-
cipally to dismissal protection, the following measures came into effect:
• the residual validity of collective agreements that are not renewed was 
reduced to one year;
• employers were given the possibility, under certain conditions, of opting 
out unilaterally from collective agreements; and
• the favourability principle was abolished for company agreements.
Thus the erga omnes principle, unlike the declarations of general applicability in 
Greece, was not abolished but punctured in order to set its erosion in motion. 
In some cases, the parties to collective bargaining tried to maintain the previous 
hierarchy of standards. Thus in some industry collective agreements the favoura-
bility principle was strengthened, and in one framework agreement the regional 
and industry actors were encouraged to conclude new collective agreements in 
order to prevent earlier agreements from expiring. The opt-out possibility is 
used primarily by larger companies, but to date to a much lesser extent than was 
initially assumed – in 2013, 160,000 employees were affected by opt-out agree-
ments, compared with around 10.3 million employees in companies covered 
by collective agreements (see Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 2017; 
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Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016), so that the expected drastic decline in collec-
tive bargaining coverage has not yet been observed. 
Thus, unlike in Greece, the dismantling of protective and participative labour 
standards has not brought the edifice of the collective bargaining system tum-
bling down, but has significantly weakened its effectiveness, as is demonstrated 
by the evolution of collectively agreed wages and salaries. Agreed nominal wage 
increases at both industry and company level have declined massively, which 
has led to cuts in real wages since the beginning of deregulation (Eurofound, 
2014, 2015). 
This weakening of the collective bargaining system can also be observed in the 
narrowing of the range of topics addressed in collective bargaining (Fernández 
Rodríguez et al., 2016). The main topic again today is pay, although the balance 
of power at both company and industry level is significantly less favourable for 
the trade unions than before the crisis.
The developments in Spain outlined above may well prove to be typical of the 
prospects for protective and participative labour standards in several European 
countries. As Schulten and Müller’s (2015) comparative survey of changes in col-
lective bargaining systems shows, the most widespread approach is not to destroy 
existing institutions completely but rather to weaken and hollow them out. 
Conclusions
The state interventions in free collective bargaining systems outlined here dem-
onstrate the urgency of Rubery’s plea, cited in the introduction to this chapter, 
for a more highly regulated labour market based on a ‘proactive state’ and 
‘extended opportunities for workers and citizens to exercise voice’. A proactive 
state is important for collective bargaining systems because it can establish and 
uphold both protective and participative standards. The wage-setting systems 
described in the literature as ‘autonomous’ are actually not so autonomous at all. 
In reality, the ‘shadow of the law’ hangs over these autonomous negotiations. 
As an ‘enabling state’, the Swedish state has acted to compensate for the unions’ 
structural inferiority by establishing strong participative labour standards. This 
makes it possible to delegate the negotiations to the social partners without 
the state having subsequently to intervene with corrective measures, such as 
minimum wages, because of high shares of low-wage workers. The counter-
example is Greece where, at the behest of the ‘institutions’, the state was able in 
no time at all to rip out the few anchors that had kept the collective bargaining 
system in place over the previous 20 years. This underscores the importance of 
 co-determination rights at establishment and company level which in several 
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countries stabilise the collective bargaining systems by establishing statutory 
rights to participation. When such rights do not exist, on the other hand, and 
the bargaining power of employee representatives at company level is weak, the 
entire edifice of collective agreements stands on very shaky ground.
Another important observation is that protective and participative standards 
can mutually support each other, as the Belgian example demonstrates. Thus 
statutory rights to participation make it easier to set up employee representative 
bodies in the workplace and to organise members, which in turn improves the 
opportunities for free collective bargaining. In France, on the other hand, where 
participative labour standards and trade union bargaining power at company 
level are weak, decentralisation of the collective bargaining system combined 
with the abolition of the favourability principle may set in motion a vicious 
circle at all levels of the collective bargaining system. This sort of decentralisa-
tion encourages pay to evolve pro-cyclically (Schulten and van Gyes, 2015). It 
widens the wage spread between companies and industries and is inimical to 
efforts to reduce income inequality. 
Thus efforts to combat social inequality should not rely solely on direct state 
intervention in the wage-setting process but should also seek to develop par-
ticipative standards. However, these will not have any effect in practice unless 
they have substance and extend the options and resources available to employee 
representatives. In contrast, the purely formal participation of ‘powerless’ trade 
unions in social dialogue, which is standard practice at EU level and in many 
member states (Meardi, 2012), serves only to provide political legitimation for 
governments and has little to do with genuine participation. Sooner or later, 
however, the pendulum swings back against the state; the weaker the institu-
tional backing for strong bargaining systems is, the more frequently employees 
require recourse to labour courts and other state institutions. The example of 
Spain shows that, as a result, ‘the state is brought back into labour relations in a 
more direct manner but without the necessary capacity to support labour rela-
tions’ (Fernández Rodríguez et al., 2016: 551). This also makes plain the politi-
cal peril that the disabling state may conjure up – it undermines employees’ 
trust in the state and democratic institutions. 
Participative and protective labour standards arose out of social conflicts 
between capital and labour and reflect the balance of power at a particular 
point in time. However, this balance of power can change, such that the his-
toric compromises are called into question (Pontusson, 2005). In virtually 
no other area can the balance of power shift as quickly as in the employment 
system, which is not without consequences for state action. While education 
and welfare systems, which are largely state-dominated, often exhibit consid-
erable durability and path dependency, the same does not necessarily apply to 
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industrial relations. As a result of the deregulation of product and labour mar-
kets, free trade agreements, the privatisation of state activities, the transfer of 
functions from highly unionised plants to unregulated segments of the national 
or international labour market, economic crises and the rapid growth of new 
service industries with lower trade union density, the balance of power has 
shifted in recent decades in favour of employers, which can have significant 
negative effects on job quality. 
This change has often taken place gradually as the various influencing fac-
tors have steadily accumulated, causing labour standards to be eroded slowly. 
The deregulation promoted by the economic governance framework of the 
European Union (EU) has accelerated this process. Jill Rubery (2015: 16) draws 
attention to this connection when she writes: ‘the complexion of the state may 
change or may be forced to change by international pressures.’ However, this 
is precisely what makes it so difficult to halt and reverse the prevailing trend in 
Europe away from the enabling towards the disabling state. National institu-
tions can rapidly be weakened or even destroyed under pressure from EU-wide 
agreements, but it takes longer to build up new, enabling institutions and in 
today’s EU, with the priority now given to competitive regulations, this task is 
more difficult than ever. With Rubery, we have concluded from our European 
comparisons that ‘more emphasis on positive integration policies is needed by 
improving the capabilities of national actors to develop proactive policies and 
create new regulatory institutions at the European level’, but also that ‘this focus 
on the EU as a constraint on national actors does not and should not let national 
actors off the hook. There is still scope for national actors to take bold action to 
develop new and innovative institutional arrangements and indeed to promote 
these ideas at the European level’ (Bosch et al., 2009: 51). 
We are grateful to Jill Rubery for the inspiration and insights she has given us 
in our many years of collaboration and feel strengthened in our academic and, on 
occasions, also political commitment to strive for an ‘enabling state’ in our own 
country, which would greatly aid the process of ‘multi-level institution build-
ing’ in the EU and its member states.
Notes
1 Parts of this chapter are based on Bosch (2015).
2 ‘Instead of more flexible employment, policies are needed to extend and reinforce 
SER-type [Standard Employment Relationship] relationships, alongside new higher legal 
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minimum standards and mechanisms to reduce the penalties for not being on an SER-
type contract’ (Rubery, 2015: 15). 
3 Sengenberger also identifies promotional standards, which increase the options open 
to individuals. They include family-friendly working times, employee rights to further 
training and the option to use certain wage components for specific purposes, such as 
old-age insurance.
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The persistence of, and challenges 




The notion of the ‘societal effect’, as posited by the Laboratoire d’Economie 
et de Sociologie du Travail (LEST) school (Maurice et al., 1986), has long 
represented a bulwark against universalist thinking within research into labour 
markets, the wider structuration of the wage-employment relationship and 
organisation studies.
The specific methodological commitments of the LEST school itself (see the 
appendices to Maurice et al., 1986) are perhaps more honoured in the breach 
than in the observance. However, the underpinning idea of the importance of 
integrating ‘the comparison and analysis of the genesis and dynamics of institu-
tional forms, social rules, policies and cultures’ (Michon, 1992: 223) into an 
analysis of economic systems has inspired a broad comparative literature on the 
organisation of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1992, 
1999). This broader literature is sometimes referred to as ‘societal institutional-
ism’ (Djelic and Quack, 2003). When applied to labour market organisation, 
this stresses the idea that labour supply and demand are the result not of the 
application of abstract economic norms, but of mutually interlocking spheres of 
social structuring of the opportunities and constraints facing work organisation 
and workers (see Rubery, 1992).
Essentially, societal institutionalism argues that capitalism is embedded at 
a national–societal level in mutually reinforcing and interlocking ‘spheres’ of 
political economy, in ways which create national ‘logics’ of employment rela-
tions, labour market construction and production organisation which combine 
to create a certain degree of internal coherence. As we will reflect on below, in 
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contemporary societal institutionalist work there are different degrees of insist-
ence on, or questioning of, the national closure of such logics, and implicitly on 
the long-controversial concept of ‘coherence’, and how far this implies function-
ality (Maurice and Sorge, 2000; Rubery, 1992). However, this embeddedness, 
or process of institutionalised social construction, is a necessary  feature of the 
complex socio-economic relations involved in the reproduction of capitalism 
within specific political-geographical spaces, rather than being only a feature of 
those societies which depart more obviously from liberal norms of the employ-
ment relationship. Thus ‘the notion of juxtaposing a labour market structured 
by institutions and a deregulated labour market structured by market forces 
is invalid. If explicit labour market regulations are dismantled then the labour 
market will be exposed to the influences of firm-specific employment policies 
on the one hand and the institutions of social reproduction on the other, with no 
regulatory systems or norms to restrict the extent of inequality or segmentation’ 
(Rubery, 1992: 258).
Methodologically, societal institutionalism was originally developed in con-
scious opposition to approaches, often based in forms of contingency theory, 
which try to draw relations between variables in all national environments, 
‘posing the existence of a rationality above and beyond national specifics and 
cultural particularities’ (Maurice, 1979: 43). Maurice was referring to research 
using contingencies drawn from organisational theory (Lammers and Hickson, 
1979), such as markets, technology and size. However, it is also the case that 
a fairly large volume of cross-sectional international research, often based on 
statistical comparisons of a large number of countries, uses indicators of more 
macro-level economic, social and political characteristics. 
The debate between formal contingency approaches and internationally com-
parative methods no longer has the prominence it once did (see the various 
contributions to Lammers and Hickson, 1979). In practice, however, a very 
considerable volume of international research follows the precepts of compar-
ing standard variables, divorced from their socio-political-cultural contexts, in 
making statements about differences in outcomes at national level. These ‘thin’ 
forms of comparison are favoured by the political economy of research, in par-
ticular through the frequent need for research to cover large numbers of coun-
tries due to funder requirements, and the incentives to make positivistic claims 
about the relations between variables across as large a number of countries as 
possible.
Societal institutionalism rejects such cross-sectional analysis, at least as the 
sole form of comparative research. Instead it argues that analysis of labour 
market construction, or of organisational decision-making, must be predicated 
on an understanding of how the dependent variable(s) of interest are socially 
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constructed through the interplay of a large range of forces, or societal ‘spheres’, 
which interact together in mutually co-constitutive ways. For the original LEST 
research of Maurice and colleagues, a comparison of internal labour markets 
in industrial firms in France and Germany required an analysis of the mutual 
co-constitution of the educational and vocational training system, the nature 
of business organisation, and the structure of employer–worker struggle in the 
industrial relations sphere. For societal analysis, it is essential to analyse how 
these ‘spheres’ are constructed in different societies, and how they relate to each 
other; the best research in this tradition goes beyond positing institutional logics 
and attempts to understand the socialised rationality of actors (see the methodo-
logical appendix to Maurice et al., 1986). 
Rubery’s work provides an illustration of how such a methodology might 
proceed, which is worth quoting at length: 
According to the LEST school, it is in fact crucial to understand the articulation of 
social and economic organisation within a given society and not seek to find universal 
patterns between societies through cross-sectional analysis. Apparently similar forms 
of economic or social organisation may in fact serve very different functions within dif-
ferent societies. To take part-time employment as an example, before it can be deter-
mined what role part-time work plays in absorbing surplus labour in recessions…, it 
is necessary to undertake a detailed analysis of, amongst other factors, the share of the 
informal economy, the overall participation rates, the measured level of unemploy-
ment, the family division of labour and hours of work for full-timers, and the role of 
part-time work in the productive system. In short the relative importance of the role of 
part-time work in disguising unemployment cannot be simply read off from a compari-
son of the shares of part-time work between societies. (Rubery, 1992: 247)
Societal institutionalist literature outside the original LEST school, and other 
comparative frameworks strongly influenced by the LEST principles of com-
parison, is often interested in different ‘spheres’ and ‘interlockages’. Indeed, 
societal institutionalist research needs to be wary of concretising the explanatory 
factors that it investigates too strictly, as ‘deep’ comparativism can only achieve 
its objectives to the extent that the researcher is confident of having understood 
the relevant interdependencies and interconnections between all the different 
spheres of social space which shape his/her particular area of interest. These 
are likely to change if the research focus changes, and may also vary themselves 
across societies. Thus while the spheres elucidated by the LEST school and other 
societal institutionalists are helpful as a guide, for a given concrete piece of 
research the relevant ‘spheres’ and their ‘interlockages’ can only really be dis-
covered inductively, and may emerge in a relatively ad hoc way in the research 
process. For example, in our own comparative research on the involvement of 
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social actors in the attraction and retention of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
the structuring of territorial politics, and the channelling of populist as opposed 
to mainstream politics, emerged as key co-constitutive variables (Almond et al., 
2017). Thus, we would argue that the precise labelling of spheres is less impor-
tant than retaining the core idea of a system of interlocking societal spheres 
structuring economic organisation (or for labour market analysis more specifi-
cally, labour supply and demand).
Challenges for societal institutionalist analysis
Sympathetic critics of societal institutionalism have tended to focus on the some-
what functionalist approach of the LEST school – exacerbated, we would argue, 
in some subsequent work influenced by it, particularly the varieties of capital-
ism approach (see Almond and Gonzalez, 2006) – and consequent difficulties 
in developing ‘a dynamic analysis of change in societal organisation, as change 
usually arises out of conflict and tension and not out of harmony and comple-
mentarity’ (Rubery, 1992: 248). Somewhat relatedly, sympathisers and crit-
ics alike have questioned the merits of defending specifically national-societal 
 embeddedness, in the context of international integration over the last 30 years.
Part of the problem in analysing change arises if the notions of ‘coherence’ 
and societal ‘logics’ are taken to mean that it is necessary to boil societal effects 
down into underpinning guiding forces of national capitalisms. This is a frequent 
but in our view non-necessary component of societal institutionalist research 
– it should be possible to trace the mutual interactions of conflicts and power 
struggles in different spheres of society, and identify the logics these interactions 
embody, without positing that these interlockages provide path dependencies 
that are necessarily ‘coherent’ in the sense of being functional (see Rubery, 1994 
on the UK productive system). Indeed, the recent trend towards a more actor-
centred institutionalism analysing the role of actors in changing institutions (e.g. 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005) is strongly affected by societal institutionalism, at the 
same time as questioning the national stability of societal systems as regulatory 
forces under neoliberal globalisation. 
 Equally, it is clearly the case that any sort of ‘coherence’ of national-societal 
systems is predicated on some sort of coherence with the demands of interna-
tional political economy and globalising capitalism. To be practically adequate, 
comparative analysis needs both to take systematic account of the selective 
‘efficiency’ of societies as informed by processes of international integration 
(Rubery, 1992; Wilkinson, 1983), and to recognise that these processes imply 
that institutional embeddedness is not exclusively at the national level. This 
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means taking into more systematic account sectoral and sub-national variations 
(Rubery, 1992: 248), as well as supranational or transnational structuration.
The remainder of this chapter revisits some of these challenges, in the context 
of the transnationalisation of productive capital, and the dynamics of regime 
competition that have ensued at national and more local levels. We argue that 
it is important to retain an emphasis on the mutual interdependencies shaping 
the social construction of labour markets, while giving greater emphasis to the 
ways that, within ‘variegated’ neoliberal capitalism (Peck and Theodore, 2007), 
the dynamics of competitiveness both depend on, but also challenge, relatively 
coherent ‘societal’ fixes as to the nature of socio-productive systems. 
International competition and societal effects
At one level, specific factors causing increased international competition for 
production can readily be identified: the more systematic incorporation of large 
parts of the Global South into global circuits of capital; trade liberalisation at 
continental and transnational levels; the financialisation of the firm; and the vari-
ety of ways in which technology and product market liberalisation have enabled 
markets to be serviced remotely and enabled more accurate surveillance of the 
international operations of multinational firms.
Notwithstanding current nationalist-populist challenges, these factors are 
related to a broad shift in the emphases of national governments, from the pro-
tection and development of national productive capitalisms to securing positions 
in international contests for mobile investment (Jessop, 2004). Countries – but 
also cities, subnational regions and, to an extent, supranational trade blocs – 
engage in competition to attract private-sector investment. More broadly, 
policy decisions are inflected by efforts to develop or maintain international 
or global ‘competitiveness’ (Pedersen, 2010), influenced not only by flows of 
capital but also by the active agency of transnational regulators. In other words, 
the contemporary international organisation of production and the nature of 
state regulation are intricately intertwined; the state, at regional, national and 
supranational levels, has been and remains a constitutive actor in enabling and 
reproducing patterns of international competition, through active processes of 
re-regulation, both of product markets and of factors of production, including 
labour (Cerny, 1997; Jessop, 2013). 
Where does this leave societal-level analysis? One stock answer to the chal-
lenges of globalisation for societal institutionalists has been to posit some form 
of comparative institutional advantage, such that the nature of coordination used 
in a national economy will present it with certain advantages in specific types of 
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production (Sorge, 1991). Thus Germany and the other densely institutionalised 
economies labelled by varieties of capitalism analysts as ‘coordinated market 
economies’ have advantages in sectors where progress is built upon incremen-
tal improvements in engineering, requiring collaborative relationships between 
employers and highly competent, adaptable employees, aided by patient capital. 
But despite the continued popularity of the varieties of capitalism argument 
as a device for labelling national economies, Hall and Soskice’s (2001) vision 
of globalisation leading to a relatively benign process of nations building upon 
their path-dependent institutionalised strengths seems over-optimistic, given 
the extent to which liberalising pressures have been felt even in the core ‘coor-
dinated market economies’ such as Germany (Holst, 2013), and the broader 
difficulties faced in persuading individual firms to tolerate ‘constraints’, even 
if their effects are acknowledged to be beneficial at an aggregate, national level 
(Marsden, 2015). In other words, the globalisation of capital makes free-riding 
by firms very much easier in weakening any notion of solidarity within national 
capitalisms. The locational flexibility of important fractions of productive capital 
is a key factor here.
Multinationals, regime shopping, resource shopping 
and societal effects
It is important to take explicit account of the fact that multinational companies 
(MNCs) can, to greater or lesser extents, choose where to locate. ‘Regime-
shopping’ (Streeck, 1991) has many different aspects, including notably fiscal 
and labour regulation. Following societal institutionalism, we would argue that 
favourable forms of societal-institutional embeddedness (e.g. skills institutions 
with favourable outputs and so on) as well as the local-national availability of 
particular forms of extra-firm coordination (e.g. access to innovation networks, 
relations with local firms and so on) are one set of forces structuring MNC 
choices about location.
If different societal-institutional complexes create possibilities for competi-
tive advantage in specific fields of activity, then a certain degree of self-selection 
is likely to take place as to which types of foreign direct investor have significant 
presence in which types of national business system. If this argument holds, then 
how MNCs behave in terms of their interactions with host-domestic institutions, 
and the degree of compatibility between the supply of, and demand for, specific 
forms of institutional resources, are likely to operate substantially differently 
between different types of national economy. Thus, in this case, regime shop-
ping by MNCs may reinforce national and local institutional complementarities 
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and contribute to divergence between business systems in different locations, 
as represented in Hall and Soskice’s (2001) discussion of globalisation as a rela-
tively benign force, at least for coordinated and liberal market economies.
Alternatively, if international market and political pressures on societies 
to follow uniform means of competing for productive investment are strong 
enough to disturb fundamentally the socio-economic foundations of host 
institutions, then patterns of firm coordination within MNCs may move back 
more within the hierarchy of the global firm itself, and its dependent sup-
plier networks. Given evidence of the important role of the state and of socio- 
historically  contingent institutions in promoting innovation (Crouch, 2005), 
such a  development would be unlikely to have positive consequences even if 
our only interest were in the promotion of exportable innovation. Such a vision 
would also have negative implications for visions of MNCs as leading local eco-
nomic development in ways that produce positive-sum games with localised 
productive systems, as positive spillover effects from MNCs to host economies 
would be more limited.
In seeking the reality between these alternate binary positions, it is important 
also to disaggregate the MNC itself (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). To a 
societal institutionalist, societal systems provide the resources allowing firms 
to compete, and do so in different ways in different types of business systems. 
For an MNC which has choices about location, each host business system is 
to some extent a ‘supplier of embeddedness’, operating in competition with 
systems elsewhere. However, to managers of a particular subsidiary unit, the 
specific host business system is the only one available. This may mean that 
managerial interest in attempts to create productive links in host economies 
differs between different levels of the international firm – local managers may 
have powerful incentives to find ways of collaborating with other local actors 
to achieve productivity, financial or other targets, even if corporate actors have 
little interest. Where regime competition is particularly intense, as, for exam-
ple, in the automobile industry, the places that are successful in attracting new 
investment often benefit from tight networks between the local/national state, 
development agencies and labour market institutional actors (Hudson, 2003). 
In such cases, regime competition and insecurity of future investment may lead 
to greater, rather than lesser, degrees of associational/network ‘embeddedness’ 
with these non-firm actors, at the same time as co-opting local institutions to the 
vagaries of international competition.
These processes of ongoing competition for productive investment have been 
extensively researched by a literature on global production networks (GPNs) 
(see Coe and Yeung, 2015), which gives analytical priority to how lead firms 
coordinate international production through relations with a wide range of 
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actors. These include dependent firms, the state at various geographical levels, 
education, training and research infrastructures, and a wide range of associa-
tional actors, including employers’ associations and trade unions. It therefore 
attempts to locate an analysis of the roles of such actors within geographically 
and organisationally ‘fragmented’ (Herrigel and Zeitlin, 2010), yet still actively 
coordinated, international networks of the production and exploitation of value. 
Importantly, for GPN scholars, the strategies regional actors must adopt to 
develop favourable positions in global production networks go beyond the more 
established notions of ‘comparative institutional advantage’ often found in the 
comparative capitalisms literature. In other words, while comparative institu-
tionalists often posit relatively ‘static’ forms of comparative advantage, work on 
global production networks sees the relationship between regions and firms as 
a more dynamic relationship of ‘coupling’ (Coe et al., 2004). This core concept 
implies that there is, or needs to be, a continual process of adaptation of ‘host’ 
human and other resources to the constantly evolving needs of firms within 
global production networks. These processes of adaptation are not limited to 
occasional institutional reforms; rather, they refer to continual, mutually adap-
tive, relations between international firms and geographically embedded state 
and other governance actors.
In arguing for an explicit consideration of how regional actors activate net-
works in order to respond to the demands of international competition, the 
GPN literature builds upon, and extends, earlier arguments within regional 
studies and economic geography that the global fragmentation of production 
was likely to cause the local network embeddedness of the subsidiary opera-
tions of MNCs to increase (e.g. Morgan, 1997). Routine branch plants, serving 
national markets and operating to well-established corporate production meth-
ods, could often function with limited interactions with local business system 
actors. However, where lead firms develop the capacity to make fine-grained 
decisions about the geographical and organisational location of their activities, 
subsidiary units increasingly compete to exercise functions, or ‘mandates’, on 
an international basis (Birkinshaw, 2013), which may be global or at the level 
of the supranational ‘region’. Units which are unsuccessful in these contests are 
increasingly marginalised, and threatened in cases where access to markets no 
longer requires the existence of local/national ‘branches’.
Clearly, the fact that much productive investment is mobile makes it much 
more difficult for regional governments, businesses, employees and trade unions 
to reach long-term relationships with inward investors. However, this marked 
shift in the balance of power does not mean that the role of host institutions has 
been reduced to a simple avoidance of ‘constraints’. Rather, host institutions have 
been repurposed to at least some extent, as the attraction and retention of the 
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investment and jobs associated with the high value-added components of global 
production networks require that regional and national actors seek, through the 
agency of their business system actors, to provide embedded resources.
Societal institutionalism and multinational companies
Although research in the coordination of MNC subsidiaries often argues that 
international firms need to develop local (network) embeddedness (e.g. 
Andersson et al., 2002) this works shows, for the most part, very limited inter-
est in the wider social contexts which underpin the extent and type of network 
relations which an MNC might pursue. It therefore largely ignores the struc-
tures of incentives and constraints which shape the ability and willingness of 
MNCs and of local network actors to participate in the relations of trust and 
mutual obligation which it focuses on. If it is true that ‘a unit’s most important 
resource is the web of specific relationships in which the subsidiary is embedded’ 
(Andersson and Forsgren, 1996: 487), then it is vital, particularly for compara-
tive and policy-oriented research, to take much more serious account of an array 
of research which indicates that national business and innovation systems differ 
from each other in non-trivial ways, even between countries of comparable 
wealth and development (Lundvall, 2010), and that sophisticated MNCs are 
capable of taking these differences into account when deciding where to locate 
different types of activities (Cantwell and Iammarino, 2000). It is here that soci-
etal institutionalist research can make a key contribution.
The societal institutionalist view has frequently been deployed in the human 
resource management and organisational studies literatures in order to investi-
gate the multiple embeddedness of MNCs in different national structures for the 
coordination of capitalism (Bélanger et al., 2013; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 
2011). There is a substantial literature on how MNC capabilities and behaviours 
are affected by elements of the socio-economic structure of their countries of 
origin – whether MNCs ‘attempt to take with them and apply their own, nation-
ally idiosyncratic, repertoire of HRM [human resource management] practices 
to their subsidiaries in foreign countries’ (Gooderham et al., 2006: 1507). 
Equally, there is a wide range of research examining the influences of societal 
effects on the management of MNC host units (Belizón et al. 2013; Parry et al., 
2008; Saka-Helmout and Geppert, 2011;). 
Host societal embeddedness is sometimes viewed as causing constraints; 
societal effects, whether in the form of concrete institutions or more diffuse 
artefacts of culture or ideology, may impede MNCs in attempts to achieve 
commonalities of organisational policies across their international operations 
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(e.g. Myloni et al., 2004). However, while these may be constraints from the 
perspective of corporate HQ managers, they may present opportunities for sub-
sidiary-level managers, who may derive power resources from their ability to 
interpret local host environments and the limitations and possibilities these raise 
for corporate action. Possessing this institutional understanding, and being able 
to apply it in the context of the MNC, is likely to complement the potential rela-
tional advantages of host managers being embedded in the host environment. As 
argued above, however, and particularly given regime competition, host-country 
institutions do not only provide MNCs with constraints (indeed, if they did, 
there would be much less FDI), but rather more focus should be placed on both 
 (relatively) static comparative institutional advantage and more dynamic patterns 
of relational or network embeddedness in MNCs’ interactions with host societies.
Thus while societal institutionalist literature on MNCs has predominantly 
concentrated on firms’ internal management structures and processes, it also 
argues that firms’ embeddedness in national institutions is likely to have implica-
tions for how they coordinate relations with external actors (Morgan, 2001). 
The ability of subsidiary-level actors to network usefully in their host environ-
ments cannot be assumed. Neither is it simply a question of good management. 
Rather, the capacity to establish embedded patterns of relations is shaped by the 
nature of local and national institutions (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005): what 
host economy actors may contribute to the capacity of the MNC unit to com-
pete internationally, and how national and local patterns of relations of trust and 
authority operate, both between different firms and, more broadly, between 
firms, labour, the state and civil society organisations. 
Logically, firms are more likely voluntarily to engage in external relations, 
and therefore have a more active effect on the performativity of local institu-
tions, the more there are actors within the host context with whom there is 
demonstrable value-added in coordinating. These may include, for example, 
supplier and other related firms who have the capacity to engage with MNCs 
in relational contracting, or institutional actors, such as labour market system 
actors capable of providing, or co-producing, local human resource advantages. 
Such relations, perhaps particularly those with institutional actors, are more 
likely to operate successfully where host institutions empower actors to engage 
in localised innovation (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). This includes insti-
tutional innovation, or what has sometimes been termed ‘experimentation’, 
where social actors develop the capacities and capabilities necessary to allow 
interactions on a flexible basis without threatening the stability of the overall 
institutional architecture (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006).
The capacity of firm and non-firm actors to engage in long-term coordi-
nation is, of course, a core concern of societal institutionalism. A simplistic 
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interpretation of work in this tradition tends to argue that non-market, long-
term, trust-based relations are of more importance in ‘coordinated market 
economies’ such as Germany and Japan, as opposed to the market and hierarchy-
centred creation and exploitation of resources in more liberal economies (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). However, there is obvious evidence of relational coordina-
tion in liberal economies; one need only think of well-known clusters of activity 
such as Silicon Valley, or life sciences around Cambridge, UK, to see examples 
of firms in such economies behaving in decidedly ‘coordinated’, or at least net-
worked, ways (Crouch, 2005). Such cases may be exceptions to the national 
rule, explained by local or sectoral specificities, or by the importance of state 
institutions in embedding activities in strategically important sectors. However, 
they nonetheless point to the need for a granular analysis of how national social 
structure shapes patterns of firm coordination.
Equally, and importantly in so far as a discussion on societal institutionalism is 
concerned, the institutionalised patterns of transactions said to favour high-trust 
patterns of ‘relational embeddedness’ in countries such as Germany and Japan 
were developed historically with domestic firms (and the core industrial labour 
force) as key stakeholders, not foreign MNCs. There is insufficient systemic 
empirical evidence as to the extent to which foreign MNCs voluntarily engage 
in such forms of embeddedness in the most ‘coordinated market’ economies. 
Theoretically, though, it may well be possible for inward investors to obtain at 
least some of the institutionalised advantages such countries are often argued 
to present – such as high-skilled, adaptable workforces – through free-riding. 
There are certainly some signs of this in economies with intermediate levels of 
coordination (Almond et al., 2014).
Finally, any comparative analysis in this area needs to get a much clearer pic-
ture of what happens when host institutions are seen as inadequate. If slotting 
into existing host-economy patterns of coordination is inadequate for the needs 
of the MNC, then at least two possibilities would seem to be available. On the 
one hand, foreign MNC units might develop fewer voluntary active links with 
network actors in the domestic economy, and rely to a greater extent on their 
own internal global networks and hierarchies, alongside their market power in 
standard contractual relations. Alternatively, they may choose to engage in vari-
ous forms of institution-building, taking the business of creating frameworks for 
the development of external coordination with local firms, civil society actors 
and governments into their own hands.
In summary, we would expect patterns of relations to differ across the various 
sorts of host political economies. But the picture is almost certainly more compli-
cated than simply positing that the volume of external network linkages is greater 
in one ‘variety of capitalism’ than another. Tracing the nature of such potential 
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cross-national differences, and their interactions with standard contingencies such 
as sector, technology and so on, is likely to require an analysis built on the thick 
description of relational networks, and what they mean to the actors concerned.
On the whole, where the international management literature explores rela-
tions between MNC units and host economies, it tends implicitly to concentrate 
on involvement in innovation networks and relations with local firms that are 
assumed to have the potential to result in positive-sum games. Yet it is frequently 
the case that subsidiary units engage with local/national institutions or networks 
for more defensive or tactical reasons. For example, firms which would prefer 
not to have relations with institutions representing collective labour may be 
required to do so in some host environments. Equally, access into some markets 
requires joint ventures with domestic firms, which the MNC might not have 
chosen freely. Further, host states or localities frequently tie subsidies and other 
forms of state support to the establishment of links with local firms, universities 
or other actors. While the latter arrangements may be voluntary, they nonethe-
less represent the host state shaping the ‘market’ for ‘embeddedness’.
Some of these arrangements may well eventually create outcomes which the 
MNC unit is able to turn to its advantage, and indeed doing so is a key skill in 
subsidiary management. This does not alter the fact that their original impetus, 
from an MNC perspective, is either tactical or defensive. Unless it results in 
some form of perceived local advantage, ‘involuntary’ relations are particularly 
liable to being opposed by MNCs; this is therefore one of the areas in which 
MNCs are particularly likely to challenge elements of established institutional-
ised societal systems.
Global, national and local effects
As observed above, early societal institutionalism, itself embedded in the rela-
tively solid societal arrangements of 1970s/1980s France and (West) Germany, 
was over-confident in stressing that the national society (and national sovereign 
state) was the container of societal effects. It is clear, though, that contemporary 
societal institutionalism cannot depend solely on a vision of relatively contained 
national systems, given that their integrity has been increasingly challenged by 
transnational influences, usually of a neoliberalising nature. This can very clearly 
be seen in the productive sphere, not just through the international firm per se, 
but more broadly by the reconfiguration of productive capitalism into global 
production networks. Equally, it is very clear that financial systems are strongly 
interdependent, and also that regulatory national sovereignty is conditional, as 
has been amply demonstrated in the course of the crisis in Southern Europe.
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At the same time, when investigating how global productive networks inter-
act with host societies, it is clear that many demonstrable ‘societal’ effects which 
influence the nature of MNCs’ relations with host economies and societies are 
relatively local in scope. It is also not a coincidence that globalisation has increas-
ingly gone hand in hand with questioning of the national sovereign state from 
‘below’. In some of these cases, it is probably relatively uncontroversial to say 
that ‘subnational’ societal effects are strong enough that specific places merit, for 
some comparative purposes, somewhat separate treatment. Quebec, in some 
respects, may not appear to have a very ‘Canadian’ variant of capitalist govern-
ance, for example (Almond et al., 2014). 
Additionally, it has sometimes been argued that the shifts in the functions 
of economic governance actors associated with a focus on international com-
petitiveness have been, or should be, accompanied by shifts in the levels of 
governance. The nation state, in other words, becomes increasingly ‘leaky’ as 
a ‘container of governance’ (Brenner et al., 2003). Its coordinating capacities 
are fragmented, with some capacity transferred upwards (e.g. supranational or 
transnational institutions providing competition rules) and some downwards 
(with subnational regions or localities charged with developing flexible infra-
structure, and tailoring to local economic and social needs). Influential ideas 
on industrial policy, not least of which is the current EU institutionalisation 
of ‘smart specialisation’ through Regional Innovation Strategies (RIS3) (see 
European Commission, 2014), provide examples of this; regional governments 
are charged with identifying their potential competitive strengths, and how these 
might be operationalised, in association with producer and user stakeholders.
Clearly, if nothing else, the political situation of the UK at the time of writing 
should alert us to the danger of teleology with such claims. The balance between 
geographical levels of governance, and thus the resources available to state and 
other governance actors at subnational levels, remains heavily contingent on 
national systems of political and economic governance, which themselves differ 
for deeply societally embedded reasons. Nonetheless, societal institutionalist 
research must be able to accommodate various effective geographical levels of 
the ‘societal’ construction of capitalism if it is to be practically adequate in the 
contemporary world.
Conclusions
Societal institutionalist researchers act under an assumption – whether explicit 
or otherwise – that economic activity is always embedded in something (inter alia, a 
system of property rights, rules about corporate governance and financing, rules 
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and less formal norms about the appropriate patterns of interaction between 
firms, social understandings about the rights and responsibilities of workers and 
so on). It is important to be clear that this is ultimately an ontological position. 
In other words, the assumption of embeddedness is not refuted by empirical 
findings that fail to show national effects in specific cases, or indeed, by ‘deregu-
lation’ (Almond and Rubery, 2000). This means that a societal institutionalist 
can either test for the effects of specific institutions at specific geographical 
levels, or, alternatively, can attempt to understand the social and institutional 
foundations of actor choices, whether or not these lie primarily in national-level 
institutional arrangements. Because of this, as the frameworks governing eco-
nomic activity have become progressively ‘de-nationalised’ as a result of broader 
changes in global political economy (Gilpin, 2011), societal institutionalists 
increasingly seek influences on patterns of the coordination of MNCs that may 
form at multiple transnational, sectoral and subnational levels (Morgan, 2007; 
Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Djelic and Quack, 2010), as well as the more tradi-
tional national level.
But moving the analysis to different geographical levels does not resolve the 
more basic tension within societal institutionalism as to whether embeddedness 
itself is an assumption – which would mean that we could perform institu-
tionalist analysis on the underpinnings of even relatively pure market forms of 
exchange (e.g. Biggart and Beamish, 2003) – or an alternative reading – which 
refers to embeddedness as meaning the social arrangements that have histori-
cally attempted to make capitalism, and market exchange, coherent with the 
stabilisation of society (Polanyi, 1944). Such arrangements are geographically 
variable, as the varieties of capitalism literature reflects. For example, Hall 
and Soskice’s binary model posits that US and German styles of capitalism are 
roughly equally successful economically, but that the social compromises that 
shape them are different, with distinct distributional consequences. Equally, 
they are historically variable; institutionalised systems for the governance of 
capitalism are the crystallisation of contests of power between social actors, 
and liable to be subject to change when they no longer fulfil their economic or 
social roles, as judged by powerful contemporary actors (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005).
Corporate globalisation, while clearly not the sole driving factor, has played 
a significant role in making the establishment and maintenance of coherent 
national business systems more difficult. MNCs, as is well known, ‘shop’ 
between regulatory and fiscal regimes with some alacrity, both when making 
location choices and in ongoing negotiations with host-country social and 
political actors (Kristensen and Rocha, 2012). There is also a known prob-
lem of ‘cherry picking’ (Geppert and Matten, 2006), where firms seek to 
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drink from the well of positive outputs of national business systems – such as 
highly educated workforces – while seeking to abstain from contributing to 
the other components of these systems (e.g. welfare states, employment rela-
tions regimes) that have been central to the construction of these advantages. 
Additionally, MNCs are, collectively and often individually, powerful actors, 
with de facto and sometimes de jure negotiating power over the nature of 
many of the social compromises on which liberal and social democratic vari-
ants of capitalism are built, at least in so far as how these arrangements apply 
to them. In this context, it is important that a comparative institutionalist 
approach to transnational capitalism also interrogates societal embeddedness in 
its original Polanyian sense of the overall coherence of the means of organising 
the economy within society (Polanyi, 1944). Societal institutionalist research, 
if pursued in a geographically open and actor-sensitive manner, can make a 
key contribution to this endeavour by accessing the relations between societal 
spheres and their interlockages.
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The networked organisation: 
implications for jobs and inequality
Rosemary Batt and Eileen Appelbaum
Introduction
The vertical integration of production into large hierarchical firms was a 
dominant organisational form during the twentieth century. Since the 1980s, 
however, firms have increasingly decentralised production to networks of sub-
contractors. Organisational boundaries have become blurred, work processes 
have been fragmented, and new forms of inter-firm contracting and outsourc-
ing of work have grown. The greater use of business strategies that re-allocate 
workers across networked organisations has important implications for employ-
ment relations and for wages, job quality and inequality.1 
More than a decade ago, in a series of important essays written with col-
leagues,  Jill Rubery drew attention to the blurring of firm boundaries and 
the fragmenting of work in the UK. Rubery was already a leading scholar 
of labour  market flexibility and the rise of temporary and contingent 
jobs in  Europe.  In the research on the fragmentation of work, she moved 
beyond that narrower focus on the rise of precarious employment to examine 
developments at the firm and organisational level. She was among the first to 
bring workers into academic studies of the rise of networked  production  – 
arguing not only that new forms of organising production across firms spill over 
into the organisation of work within firms, but that the outcomes for firms, sup-
pliers, workers, customers and relations of power in inter-firm networks 
depend importantly on variation in the institutional context within and across 
countries. 
Building on her extensive work on labour market segmentation, Rubery also 
emphasised that employers as a whole do not have a unified set of interests. 
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As she and her colleagues wrote in Fragmenting Work: Blurring Organizational 
Boundaries and Disordering Hierarchies:
The situating of employing organisations in a web of inter-organisational relations 
provides a framework through which we can understand the development of employ-
ment relations in the context of the restructuring of capital–capital relations. The 
twin tensions between cooperation and conflict underpin both capital–capital and 
capital–labour relations. These tensions and opposing tendencies need to be con-
sidered conjointly rather than separately. … we need to recognize that inter-firm 
 relations rely on elements of cooperation, competition, and dominance. (Rubery et 
al., 2005: 87)
With colleagues, she went on to argue:
A second step is to bring work back into the analysis. … It enables us to introduce 
such questions as: Does the network form represent a new concentration of power 
among employers better able to avoid or oppose the collective demands of labor? Do 
networks promote new divisions and new inequalities among workers? (Grimshaw 
et al., 2005: 40)
These remain key questions today in the analysis of networked forms of pro-
duction. Where is value created and how and where is it extracted? Does 
outsourcing deliver on promises of increased efficiency and, if so, do work-
ers share in  productivity gains? How are workers allocated among different 
organisations in an inter-firm network? How does this affect the quality of 
jobs, wage  growth, wage inequality and the power of collective forms of 
representation?
In this chapter we examine the original contributions Rubery and her col-
leagues have made to our understanding of the effects of the rise in outsourc-
ing and production networks on work and workers. While the outcomes for 
workers continue to receive far less attention than warranted, some important 
new case-study and empirical research address these issues. We conclude with a 
discussion of directions for future research. 
Blurring boundaries and the employment relation
Research on the networked organisation emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, with 
attention paid primarily to describing the phenomenon, why it was emerging in 
the context of heightened competition and the enabling features of digital tech-
nologies, and whether it led to superior firm performance. Few scholars paid 
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attention to the implications of these structural changes for work and employ-
ment relations. At the forefront of new scholarship investigating these issues, 
Rubery and her colleagues published a series of qualitative case studies and a co-
edited book in the early to mid-2000s (Marchington et al., 2005). They did not 
assume any particular outcome for workers, but rather drew on their qualitative 
research to build an inventory of ways in which the rise of networked forms of 
production affects the quality of jobs and the nature of employment relations. 
This approach allowed them to expand on the institutional conditions under 
which networked forms may lead to better or worse outcomes for workers. 
A common thread in this ambitious undertaking is the multiple ways in which 
boundaries between organisations have become blurred as firms increasingly 
contract out and fragment work. Rubery and her colleagues were among the 
first to recognise that existing scholarship – which examined changes in the 
organisation of production and changes in the employment relation in isola-
tion from each other – missed the main point: changes in the organisation of 
production and the extent of outsourcing both shape and are shaped by changes 
in the employment relation (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2005). They were at the 
forefront in recognising that changes in the organisation of production across firms 
spill over into changes in the organisation of work within firms, with implications for 
human resource (HR) management and the quality of jobs (Rubery et al., 2002). 
They demonstrated that combining analyses of the disintegration of production 
processes and of the fragmentation of the employment relation allows for a 
more complete understanding of both.
Explaining the rise and fall of the vertically integrated firm
To understand the changes now underway, it is helpful to step back and briefly 
review why vertically integrated and hierarchical forms of organisation emerged 
during the twentieth century and replaced the price mechanism as a primary 
form of coordinating production. 
Businesses choose whether to perform certain functions in-house or to con-
tract with other firms for those inputs when producing goods and services 
for final demand. The transactions cost framework (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975, 1985) favoured by mainstream economists explains the make or buy deci-
sion on the basis of relative transaction costs. Firms and markets, Coase argued, 
are alternative ways to organise transactions, coordinate production and allocate 
labour and other resources. Markets rely on the price mechanism to do this, 
which is efficient when transactions are straightforward, non-repetitive and do 
not require specific investments in assets in order to carry them out. Where 
these conditions are not met – where outcomes are uncertain, interactions are 
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repeated and transaction-specific investments are required – vertically inte-
grated firms are more efficient than markets for coordinating production. In 
this view, large, vertically integrated firms that retained production activities 
 in-house emerged in the twentieth century to minimise firms’ transaction costs. 
In particular, firms internalised the employment relation when the costs of 
bureaucratic monitoring and control of workers were less than the costs of 
specifying and enforcing external contracts with vendors or suppliers. 
Alternative explanations for the emergence of hierarchical organisations also 
focus on the internalisation of the employment relationship. Political economists 
view hierarchy as a governance mechanism for managing the inherently antago-
nistic interests of employers and workers in the production process (Marglin, 
1974). Employers are able to exercise authority over workers to achieve labour 
flexibility and cooperation in productive activities. In return, workers gain the 
economic security provided by regular work and wages.
A third approach, favoured by Rubery, notes the importance of labour 
market segmentation theory (Jacoby, 1984; Osterman, 1984; Rubery, 1978) 
and rejects the simple capital–labour struggle story that underlies the politi-
cal economy rationale for hierarchical organisation as overly deterministic 
(see Chapter 1). Rather than a pre-determined identity of interests among all 
employers, this approach views the internalised employment relation as emerg-
ing out of competitive struggles among capitalists for market share and among 
workers for jobs that offer economic and employment security – as well as the 
struggles between employers and employees within firms. Capital–capital as 
well as capital–labour relations are important for understanding how produc-
tion is organised. The internalisation of the employment relationship, according 
to this line of argument, is not an outcome imposed on workers by employers 
unified by their common interests. Rather, ‘the historical internalization of 
employment is interpreted through the process of identity and interest forma-
tion’ (Marchington et al., 2005: 11). 
In the 1980s, large hierarchical firms began to lose their comparative organi-
sational advantage in the face of technological innovation, heightened compe-
tition, market deregulation and the ‘shareholder value revolution’. Flexible 
manufacturing technologies, for example, undermined mass production by 
allowing factories to produce a greater variety of goods in small batches,  enabling 
decentralised production in flexibly specialised firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Japanese lean production, characterised by lead firms controlling manufactur-
ing processes in a complex web of supplier firms (Dore, 1986), achieved higher 
levels of innovation, lower time-to-market for new products and higher qual-
ity and efficiency than mass production models (Jaikumar, 1986; MacDuffie, 
1995). The rising influence of institutional investors and shareholders also put 
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pressure on firms to reduce costs and headcount and dismantle the corpora-
tion by selling off assets or less profitable business units and returning cash to 
shareholders (Appelbaum and Batt, 2014; Batt and Appelbaum, 2013). And 
finance and management scholars urged firms to respond by focusing on their 
‘core competencies’ or ‘what they do best’, and outsourcing the rest (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992; Lepak and Snell, 1999; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). The core 
competency model has diffused widely across many industries and countries.
Our understanding of the extent of outsourcing within and across  countries – 
and the number of workers affected by this process – is seriously inadequate given 
that national data collection continues to be based on traditional definitions of firms 
and industries. Nonetheless, extensive field-based and  industry-specific research 
has documented the powerful restructuring of supply chains  –  particularly in 
manufacturing – since the 1980s. Our most advanced understanding is found 
in the literature on global production networks (Dicken, 1992) or global com-
modity chains (Bair, 2009; Gereffi and Koreniewicz, 1994); but here, the poor 
outcomes for workers are often attributed to the location of jobs in low-wage 
countries with poor labour standards. Much less attention has focused on how 
and why workers in advanced countries are affected by domestic outsourcing, and 
here is where Jill Rubery’s research has made a lasting contribution.
The emergence and outcomes of networked forms of production
Rubery’s critique of the mainstream literature on the networked firm offers 
several insights. Firstly, she argues that beyond tangible benefits, such as greater 
efficiency or profitability, the network form is important for many intangi-
ble benefits it provides. These include the capability to exploit new knowl-
edge, preferential access to financing, organisational learning through access to 
technical capabilities, sharing of tacit knowledge and development of a shared 
understanding of rapidly changing markets. The extent to which networked 
organisations can obtain these intangible benefits depends importantly on how 
labour is managed across the network (Marchington et al., 2005). Empirical 
studies of the links between technological change, organisational structure and 
knowledge creation support this view (Grimshaw et al., 2000; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002; Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2005; Saxenian, 1996).
Closely related to this argument is Rubery’s conceptualisation of skill. Skill is 
not a set of objectively measured technical competencies, which can be distin-
guished according to the value they contribute to firm profitability, as argued by 
core competency theorists. Rather, skills are defined and determined via social 
and political processes. Equating skill with technical competence means that tacit 
skills and social capital – two dimensions of skill that are critical to the success 
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of networked organisations – are overlooked. She disputes the assumption that 
a clear divide exists between jobs that require cooperation and commitment (or 
those with high technical skills) and those that do not. Thus attempts to separate 
out strategic from non-strategic jobs on the basis of a narrow technical definition 
of skill are likely to fail (Rubery et al., 2004; Ward et al., 2001). Similarly, there 
is no neat division of inter-firm networks into ‘relational’ (where  employment 
relations are internalised to the network and investments in human capital are 
shared) or ‘transactional’ (where employment is externalised to the market) 
(Rubery and Grimshaw, 2001). 
Networked forms of production also ‘complexify’ the capital–labour rela-
tionship, according to Rubery. Her early insights into capital–capital as well as 
capital–labour conflicts, developed in her work on labour market segmentation, 
carry over to her analysis of inter-firm relationships. Both sets of  relationships 
shape the extent to which firms internalise or externalise (outsource) labour. 
Moreover, organisations in inter-firm networks need to gain the coopera-
tion both of other firms across the network and of workers within their firm. 
Conflicting employer–employee interests persist, but within a framework of 
inter-organisational relations that provide new opportunities for cooperation 
and division between firms in addition to the opportunities for conflict and 
mutual benefit generated by the employment relationship. Thus it is an empiri-
cal question whether the shift from vertically integrated firms to boundary-less 
organisations, and related changes in the organisation of work, are positive or 
negative, and for whom (Rubery, 2007).
Rubery also emphasises the importance of asymmetrical power relations 
among these firms, which more often than not create pressures for less collabo-
ration. This view contrasts with the conventional view that firms in a network 
necessarily provide complementary as opposed to competing inputs (Miles and 
Snow, 1986). Her argument is that the rents generated in the production pro-
cess may be distributed unevenly among the organisations in the production 
network, with more powerful organisations positioned to extract a dispropor-
tionate share. More powerful organisations may then share those rents with 
their workforce in order to harness workers’ cooperation in producing goods 
and services. Unequal power relations among network members may enable 
some organisations (e.g. primary or client firms) to impose performance goals 
on weaker network members (e.g. force cost reductions onto subcontractors). 
Weaker firms in a network may operate on narrow margins and rely on the 
externalisation of labour in order to lower labour costs, with negative outcomes 
for workers limited only by social and political institutions, such as employment 
laws and the strength of unions. Thus Rubery avoids drawing generic principles 
about outcomes for workers as these are contingent on power relations within 
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the network as well as on the institutional landscape – unions, trade associations, 
government legislation (Grimshaw et al., 2005). Her analysis leaves open the 
possibility of positive outcomes and a role for political intervention.
In Rubery’s theoretical framework, three dimensions of institutional 
 context – trust, power asymmetries and institutional embeddedness – play a 
central role in determining the conditions under which networked organisations 
may lead to better or worse outcomes for stakeholders. Firstly, networks may 
be distinguished between those that rely primarily on the market mechanism 
and legal contracts (‘arm’s length’ relations) versus those that rely on relations 
of trust and reputation (relational contracting) (Adler, 2001; Sako, 1992). The 
latter require greater interdependence among members of a network and are 
underpinned by ‘goodwill trust’ and a ‘moral commitment’ to maintain the rela-
tionship. Secondly, power asymmetries between capital and capital – between 
primary and contractor firms, for example – may undermine the mutual sharing 
of benefits. Contractor firms may find themselves facing a powerful rationale 
for externalising labour in order to reduce costs. This may lead to differentiated 
outcomes for workers in lead and subcontractor firms. Thirdly, networks are 
embedded in national institutional landscapes, which may in some cases encour-
age trust and limit the exercise of power within production networks – for 
example, if national law mandates the extension of collective bargaining agree-
ments to all parties in an industry (Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2006). In countries 
such as the USA and the UK, where institutional arrangements that undergird 
moral contracts are weak, it is the stronger organisations that are likely to exer-
cise power over the weaker ones in the network. This may be a second-best way 
to organise production, but it is likely to be preferred in situations where the 
cost of conflict is preferable to the costs and risks of contracts secured by trust. 
Thus Rubery and her colleagues argue that because relations of trust, power 
and risk are so important in shaping production networks, efficiency is a second-
order concern for understanding the dynamics of changing organisational forms. 
Their analysis breaks new ground in theorising about the nature of employment 
contracts and the quality of jobs – by analysing how networked forms, within 
and across industries, lead to new types of labour market segmentation and 
inequality among workers. 
What have we learned since the Great Recession?
As Rubery and her colleagues developed their research programme on the impli-
cations of the networked firm for management and employment relations in the 
2000s, interest in this question was emerging among other scholars – prompted 
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by growing evidence of stagnant wages, the decline in the quality of jobs and 
rising inequality in advanced economies. The financial crisis and recession in 
2008, and the subsequent austerity regime in Europe, exacerbated these prob-
lems by increasing incentives for public entities and private enterprises alike 
to cut labour costs by outsourcing and restructuring. These events made more 
salient the need for empirical research to identify the impact of these strategies 
on workers and unions. 
As we noted above, Rubery and colleagues argued that the relative out-
comes for workers are an empirical question, contingent on the power relations 
among capitalists in the supply chain and between capital and labour, and on 
the points of institutional leverage available to the parties involved. Existing 
empirical research, unfortunately, presents a sobering landscape in the context 
of an overall shift in power to capital and the weakening of unions in recent 
decades. In the European Union (EU) specifically, the ability of elites to advance 
a programme of market liberalisation and privatisation of public services has 
increased dramatically. 
Most empirical research in both the USA and Europe suggests that the rise of 
the networked firm and outsourcing of production has led to a deterioration in 
the jobs and pay of workers and to a growth in wage inequality. The European 
research appears to be more advanced than its US counterpart (Bernhardt et al., 
2015), but the findings are quite consistent. The negative effects of outsourcing 
are particularly noteworthy for low-wage workers, but also for public sector 
workers and middle-income groups. At the same time, the comparative insti-
tutional research to which Rubery has prominently contributed also shows the 
ways in which negative outcomes can be moderated or reversed – depending on 
a range of national and local institutional factors, public policies and the particu-
lar strategies of actors. 
At a general level, a handful of studies using national government statisti-
cal data provide persuasive evidence linking outsourcing to lower pay and pay 
inequality for working people. A recent US study using national government 
data attributes a large portion of the rise in earnings inequality since the 1970s to 
increased dispersion in earnings across establishments – consistent with a story 
of increased sorting of workers into higher- and lower-paying establishments 
(Barth et al., 2014). Similarly, recent US research has shown that increased 
occupational concentration of workers in establishments accounts for a large 
share of the growth in wage inequality (Handwerker, 2015; Handwerker and 
Spletzer, 2015). This would suggest that firms have found it useful to increase 
the specialised division of labour – segmenting labour markets based on occu-
pational expertise or ‘core competencies’ and the sorting of workers by skill 
level or skill type into higher and lower paid firms and establishments. If firms 
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focus on their ‘core competencies’ – for example, engineering, IT services or 
value-added manufacturing – they may shift ancillary work to firms specialising 
in HR services, cleaning services, food services, logistics and the like. Consistent 
with this story, Davis and Cobb (2010) examined the size distribution of firms 
in a large-scale multi-country study and found that the lower the proportion of 
workers in large firms, the higher the wage inequality.
Two studies of low-wage workers in ancillary services provide a more 
detailed examination of how outsourcing leads to lower pay and pay inequal-
ity. In a critical study that links longitudinal employer and employee data in 
Germany, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) documented a dramatic growth 
in domestic outsourcing of ancillary services (janitors, security guards, food ser-
vice workers) since the early 1990s. They found that wages for these groups fell 
on average by 10–15 per cent when these workers moved from in-house firms 
to outsourced contractors and that they remained permanently lower. Wages 
of temp agency cleaning workers fell by 26 per cent. More generally, they 
showed that the outsourcing of cleaning, security and logistics services alone 
accounted for roughly 10 per cent of the increase in German wage inequality 
since the 1980s. Similarly, a US study using national government data found an 
outsourcing wage penalty of 4 to 7 per cent for janitors and 8 to 24 per cent for 
guards (Dube and Kaplan, 2010). The similarity of these results in the context 
of remarkably different national labour laws and industrial relations systems 
suggests that this type of restructuring may be a source of rising within-country 
inequality in many countries.
These studies are suggestive of broad-based patterns linking outsourcing to 
lower pay, although they do not provide the kind of nuanced detail to identify 
potential causal mechanisms or variation across institutional settings and actor 
strategies – the hallmark of Rubery’s approach. Other qualitative and mixed 
methods research follows more in this latter tradition. This stream of research 
also generally finds negative outcomes for workers in outsourced operations, 
although variation in the magnitude of the effects on job quality depends on 
institutional and other external factors. The case-based research in Europe is 
considerably more advanced than in North America, perhaps because outsourc-
ing has been more publicly salient – as in the privatisation of public services or 
outsourcing of work in highly unionised settings where deep institutional lega-
cies are challenged and unions have waged public and media campaigns.
Call centres were an early focus of attention in part because they were a 
new phenomenon that used new technologies to industrialise service work in a 
dramatically new way. But early research did not distinguish between in-house 
and outsourced centres, viewing them equally as a new form of Taylorisation 
and degradation of work; rather, it focused on the threat of job loss owing 
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to offshoring. Later research, however, clearly showed that within advanced 
countries, outsourced centres had consistently lower job quality and pay. A 
 20-country study based on field research and identical establishment-level sur-
veys, for example, showed systematic differences between union in-house, non-
union in-house and outsourced operations, with the latter scoring the lowest on 
virtually all dimensions of job quality – including substantially lower pay, ben-
efits, training and discretion at work – and the highest on the use of electronic 
monitoring and part-time and contingent work. These conditions also led to 
higher quit rates (Batt, Holman and Holtgrewe, 2009; Doellgast et al., 2009). 
The average wage penalty for outsourced establishments was 10.8 per cent in 
the USA and Canada, but 14.6 per cent in major European countries (Batt and 
Nohara, 2009)  – higher in Europe because employers shifted work not only 
from in-house to outsourced centres, but from union in-house to non-union out-
sourced centres. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions 
that outsourcing leads to new forms of labour market segmentation and inequal-
ity for workers performing similar tasks in the same industry.
Other sector-specific research has focused on construction and transportation 
services, where the accelerated use of subcontracting has also led to a decline 
in wages and working conditions in both Europe and the US. While construc-
tion work has always relied on a network of contractors, market liberalisation 
in Europe and deregulation in the USA have undermined union power and 
facilitated the emergence of new non-union competitors. In Europe, this has 
taken the form of transnational contractors hiring migrant workers within the 
EU (‘posted workers’) to work on shipbuilding and construction sites for lower 
wages (Lillie, 2012). In the USA, subcontracting to non-union firms in residen-
tial construction and to owner-operators in trucking was the key strategy to 
undermine union power in those industries, leading in turn to the proliferation 
of low-wage, non-union jobs (Belzer, 1994; Milkman, 2008).
Some research has also addressed the impact of outsourcing in manufacturing. 
In the European auto industry, for example, the major players adopted three 
strategies that have led to two-tier wage and employment conditions (Doellgast 
and Greer, 2007): the establishment of separate subsidiaries with second-tier 
union contracts; the greater outsourcing of parts production; and the use of con-
tractors to staff on-site activities – including those for ancillary services such as 
logistics, cleaning, food service and maintenance, as well as temporary staffing 
agencies to fill core jobs in assembly and parts production. Consistent with this 
grounded research, econometric studies of German manufacturing have found 
that while the wages in primary manufacturing firms have not fallen, their labour 
costs have – supporting the idea that they have shifted some work to lower-wage 
contractors to reduce overall labour costs (Dustmann et al., 2014).
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Other research demonstrates that workers in outsourced operations face far 
worse health and safety conditions or higher violations of basic labour standards 
and labour and employment laws (Weil, 2014). Compared to primary firms, 
contractor firms have shown substantially higher injury rates or safety hazards in 
the US context (Boden, Spieler and Wagner, 2016), and specifically in the US 
petrochemical industry (Rebitzer, 1995), mining (Muzaffar et al., 2013), truck-
ing (Belzer, 1994) and among staffing agency workers in a variety of occupations 
(Foley et al., 2014; Morris, 1999). Franchising is another fast-growing form of 
contracting out; and recent US research shows that establishments owned by 
franchisees have a 24 per cent higher probability of non-compliance with wage 
and hour laws than those owned by franchisors (the primary firm) – attributable 
to differences in the profit models and cost pressures that each type of establish-
ment faces (Ji and Weil, 2015). 
Research on the outcomes of outsourcing for knowledge and professional 
workers is less developed, and the evidence is more mixed. In theory, if 
 outsourcing creates a more specialised division of labour across firms, then 
workers with specialised occupational skills (or higher human capital) should 
have substantial bargaining power and be able to extract rents, for example, 
in engineering, IT or consulting firms. A specialised division of labour should 
also allow these firms to compete on the basis of differentiated or ‘value-added’ 
services, facilitating their revenue growth that in theory may be shared with 
workers. Moreover, workers should benefit from knowledge-sharing and pro-
motion opportunities. One study, for example, found that dieticians and food 
service managers had better job promotion opportunities if they worked for a 
contract food service company than if they were a direct-hire employee of an 
individual school or hospital (Erickcek et al., 2003). By contrast, research on 
the unbundling of corporate functions (law, accounting, HR functions, shared 
services) provides no clear evidence regarding the quality of jobs in outsourced 
high-skilled occupations (Sako et al., 2013). 
In Europe, a particularly important stream of research has examined the 
restructuring of public sector service provision in response to government pres-
sure to reduce costs, as well as strategies of the EU to create integrated markets 
for services across member states. New Public Management strategies have 
included a blurring of boundaries between the public and the private sectors 
via public–private partnerships or the use of market-based incentives, as well 
as complete outsourcing of traditionally public sector work to private sector 
vendors that are increasingly trans-European providers. This trend accelerated 
as the EU and member countries adopted widespread austerity policies from 
2012 on. Two large-scale research projects investigating the impact of public 
service outsourcing (WORKS and PIQUE)2 provide substantial evidence that it 
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has led to the deterioration in pay, benefits and a range of working conditions – 
 including longer or flexible work hours, understaffing and work intensification, 
and job insecurity – across a wide swathe of different types of services and differ-
ent countries (Flecker and Hermann, 2011; Flecker and Meil, 2010; Hermann 
and Flecker, 2012; Vrangbæk et al., 2013). Case studies showing specific sec-
toral dynamics also document lower wages, employment contracts or work 
 intensification in health care (Greer et al., 2013), adult social care (Grimshaw 
et al., 2015; Rubery and Urwin, 2011) and municipal services (Mori, 2015).
More importantly, Rubery and her colleagues have been at the forefront of 
documenting the ways in which public sector outsourcing and privatisation exac-
erbates gender inequality as women have historically dominated public sector 
jobs and have been the hardest hit by austerity measures designed to outsource 
public sector services (Rubery and Karamessini, 2013). After two  decades of 
proactive gender policy and economic progress for women in Europe, the aus-
terity turn has undermined many of those gains (Rubery, 2015). The intersec-
tion between outsourcing and European migration patterns is also noteworthy in 
current research, as the fragmentation of work across organisational boundaries 
places disproportionate risks on migrant workers who are least able to organise 
or who may or may not be incorporated into union strategic campaigns (Danaj 
and Sippola, 2015; Haidinger, 2015).
In the context of these broad-brush trends, however, the comparative insti-
tutionalist research tradition that Rubery and her colleagues have fostered does 
offer theory and evidence for the effectiveness of political and strategic action 
(see Chapters 1 and 3). The devil is in the detail, as research illustrates how 
national and local institutions and activist strategies have shaped the magnitude 
of outsourcing’s effects. Unions and social movement organisations have used 
different points of institutional leverage to moderate the negative impact of 
outsourcing or to resist it all together. Doellgast’s (2012) careful comparison 
of the dynamics of outsourcing in German and US telecommunications dem-
onstrates, for example, the specific mechanisms through which union power 
and co-determination rights were used to limit the unilateral power of manag-
ers and the extent and conditions of outsourcing in Germany. And Doellgast 
and colleagues’ (2016) follow-on study of telecommunications call centres in 
10 countries found that while outsourcing produced wage inequality between 
in-house and outsourced or externalised groups of workers, the magnitude of 
the effect depended importantly on how national institutions shaped the cost 
structures faced by employers as well as the sources of bargaining power that 
unions could call upon (Doellgast et al., 2016). 
Rubery and colleagues’ recent work on local government outsourcing illus-
trates how public sector sourcing decisions are complex and varied – depending 
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on the extent to which the public and private sectors differ in terms of pay levels, 
union coverage and opposition, collective bargaining provisions, labour market 
protections, the level of the minimum wage and differences in the legal status of 
public and private sector workers (Grimshaw et al., 2015). As a result, public 
sector outsourcing calculations are complex, with outcomes shaped by political 
contestation, which varies markedly across national and local institutional con-
texts. This variety – and new strategies for organising and solidarity across organi-
sational boundaries and supply chains – is illustrated in a series of recent case 
studies of resistance to public and private sector outsourcing across Europe (Danaj 
and Sippola, 2015; Doellgast et al., 2017; Drahokoupil, 2015; Haidinger, 2015).
Conclusions: Implications for research and policy
Recent scholarship has advanced our understanding of how and why organisa-
tional restructuring and outsourcing has occurred in advanced economies and 
what the general implications are for working people. But there is much to be 
done. Accurate data on the prevalence and growth of outsourcing appears to 
be weak in both Europe and North America, as government statistical agen-
cies typically do not collect data based on contractor status, and researchers 
have often relied on industry or trade association surveys or consulting reports 
instead. Nationally representative data linking contractor status to wages and 
employment conditions are also rarely available. Thus, at a general level, we do 
not know how much organisational restructuring and outsourcing have occurred 
and the extent to which they have contributed to stagnant wages and wage 
inequality in advanced economies – information that is needed to inform public 
policy debates.
In the meantime, however, researchers can and should pursue the kind of 
grounded, industry- or occupation-specific studies that can inform public policy. 
These studies may be undertaken from the perspective of the contracting indus-
try (autos, hotels, health care) but also from the angle of contractor industries 
(third-party logistics companies, professional and business services). Industry 
studies can capitalise on a rich combination of sources – including govern-
ment and administrative data, media analysis, company and union archival data, 
interviews with industry actors and on-site observation – which taken together 
can advance our understanding of the complex causal mechanisms linking firm 
organisational strategies to better or worse employment outcomes for working 
people (Bernhardt et al., 2015).
Industry studies of this kind are also important because the dynamics of 
outsourcing and the different forms that networked organisations take vary 
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according to the institutional legacies and market dynamics of specific sectors. 
Plotting complex network ties is also a first step to examine a relatively unex-
plored topic  – highlighted in Rubery’s theoretical perspective – that is, the 
importance of asymmetrical power relations between and among primary and 
contractor firms. Strategic analysis of power relations is critical to identify the 
points of leverage for negotiating better outcomes for workers across supply 
chains, to pinpoint opportunities for public policy reform and to begin to con-
struct models of new inter-organisational industrial relations systems to repre-
sent workers’ rights.
Research on the differential effects of outsourcing on distinct demographic 
and occupational groups is also undeveloped. There have been some important 
studies of public sector restructuring and its unequal gender effects, as well as 
case studies of migrant or posted workers. And some studies of organisational 
restructuring have highlighted outcomes for certain occupations and demo-
graphic groups. But we lack deep empirical investigations at the intersection of 
organisational restructuring on the one hand, and race, gender and ethnicity on 
the other. 
In addition, as we have noted, emerging research has identified some 
promising forms of collective action via coalitions of labour, community, con-
sumer and other constituencies in both the USA and Europe. Unions in some 
cases have moved beyond only protecting their core members to embrace 
a broader advocacy agenda for the rights of migrants and other ‘peripheral’ 
workers. But a central question for future research is whether these promis-
ing examples can diffuse more broadly – or get to scale. Which mobilisation 
strategies or policy reforms are the most effective in securing minimum job 
and income security as the employer of record and location of work continu-
ally shift? Broad-based campaigns, such as minimum- and living-wage cam-
paigns, are particularly effective as they disproportionately affect low-wage 
workers – often working for subcontractors or franchised operations. In the 
USA, the ‘fight for fifteen’ is an example of a broad grassroots movement 
to raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour that rapidly and unexpectedly 
moved into the mainstream, with many states and localities now raising their 
minimums to at least $10 per hour and some to $15. But that still does not 
deal with challenges of ensuring workers’ rights when existing employment 
laws continue to assume that the employment relationship is between a single 
employer and employee. 
The challenge, as Rubery and her colleagues point out, is to rethink employ-
ment policy to respond to the growing importance of networked forms of 
organisation and fragmented work. As organisational boundaries have become 
blurred, assigning responsibility for poor job quality, poor customer service, 
84 Making work more equal
inefficient use of resources or poor economic performance becomes ambiguous. 
Employment law and labour market policy that assumes a single employer may 
mean that no one is accountable or that legal liability falls on less powerful and 
less well-resourced organisations. The most vulnerable workers are the most at 
risk from the fragmentation of work. But the lack of regulation may also be det-
rimental to the interests of employers and production networks, as unfettered 
competition may undermine the collaboration and coordination among capital-
ists necessary for innovation and growth. A better balance of power among 
stakeholders in production networks, achieved through government policy and 
legislation and new forms of worker representation, can improve outcomes for 
workers, citizens and national economies more generally. Meeting this chal-
lenge will require another type of collaboration – among researchers, practi-
tioners and policy-makers. 
Notes
1 This chapter benefited greatly from the joint work of Bernhardt and colleagues 
(2015).
2 WORKS (Work Organisation and Restructuring in the Knowledge Society) Project – 
Changes in Work (www.worksproject.be); PIQUE (Privatisation of public ser-
vices and the impact on quality, employment and productivity) Project (http://www.
pique.at).
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The challenges for fair voice in liberal 
market economies
Mick Marchington and Tony Dundon 
Introduction
The notion of fair voice sits centre stage in arguments about the relative 
importance of employee, organisational and societal goals because it connects 
directly with questions of managerial prerogative and social legitimacy. This 
creates  tensions which are particularly apparent in liberal market economies 
(LMEs) – such as the UK, Australia, Ireland and New Zealand – where the law 
plays a relatively limited role in structuring workplace practice. In the case of 
the UK, following the decision to leave the EU in June 2016, it is uncertain 
whether the rhetoric and reality of fair voice will move further away from 
the EU social model. The notion of ‘fair voice’ is difficult to define because 
it does not relate to any one specific form of voice but can be seen through a 
variety of mechanisms, whether formal or informal, direct or representative. 
While some  forms of representative participation might be seen as getting 
closer to achieving fair voice owing to the involvement of independent and 
effective trade unions, other forms of voice such as informal or individual chan-
nels may engage and involve workers in decisions and so achieve a degree of 
perceived fairness. An evaluation of ‘fair voice’ depends on who is asked, and 
when, about their level of participation. We return to this issue throughout 
the chapter.
This chapter draws upon the long-standing and distinctive academic con-
tribution of Professor Jill Rubery by posing multiple challenges to the idea of 
‘fair’ voice. This relates to her work in areas such as disorganised organisational 
 hierarchies, feminisation, formal and informal labour market segmentation, 
flexibility and liberal market economic regimes. It reviews the notion of fair 
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voice via a discussion of three key challenges. Firstly, it challenges simplistic 
definitions which treat fair voice as a uni-dimensional concept by showing how 
formal/informal and direct/representative practices operate beyond and within 
organisations in LMEs. These include European Works Councils (EWCs), part-
nership agreements, joint consultative committees (JCCs), problem-solving 
groups and informal interactions between line managers and staff, many of which 
operate alongside each other in large organisations. Also, the terms are elastic 
and debatable, subject to different interpretations by the principal actors: gov-
ernments, employers and their organisations, trade unions, professional associa-
tions, HR and line managers, and employees. Secondly, it challenges the notion 
that employers have complete freedom to decide how to deliver fair voice. At 
an institutional level, so-called ‘hard’ national and transnational level forces 
shape voice through legislation (e.g. information and consultation or EWCs). 
Voice is also shaped by ‘soft’ forces – for example, by the Advisory Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service (Acas) or the Involvement and Participation Association 
(IPA) in the UK. At the intermediary level, lead bodies for employers and 
trade unions, professional associations, specialist bodies promoting partnership, 
management consultants and ‘movements’ such as Engage for Success have 
also captured space to promote specific forms of voice (Marchington, 2015a). 
Thirdly, it explores challenges to fair voice at the organisational level where 
formal practices can be undermined by managerial preferences for informal 
voice which is difficult to sustain. Moreover, contracting-out, agency work 
and multi-employer partnerships make it difficult to identify the employer at 
many workplaces, further fragmenting efforts to achieve fair voice (Marchington 
et al., 2005).
Challenges of definition: meanings and interpretations  
of fair voice 
The range of terms used to describe employee voice makes it a highly debat-
able concept. For many managers, ‘information-sharing’ or ‘communications’ 
are regarded as normal and legitimate, symbolising fair expectation. However, 
for trade union officials, and even government policy advisors, labels such as 
‘participation’, ‘consultation’ and ‘bargaining’ constitute voice systems. Much 
depends on context: size of the employer, labour and product markets, occu-
pational mix, different management styles, inter-organisational relationships 
and whether or not the labour force is unionised. The choice of which prac-
tices to adopt is shaped by the degree of power and influence exercised by 
 different actors. Negotiation, for example, implies mangers agree to relinquish 
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some of their prerogative when they negotiate and make agreements with union 
officials representing the interests of workers. Employee involvement, on the 
other hand, may seek ideas but the final decision remains with management. 
Given these different interpretations and approaches, we define employee voice 
broadly, following Boxall and Purcell (2011: 162), as incorporating a range of 
mechanisms ‘which enable, and at times empower employees, directly and indi-
rectly, to contribute to decision-making’.
Further meanings arise when considering employee voice in international 
terms. For instance, in many European countries, statutory rights suggest a 
more equal or fairer system for employees to have a say on matters that affect 
them, such as via EWCs. In other liberal market countries however, such as 
the USA or Australia, there is limited emphasis on statutory provisions for fair 
voice, so much depends on managerial prerogative, union bargaining power or 
the role of other institutional actors. But things also vary between European 
countries and voice can be tailored to fit national customs and cultures. In 
the UK and Ireland, for instance, the content of the European Directive for 
Employee Information and Consultation (the ICE Directive) has been transposed 
with minimal  regulatory power and enforcement (Hall et al., 2013). While the 
European ICE Directive explicitly called for indirect forms of employee voice 
with elected representatives, the transposed UK and Irish regulations allow 
for direct and individual channels of communication and information-sharing 
(Dobbins et al., 2016). 
The meanings of voice can further differ depending on the presence or 
absence of a trade union. It is common for non-unionised companies to use the 
terms ‘empowerment’ and ‘communications’, even when they utilise repre-
sentative forums such as EWCs (Ackers et al., 2004). In Britain, the Workplace 
Employment Relations Study (WERS) surveys indicate that the majority of 
managers generally prefer to consult with workers in more direct than indirect 
ways: only 10 per cent of all workplaces use a combination of both representa-
tive and direct forms of voice, while 37 per cent of establishments use neither of 
these methods (van Wanrooy et al., 2013: 66).
There are two underlying philosophical perspectives that can help conceptu-
alise fairness in relation to voice. First is the idea of political citizenship where 
fairness relates to ideas derived from societal democracy. Hyman (2015: 12) 
has observed that one cannot justify the notion of a ‘free citizen in the public 
sphere but a slave in the workplace’. Rights and access to voice as a citizen of a 
democratic country, say in political elections or referenda, do not end inside the 
factory or workplace. In this context, fair voice is seen as a fundamental human 
right and the principle of having an input on decision-making at workplace level 
is as legitimate as voting in political elections. A second perspective assesses 
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how fair voice relates to economic efficiency ideas. The argument here is that 
allowing workers and/or their representatives to contribute to management 
decisions may encourage higher levels of commitment and ultimately better 
performance (Marchington et al., 2016). Some forms of voice, such as partner-
ship, draw upon both approaches, but ‘patrimonial capitalism’ (Piketty, 2013) 
allows managerial decision-making to take place beyond independent scrutiny, 
thus providing a further challenge to the concept fair voice. 
One way of addressing the challenge is to specify voice with informed preci-
sion, using a fourfold schema including the ‘degree’, ‘level’, ‘scope’ and ‘form’ 
of the mechanisms used in practice (Wilkinson et al., 2013). Degree is central to 
ideas of fair voice, as it captures the extent to which employees have a genuine 
or influential say about organisational matters that concern them (Marchington 
et al., 2016). A stronger degree occurs when employees, either directly or indi-
rectly, can influence decisions traditionally reserved for management. By con-
trast, a diluted degree of fair voice is evident when employees have little or no 
say, perhaps merely being informed by management of their decisions. Second 
is the level at which voice occurs, covering a small work unit, department, divi-
sion or company but this is based on judgements about the appropriate level to 
make decisions. For example, asking all employees for a detailed input about 
new corporate investment plans would be too far-removed from employees’ 
day-to-day matters, though it would offer an opportunity for fair voice if work-
ers representatives were involved via EWCs or JCCs. Likewise, deciding to 
restructure a team or department without any input from front-line managers 
or employees would be unfair for those most likely to be affected by the deci-
sion. Third is the scope of voice, which relates to the issues on which workers or 
their representatives are involved. Scope can range from relatively minor work 
task issues to more substantive employment conditions outcomes; for example, 
involvement in procedures to ensure equal pay or promotion criteria may signal 
wide scope and potentially fairer voice opportunities (Rubery and Fagan, 1995; 
Rubery, 2015a). 
There are three main forms of voice. First is representative voice, where 
employee voice is indirect and heard through formal bodies such as trade unions, 
JCCs, negotiating committees and employee forums. This category is typically 
high in degree and wide in scope, providing opportunities for employee repre-
sentatives to discuss issues with managers, or where collective bargaining exists 
to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. Second is direct voice, where 
individual employees receive information and have a say through mechanisms 
including team briefing or problem-solving groups, suggestion schemes, engage-
ment surveys or social media platforms, which have all become more widespread 
in LMEs (Marchington, 2015a). Direct voice may be fair or not, depending 
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on the scope and depth of a particular mechanism. For example, Rubery and 
Fagan (1995) recognised the issue of gender blindness in employment relations 
systems, including voice and participation, pointing out that many sections of 
the labour force can be marginalised or silenced. At the same time, however, 
individualised direct channels may offer new avenues for voice as front-line 
managers are allowed to provide opportunities for team members to offer ideas 
(Cox et al., 2009). Third is informal voice, which has been seen as either a substi-
tute for or a supplement to formal voice mechanisms (Marchington and Suter, 
2013). It includes ad hoc interactions between front-line managers and employ-
ees, typically sharing information and ideas through conversations. Research 
across LMEs indicates that informal voice is important not just in small firms, 
where formal mechanisms are less prevalent, but also in larger organisations 
(Marchington, 2015b). Informal dialogue may be an important lubricant to fair 
voice as communications are seen as friendly and regular, adding to a broader 
engagement culture where processes are often regarded as more important than 
formal structures (Schaufeli, 2014). However, as Purcell (2014: 251) notes, 
much of the engagement literature ignores the strong-established connections 
between voice and fairness, justice and trust, preferring to focus primarily on 
organisational performance. 
This demonstrates voice is more complex than a straightforward continuum 
from no involvement (information) to extensive workforce involvement (con-
trol). The extent to which voice practices are perceived as fair depends on the 
degree to which they are embedded, the ways in which they overlap, the scope 
of topics covered and the level at which voice decisions are taken. However, 
there are also challenges from beyond the workplace in how hard and soft regu-
latory and intermediary forces shape fair voice. 
Challenges for fair voice from beyond organisations: hard,  
soft and intermediary forces 
The role of ‘hard’ institutional forces in shaping voice at organisational level
Most of the literature examines voice at the organisational level. To varying 
degrees, factors of interest tend to include product and labour markets, organi-
sation size, culture, management choice, and union or non-union structure 
(Marchington, 2007). Unfortunately, as Rubery (2015b) notes, these studies 
tend to ignore how regulatory institutions can shape voice practices for more 
inclusive labour markets. Furthermore, Rubery and Grimshaw (2003) point 
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out that these institutions in different countries can constrain and reconfigure 
employer choice about employment policy and practice. As such, the perceived 
fairness of voice can be facilitated or undermined in LMEs by the application of 
employment laws or by national business systems operating within a country. In 
short, institutional structures and systems do matter.
In comparison with coordinated market economies (CMEs), ‘hard’ insti-
tutional forces have a lesser role in shaping mandated voice rights in the UK, 
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and the USA. Dundon and colleagues (2014: 
9) report that at a transnational EU policy level, lobbying from employers and 
employer bodies, such as the US Chambers of Commerce, has been successful 
in influencing employee information regulations before wider and formal public 
consultations. In particular, employers were able to persuade policy agencies to 
support information obligations via direct voice rather than wider collective rep-
resentative bargaining channels for ICE. At national levels the situation was simi-
lar to the minimalist rights to fair voice found at the transnational – European 
Union (EU) – level. In Ireland, for example, the harder EU regulations for voice 
were transposed with a conscious ‘light-touch’ impact on employer obligations 
(Dobbins et al., 2016). In the UK, laws that support employees to receive infor-
mation and be consulted by their employer were perceived by Taylor and col-
leagues (2009) to constitute little more than ‘an umbrella full of holes’, broadly 
compatible with other concerns about the future of the UK’s tradition of liberal 
collectivist forms of employment regulation (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012).
However, light-touch regulation does not imply totally unfettered free choice 
for employers (Edwards et al., 2007). In the UK, worker participation was 
shaped partly by public policy for representative voice which reflected govern-
ment views on best practice partnership (Ackers, 2010: 69). In Ireland, volun-
tary rather than statutory partnership was endorsed by government policy with 
evidenced gains for workers and unions (Geary, 2008). Moreover, legislation on 
ICE and EWCs means some employers in LMEs are bound by statutory laws that 
mandate certain forms of voice. Both Hall and Purcell (2012) and Marchington 
(2015a) found that where large employers in the UK had used JCCs and/or 
partnership forums for some time, they were quite comfortable with these 
arrangements and open to EWCs if they had locations in several EU countries. 
In Australia, too, the Federal Court has powers to fine employers for failing to 
consult workers properly. However, when institutional support is withdrawn 
or seen as partial, incentives to maintain existing forms of voice can dissipate 
if government and employer support is lukewarm (Roche and Teague, 2014).
Consequently, minimalist ‘hard’ institutional forces have a limited impact 
on managerial choice, which raises questions about the extent of fair voice for 
employees across LME regimes. Any specific impact on direct and  informal 
96 Making work more equal
voice is likely to be minimal because these forms of engagement are not included 
in legislation, but ‘hard’ institutions can shape representative voice, particularly 
EWCs and some ICE forums, if the organisations concerned fall within the remit 
of statutory laws. The limited impact of fair voice can further be reinforced by 
national business systems which promote flexible labour markets and privilege 
choice, informality and light-touch regulation. As such, while ‘hard’ institutional 
forces can influence the take-up of representative voice they cannot shape the 
fairness of the processes accompanying it, and thus in themselves may not be able 
to address the challenges to fair voice. The impact of ICE in the UK and Ireland 
showed that ‘hard’ institutional forces were treated in ‘a reluctant and half-
hearted manner’ by employers, who – while implementing voice forums within 
their own businesses – traditionally favour the primacy of flexibility and choice 
within a voluntarist employment relations regime (Hall et al., 2013). 
The role of ‘soft’ institutional forces in shaping voice at organisational level
Given the limited direct impact of ‘hard’ institutional laws mandating worker 
voice in LMEs, perhaps ‘softer’ institutional forces designed to improve voice, 
employee well-being and organisational performance by supporting partner-
ship, engagement and workplace cooperation stand a better chance of being 
adopted because they are better aligned with the voluntarist traditions in these 
countries. These take two broad forms: 
(1) Specific ‘soft’ institutional initiatives funded by government, designed 
to embed workplace partnership, have been tried in the UK, Ireland, Australia 
and New Zealand since the mid-1990s. These can be regarded as ‘soft’ because 
they do not compel employers to implement specific voice mechanisms but 
rather persuade them to adopt the principles of mutuality (Stuart et al., 2011). 
Consequently, this type of voice is assumed, in the LME context, to have more 
chance of being implemented at organisation level because it is seen as less rigid 
by senior managers and employers. However, it is susceptible to collapse, espe-
cially when economic conditions deteriorate and/or political power struggles in 
government change priorities because they are not enshrined in law. 
(2) Longer-standing government and other semi-autonomous organisational 
schemes that may help lubricate fairer voice on a voluntary basis continue 
to figure prominently in LMEs. Examples include Acas in the UK and the 
Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) in Ireland,1 both of which publish 
codes of practice and information sheets, as well as run seminars for practition-
ers which can be seen to promote fairer systems for voice. For example, Stuart 
and colleagues (2011) demonstrate how Acas officials played a key role in help-
ing to support partnership and workplace cooperation. Moreover, because they 
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build trusting networks with practitioners over time, their ideas for voice have 
a greater chance of acceptance. As with Rights Commissioners in Ireland and 
Fair Work Commissioners in Australia, officials and advisors are recognised as 
‘impartial, objective and independent’ which adds legitimacy to their role and 
influence – unlike private consultancy firms which are typically hired by man-
agement and openly biased towards employer views (Stuart et al., 2011: 3802). 
‘Soft’ institutional forces have shaped representative and direct voice at 
organisational level in Australia and New Zealand because managers and unions 
were willing recipients of the advice offered. The scope of voluntary support 
also seemed to allow a degree of flexibility which appealed to employers. 
However, as many voice initiatives were relatively short-lived, the longev-
ity of fairness for employees or impact across the whole economy remained 
in some doubt (Marchington, 2015b). Similarly, in Ireland, many workplace 
partnerships were endorsed as exemplar best-practice models by the state 
institution, the National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP). In 
these cases,  however, as economic uncertainty increased, cooperative forms 
of engagement faltered despite the good intentions among managers, employ-
ees and unions (Dobbins and Dundon, 2016). Several factors exposed the 
limitations of softer institutions supporting representative voice. For example, 
local managers had difficulty sustaining collaborative initiatives and fulfilling 
employee expectations for fair voice, often owing to external economic pres-
sures that were beyond their control and that of the supportive state institu-
tions. In addition, senior managers at multinational HQs used their influence 
to constrain local managerial discretion for partnership arrangements. While 
some semi-autonomous state institutions provided a lubricant for voice by 
maintaining networks of trust between employers and trade unions and helped 
to mediate issues and tensions, in others the impact on employers was less sig-
nificant and the longevity of fair voice constrained owing to external economic 
and political pressures.
The role of intermediary forces in shaping voice at organisational level
Given that LMEs traditionally have highly deregulated systems for employee 
voice, it is surprising to find so little interest in the role of intermediary forces 
which operate between government and employers, independent of both. As 
Edwards and colleagues (2002: 6) note, ‘there remains a large gap (the missing 
middle) between public policy and what happens on the ground, and the oppor-
tunity to narrow it should be grasped’. These ‘intermediary forces’ include 
employers’ organisations, professional associations and other bodies with a spe-
cialist interest in voice and engagement. 
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Many employers’ organisations provide advice and support to promote voice 
that may not otherwise exist among their members. Both the Confederation 
for British Industry (CBI) in the UK and the Irish Business and Employers’ 
Confederation (IBEC) support voluntary voice practices, particularly direct and 
informal voice, and many members have EWCs or other forms of representative 
voice. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) has had 
a strong interest in voice for many years, funding research, running an annual 
UK conference, advising members about the potential impact of EU legislation 
as well as contributing to the Employee Engagement Task Force and the IPA 
Council. The CIPD believes a flexible approach which fits with organisational 
needs is most appropriate, including representative voice where trade unions 
or staff associations exist. These ideas are disseminated to HR specialists via 
national and local presentations, research reports from CIPD-funded projects 
(e.g., Alfes et al., 2010; Dundon et al., 2004) and its monthly magazine. The 
CIPD Ireland branch also held a research conference on employee engagement 
(Hickland, 2011). While the potential for the CIPD to shape voice practices is 
potentially sizeable, it is hard to be precise about its contribution because ideas 
are diffused through a range of different channels. In addition, the IPA has had a 
specific interest in employee voice for many years, including its role in promot-
ing partnership and representative participation.
Not all intermediary bodies have a ‘permanent’ presence but they can still 
influence the implementation of voice. A good example here is Engage for Success 
in the UK, which has received support from government to make employee 
 engagement more visible (see also MacLeod and Clarke, 2009). It is funded 
by members, either by seconding staff or providing technical expertise, though 
whether it will remain a key part of the voice agenda or merely be the latest fad 
and fashion in management thought is contested (Guest, 2014). Marchington’s 
(2015a, b) research demonstrated that in some UK and Irish organisations, 
employee engagement went way beyond surveys to include training opportuni-
ties for all staff, organisational change programmes and, in relation to fair and 
independent voice, employee champions drawn from the workforce to sit on key 
committees. For example, one large, highly unionised firm had set up a system of 
workplace teams which had autonomy to identify work improvements within the 
context of a strong representative voice structure. Engage for Success encourages 
organisations to create dedicated programmes by drawing upon ideas from across 
the network but adapting them to suit their own organisation context. 
While intermediary forces can shape representative voice, they are more 
likely to influence direct and informal voice; the latter in particular fits well 
with the discourse of flexibility and voluntarism associated with LMEs. Before 
moving to the next section, two points need to be reiterated. Firstly, in LMEs 
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with light-touch regulation all forms of voice are susceptible to break down 
if they have not been well-embedded with other organisational HR prac-
tices; if they become susceptible to economic or political change factors; or if 
they are perceived as unfair by employees or unions (Dobbins and Gunnigle, 
2009). Such fragility is likely to be even more prevalent for informal voice 
(Marchington, 2015b). Intermediary forces are potentially unstable because 
they are not enshrined in law but rely on flexible business systems and neolib-
eral political ideologies. Secondly, fair (and successful) voice initiatives tend to 
be copied by other organisations, either directly or via consultants, and thus 
spread more widely. Accordingly, the process of transfer is not solely one-way 
from intermediary level to organisations but also takes place internally, par-
ticularly among foreign-owned multinational corporations (MNCs) (Lavelle 
et al., 2010).
It appears that ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ institutional and ‘intermediary’ forces are 
active across LMEs, though their role varies between countries, as Table 5.1 
shows. This draws on research by Marchington (2015b) and Dobbins and 
Dundon (2016) to show that ‘hard’ regulations shape patterns of representa-
tive voice more than they do direct forms. Intermediary institutional forces are 
important for representative voice in different economic regimes (Rubery and 
Grimshaw, 2003), though the impact is confined to the organisations actively 
involved in such initiatives and institutional arrangements. The contribution of 
intermediary forces to fair voice is harder to evaluate given their primary target 
on direct and informal voice, both of which can lack underpinning independent, 
formal structures. 
Challenges for fair voice at the organisational level 
Front-line managers and informal voice
While some would argue that fair voice is only achievable through independent 
trade unions representing their members through high-level committees such as 
EWCs, it could be argued that these are not sufficient on their own to embed 
voice effectively at workplace level (Wilkinson et al., 2013). Indeed, for many 
years unions have not been good at including the voices of women and ethnic 
minorities, although recent strategies have been designed to correct the gender 
representation gap with specific committees to input union decision-making 
(Kirton, 2015). Fair voice might well rely on a mix of practices at different 
levels, including the opportunity for workers to raise issues directly with their 
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front-line manager at any time. Because blockages can occur within managerial 
and union hierarchies, informal voice may fill some of these gaps. 
Evidence suggests that workers like informal voice as it gives them a chance 
to engage directly with front-line managers. Some find it easier to communicate 
with their front-line managers on a one-to-one basis because they are nervous 
about speaking in large groups (Marchington and Suter, 2013). Informal dia-
logue may provide a conduit to fairer voice from the perspective of employees 
because this allows workers to hear about new developments and provides 
them with an opportunity to discuss matters immediately at a level which is 
directly relevant. As Purcell and Georgiadis (2007: 197) note, ‘employers who 
want to gain the maximum value from voice systems would do well to note 
that all the evidence points to the need for direct face-to-face exchange with 
employees at their work stations and in groups’. Similarly, in organisations with 
formal non-union employee representation (NER) committees, some employ-
ees found their immediate supervisor more responsive to their needs and tended 
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Legal regulation via EU laws and 
directives in UK and Ireland, 
and federal Court in Australia
National business system in each 
country supports voluntary 
light-touch regulations for 
voice
Representative voice at organisations 
covered by these regulations








Representative and direct voice, 
typically limited to those actively 
involved in initiative
All forms of voice to some extent, but 
especially direct and informal voice
Intermediary 
forces
Employers organisations (and 
trade union federations)
Professional associations
Organisations specialising in 
voice and engagement
Some representative forms of voice, 
but more the promotion of direct, 
flexible and informal voice
Direct and informal voice but also 
representative voice if already exists
Direct and informal voice, 
employee engagement and some 
representative voice
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to raise concerns with line managers rather than utilising formal NER channels 
(Cullinane et al., 2014). Dundon et al. (1999: 262) found that informal commu-
nications at workplace level helped ameliorate some of the harsher working con-
ditions felt by employees in small firms; in particular, informal voice facilitated 
friendly relations among co-workers and gave garage mechanics work satisfac-
tion because they could discuss technical challenges and speak directly with cus-
tomers. Informal voice can also be attractive to front-line managers because 
research indicates that informal chats account for the vast majority of what they 
learn about employee feelings, and it also gives them the chance to discuss issues 
directly with workers and offers some choice about whether or not to accept 
or modify employee ideas for improvement (Marchington and Suter, 2013). 
However, as we have already suggested, informal interactions alone are unlikely 
to achieve fair voice without clear underpinning from formal practices and a 
strongly stated commitment from senior managers that workers’ ideas and con-
tributions are vitally important.
Accessing fair voice across organisational boundaries 
The way in which employee voice practices operate across organisational 
boundaries at multi-employer workplaces raises even greater challenges for 
fair voice because authority, power and trust can be further undermined by 
added layers of subcontracting and multiple contracts. Several Manchester-
based research projects (e.g. Grimshaw et al., 2010; Marchington et al., 2005; 
Rubery and Urwin, 2011) provide evidence that workers employed across 
organisational boundaries enjoy less voice than their in-house colleagues at the 
same workplace. In short, ‘non-citizen’ workers in these contexts experience 
a double whammy. They suffer not just from the usual hazards that arise from 
being the weaker party to a traditional employment contract, but also from the 
additional risks of having their work governed by commercial contracts over 
which they have no influence and whose systems offer them little or no oppor-
tunity for voice. 
This is especially problematic for workers employed for relatively short peri-
ods of time at a particular site, such as agency supply teachers (Hebson et al., 
2003). In such situations, agency workers can move between establishments reg-
ularly, consequently feeling little identification with or involvement in issues at 
the host organisation. Missing out on vital pieces of information limits the oppor-
tunity to contribute to discussions about work organisation, with or without 
unions having an active presence. Accordingly, fair voice can be found wanting 
when the proportion of contracted workers is small since they can easily be over-
looked or regarded as not important enough to be included in communications 
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available to employees at the host organisation. Moreover, if there is resentment 
to ‘external’ (agency) workers, perhaps because they are employed on lower 
rates of pay or are felt to have taken jobs from ‘internal’ workers, their chances of 
being included in formal and informal voice are also reduced (Marchington et al., 
2005). Moreover, agency and subcontract workers based at a host organisation 
can also miss out on more formal opportunities to participate – such as in-house 
suggestion schemes or JCCs – because they are not actually ‘employees’ and 
managers may be reluctant to share confidential data with people who are seen as 
peripheral or regarded as having little commitment to the host employer. 
A slightly different scenario occurs at large, multi-employer sites – such as 
airports or hospitals – where people are employed by many different organisa-
tions on a range of employment contracts, even though they are all aiming to 
provide an integrated and holistic service for customers (Grimshaw et al., 2010; 
Rubery et al., 2003). At the same time, each organisation has competing priori-
ties, a multiplicity of different management styles and occupational mixes which 
result in the emergence of representative, direct and informal voice practices 
that lack integration, consistency and alignment. The case-study research tradi-
tion has been particularly insightful in unpacking the tensions and ambiguities of 
fairness, voice and employment equity issues. 
Although mechanisms of representative and union participation have declined 
over recent decades in LME regimes such as the UK (van Wanrooy et al., 2013), 
the implementation of statutory information and consultation arrangements has 
had a mixed response. At one level, the idea of regulatory support reinvigorated 
interest in representative voice at the workplace, while at another trade unions 
have largely vacated the regulatory space for voice, perhaps seeing European-
style employee information rights as a back-door form of non-union voice (Hall 
et al., 2013). While EWCs, JCCs and some NERs offer employees some say in 
matters that affect them and their work, the barriers for those on the periphery 
of the employment relationship – agency and outsourced workers, and those 
working in public–private partnerships – can result in a lower level of access 
to these voice institutions than for those working for the dominant employer in 
these relationships. Worse still, in the case of statutory works councils, flexible 
workers have no legal recourse to collective representation. Similarly, in terms 
of outcome, in the case of JCCs or other voluntarist NER forums in the UK and 
elsewhere, agency workers can be proactively excluded by managers as well as 
core employees.
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Conclusions 
As we noted in the introduction, this chapter is part of a celebration and rec-
ognition of the academic career of Professor Jill Rubery. Many of her contribu-
tions – often in conjunction with other long-standing Manchester researchers 
such as Goodman, Marchington and Grimshaw – have instigated and extended 
key debates about labour market regulations and institutions that shape voice 
and other aspects of employment relations. Ackers (2010) analyses the way in 
which these research trajectories shaped numerous investigations into labour 
markets over the last 30 years. Rubery, in different ways, discredited the pop-
ulism of a new right political agenda of free market managerialism while ques-
tioning materialist traditions of economic Marxism as a source of realistic social 
change amidst restructured labour markets, blurred organisational boundaries 
and flexible and feminised employment patterns (Marchington et al., 2005; 
Rubery, 2015b). A body of research brought centre stage the voices of many 
of those who had become marginalised and disenfranchised from access to fair 
voice (e.g. low-paid workers, women, agency and outsourced workers, those 
in precarious jobs, and part-time and casualised contract employees). This work 
has added an important gendered and, more recently, intersectional focus to 
the study and analysis of fairness surrounding employment issues, particularly 
pay, working hours and skill, but also voice and representation in comparative 
context (Hebson and Rubery, 2017).
We acknowledge it is difficult to define, develop and sustain fair voice. 
Regulation, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s 2012 objective to promote ‘better regulation’ (OCED, 2012), 
is usually advanced as one way to ensure fairness, but the future prognosis for 
more or better regulation seems unlikely in LMEs. Opportunities for fair voice 
do exist but there are also multiple challenges to its development and sustain-
ability in LMEs, particularly the waves of light-touch regulation minimising 
deeper forms of voice. A contemporary pragmatic challenge for fair voice, at 
least among large UK and UK-based MNCs, is what to do post-Brexit. One 
response might be an extension of individualism alongside light-touch regula-
tion as part of a continued neoliberal system. A consequence of this might be 
further individualisation and flexibility for voice shaped by managerial preroga-
tive, without the checks and balances of a European social model for fairer voice. 
However, the agency influence of employers, unions and other soft institutions 
may reconfigure the agenda for fair voice to some extent in a post-Brexit world. 
For example, managers may opt to support the institutional arrangements for 
representative voice such as JCCs and EWCs, particularly if these ‘fit’ with 
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the organisation’s business objectives. This might provide the opportunity for 
employers to embed the importance of fairness, justice and best-practice effi-
ciency by signalling to employees and stakeholders the value of voice as a funda-
mental right and a major contributor to employee well-being. 
In celebrating Rubery’s career, this chapter has posed multiple challenges to 
the promotion of fair voice in LMEs within the context of global labour market 
restructuring. As we mention, the very concept of fairness is of course debat-
able. Important insights to such debates have been advanced from both the ‘case-
study’ research tradition and the use of ‘comparative international analysis’ used 
by Rubery (and others) in teasing out the complexities of work and the sources 
of power, equality and inequality in employment systems (see Beynon et  al., 
2002; Karamessini and Rubery, 2013; Marchington et al., 2005). Whether 
voice is seen as fair or not is shaped to a significant degree by forces at different 
levels: hard and soft regulations, intermediary market institutions, fragmented 
organisational structures and informal workplace relationships. These forces all 
play a role in undermining or blurring the impact of formal systems of fair voice 
within employing organisations, particularly for those workers on the periph-
ery of the labour market. Our contention is that fair voice is a legitimate and 
valuable goal, irrespective of measures of performance, although without harder 
regulations for worker rights, the achievement of fairness may remain fuzzy and 
elusive, particularly in a more uncertain post-Brexit world. 
Note
1 The WRC was formed in 2016 from previous state agencies, including the former 
Labour Relations Commission (LRC), Rights Commissioners and Equality Authority. 
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Working-time flexibility: diversification 
and the rise of fragmented time 
systems
Iain Campbell
Despite a lack of consensus concerning its meaning and measurement, labour 
market flexibility has been central to employment research and policy for at least 
three decades. Much of the impetus for its persistence comes from the stubborn 
push by neoliberal policy-makers, under the banner of flexibility, for deeper 
market liberalisation and the elimination of labour market rigidities. Even after 
the disarray and shock of the Global Financial Crisis, increased flexibility, now 
wedded with austerity politics, continues as a fundamental goal of public policy 
in most countries. 
Employment protection and wages feature prominently in ongoing 
debates on labour market flexibility, but working time is also conspicuous. At 
the same time, working time is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the flex-
ibility debate. The organisation of working time is at the centre of employer 
strategies of competition and proposals for further labour market deregulation, 
but it also figures in employee demands for improved job quality and decent 
work. At the level of practice, an array of changes, often labelled ‘flexible 
working-time arrangements’, has emerged in many industrialised societies, 
signalling a significant diversification of working-time patterns for the work-
force (Lee, 2004; Lee et al., 2007; Messenger, 2004). In some cases, the new 
working-time arrangements represent increased insecurity and precariousness 
for employees, while in other cases they are welcomed and actively pursued by 
employees. Further complicating the task of understanding this phenomenon 
is the cross-national variation in both the extent and the content of diversifica-
tion, which reveals the significance of societal systems in mediating the out-
comes of change and contestation (Berg et al., 2014; Rubery, 2005a; Rubery 
and Grimshaw, 2003). 
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This chapter explores the theme of working-time flexibility,1 seeking to dis-
entangle the meanings of the term, to develop a useful conceptual framework 
and to identify patterns of change. It concentrates on description of change 
rather than analysis of its causes and consequences. The chapter draws on reflec-
tion by numerous scholars, but it is particularly indebted to the rich vein of 
research from a labour market segmentation perspective (see Chapter 1), as it 
has been revised and reformulated in order to overcome the weaknesses of dual-
istic versions (Rubery, 2005a).
The first section, ‘What is working-time flexibility?’, examines how flexible 
working-time arrangements fit within the context of the traditional regula-
tory system, before outlining a conceptual framework that can be used for 
differentiating the varied forms of flexible working-time arrangements. The 
second section, ‘Patterns of change’, scans contemporary patterns of change in 
industrialised societies, focusing on evidence of diversification in working-time 
arrangements. The third section, ‘Fragmented time systems’, underlines the 
significance of the concept of ‘fragmented time systems’ for pursuing an analysis 
of one important set of working-time changes. The conclusion summarises the 
central arguments. 
What is working-time flexibility?
Working time is time spent engaged in activities of paid work. For employees, 
working time can be further defined as time spent at the disposal of an employer, 
who plays the major part in organising working time into ‘working-time arrange-
ments’, that is, specific schedules or rosters, for individuals or groups. Working 
time can be distinguished from non-work time, which is devoted to other activi-
ties, including tasks of personal care (such as eating, sleeping and grooming), 
tasks of unpaid household labour (such as cooking, cleaning, physical care of 
children and shopping) and what is often loosely called free time or leisure time 
(Bittman, 2016: 529). More broadly, working time can be juxtaposed to work-
ers’ own time or their (personal) life, as in formulations that refer to the chal-
lenges of work–life integration or balance (Fagan et al., 2012).
Although the concept of working time is straightforward, it is difficult to find 
a plausible definition of flexible working time. As with all calls for flexibility, the 
notion of working-time flexibility derives most of its immediate appeal from an 
implicit contrast with its antonym – rigidity or inflexibility (Campbell, 1993). 
Despite constant invocation by policy-makers of the term ‘flexibility’, scholars 
have had little success in moving much beyond this rather empty metaphor. For 
the purposes of this chapter, however, it is not necessary to settle on a definition. 
110 Making work more equal
Flexible working-time is understood here, not so much as a cohesive set of prac-
tices, amenable to tight definition, but rather as a zone for exploration.
The regulatory system and flexible working-time arrangements
In order to analyse flexible working-time arrangements it is useful to situate 
them in relation to the regulatory system for standardised working hours, which 
was established via collective bargaining and statutory regulation and which 
reached out to cover the majority of the waged workforce in most industri-
alised countries by the middle of the twentieth century (Bosch 2004, 2006). 
Like the broader Standard Employment Relation (SER) with which it is linked, 
this regulatory system fulfils several functions, including service to firms 
and the broader economy, but its central aim is protection of employees, in 
line with a principle of de-commodification (Bosch, 2004: 632–3).2 Though 
under  challenge, this regulatory system remains an important force in most 
 industrialised societies.
The regulatory system for standardised working hours comprises two main 
components: (1) a working-time standard – a standard working-time arrange-
ment; and (2) provisions for deviation from the standard. A common mis-
conception holds that flexible working-time arrangements inevitably involve 
a rupture in a regulatory system for standardised working hours. It is true that 
practices such as part-time work, evening and night work, and weekend work 
fall outside the traditional working-time standard, which can be summarily defined 
in terms of continuing (‘permanent’) full-time employment of approximately 
40 hours per week, distributed in equal daily segments over the daytime hours 
from Monday to Friday and joined with paid annual and public holiday entitle-
ments equivalent to several weeks per year (see Berg et al., 2014: 807–8). But 
this does not mean that such flexible working-time arrangements necessarily fall 
outside the regulatory system as a whole. 
Even at the height of the dominance of the traditional working-time stand-
ard, the regulatory system always incorporated elements of working-time flex-
ibility. For example, the regulatory system has always incorporated rules that 
allow employers to adjust (‘flexibilise’) standard working-time arrangements. 
For example, rules for shift work and overtime allow organisational needs – for 
example, for continuous production in manufacturing, in emergency services, 
for safety and maintenance work, or to improve capital utilisation in capital-
intensive industries – to be met. In this case, however, the rules enforce a 
compromise so that employees continue to be protected – for example, by 
imposing limits and requiring that the deviations from the standard should be 
compensated, planned, subject to agreement, safe and equitable.
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At the same time, the system always provided for elements of flexibility to suit 
individual employee needs. Recent examples include flexitime systems, which allow 
scope for workers to vary start and finish times according to individual choice or 
external constraints (as long as a set number of hours are worked and core periods 
are covered) and individual ‘right to request’ legislation, which allows employees 
to request variations to their work arrangements (Fagan et al., 2014). But the key 
historical example is paid leave arrangements, including annual leave, public holi-
days and sick leave, extended more recently into an array of family-related leave 
entitlements such as maternity, paternity, parental and other carers’ leave entitle-
ments. Paid leave arrangements are significant in that they not only help to pre-
serve health and well-being but also, more positively, allow employees to pursue 
personal needs (which may of course also be social needs associated with families 
and communities) without incurring substantial penalties as a result of absence 
from paid work or failure to be available to the employer. Such arrangements 
bridge paid work and personal life and support employees’ capacities to reduce 
the conflict between the two. Though often overlooked in narrow definitions of 
working-time arrangements in terms of weekly schedules, such paid (and unpaid) 
leave arrangements have been integral elements of the system from the start, sig-
nalling recognition of employees as individual human beings with lives outside of 
the workplace. They represent a crucial step away from the highly commodified 
forms of work such as casual work or ‘day labour’, characteristic of the late nine-
teenth century, where employees were simply suppliers of labour-time in return 
for hourly or daily wages and were dependent on employers on a recurrent day-
to-day basis for offers of work and pay (Bosch, 2006: 44–5).
A broad understanding of the regulatory system of standardised work-
ing  hours allows us to see how it functions to protect workers’ own time 
(Hinrichs, 1991: 37–8). In effect, the system establishes and defends a series of 
important temporal boundaries. Most obvious is the basic distinction between 
work time and non-work time, which in turn overlaps with another boundary 
between ‘social’ and ‘unsocial’ hours. Also important is a boundary between 
paid time and non-paid time. The notion of paid time is extended beyond 
time at the workplace through entitlements to periods of paid leave and train-
ing time, while conversely rules such as those on the definition of work time 
ensure that workers are not obliged to commit parts of their own time, either 
at the workplace or elsewhere, as unpaid time to the employer. Similarly, rules 
requiring agreement and adequate notice for changes to schedules help to con-
solidate rosters that are regular and predictable, thereby protecting workers’ 
time from the sudden incursion of work demands. And rules about the use of 
labour time support the health and safety of employees and defend against esca-
lation of work demands through intensification or extension of working hours. 
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In short, from the point of view of individual employees, the regulatory 
system of standardised working hours has always been enabling as well as con-
straining. It helps to protect and expand a realm of individual choice and helps 
employees to achieve a measure of time autonomy (Lee and McCann, 2006: 78; 
McCann, 2007). Because the system incorporates – in addition to the standard 
– provisions for flexibility to suit employer and employee needs, it would be 
inaccurate to label it as ‘rigid’ and to argue that it is the antithesis of all flexible 
working-time arrangements. On the contrary, the system readily incorporates 
at least some flexible working-time arrangements. 
It remains true that the traditional working-time standard at the heart of 
the system was framed in terms of full-time working hours and a model of 
the male breadwinner, female carer household. It was connected to a wider 
set of societal institutions, which constituted a Fordist model of employment 
(Rubery, 2005b). Because the standard functioned as a regulatory pivot and 
guided access to entitlements, not only in employment but also in social pro-
tection, it had exclusionary effects that disadvantaged workers whose employ-
ment fell outside the standard, including, in particular, women workers who 
picked up part-time schedules in order to respond to demands of caring for 
children (Vosko 2011). Many of these effects continue to be felt. Nevertheless, 
the answer is to adapt and modernise, not abandon, the regulatory system. As 
Bosch suggests, the central challenge is to modernise the traditional working-
time standard, distinguishing the form (full-time employment) from the sub-
stance (de-commodification) and pushing towards a new, flexible SER which 
would continue to serve firms and the society as a whole but would accom-
modate a more diverse workforce and more diverse patterns of participation 
in paid work. Revision in this direction, already underway in many countries, 
would build on the elements of flexibility for employees that are already in the 
system, extending these through initiatives such as new systems of paid leave 
in order to facilitate labour market transitions, good-quality part-time employ-
ment and new flexi-time systems (Bosch, 2004; 2006: 57–62; see also Fagan 
et al., 2014; Schmid, 2008). 
The policy challenge here also extends to the broad swath of casualised 
work  arrangements that have sprung up as ‘new’ forms of flexibility at the 
edges or even outside the regulatory system. McCann (2014) aptly argues that a 
modernised version of the SER can be the crucial starting point and prompt for 
designing new regulation in areas with highly casualised working-time patterns 
such as domestic work (see also, McCann and Murray, 2014). In this perspec-
tive, revising and extending the SER would figure as one element in a com-
prehensive reform agenda aimed at re-regulating for inclusive labour markets 
(Rubery, 2015). 
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Differentiating flexible working-time arrangements
Flexible working-time arrangements occur in varied forms, which have distinct 
and often contrasting implications for employees, households, firms, communi-
ties and the society as a whole (see Fagan et al., 2012: 6–7). It is vital to differ-
entiate among these forms if we are to make sense of patterns of change in the 
current period. The concept of ‘flexibility’ is not in itself adequate for this task; 
instead, it is necessary to develop a more robust analytical framework. 
An analytical framework can start with the basic division between duration 
(the number of usual working hours) and position (the distribution of usual 
working hours over the day or week).3 From the point of view of the traditional 
working-time standard, flexible working-time arrangements involve deviation: 
(1) in terms of duration (i.e. short hours below the full-time standard or long 
hours well above the standard); and/or (2) in terms of position (i.e. schedules 
that involve evening and night work or weekend work). Each of these two basic 
dimensions can in turn be divided according to the degree of variability. Is the 
duration and/or the position of the particular working-time arrangement fixed 
or does it vary in some way? 
The discussion so far allows a basic differentiation of contemporary working-
time arrangements. But the task of differentiation needs to go further. Working-
time arrangements, whether standard or flexible, differ in their impact according 
to the degree of worker control (discretion, autonomy) over the varied features 
of the working-time arrangement. With respect to the theme of flexibility, the 
pertinent question is always: flexibility for whom? The answer generally comes 
down to either the employer (the organisation) or the individual employee, 
and the most common way of denoting the division is in terms of ‘employer-
oriented flexibility’ or ‘employee-oriented flexibility’ (Campbell, 1993; Chung 
and Tijdens, 2012; Heron and Charlesworth, 2012).4 This distinction can be 
applied across all features of flexible working-time arrangements. It is most 
clearly needed in connection with arrangements that involve variation, either 
in duration or in position, but the distinction is also salient when the discussion 
turns to rosters based on relatively fixed short or long hours and relatively fixed 
schedules situated outside standard hours. 
The distinction between employer-oriented and employee-oriented flexibility 
is essential to any plausible account of working-time flexibility, but it should not 
be seen as a chasm separating two entirely distinct phenomena. It is best seen in 
terms of a spectrum, with opportunities for an overlap of interests located in the 
middle. For example, working-time accounts (time banking) can – if properly 
designed – be a mechanism that offers increased internal flexibility for employers 
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while also enhancing flexibility for employees (Fagan, 2004: 125–9; Messenger, 
2004: 181–3). Similarly, it can be noted that employer interests are not transpar-
ent; the strict pursuit of short-term interests in employer-oriented flexibility is 
not necessarily in the long-term interests of firms. Moreover, in practice even 
opposed interests may interact and lead to negotiated compromise rather than an 
open clash, as in the case of the shift-work and overtime systems incorporated into 
the system of standardised working hours. Similarly, contextual factors can modify 
the extent and form of flexibility pursued by both parties. For example, employers 
may soften their demands and accommodate the interests of employees in flexibil-
ity if they are dealing with a tight labour market and with groups of skilled workers 
who need to be retained and motivated. Conversely, lower-skilled employees may 
tolerate high levels of working-time insecurity associated with employer-oriented 
schedules if they judge that they have few alternatives (poor labour market condi-
tions, restricted access to social security, limited availability of childcare, limited 
rights in the employment contract) to improve their situation or if they feel that 
they are at least partly  compensated for their insecurity by premium rates of pay. 
Patterns of change
The framework sketched out above can assist in describing and analysing con-
temporary working-time trends, especially flexible working-time arrange-
ments. A useful starting point is the national level, reflecting the influence of 
national systems of employment and social protection and allowing us to draw 
on relatively rich sources of data on working-time arrangements at national (and 
cross-national) level. 
Description of working-time trends at the national level is often couched in 
terms of diversification, that is, the emergence of multiple flexible working-time 
arrangements in conjunction with the traditional standard (Lee et al., 2007).5 
Drawing on the above discussion, we can distinguish three ideal typical patterns 
at national level: 
1) a pattern of little diversification, in which the traditional standard remains 
dominant; 
2) a pattern of moderate to strong diversification, in which the traditional 
standard shrinks in its reach and is now supplemented by new flexible 
working-time arrangements that are embedded in the system of standard-
ised working hours; and 
3) a pattern of strong diversification, in which the traditional standard shrinks 
in its reach and is now supplemented by a proliferation of new flexible 
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working-time arrangements that are largely, if not entirely, disconnected 
from a system of standardised working hours. 
Both latter ideal types involve diversification, but they differ in terms of whether 
employees in flexible working-time arrangements are integrated into a regula-
tory system oriented to worker protection. 
The last ideal type appears as the most problematic, rarely embracing 
 working-time changes in favour of employees but instead centring on changes 
that are employer-oriented and that threaten increased precariousness for 
employees. It is useful to note here that disconnection from the system of 
protective regulation is generally associated with regulatory gaps or ‘protec-
tive gaps’ (Grimshaw et al., 2016), which provide opportunities for employers 
to avoid, either partially or totally, the conventional protections available to 
employees. Such gaps offer ‘exit options’ for employers (Jährling and Méhaut, 
2013). They include gaps that are associated with the absence of key protective 
regulations (e.g. maxima for daily or weekly working hours) or gaps owing to 
ineffective enforcement, but more commonly they are associated with exemp-
tions, exclusions, high thresholds and lengthy service requirements, which affect 
both employment regulation and the institutions of social protection (Grimshaw 
et al., 2016). Patterns of long work hours, for example, tend to spread most vig-
orously when, as in Australia, employers can use gaps that exempt them from an 
obligation to pay for overtime (Campbell, 2008: 137–9). Regulatory gaps may 
be either long-standing or only recently introduced as a result of policy changes. 
They may lead directly to easily recognised flexible working-time arrangements 
or they may unfold in a more covert way, through a weakening of the standard 
working-time arrangement. One special type of gap is located on the bound-
ary between employee and non-employee status, where artificial arrangements 
or outsourcing and long chains of subcontracting can lead to employees being 
falsely classified as non-employees and thereby excluded from most protections 
provided through employment regulation. 
 Matching advanced industrialised societies against the ideal types is difficult. 
Societies may show a leaning to one or another ideal type but they rarely fall 
neatly into just one type. As a liberal market economy, Australia, for example, 
would seem to approximate fairly closely to the third ideal type, as a result of 
shrinkage in the reach of the standard, weakening of the substance of the stand-
ard and proliferation of poor-quality working-time arrangements, including long 
hours based on unpaid overtime and varied forms of casualised part-time sched-
ules. These flexible working-time arrangements are largely disconnected from 
the regulatory system, emerging within regulatory gaps that are partly inherited 
from the past and partly created in the course of labour market deregulation 
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since the late 1980s (Campbell, 2008). Employers continue to push for further 
dismantling of the working-time entitlements embodied in modern awards, such 
as minimum shift payments, access to annual leave and penalty rates for work 
in non-social hours (Heron and Charlesworth, 2012). Nevertheless, even in the 
Australian case, it is possible to observe changes that reinforce the system, such as 
improvements in paid leave arrangements, including the introduction in 2011 of 
a comprehensive system of paid parental leave (Pocock et al., 2013). Moreover, 
it is also possible to detect elements of the second ideal type, consistent with 
the notion of a move towards a flexible SER. An individual ‘right to request’ 
flexible work is now enshrined in the National Employment Standards (Pocock 
et al., 2013) and similar principles underpin the provisions in many awards that 
allow some employees to request a conversion from casual to permanent status. 
Unfortunately, both new measures have failed to fulfil the promise of increased 
temporal autonomy for employees. They remain limited in scope and impact, 
running into difficulties because employees tend to be reluctant to put forward 
a request because they are worried about employer reprisals and do not see a 
change as feasible in their workplace (Skinner et al., 2016).
A further difficulty in assessing the reach of the ideal types stems from the 
deficiencies of standard labour force data in identifying and differentiating new 
flexible working-time arrangements. National data sets are strong in measur-
ing aspects such as working-time duration, but they generally lack the ability to 
distinguish arrangements that are employee-oriented from arrangements that 
are better suited to employer needs. Some advances have been made, generally 
in association with investigations of job quality and using special data sets that 
offer more detail on job content, including issues of control, such as the regular 
European Working Conditions surveys (Fagan and Vermeylen, 2016; Green et 
al., 2013; Piasna, 2015). Data on employee preferences concerning working-
time duration, position and regularity are relevant and can in principle make a 
contribution. But responses to simple, closed-ended questions on preferences are 
by no means transparent, given that preferences are formed (and re-formed) in 
a social context: firstly, the context of the life course (Anxo et al., 2006) and the 
household (Anxo, 2004), but also more generally in the context of institutions 
of social welfare and gender norms. An Australian study of stated preferences 
among employees engaged in long hours of unpaid overtime found, in subsequent 
qualitative interviews, that the answers to preference questions were unstable 
and that employees who declared that they were content with their long hours 
were often ambivalent, judging that long hours were unavoidable components of 
the job or of a professional ethic (Campbell and van Wanrooy, 2013). 
The challenge of differentiating flexible working-time arrangements is sharp-
est in the case of the multiple forms of part-time work (Messenger and Ray, 
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2015). Fortunately, this is also where thinking is most advanced and policy 
initiatives are most developed –  for example, not only at national level but 
also through the International Labour Organization (ILO) Part-Time Work 
Convention (No. 175) and the EU Directive on part-time work. Research has 
long noted the division between marginalised and integrated part-time work 
(O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998) and discussion of the latter is developed in the subse-
quent literature on good-quality part-time employment, which proposes criteria 
for differentiating good quality from poor quality (Fagan et al., 2014; Lyonette et 
al., 2016). However, it remains difficult to use the criteria with national labour 
force data, except through relatively crude indicators, such as the incidence of 
marginal part-time hours and employee preferences for longer hours (i.e. time-
related underemployment) (Lee et al., 2007: 55–60; but cf. Piasna, 2015). 
Despite all difficulties, it is possible to make a rough aggregate judgement of 
working-time trends at national level. Substantial cross-national variation exists 
(Berg et al., 2014; Rubery et al., 1998). It would be wrong to exaggerate the 
move away from the system of standardised working hours; in most industrialised 
countries the standard working-time arrangement remains influential. Similarly, 
in many countries at least some changes, especially around good-quality part-
time work, indicate evolution of the system along the lines of the second ideal 
type and a move towards a ‘flexible SER’. Nevertheless, the problematic third 
ideal type is clearly significant, and indeed several countries, especially the liberal 
market economies, seem to approximate to this ideal type. Trends towards flexi-
ble working-time arrangements that are disconnected from the system and are the 
product of employer needs are widespread. For example, in addition to evidence 
of moves towards good-quality part-time work, evidence exists for a proliferation 
of poor-quality, casualised part-time work arrangements that are closely associ-
ated with employer needs and offer little to workers (Lee et al., 2007). 
Fragmented time systems 
The spread of flexible working-time arrangements that are disconnected from 
the regulatory system and that are associated with high risks of precariousness 
for employees is a major challenge for research and policy. To understand these 
practices, it is helpful to dig beneath national level data sets. One valuable con-
tribution stems from case-study research in the UK, initially in organisations 
across a range of sectors in the early 2000s (Beynon et al., 2002; Marchington 
et  al., 2005; Rubery et al., 2005; Rubery et al., 2006), subsequently supple-
mented by further research in organisations in other sectors such as domiciliary 
care (Rubery et al., 2015; see also Grimshaw et al., 2016).
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The research builds on a powerful analytical framework, linked to a segmen-
tation perspective. It follows the principle of a multi-level analysis, in which the 
agency of the employer (the organisation) is brought to the fore, but within a 
context that pays attention to the influence of structural forces associated with 
the national institutional framework, segmentation processes on the demand 
side and the supply side, and internal organisational pressures. The research 
pursues a comparison across different sectoral and regional locations in the UK, 
paying attention inter alia to the differential impact of tertiarisation and new 
information and communication technologies. 
The research centres on working-time flexibility as a site of transformation. 
It points to a multiplicity of changes, made up largely, though not exclusively, 
of employer-oriented forms of working-time flexibility. The authors identify 
two main ‘modes of flexibility’ (Rubery et al., 2005; Rubery et al. 2006). In 
both cases the employer interest is in reducing unit labour costs, in particular 
through altering the wage/effort bargain and soliciting greater effort, but differ-
ences arise according to the type of worker. Drawing on Supiot (2001), Rubery 
and colleagues (2006: 135–41) suggest that among high-skilled employees the 
trend is towards results-based systems, in place of time-based systems, in which 
working time is extended and intensified through indirect pressures such as lean 
staffing, heavy workloads and new reward systems. 
For lower-skilled, low-wage employees, on the other hand, employment 
contracts remain time-based but working hours are increasingly broken down 
and reduced. The principle here is careful scheduling in order to match hours 
to uneven patterns of demand, marked by core staffing for troughs in demand 
but then ‘fragmented and variable’ scheduling for other employees to match 
the peaks (Rubery et al., 2006: 139–41). Such scheduling in turn implies 
careful monitoring, often facilitated by new technologies, both of demand 
patterns and of the time taken for the tasks involved in meeting demand. 
The resulting fragmented time systems or arrangements are defined as ‘when 
employers use strict work scheduling to focus paid work hours at [periods of] 
high demand … and do not reward or recognise work-related time between 
periods of high or direct customer demand’ (Rubery et al., 2015: 754). The 
system can be used for conventional operations during daytime hours on 
weekdays, but its full potential emerges when used, with flat hourly rates of 
pay, for longer operating and opening hours, where it appears as a radical 
alternative to traditional overtime and shift-work systems. As the defini-
tion suggests, the employer aims to achieve cost savings in the first place by 
avoiding payment for idle time, as in conventional strategies of intensification 
designed to fill in the ‘pores’ in the working day. The logic of cost savings 
readily extends, however, to all types of paid time that do not appear as 
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time that is immediately productive for the employer. Thus it targets several 
features of protective regulation such as rest periods, which can be avoided 
by careful scheduling of the length of shifts, and it also extends to standard 
arrangements for holiday leave, training and transport time. Though still 
vulnerable to conflicts and contradictions, the new time organisation allows 
risk to be shifted away from the employer towards the employee and his/her 
family or perhaps towards the state. 
The UK case-study analysis resonates strongly. The concepts offer a rich 
research agenda for examining working-time trends in many industrialised socie-
ties. In particular, the notion of fragmented time systems is helpful for describing 
trends towards casualised working-time arrangements and for connecting them 
to employer labour-use strategies in a wide range of industries. To  underline the 
relevance of the analysis, it is useful to draw out three points, which link up with 
the earlier reflections on flexible working-time arrangements. 
Firstly, schedules under fragmented time systems can be diverse. Shifts may 
be long or short, though they are more likely to be short, and – depending on 
operating or opening hours – they may be distributed across any time of the 
day and week, including split shifts in the one day. The shifts may be fixed or 
variable, with variation often implying an on-call element that plays havoc with 
employees’ lives outside of work. In short, flexibility in this case can involve 
employer control of duration and/or position and, in both cases, it can further 
entail employer control of variation; commonly it involves an unwelcome com-
bination of all elements. The content of the schedules is partly dependent on 
the pattern of demand to which the hours are matched, thereby allowing the 
risks associated with fluctuating demand to be shifted onto the employee. But it 
should be noted that the system generates pressures towards variable schedules 
even when demand is relatively predictable and relatively fixed schedules would 
be possible in principle. As a result of short, fragmented shifts with flat-rate pay-
ments, scheduling is often a site of intense inequalities. Because it may be more 
difficult to fill less attractive shifts and, even when they are filled, such shifts may 
be disproportionately affected by absenteeism, the system often requires extra 
temporal availability to cover all potential gaps. The problem can be solved by 
adding layers to the workforce and using different employment contracts and 
sources of recruitment such as temporary agencies. Another common approach 
is to design temporal availability into the employment contract or the job for the 
majority of employees, for example by ensuring that they have fewer hours than 
they want and are therefore willing to be available to pick up extra shifts – what 
has been called ‘passive flexibility’ (Lehndorff and Voss-Dahm, 2005). 
Secondly, reduction and fragmentation of working time in contemporary 
societies depend on the existence of regulatory gaps in employee protection. 
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If we set aside the issue of non-compliance, then opportunities for employ-
ers are greatest when they can use particular types of employment that are 
equipped with reduced employment rights, including, especially, reduced rights 
to working-time security. Several options exist in the UK, but a central place 
in the debate is taken by zero-hours contracts (ZHCs), defined as ‘contracts or 
arrangements under which an employer agrees to pay for work done but makes 
no commitment to provide set hours of work’ (Adams and Deakin, 2014: 1). 
ZHCs appear as an extreme form of on-call work, allowing extensive and unpre-
dictable variation in both the duration and the position of working time. They 
are associated with fragmented time systems in domiciliary care (Rubery et al., 
2015), but are also influential in other sectors such as cleaning services, hospital-
ity and even education. Scholars warn that the concept has no clear legal status 
and embraces a variety of practices that exist at the edges of protection, indeed 
at the edges of employee status (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2016). In all their 
forms, zero-hours arrangements come equipped with a shortfall of employment 
rights, but evidence points to pervasive uncertainty among both employers and 
employees about the extent of the shortfall, indicating that in practice these 
arrangements act as important covers for employer avoidance of rights, whether 
deliberate or inadvertent (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2014). 
Thirdly, fragmented time systems imply a significant restructuring of tem-
poral boundaries for employees. The difficulties extend beyond the perforation 
of the boundary between standard and non-standard (community) time and 
beyond the difficulties associated with intensification of work time. One further 
change concerns the redrawing of the boundary between paid time and unpaid 
time, so that only hours of direct (and intense) labour are regarded as deserv-
ing of remuneration by the employer. This reverses one of the central achieve-
ments of the regulatory system for standardised working hours, and reinstates 
a fundamental feature of the highly commodified casual ways of working in the 
nineteenth century. Also important is the implication of the on-call principle of 
availability, whether this is an explicit obligation in a contract or a more infor-
mal understanding between employee and employer. Availability involves time 
spent waiting for work and can itself be seen as a form of working time, albeit 
unpaid. Expectations of availability represent a major incursion of working time 
into personal life (Rubery et al., 2005). 
Conclusions
This chapter examines the important theme of working-time flexibility. It draws 
on recent work from a segmentation perspective, including the work of Jill 
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Rubery and her colleagues, in order to throw more light on this pivotal and puz-
zling arena of change and contestation. 
The chapter situates flexible working-time arrangements in relation to the 
regulatory system of standardised working hours. It outlines a conceptual 
framework that can help to describe the varied types of flexible working-time 
arrangements and to analyse their implications. It sketches out three ideal typical 
patterns of diversification. It underlines the significance of the notion of ‘frag-
mented time systems’ for an understanding of the spread of highly casualised 
working-time arrangements. Though first formulated in the UK context, this 
concept has broad relevance to organisations and industry sectors in many other 
industrialised societies. It is associated with new forms of scheduling, often with 
a strong bias to employer-led variation, new forms of employment such as zero-
hours arrangements and a major restructuring of temporal boundaries. 
Notes
1 I prefer to use the term ‘working-time flexibility’ rather than ‘temporal flexibility’. The 
latter is effectively a synonym, but it often appears in typologies at firm level, where it 
is identified with ‘internal numerical flexibility’, defined as practices where the number 
of working hours is adjusted in line with business needs, but the number of workers 
remains unchanged (Messenger, 2004: 152). As a result, temporal flexibility tends to be 
associated just with forms of employer-oriented flexibility and risks missing other forms 
that are more employee-oriented (see the section ‘What is working-time flexibility?’). 
2 Bosch underlines the significance of working-time regulation when he points out that 
the three main buffers against the market that are linked to (partial) de-commodification 
for employees are: (1) the welfare state; (2) provisions in the employment contract for 
employment security, support in case of accident and illness, and support for retire-
ment; and (3) rules about the use of labour time within employment such as maxi-
mum hours, rest periods and holiday leave (Bosch, 2006: 44–5; see also Rubery and 
Grimshaw, 2016: 242–3).
3 Duration (or time) and position (or timing) are the basic dimensions of working time. 
A third dimension is variously described as ‘tempo’, ‘intensity’ or the ‘degree to which 
working time is utilised’ (Noon and Blyton, 1997: 56). Tempo is indeed important in 
how work time is structured and experienced, and increased tempo (intensification’) 
has become an important theme in the discussion of contemporary changes at the work-
place. But tempo is best seen as a contingent outcome of processes such as supervision 
and should not be equated with duration and position as necessary aspects of working-time 
arrangements. 
4 Other parallel formulations speak of ‘employer-driven’ versus ‘employee-driven’ flex-
ibility or ‘employer-led’ versus ‘employee-led’ flexibility.
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5 Other terms include de-standardisation (Carré, 2016). ‘Fragmentation’ is sometimes 
used in this, as in several other contexts, but it is best reserved for the time systems 
discussed in the section ‘Fragmented time systems’. Another alternative is ‘individuali-
sation’, but this is misleading unless we distinguish genuine forms of individualisation 
from the often-spurious claims of individualisation associated with market processes 
(McCann, 2007).
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Part II
International evidence:  





and precariousness in Spain: 
theories and evidence
Josep Banyuls and Albert Recio
Introduction
Spain is a country with strongly marked contrasts in the labour market. Since the 
economic crisis of the 1970s until today it is the European country that has expe-
rienced the greatest fluctuations in the volume of employment. During periods 
of recession, unemployment rates have been among the highest worldwide, 
but conversely, during recovery periods, employment growth has been very 
intense. It is also the European labour market with the greatest use of temporary 
employment. As a result of these conditions, many significant labour reforms 
have been implemented and, consequently, the Spanish economy can in some 
ways be considered as a laboratory of their impact.1 It is because of this that the 
debate on the functioning of the labour market in general, and on segmentation 
in particular, has been especially intense in Spain during these years.
The segmentation approach arrived in Spain, as in many other places, from 
the hands of heterodox economists (in a broad sense) and it had a strong echo 
among labour sociologists. In the early 1980s, neoclassical economists in aca-
demia and leading economic think tanks (particularly the Spanish Central Bank 
and the research services of large banks) ignored this approach. Those were 
times when the official debate revolved around the rigidity of labour markets 
and the economy. In Europe, the discussion was about Eurosclerosis (Krugman 
and Wells, 2006), which portrayed Europe’s poor performance compared with 
the USA in terms of its ‘generous’ unemployment protection systems and strong 
trade union bargaining power. In Spain, owing to the absence of these aspects 
at the beginning of democracy, rigidity was attributed to the persistence of laws 
and practices inherited from the Franco regime. The situation changed in 1987 
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when, for the first time, the Labour Force Survey published information on 
the level of temporary employment and estimated the temporary employment 
rate at 17.7 per cent. Suddenly, Spain had gone from being a country with rigid 
employment to being one of the most advanced countries in terms of the use of 
flexible forms of employment.
The official explanation of unemployment had necessarily to be revised, and 
with this change, the concept of segmentation (in its most simplistic version of 
duality) eventually became the reference point for new discussions. As we shall 
see, the interpretation of segmentation by neoclassical economists is completely 
different from the heterodox view developed by Jill Rubery (Rubery, 1978; 
Rubery, 1992; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994) and other members of the 
International Working Party on Labour Market Segmentation  (IWPLMS) 
(Wilkinson, 1981; see Chapter 1). This approach suggested alternative lines of 
analysis based on a more wide-ranging analysis of segmentation and an appre-
ciation of the influences of national models of employment (Bosch, Lehndorff 
and Rubery, 2009). For the conventional approach, at least for the mainstream 
neoclassical economists, markets work reasonably well in terms of competitive 
balance, and employment problems are essentially caused by the interference 
of extra-market institutions that generate inadequate incentives and create 
discrimination and inefficiency. Therefore, the main recipe against unemploy-
ment is to carry out structural reforms of labour market institutions, which 
lead to some extent to a competitive behaviour of unemployment itself. 
For heterodox economists, unemployment is a macroeconomic problem gen-
erated by the normal functioning of capitalism, labour market segmentation is 
in part a product of company policies, and the specific problems of each coun-
try cannot be interpreted only as a result of their local institutions but also in 
terms of their interaction and positioning in the global economy (e.g. Recio, 
1994; Rubery, 2007; Wilkinson, 1981). Drawing on the key ideas developed 
by Rubery about labour market segmentation, this chapter discusses how this 
debate has materialised in Spain, and how the empirical evidence vindicates the 
heterodox approach. Spain is a particularly interesting case to consider these dif-
ferent points of view due to its high unemployment rate and the huge amount of 
reforms that have taken place in the labour market’s regulatory framework. We 
begin by addressing the main lines of argument of the neoclassical approach to 
explain labour market problems in Spain. We then offer an alternative perspec-
tive rooted in the structural and historical characteristics of the Spanish National 
Employment Model based on a broad set of empirical evidence. The chapter 
closes with some brief conclusions.
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The conventional approach ‘discovers’ segmentation 
In the economic crisis of the 1970s, Spain experienced a high rate of unemploy-
ment and, for the first time, there was a theoretical debate about its causes. The 
explanation offered from the neoclassical economics perspective was articulated 
around the idea that unemployment originated in problems of labour market 
rigidity caused by the existing institutional framework (Bentolila and Jimeno, 
2003; Malo de Molina, 1983). The rigidity stemmed from the persistence of 
many labour norms inherited from the Franco period, as well as from the 
concessions made to trade unions during the political transition (Dolado et al., 
2002). Reviewing the debates of those years, the arguments used to explain 
unemployment were articulated around five issues:
1) Labour market rigidity associated with difficulties for businesses to make 
quantitative adjustments of their workforce, thereby impairing the speed 
of response to economic shocks. This rigidity materialised in difficulties in 
flexible hiring, in dismissal and in limits on work organisation;
2) Wage rigidity and excessively high wages as a result of Spain’s collective bar-
gaining model (involving bargaining at the sector level, not company 
level) and the existence of minimum wages set by collective agreement at 
levels higher than the statutory national minimum wage, as well as social 
contributions;
3) Malfunctioning of labour intermediation (that is, inefficient active labour market 
policies) and problems of availability of sufficiently skilled workforce;
4) Overly generous unemployment subsidies that discouraged the search and accept-
ance of job vacancies by unemployed people and maintained real wages at 
too high a level; and
5) Supply-side shocks. Although the origin of shocks was changing, the argu-
ment ultimately relied always on the idea that the collective bargaining 
model prevented the fall of real wages against shocks. The main causes 
of shocks that were identified were a rising active population (without a 
corresponding reduction in wages), falling total factor productivity (again 
without lower wages), rising interest rates (in the context of the 1970s 
crisis) and production costs out of balance with wages that did not diminish 
sufficiently to sustain the stimulus to investment.
These five explanations were not attributed equal importance. Factors such as 
labour rigidity, the collective bargaining model, which generated wage rigid-
ity, and social subsidies (overly generous) were highlighted as having a greater 
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responsibility in generating high unemployment rates, as well as some personal 
characteristics (lack of training), which discouraged the acceptance of posi-
tions and kept wages high. Yet the two central arguments that were raised at 
that time and that persist today from the conventional perspective were, and 
still are, the problem of quantitative rigidity and the low flexibility of wages 
(Andrés et al., 2010; FEDEA, 2012). Unemployment benefits have been gradu-
ally losing importance as a cause of unemployment, given the evidence of their 
low coverage.
Hence, arguments were gradually closing in around the two aforementioned 
aspects, quantitative rigidity and wage rigidity, and continue to this day. The 
economic policy proposals derived from these approaches have always presented 
themselves, both in the crisis of the 1970s and today, as the inevitable course 
of action, as the only way out of the various crises experienced by the Spanish 
economy. Underpinning them there is always a blind belief that businesses fail 
to create employment because the labour market cannot afford it. The problem, 
it is claimed, is not in the characteristics of the production structure, nor in the 
demand of goods or the management strategies. It is in regulation – a regula-
tion that allows wages to be excessively high (above productivity) and forces 
businesses to experience great difficulties in the quantitative adjustment of the 
workforce (Dolado and Jimeno, 1997).
This explanation faced an important test when, in 1984, labour legislation 
was reformed and the use of temporary contracts without requiring a justifica-
tion was legalised. In 1987, the Labour Force Survey included, for the first time, 
information about the kinds of labour contracts, and temporality was placed over 
17 per cent, a much higher value than the usual rate in Europe. In subsequent 
years, the percentage share continued to grow as numbers in total employment 
also increased until it reached an average rate of around 33 per cent, right up to 
the 2008 crisis. In terms of ease of temporary hiring and of employment sensi-
tivity regarding economic activity, employment in Spain was shown to be very 
flexible, and labour market rigidity became a difficult argument to sustain as 
an explanation of continued high rates of unemployment (Figure 7.1). Neither 
could excessive unemployment benefits be sustained as an argument, given that 
during the 1980s, the percentage of unemployed people who received subsidies 
was placed at around 25 per cent. 
By the early 1990s, it was clear that the neoclassical economics explanation 
was in need of repair. It was at that moment when the defenders of rigidity as 
the cause of unemployment ‘discovered’ the idea of labour market segmen-
tation, in its most radical version of dualism, but limiting its causes to the 
stylised impact of labour market regulations. In this reformulated approach, 
dualism in labour markets emerged simply from the adaptation of businesses 
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to a rigid institutional market (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). The introduction 
of flexibility stemming from the labour contract with the 1984 reform had 
been a reform ‘on the margin’, it was claimed, because employment protec-
tions for workers with permanent contracts remained untouched. In this way, 
businesses faced the dilemma of making permanent contracts with a high cost 
of dismissal or temporary contracts at no cost.2 The majority of businesses 
opted for the second option and this accounted for the growth of temporary 
employment. Permanent employees saw their bargaining position strength-
ened, because now they not only enjoyed the protection of the law, but they 
also had the protective cushion of temporary employees. When businesses 
faced a drop in demand, the adjustment would be applied exclusively or mainly 
to the temporary workers.
The next step of the argument relied on the idea that unions represented 
solely permanent workers and, therefore, they could push for foolish wage 
increases, or resist downward adjustments, because if these increases generated 
workforce adjustments they would be applied to temporary workers rather 
than their members. The Spanish labour market behaved as a dual market 
with insiders protected by the law and by trade unions and outsiders outside 
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protections and subject to market forces. This implied not only a high segmen-
tation in terms of employment and wages, but also important macroeconomic 
effects (Jimeno and Ortega, 2003: 107). On the one hand, there was an infla-
tionary pressure, derived from collective bargaining, which only took into 
account stable employment. On the other, businesses’ preference for hiring 
temporary employees affected the training of human capital and favoured spe-
cialisation in low-productivity activities.3 Overall, these studies represent an 
adaptation to the Spanish case of the initial neoclassical economics analysis of 
Lindbeck and Snower (1988, 2001), which sought to incorporate some of the 
ideas of Piore’s dualism (1980). 
However, unlike Piore’s work, the revised studies of Spanish neoclassical 
economists implied a shift in the causes of labour segmentation. Instead of high-
lighting the demand factors and the business strategies at the origin of segmenta-
tion in response to both the problems generated by the control of the workforce 
and the functioning of the diverse product markets, they point to labour regula-
tions and unions as the main causes of segmentation. This argument ignores that 
segmentation is visible in countries such as the USA, with high labour deregula-
tion and a low union presence. It also has an enormous political burden, since 
it tries to make permanent adult workers, and the unions that represent them, 
responsible for the dualisation of the labour market, shifting from a capital–
labour conflict to a conflict between workers. 
This analysis has been used to justify the 1994 labour reform, launched as a 
response to the 1991–94 economic crisis, as well as the following reforms of 
1997, 2002, 2010 and 2012, which cut severance payments and made the pro-
cedures for dismissal easier. Despite these series of reforms, the argument has 
been persistent. The discourse is promoted by influential organisms of economic 
opinion (particularly Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA), 
the research service of the Spanish Central Bank, and that of the Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA)) and by mainstream economists from the Universities 
who have always considered these labour reforms insufficient. The current 
policy recommendation for eliminating segmentation is to introduce a single 
contract with a dismissal compensation growing proportionally to the number 
of years worked.4 This is an idea for which they have gathered important inter-
national support, especially from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, 
it is not clear whether this measure would change the massive use of short-term 
employment  in an economy with a high degree of seasonality in key sectors 
(especially  in those depending on tourism). What would be achieved, how-
ever, would be the disappearance of the statistical indicator of the percentage of 
temporary employment, which shows the poor quality of employment in Spain.
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The contradictions of the conventional view
The conventional view reduces labour market segmentation to a mere response 
of businesses to the institutional framework (in the case of Spain, to the contrac-
tual arrangements) and as such ignores the main achievements of institutionalist 
labour economics. From an institutionalist approach, developed for decades as 
an alternative to the mainstream economic orthodox thinking,  segmentation is a 
result of business policies oriented to resolve the complexity of conflicts and 
problems faced by companies, both in the management of labour activity and in 
the product market, and not just a simple problem of regulation.
As noted by Rubery (1992, 2007), the segmentation approach places the 
employment practices of businesses and their determining factors at the centre 
of the analysis in order to explain employment conditions and labour inequali-
ties. The role of the employer is therefore central in accounting for the level 
and characteristics of employment, and is a key factor in shaping the dynamics 
of employment structure. Therefore, from this perspective, and in contrast 
with the conventional approach, the core factors that shape labour market 
dynamics are on the side of demand. This contrasts with the neoclassical eco-
nomics approach to which individual decisions in human capital investment, job 
search and wage demands are reflective of, and somehow account for, labour 
demand.
Another notable aspect of the segmentation approach is that segmentation is 
present both within an economy and between economies, with different forms 
and manifestations. The determining factors change over time and are specific 
in each case, so that in practice we find a wide variety of situations, without any 
tendencies toward ‘natural’ convergence of employment models, neither within 
a society nor between societies (Bosch, Lehndorff and Rubery, 2009). A good 
example is the case of the European Union, in which the various processes of 
integration (monetary, trade and so on) have not resulted in a convergence of 
labour market patterns. In this dynamic, key importance is attributed to institu-
tions and strategies of social actors. Both are crucial in shaping the diversity of 
labour market structures. 
Obviously, the focus of orthodox economics does not consider all these 
aspects. The analytical reductionism that it applies in the case of Spain leads it to 
explain segmentation in the exclusive terms of permanent and temporary con-
tracts, overlooking aspects of the real functioning of the labour market which 
in other approaches are relevant. A quick review of key aspects of the Spanish 
labour market that are easily detectable empirically raises clear questions for the 
conventional explanation, as follows.
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• The choice of an explanatory variable of labour inequalities – for example, 
the type of contract – suggests significant results in terms of labour dual-
ity. For instance, in terms of wages, people with permanent contracts have 
higher wages than temporary workers. But the same result can be achieved 
by choosing a different explanatory variable. One can, for example, build a 
dualist explanation of the Spanish labour market based on the gender vari-
able and construct a plausible theory of a dual market in terms of gender. 
Age (and seniority) could also be suggested. However, these forms of dif-
ferentiation are not explainable in the terms of the proposed model.
• Disaggregation by sector shows substantial diversity in the use of temporary 
employment and the strategies that explain their use. For instance, in the 
sector where use of temporary employment is highest – construction – its 
use corresponds in part to the functioning of professional markets where 
skilled workers change employers fairly frequently while maintaining a 
certain professional career. However, in hospitality, another sector with a 
high temporary rate, this is instead due to the seasonality of tourism.
• A detailed analysis of the evolution of the relationship between temporary 
and fixed-term employment offers paradoxical results that contradict the 
conventional model. In the 1991–94 crisis, the adjustment was higher 
among permanent employment contracts than temporary contracts because 
it was basically an industrial crisis and, in many businesses, insiders did not 
have any ability to ‘unleash’ adjustments on temporary workers (Alba and 
Alonso, 1997). Conversely, the period of expansion prior to the 2008 
crisis shows a fall in temporality rates in most sectors. This was due largely 
to collective bargaining where in many cases unions decided to moderate 
wage demands in exchange for transforming temporary employment into 
stable employment (contrary to the behavioural assumptions of insider–
outsider models). There is no evidence that there was strong growth of 
wages in this expansive period as suggested by the orthodox theory. The 
increase in temporary employment in this period was primarily due to the 
explosive growth of employment in construction and the strong growth of 
temporary employment in the public sector.
• The huge adjustment of temporary employment in the first phase of the 
2008 crisis is explained by its rapid impact in the construction sector. As 
the crisis has progressed, job destruction has also impacted many perma-
nent jobs (Banyuls and Recio, 2015).
• The various reforms that have delivered lower costs and easier dismissal 
procedures have not altered employers’ preference for temporary employ-
ment (Toharia, 2005; Toharia, 2011). As we explain in the next sec-
tion, temporary employment is a resource that is part of a larger and 
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more complex raft of labour management practices, which aim to minimise 
labour costs and contribute to a dismantling of Spain’s industrial relations 
model. 
 An alternative view of segmentation: new and old dynamics
Although rather discreet, labour market segmentation theory had already 
entered the debate on the Spanish labour market long before the analysis was 
reformulated into crude dualistic terms. A mandatory starting point is the con-
tribution of Lluis Fina and Luis Toharia in the 1980s (Fina et al., 1989; Fina 
and Toharia, 1987), which addressed the causes of unemployment during that 
period. For them, the analysis of the Spanish labour market could not be sepa-
rated from the analysis of the characteristics and dynamics of the production 
structure and business policies. The depth of the crisis and the rise in unemploy-
ment during the 1980s was largely the result of opening up the Spanish economy 
to internationalisation, with massive job losses in outdated and over-sized indus-
tries. After the sharp rise in unemployment in those years, its continuity over 
time is largely explained by a truncated process of modernisation. On the one 
hand, parts of the traditional sectors (agriculture, retail, some small industrial 
activities) with high levels of informal employment were modernised and yet 
Spanish businesses at the time lacked the capabilities and structures to generate 
stable, decent quality, formal jobs. On the other hand, the public sector was 
insufficiently developed, although its growth during the 1980s played an impor-
tant role in the consolidation of an educated middle class.
The Spanish labour market has always been strongly segmented (Recio, 
1999). Leaving aside the public sector, with its specific labour system, a cen-
tral difference exists between big business and the huge mass of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In the former, internal labour markets were 
developed, while in most SMEs a system of highly personalised labour rela-
tions prevailed. The collective bargaining system implemented in 1959 reflected 
this duality with the combination of enterprise agreements, particularly in the 
large firms, and sectoral agreements, in which the working conditions of SMEs 
were established and where union presence was practically non-existent. This 
resulted in a significant wage differentiation. In addition to this, sectors with a 
high level of seasonal employment (tourism, agriculture) or temporary employ-
ment (construction) have for many years exerted a strong weight in the produc-
tion structure, and other areas of the economy have generated important and 
persistent spaces for the informal economy where the work is mostly performed 
by women (e.g. domestic service, clothing industry, some industrial activities, 
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small assemblies and so on). All of this accounts partially for the high level of 
temporary employment showed by the Labour Forces Survey (LFS) in 1987 that 
questioned the alleged rigidity of the Spanish labour market. Rather than a dual 
market, we have faced for many years a series of interacting labour segments 
that offered varying degrees of labour protection, remuneration and rights. At 
the peak are situated the major energy and finance companies (along with some 
of the large, successful industrial companies) and at the base small businesses and 
sectors characterised by high labour turnover. 
The transformations that took place in subsequent years have only strength-
ened this differentiation due to both the effect of the legislative changes that have 
facilitated the deregulation of working conditions and the substantial organisa-
tional changes adopted by large companies. In these processes we can detect two 
parallel dynamics: firstly, the expansion and remodelling of secondary markets; 
and secondly, changes in the conditions in which domestic markets operate 
towards greater individualisation of working conditions and increased flexibility.
The extension and complexity of secondary markets: temporality 
and outsourcing
Changes in regulation have fuelled the growth of employment precariousness, 
but it is a considerably more complex process than suggested by conventional 
analysis which simply states that the high volatility of temporary employment is 
caused by an excessive protection of permanent employment. In the previous 
section we have already noted some of these aspects, such as the high concentra-
tion of temporary employment by sectors, which is partly owing to the different 
degree of variability in demand. But there are other issues to be considered. The 
use of temporary and part-time employment is due in many cases to a business 
strategy to minimise labour costs, and to consider such contracts as an adjust-
ment mechanism. For instance, a fall during the summer of employment in the 
education sector is a recurring fact, caused by the massive use of discontinuous 
fixed-term contracts in the sector. However, such contracts are also a clear 
control mechanism, since employers can reward appropriate worker behaviour 
with a succession of temporary contracts. 
The extension of part-time employment is also due in large part to this time 
management logic in all those activities where activity peaks predominate on 
certain days or hours, as is the case in retail, hospitality, leisure activities and care 
services for the elderly, among others (Recio et al., 2015). The minimisation of 
working time has become part of the dominant model of personnel management 
(O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998; Sandor, 2009), especially as the commodification of 
service activities has demonstrated the importance of time constraints in many 
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activities (Rubery et al., 2015). The extension of temporal flexibility is one of 
the forces which promotes the extension of short-term employment and the 
spasmodic use of the workforce as an adjustment variable. Some studies show, 
in addition, that temporary and part-time contracts are also a mechanism to 
intensify work effort (Moreno et al., 2014; Pinilla, 2004). 
These contractual forms are often presented as an employment form that 
favours the reconciliation of work and home life and as a pathway for women’s 
entry into the labour market. However, their expansion is concentrated in the 
services most affected by irregular and unstable working-time patterns and 
characterised by very low levels of wage income. Often it is not only the prob-
lem of too few hours of work and little income, but also too few hours during 
anti-social and undesirable times or even, which is probably worse, at varying 
schedules at the employer’s demand (particularly in retail and hospitality).
We should also take into account the intense immigration experienced in 
Spain during the last phase of economic growth. This fuelled a segment of sec-
ondary, unregulated and informal employment, which is totally beyond the con-
trol of unions or public bodies (Recio et al., 2006). Elderly care is probably the 
sector where this type of employment is most expressive, although the presence 
of migrant workers employed in such conditions is also important in agriculture, 
construction and hospitality.
The other motor of change is the outsourcing of productive activities, which 
has notably progressed, although it is governed by different organisational pat-
terns in each sector. Compared to the model of the large, vertically integrated 
companies, today most large companies are characterised by organising produc-
tion around a huge national and international network of suppliers and auxiliary 
companies that perform substantial functions in the production process (Alonso 
and Fernández, 2012; Grimshaw and Rubery, 2007; Harrison, 1997; see also 
Chapter 4 in this volume). 
This transformation has occurred following different routes. A general trend 
has involved business strategies to outsource those activities considered ancillary 
or secondary (e.g. cleaning, maintenance, catering, security, logistics, assem-
bly) to companies that specialise in these tasks (Aguiar, 2001). A second trend 
has involved the unbundling of the production process and subcontracting a wide 
range of activities to outside companies (this can be seen in sectors such as the 
automotive or the civil construction sector) (Banyuls and Lorente, 2010; Recio, 
2007). A third trend has taken place in sectors where, paradoxically, there has 
been a growing concentration and centralisation of activities at all stages of the 
production process – especially those activities concerning retail and design – 
while other phases are outsourced to companies over which strict control is 
exercised in all that affects the production cycle (quality, delivery deadlines and 
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so on); we witness this pattern most notably in the food and textile industries 
(Castillo, 2005a). The fourth trend highlights the process of privatisation and 
the outsourcing of public services, generated by policies designed to dismantle 
monopolies and, it is claimed, to generate greater productive efficiency among 
private enterprises (Recio Cáceres, 2014). These four processes converge in 
a way that has favoured the configuration of large enterprise networks with a 
smaller labour core, but with a capacity to influence the employment relations 
and productive activities of a far wider production space. In many cases, the net-
works of production replicate themselves with an ever-growing number of tiers 
of contracting generating production chains that can result in activities carried 
out under conditions of informality (Castillo, 2005b).
The conventional argument that justifies this reorientation is that of effi-
ciency and flexibility. Greater efficiency is explained by the advantage of labour 
division and specialised knowledge. Flexibility regards the consideration that 
we are facing increasingly volatile markets, rendering the traditional stock-
adjustment model undesirable. Smaller-sized, less-integrated companies would 
have a greater ability to respond to this variability, through the reconfiguration 
of their own production network and, in turn, each one of these specialised 
companies could reconfigure its activity by placing themselves in other parallel 
networks. However, there is evidence that calls these arguments into ques-
tion. On the one hand, it is found that large business groups end up being 
established in the field of ancillary services offering a very extensive range of 
activities, which contradicts the argument of the effectiveness of specialisa-
tion. On the other, neither does the flexibility of the overall production net-
work seem clear as a mechanism of adaptation to the economic changes. For 
instance, in a sector highly disaggregated, such as construction, the current 
crisis has exposed the inability of the sector’s production network to adapt to 
demand sinks or to move to other activities. At any rate, what is interesting 
is to observe what the impacts of these policies are on working life. Here we 
illustrate three issues.
In the first place, outsourcing is almost always a path to reduce wage costs, 
given that in most cases, external companies operate in labour frameworks 
where wage conditions are inferior. This becomes evident in the case of ancil-
lary activities where in several countries in which studies were undertaken 
collective agreements provide for lower wages or are absent altogether (Dube 
and Kaplan, 2010; Havard, Rorive and Sobezck, 2009; Prieto et al., 2011; 
Lethbridges, 2012). There are many reasons that account for this: the greater 
difficulties of union organisation related to the fact that employees in these sec-
tors are often isolated spatially; the competitive pressures that these companies 
hold before their customers, which lead them to exert downward pressures 
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on labour conditions; and the social valuation of these jobs where outsourced 
can often be conflated with meanings about ‘low-skilled’, ‘simple’ and unim-
portant activities, which have a damaging impact on these workers’ bargaining 
capacity.
But this same situation can be seen in the subcontracting of activities of other 
kinds. In some cases, outsourcing allows subcontractor companies to operate 
in collective agreements more appropriate to their own interests or even to 
differentiate the collective agreements of each of their plants (Castillo, 2013). 
For instance, in the motor industry one supplier firm can have different col-
lective agreements depending on the area in the country in which it is located 
(using territorial collective agreements) or the specific product manufactured 
(using sector agreements) (Banyuls and Lorente, 2010). In other cases, as in the 
construction sector, the enormous fragmentation of the production process, 
and constraints on the use of time in each one of the different teams, opens the 
way for a low ability to control labour conditions and leads in many cases to 
the breach of certain labour conditions (Bosch and Philips, 2003; Recio, 2007).
In the second place, the chains of production have been found in certain 
situations to generate greater control over labour. Workers in subcontractor 
companies are likely to be subject to a double hierarchy: that of their employer 
and that of the client organisation to which they are contracted. As the detailed 
case studies in Rubery’s work with her Manchester colleagues show, this may 
involve the sharing of workspace with client managers, or strict controls by 
the client over product and service quality, or direct client influence over staff 
deployment and discipline (Marchington et al., 2005). This has an impact on 
labour process issues such as work rhythms, control of safety conditions and 
other issues (Castillo, 2005a). 
This ‘double’ direction effectively shifts part of the conflict at the heart of the 
employment relationship to an external actor, which is outside the negotiating 
frame of subcontracted worker and employer and sets the interface with cus-
tomer demands (Moreno et al., 2014). A particular and especially interesting 
case is represented by the use of temporary work agencies, because in this case 
the worker is completely under customer orders. In Spain, working condi-
tions depend on the collective agreement that prevails in the company where 
one works. The temporary work agency only has secondary control over their 
labour activity – most importantly, to ‘reward’ workers with new contracts in 
case of good behaviour. And yet regarding job security and bargaining for work-
ers’ labour conditions, agencies are relatively helpless. When, after a strong 
trade union mobilisation, a legal reform required the equalisation of the wages 
of agency employees with employees in the client organisations, the market 
response was the creation of new service companies. These companies assumed 
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the labour activity of a part of the production process, had their own collective 
agreement (or were cooperatives) and favoured wage discrimination in the sense 
that bargained wages are usually lower than those formerly paid by temporary 
work agencies. Moreover, in some cases this new organisational form results in 
the appearance of ‘false’ self-employed workers who are tied to the service com-
pany through individual negotiation and do not enjoy the protections enshrined 
in labour law.5
In the third place, subcontracting opens up a process of continuous pressure 
on working conditions, since it frames the necessity of adaptation in seemingly 
‘objective’ terms whereby the subcontractor must adjust working conditions 
in order to avoid losing the contract; in other words, it shifts the blame outside 
the sphere of union influence. It is a kind of pressure that has similarities with 
that affecting employees of core companies, especially those operating interna-
tionally, which practice a similar strategy of fragmentation of units (plants) that 
must compete among themselves (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2008; Korczynski, 
2004). The automotive sector is illustrative; it has combined internal flex-
ibility with increased subcontracting (inside and outside the plants) focused 
around enhanced production specialisation and reduced labour costs (Banyuls 
and Lorente, 2010). At upper levels, activities with higher added value are 
carried out and as the pyramid descends, pressure for cost reduction is more 
intense. In the lower rungs, activities with less added value are carried out by 
a less-qualified workforce subject to worse working conditions. Greater labour 
instability, more deregulated labour relations and more intense work are ele-
ments that have facilitated cost reduction. Ultimately, the uncertainty to which 
the matrix company is subject shifts to the ancillary company and, in turn, to 
its workers. Different studies (Banyuls and Haipeter, 2008; Recio et al., 1991; 
Martínez and Pérez, 2000) show that the use of subcontracting, network struc-
tures with the purpose of increasing production flexibility leads to increased 
labour flexibility across the entire network and a worsening of employment 
conditions.
The transformation of stable jobs
Increased use of outsourcing and continued high reliance on temporary employ-
ment contracts have not left intact the conditions faced by workers with per-
manent contracts of employment. Considering all permanent workers as a 
homogeneous collective is a mistake since it loses sight of the substantial differ-
ences that can be detected according to the size and type of organisation. The 
most important changes have occurred in large companies, since in small firms 
there remains a more personalised and informal management system. A great 
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variety of labour management practices have been introduced in recent years, 
aimed at transforming employment conditions and increasing the individualisa-
tion of employment conditions under the stated goal of the flexibilisation of 
labour conditions (Pérez de Guzman and Prieto, 2015). Permanent jobs today 
are, in many cases, rather different from those 20 years ago, something that has 
also been strengthened by the generational renewal of staff.
Among the new management practices, the introduction of time flexibility 
measures and of new remuneration systems oriented to the individualisation 
of labour relations stand out powerfully. Although these processes have been 
in great part introduced through collective bargaining, in practice they have 
allowed companies an important degree of freedom in labour management and 
they have favoured increased wage differentiation. In some large companies, 
two-tier wage scales have come to be introduced for incumbent and newly 
recruited workers and, although this is illegal, in practice it has resulted in 
the gradual reduction of salaries for new employees. In some sectors, such as 
finance, the use of individual incentives is so widespread that it is customary to 
perform unpaid overtime to meet performance targets for the salary bonus. As 
for professional markets, traditional recruitment policies have been replaced by 
more competitive processes in which some applicants end up being excluded or 
relegated to precarious underemployment (Oliva et al., 2012).
Analyses of collective bargaining show that all these policies have resulted in 
a sustained pattern of wage moderation (Gutiérrez Calderón, 2011; Sanabria, 
2013). In addition, unions have prioritised job creation and reduction of pre-
carious employment rather than real wage gains and within corporations dif-
ferent units and plants have increasingly had to compete via cost concessions 
to maintain employment and investment from the centre. The 2012 labour 
reform, by introducing mechanisms that break the collective bargaining model, 
opened new potentialities for employer policy and practice. The legislation 
grants privileged status to the company agreement and therefore provides 
new ways for companies to detach themselves from the conditions collec-
tively agreed at sector and regional levels. This offers new opportunities to 
the myriad small and medium-sized businesses with scarce union representa-
tion for introducing labour conditions à la carte, and of generally increasing 
wage inequality and differences in labour conditions. While it is still early to 
assess the net impact of this reform, preliminary analyses provide a fairly clear 
result – that the deregulation far from generating greater equity in the labour 
market has resulted in wage cuts in precisely those sectors that already had the 
lowest wages (Lago, 2015).
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Conclusions 
The interpretation of labour market segmentation solely in terms of duality 
has turned into the key reference point of the main international organisations 
for employment policy and of the academic world. It promises both a power-
ful analytical model (underpinned by neoclassical economics rigour) and clear 
recommendations for policy. It suggests that reduced precariousness and visible 
inequalities in the labour market are achieved by eliminating the excessive pro-
tections enjoyed by core segments of the workforce. In one sense, these models 
extend to the labour market the simplistic assumption that perfectly competitive 
markets lead to the maximisation of collective welfare. In the case of Spain, a 
country affected by high shares of people in temporary employment and unem-
ployment, this model has become a persistent axis of the public debate.
In our analysis of this debate, this chapter has identified the shortcomings of 
this approach and raised doubts about the stylised temporary–permanent dual-
ity of the Spanish employment model. Detailed scrutiny of the Spanish labour 
market reveals enormous diversity of working conditions, and not just a prolif-
eration of non-standard jobs, in a way that is far more complex than the por-
trait presented by the orthodox approach. Employees with stable contracts in 
outsourced sectors experience labour conditions similar to those of temporary 
employees. Even temporary employment itself has a different meaning, depend-
ing on the context in which it has emerged. There are significant differences for 
stable employment and what it means by type of business, productive network 
position or productive sector. These differences have implications for wages, 
careers, working conditions and working hours. Also, internal labour mar-
kets have been weakened but differences persist between companies. Diversity 
is also present in temporary employment and in the secondary market, both 
characterized by a remarkable diversification of situations. For example, some 
professional markets facilitate mobility, while other spheres of the economy are 
characterised by perfectly bounded secondary markets – such as youth employ-
ment in fast-food chains and the textile industry and related informal spaces 
where immigration policy plays a crucial role. Analyses using cluster methods 
(Prieto et al., 2011) or working life data (Miguelez and Lopez Roldan, 2014) 
show that we face an increasing picture of social diversification and a continuum 
of increasing inequalities, far away from a stylised dual market model. 
The analytical question is not only to determine the character of labour 
market segments, in Spain and elsewhere, but also to understand their dynamics. 
Contributions from comparative labour market segmentation theory explain-
ing the changing patterns of national employment models (Bosch et al., 2009) 
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are far more useful in explaining contemporary labour market transformations 
than the orthodox economics approach. The Spanish case shows clearly that 
labour market trends cannot be understood as the mere result of a handful of 
labour regulations. Therefore, we consider the institutionalist approach of seg-
mentation more appropriate for analysis, since it shows the plurality of factors 
involved in shaping labour markets, and crucially the importance of business 
strategies in shaping labour segments. At a general level of analysis, the situation 
of labour market segmentation reflects the nature of Spain’s production system, 
its positioning in the world economy, and the productive and social options of 
Spanish elites. These options have for many decades generated a societal lock-
in around low wages and precarious labour conditions rather than promoting a 
high-skill production model in technology and quality production. To a great 
extent, deregulation policies do nothing but help to maintain this model.
We end with a response to the current policy proposal in Spain for a single 
employment contract as a means to eliminate duality. The orthodox approach 
needs to recognise that, firstly, various labour reforms to cut protections for 
permanent employment have not generated the desired change and, secondly, 
the early effects of the 2012 reform seem to go in the opposite direction by in 
fact worsening labour conditions of so-called ‘outsiders’. This is a predictable 
outcome based on a reading of the labour market segmentation approach associ-
ated with Rubery’s work and members of the IWPLMS: in deregulated labour 
markets, where individual entrepreneurs have greater power, greater differenti-
ation of labour conditions occurs. Imagining a world with inclusive development 
that generates better labour conditions for everybody requires a radical rethink-
ing of interventions from a global perspective that encompass macroeconomic, 
 institutional and organisational change.
Notes
1 Since 1984 until the present, more than 50 labour reforms have been implemented in 
Spain. The major reforms, judged by the significance of their change, took place in 1984, 
1992, 1994, 2002, 2010 and 2012.
2 From 1984 to 2001 fixed-term contracts were without economic compensation. In 
1997, a labour market reform placed some limits on the length of the fixed-term con-
tracts. In 2001, the government established a small dismissal cost for this type of con-
tract: 8 days’ pay per year of tenure. In 2010, this compensation was increased in some 
cases to 12 days’ pay per year of tenure. 
3 This connects with another one of the reform proposals that was implemented during 
these years: the necessity of reducing wages and of making them flexible, with a change 
in the collective bargaining model. The proposed line is that there must be a shift 
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towards a negotiation model that is decentralised, individualised and at the company 
level, not the sectorial level.
4 This proposes that a single employment contract should replace the several types that 
currently exist. The objective is also to reduce the costs and simplify the process of dis-
missal. Currently, individual dismissals of permanent employees can be legally justified 
by economic or similar reasons and in this case the compensation is 20 days’ pay per year 
of tenure (with a ceiling of 12 months’ pay). The single contract proposes to remove the 
need to justify dismissals and that the value of the compensation would be incremental 
according to tenure.
5 Temporary work agencies pay their employees the same wage as those of employees 
directly employed by the customer firm. ‘The “new service companies” are subcon-
tracted to carry out a part of the production process and pay wages according to their 
own collective agreement. The most extreme case is the extensive use of “cooperatives”, 
in slaughterhouses and in construction, where employees become “self-employed” and 
do not have labour rights’ (Allepuz, 2000). 
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Subsidiary employment in Italy: 
can commodification of labour be 
self-limiting?
Francesca Bettio and Alberto Mazzon
Introduction
In May 2015, the President of Italy’s National Social Security Agency (INPS) 
presaged that vouchers – the Italian version of the pre-financed French Chèque 
emploi service (CES) – threatened to become the ‘new frontier of precarious 
employment’ in the country (La Repubblica, 2015).1 This warning was prompted 
by information that the number of recipients of vouchers had increased from less 
than 25,000 in 2008 to nearly 1 million in 2014. 
The alarm sounded by the INPS President would appear to add further sub-
stance to concerns about rising ‘commodification’ of the labour relationship 
which are being increasingly voiced in scholarly circles in Europe and elsewhere. 
Here we understand growing commodification as a process whereby labour 
(power) is increasingly treated as a ‘spot’ commodity, hired when, and for 
exactly as long as, production requires, with few or no strings attached in terms 
of social security, severance pay and sick pay. The need to ensure sufficient 
earnings to enable the ‘re-production’ of labour power – as Marx would put it – 
and to nurture labour by means of education, training and good health are thus 
shifted progressively onto the worker or the state.2
Commodification of labour thus understood follows from the progressive 
demise of the standard employment relationship. Jill Rubery is an authorita-
tive voice in the literature opposing this demise (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2016; 
Rubery et al., 2015). She and her co-authors argue that commodification is being 
driven by increasing flexibility and precariousness of employment, compounded 
by fragmented time practices such as those prevailing in the elderly care services 
in the UK. Breman and van der Linden (2014) bring an even more sombre 
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perspective to the debate with the claim that commoditised labour power is the 
general rule in the history of market economies, with the standard employment 
relationship actually representing an historical exception that may have run its 
course.
It is tempting to see the growth of vouchers in Italy as one of the clearest 
cases of rampant commodification in Europe. Unlike mini-jobs in Germany, 
Italian vouchers are not labour contracts (Pala, 2014). Presently, they can be 
bought at a tobacconist’s shop (as well as other selling points, including online) 
and can be used to buy multiple hours of services. Unlike pre-financed CES in 
France, they can be used across practically all sectors, types of firm and type of 
‘worker’ (with very few exceptions).3 The current gross value is 10 euros, 7.5 
of which accrue to the worker net of income taxes, while the remaining 2.5 go 
partly towards financing an insurance against occupational hazards and partly to 
a ‘special’ (state) pension fund. They do not, however, entitle the worker to 
sick pay, holiday pay, maternity or parental leave, unemployment benefits or 
severance pay. 
Despite such premises, the story of Italian vouchers is reassuring in some 
important respects. Although since 2008 their growth exploded, the availa-
ble evidence suggests that they have been used to replace more ‘structured’ 
employment forms, but not as frequently as was initially feared. On the con-
trary, they may have helped some occasional and seasonal labour to surface 
from the underground economy.4 This is no reason for complacency, however, 
because the story of Italian vouchers is still in the making, since the number of 
workers depending solely on vouchers for their income is very small but grow-
ing, and because, importantly, evidence is still scant. However, the current 
situation raises questions about what may prevent even stronger forms of com-
moditised labour exchanges from becoming pervasive, and what may relegate 
such exchanges to niche labour markets while contributing to regularising ‘pin 
money’ employment.5
The following discussion recounts the specific Italian experience but con-
cludes by raising more general questions about commodification. The section 
titled ‘How vouchers work in Italy’ sets out the current legal framework for 
vouchers in the country; it also discusses how they evolved through successive 
statutory revisions along a trajectory that started with a French-style cheques 
service scheme and ended with what may be viewed as an idiosyncratic version 
of German-style mini-jobs. The next section, ‘Exponential growth: who is 
involved and how?’, factually documents this trajectory, focusing in particular 
on the characteristics of the workers involved and of the employment oppor-
tunities being offered. The last section, ‘What do Italian vouchers teach us 
about  commodification? Questions in search of answers’, asks whether and 
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how the spread of such forms of commodification that may otherwise look 
rampant may actually be contained by in-built ‘stabilisers’ as well as effective 
regulation.
The account of the growth of the Italian payment-by-voucher system which 
we provide below intersects with the scholarly work of Rubery in at least 
two respects. As noted, the main intersection is with her research on the 
consequences of the demise of the standard employment contract. An addi-
tional intersection concerns the shape such a demise can take, especially in 
feminised areas such as care work. Rubery and her co-authors coined the term 
‘fragmented time practices’ (see also Chapter 6) to group different forms of 
de- commodification within the care sector. Towards the end of the chapter we 
explore similarities and differences with the Italian-style use of vouchers within 
elderly care.
How vouchers work in Italy
The text of the Italian law refers to vouchers as ‘lavoro accessorio’, literally ‘sub-
sidiary employment’. When first introduced in 2003, as part of one of the 
milestone reforms of the national labour market (the so-called ‘Legge Biagi’), 
subsidiary employment competed with a host of other newly introduced con-
tractual arrangements, and was consequently assigned distinctive goals. As a 
means of payment, vouchers were limited to casual and ancillary activities ‘per-
formed by individuals at risk of social exclusion, not participating in the labour 
market or about to leave it’.6 They were intended to provide a viable  alternative 
to informal employment for a set of activities often confined to the shadow 
economy, while favouring the inclusion of peripheral and marginalised workers 
(Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2016). The activities in question 
ranged from housework and care work to private tuition, small-scale gardening 
and cleaning, natural disaster management and the organisation of occasional 
events – from conferences to athletic contests. Eligible workers included the 
long-term unemployed, housewives and retirees, as well as non-EU migrants 
with a regular residency permit. Hours of work were limited to 30 per month 
and earnings to 3,000 euros per year.
On most counts, the inspiration clearly came from the French CES instituted in 
1993, but two closely related differences are worth noting. The French scheme 
did not set a fixed per-hour value, whereas in Italy each voucher was intended to 
equate to an hour’s work. Its initial price was set at 7.5 euros gross, 5.8 of which 
accrued to the worker net of tax and social security while the remainder was 
divided between a small fee for operating costs and employer’s contributions to 
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a special pension fund, as well as to the abovementioned national, occupational 
hazard insurance scheme.7
Hence, social security costs were (and remain) much lower than for any other 
type of contract in Italy. So too were benefits, since voucher recipients could 
not and still cannot claim any benefits other than insurance payments in case of 
work-related accidents, and a very small pension income. By contrast, in France 
social security benefits were (and remain) comparable to other types of employ-
ment with the difference that contributions were heavily subsidised while pro-
viding full benefits (in proportion to earnings). Also, the (variable) value of 
CES was intended to factor in holiday pay, sick pay and so on. From the start, 
therefore, Italian law set vouchers as something clearly apart from anything like 
a standard labour contract.
A second difference is that, unlike in France, the Italian scheme did not take 
off immediately. In 1998, five years after actual enforcement, the monthly figure 
for average hours worked under the ES schemes was over 8 million in France. 
This compares with slightly over 100,000 in Italy five years after enforcement 
(2008) even though the total population of the two countries was of a roughly 
comparable magnitude in the respective years.8 As we document in the section 
‘What do Italian vouchers teach us about commodification? Questions in search 
of answers’, the main reason for poor results in Italy is that the scheme was and 
remains relatively unpopular with households.
In the attempt to remedy a shaky start, the scheme was repeatedly revised. 
The most consequential changes were enforced at different dates between 2008 
and 2015, which actually had the effect of turning the vouchers into minimum-
protection, German-style, mini-jobs anchored at a set wage. Firstly, the range 
of admissible activities was expanded until eventually encompassing the whole 
economy, with a few specific exceptions within agriculture (INPS, 2016b). 
Secondly, eligible workers no longer need to belong to groups on the margins of 
the labour market but comprise almost everybody, including full-time employ-
ees or self-employed workers wishing to supplement their earnings. Employers 
can be families, entrepreneurs, professionals, non-profit organisations and even 
public authorities. Thirdly, the price per voucher was eventually set at the cur-
rent value of 10 euros and total earnings were capped higher: each worker can 
now cash vouchers for up to 2,000 euros, net, per year from the same employer 
and for up to 7,000 euros, net, per year from all employers (Natali, 2016). The 
selling of vouchers was also made easier, for example by adding tobacconists to 
the list of authorised sellers. As a result, about two-thirds of all vouchers in 2015 
were sold by tobacconists (INPS, 2016d: figure1). Employers can also purchase 
vouchers via the website of the National Social Security Institute (or at its local 
offices), in most banks and in post offices. 
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To gauge similarities and differences between vouchers and mini-jobs recall 
that the latter are also permitted across sectors and according to individual 
employment status. Like the Italian vouchers, moreover, they are not incompat-
ible with other sources of income, including wages, unemployment benefits and 
pensions. Also, with the introduction of a statutory national minimum wage in 
Germany (which was actually prompted by fears of wage exploitation of mini-
jobbers), a large share of mini-jobbers is currently likely to be paid 8.5 euros 
gross per hour (the minimum wage rate until December 2016; see also Chapter 
2), which may actually be lower in purchasing power parity than the 7.5 euros 
per hour in Italy, net of taxes and any contributions. Annual earnings are capped 
at 5,400 euros per year for German mini-jobbers compared to 7,000 for Italian 
voucher recipients, although the former may actually receive extra compensa-
tion for in-work-related expenses which are not taxed and are not counted 
towards the earnings ceiling (Mazzon, 2013). 
Differences are also worth noting. Mini-jobs are proper labour contracts 
that grant mini-jobbers the status of employed individuals, whereas vouchers 
do not. From the very start, the text of the Italian law clearly stated that being 
in receipt of vouchers does not affect the employment status of the recipient. 
As a result, German mini-jobbers enjoy the same labour rights as regular work-
ers. Employers pay full contributions at a 30per cent, a flat rate which slightly 
exceeds the average rate. Employees are generally expected to pay contributions 
only towards their pension, with the possibility for some to be exempted, in 
which case they also forfeit future pension income (Federal Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, 2014).
With regard to pension entitlements, however, practical differences between 
mini-jobs and vouchers are likely to be slim: both voucher recipients and mini-
jobbers are likely to be entitled to pensions well below the poverty line should 
they rely only on this source of income during their working life. For example, 
the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs estimated that each additional 
year as a mini-jobber adds 3.11 euros to one’s monthly pension amount, thus 
requiring 37 years to be entitled to 116 euros in Germany! (Mazzon, 2013:6). 
In Italy, social security contributions are set aside in a special pension scheme 
called Gestione separata. Each year a so-called minimale is set, corresponding to the 
minimum amount of money that a worker must pay into the scheme for her or 
him to be credited one full year of contributions. If a worker pays less than the 
minimale he or she will be credited only a fraction of a full year (INPS, 2016a). 
Given the current limitations on annual earnings, a worker who relies solely 
on vouchers cannot reach the minimale even at the maximum level of earnings. 
To clarify this point with numbers, in 2015, a worker on vouchers receiving 
7,000 euros (the earnings ceiling) would have paid 1,213 euros into the pension 
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scheme. With a minimale of 3,653.78 euros, he or she would have been credited 
four months of contributions. However, very few workers earn up to 7,000 
euros; with approximately 64 vouchers per worker cashed per year the average 
worker would pay just 83 euros into the scheme, corresponding to less than a 
month of contributions.
Exponential growth: who is involved and how?
Was the transformation of the voucher system from a CES-style provision to 
mini-jobs-of-a-kind successful? The short answer is yes if success means that 
vouchers have become much more popular. We already noted that growth was 
exponential between 2008 and 2015, as measured by the number of vouchers 
sold and the persons (recipients) involved. If we qualify a recipient as all those 
who cashed at least one voucher in the reference year, their number grew from 
almost 25,000 in 2008 to almost 1.4 million in 2015 (Figure 8.1). During the 
same period, the number of vouchers actually cashed grew from less than half 
a million in 2008 to more than 115 million in 2015 (Figure 8.2). The use of 
vouchers did spread across sectors, some more than others, but households 
remain peripherally involved. In 2015, the number of employers doubled 
with respect to 2013, exceeding 473,000 units. As shown in Figure 8.3, about 
two-thirds of them are firms operating in the secondary or tertiary sector, with 
the largest shares accruing to tourism and manufacturing. Only 15 per cent 
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of all employers are families, while employers operating in agriculture account 
for less than 4 per cent.9 With more than 400,000 employers each year, many 
of them are bound to have used only a limited number of vouchers. The 2015 
average of 3.5 recipient per employer actually obscures the fact that only 
3per cent of them hire more than five workers over the course of one year, 
with each of whom receiving at least 70 vouchers (Bombelli et al., 2016: 
table 10).
Figure 8.2 Number of vouchers sold per year and average number of vouchers per 
recipient per year, 2008–15
Note: Vouchers cashed are less than vouchers sold which explains possible discrepancies between 

































2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015






































Industry and third sector with other employees
Industry and third sector without other employees
Other (legal persons)
Other (natural persons)
 Subsidiary employment in Italy: commodification of labour 157
Unsurprisingly, the share of women cashing vouchers has grown in parallel 
with the number of vouchers, reaching 52 per cent in 2015 against a female 
representation of 42 per cent across the rest of the employed population. Hence 
women are over-represented among those who work for vouchers, but the 
imbalance ‘in favour’ of women is still contained in comparison with recipients 
of the French CES or German mini-jobbers. However, the final judgement 
should be suspended in view of the ongoing upward trend in feminisation in 
Italy. The share of very young recipients has also grown in Italy alongside 
the volume of vouchers, with the average age on a downward trend, a small 
incidence of recipients older than 60 and one in every three recipients below 
25 years of age in 2015.
With demographic indicators evolving rapidly, it is still too early to conclude 
that vouchers will enhance the segmentation of the Italian Labour market by fur-
ther shifting the risks of precariousness onto women and young people. But we 
cannot rule out such risks. As with migrant labour, available data only separate 
out non-EU migrants from EU recipients (including nationals) and show that the 
former are not over-represented. Again, however, over-representation among 
voucher recipients cannot be ruled out for migrants from EU countries, as we 
simply do not have enough information. 
Overall, the demographics of voucher recipients are not (yet) particularly 
informative about the role this scheme is playing in the labour market. Indicators 
of turnover, earnings and displacement effects are more telling. The main facts 
are as follows.
Turnover of recipients is and remains high despite a downwards trend. Year after 
year, new entrants (or re-entrants) were and remain the majority of voucher 
recipients. The percentage of voucher recipients not having performed subsidi-
ary work in the previous year followed a decreasing trend since 2008, but stayed 
well above 50 per cent since 2008 (Figure 8.1). This may simply reflect the fact 
that we have witnessed fast growth in the number of recipients in recent years. 
But, again, we cannot rule out the possibility that for most recipients, employ-
ment by means of vouchers will continue to represent a largely temporary con-
dition lasting less than one year.
The average number of vouchers per recipient is low. Despite the pace of growth in 
the number of vouchers, the average number of voucher per worker per year 
was roughly stable around 60units in the last five years or so (Figure 8.2). This 
suggests that most work spells on vouchers tend to be short, sometimes even 
just a few hours in the whole year.
Average earnings per recipient are low. Earnings per recipient are also low, con-
sistent with the previous finding on vouchers per head. In 2015, annual average 
earnings ranged from 554 euros for the youngest recipients to 700 for the oldest 
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(Table 8.1), exhibiting the familiar concavity of most age-earnings profiles. If, 
moreover, we look at the distribution of average earnings across age groups the 
tail is thicker on the left-hand side. In 2015 more than three-fifths of all recipi-
ents totalled less than 500 euros each and more than one in seven recipients 
cashed less than five vouchers in the whole year (Bombelli et al., 2016: 4)
The striking findings in this respect is that the earning ceiling of 7,000 euros, 
net, per year is set about ten times higher than actual, average figures. To gauge 
the anomaly of these figures compare them with earnings for mini-jobbers in 
Germany. In 2014, the number of German mini-jobbers was slightly more than 
7 million, 6,803,327 hired by firms, 267,478 by families; the former earned 
€282 per month (or the annual equivalent of more than three thousand euros), 
the latter €181 per month (Minijob Zentrale, 2015).
Vouchers are the sole source of income for only a minority of recipients. In the light 
of the preceding figures, it would be surprising if vouchers represented the only 
source of labour income for the majority of recipients. There are no clear official 
data in this respect, but Cicciomessere (2015: 4) cites Anastasia and colleagues 
(2015) to estimate that, if we exclude very young people who are still likely to 
be dependent on their family, the share of recipients for whom vouchers are the 
sole source of monetary income may be less than 25 per cent,10a large minority 
who cannot be ignored, but still a minority.
Displacement effects are contained. Italian trade unions often voiced concern that 
the deregulation of vouchers would encourage their use to replace existing, less-
profitable contractual relations rather than encouraging shadow employment 
to emerge. It seems that this happened but ‘only’ affected some 10 per cent of 
recipients. The specific finding is that one in ten recipients of vouchers appear 
to have worked for the same employer in the previous six months, either as an 
employee or as an own account worker – one in eight if the period is restricted 
to the previous three months (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 
2016: 7). However, there is great variability across branches of activity, with 
what we may call the ‘displacement rate’ ranging from a maximum of 15 per 
Table 8.1 Annual earnings by age of voucher recipients
Age Number of 
recipients
% Average annual earnings 
per recipient (€)
<25 431,613 31.0 554
26–59 849,968 61.0 660
60–65  57,483  4.1 762
>65  53,842  3.9 700
Source: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2016: 5).
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cent for firms in the tourist sector to a minimum of 0.7 per cent for housework 
and carework (2016: 8).
If we take all this evidence together what does it suggest about the role of 
vouchers in the Italian labour market? With the due caveat that any inference is 
bound to be speculative against a background of limited information and ongo-
ing change, the introduction of vouchers seems to have partially missed the 
purpose of the CES in France to bring into the regular market unpaid and grey 
work in the household sector. At the same time, the employment opportunities 
that have been created yield occasional, seasonal or marginal earnings, too small 
to fully qualify as mini-jobs, although on paper, similarities with mini-jobs are 
strong. Unsurprisingly, official assessment of the voucher scheme (Ministero 
del lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2016) turns failure to create (or regularise) 
opportunities that may somehow qualify as ‘jobs’ – however mini – into suc-
cess for the scheme, hinting that vouchers by and large create or regularise truly 
subsidiary employment, as they were originally intended to do.
What do Italian vouchers teach us about commodification? 
Questions in search of answers
The evidence illustrated in the previous section raises at least three inter- 
connected questions which hark back to the issue of commodification we raised 
in the introduction to this chapter. The first question is why vouchers remained 
relatively unpopular with Italian households, unlike the French CES that had 
inspired them. The second question is why voucher earnings per recipient are 
so low, and, in particular, why they are much lower than for German mini-
jobs despite the fact that Italian vouchers are less costly for Italian employers 
and subject to equivalent- or higher-earnings ceilings than in Germany. The 
final question follows partly from the preceding ones and asks why a commod-
itised, employer-friendly, simple-to-use, no-strings-attached labour transaction 
is eroding traditional labour relationships only to a limited extent.
In answer to the first question let us further substantiate the claim that vouch-
ers are only moderately popular with Italian households. It is not possible to 
know from available data exactly how much demand from households is con-
tributing to the spread of vouchers, but we can venture an estimate of only 
about 6 per cent of all vouchers sold in 2015, based on data from Bombelli and 
colleagues (2016).11
The reasons are not entirely clear, but ‘wrong’ pricing could be one of them, 
as occurred in Austria (Farvaque, 2013). To shed some light on the issue, con-
sider the two main alternatives to vouchers, namely hiring on the black market 
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on the one hand and, on the other, hiring on the legal market using the contract 
for domestic and care workers (‘collaboratori famigliari’). For the sake of argu-
ment, consider two polar cases from the point of view of the continuity of the 
relationship: on the one hand, demand is for services expected to be occasional 
or rather temporary; on the other hand, demand is for services with a long or 
indefinite horizon. In both cases demand is for a limited number of hours, say 
five per week.
Let us focus now on demand for occasional services and suppose the hourly 
rate for domestic and care workers is 8 euros on the black market, the most 
convenient alternative to vouchers.12 For the worker the alternative of pocket-
ing 7.5 euros with a voucher would not be especially attractive given that pen-
sion benefits attached to vouchers are very small and uncertain. The additional 
benefit for her or him would be insurance against work-related injuries, but this 
risk is likely to be perceived as rather low in the domestic work sector. The 
household buying the voucher, on the other hand, would need to pay an extra 
2.5 euros per hour compared to the black-market rate in exchange for avoiding 
the risk of being sanctioned for irregular hiring. Taking this risk could be costly 
in some cases, for example if the worker is injured at the employer’s premises; 
or if he or she commits a wrongdoing, in which case irregular employment 
makes it difficult for the employer to seek justice. However, such possibilities 
are likely to be perceived as sufficiently remote, especially when the domestic 
worker has been engaged via networks of friends, catholic institutions and the 
like. Hence for occasional house-help or care work, informal hiring may still be 
a strong competitor of vouchers, at least in some regions of Italy.
Next, let us consider demand for housework/care services on a longer-term 
basis, retaining the previous assumption that hiring on the irregular market 
would cost 8 euros per hour. In this case, irregular employment might lose 
attractiveness for both sides of the transaction. For households employing irreg-
ular family helpers or carers the cumulative risk of being caught increases with 
the length of the relationship, and sanctions are severe. All the more so because 
workers can report employers for irregular hiring. Workers are often migrants 
from within or outside the EU, and both depend on a formal regular source of 
income in order to be eligible for residency and have full access to the National 
Health Service. At the going rate in the shadow economy, therefore, vouch-
ers may compete effectively with irregular work. To be used on a large scale, 
however, vouchers also need to effectively compete with the special contract 
for domestic helpers (‘collaboratori famigliari’). If a regular contract were drawn, 
the employee would need to pay 40 cents per hour in social contributions. 
Assuming that the gross contractual pay also amounts to 8 euros, the employee 
would receive 40 cents less which would leave her or him practically indifferent 
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in monetary terms between a voucher and a regular contract (INPS, 2016c). 
And if her/his only source of labour income were those five hours per week he 
or she would have to pay no taxes. However, he or she may prefer the contract 
because it grants holidays, sick leave etc. as well as ensuring greater continuity.13
On her and his side, the employer would pay 1.57 cents in contributions, per 
hour, to hire on a regular contract, in addition to the gross salary of 8 euros for 
the employee (INPS, 2016c). He or she might find the voucher slightly more 
convenient in strictly monetary terms than the standard contract for domestic 
helpers (or carers) as the latter would also require granting employee holidays, 
sick leave and maternity leave in proportion to the weekly hours. However, 
direct gains in monetary terms are likely to be more than compensated by indi-
rect transaction costs. These would arise from the fact that a regular contract 
strengthens trust and enhances collaboration between domestic workers and 
families: trust lowers the cost of security (household helpers generally have keys 
to the house or live with the family) and promotes collaboration from employ-
ees with positive effects on the quality of services that are supplied. The upshot 
is that for short-hours employment within a long-lasting relation the monetary 
incentive to replace existing contractual alternatives with vouchers may be too 
slim to always compensate for losses in the quality of services and in security 
risks. 
In sum, if our back-of-the envelope calculations are roughly correct, the 
answer to the first question is that vouchers in Italy may not be ‘cheap’ enough 
to strongly compete with existing alternatives, be it irregular hiring or regular 
hiring on the existing contract for collaboratori famigliari.
The second question we raised is best answered with reference to the non-
household sector. As we described above, average annual earnings per recipient 
are very low and the vast majority of recipients are far from reaching the ceil-
ing of 7,000 euros per year. We see three possible reasons for this. The first is 
that most recipients do not rely on vouchers as the only source of income. The 
second is the fraudulent use of vouchers, especially for workers who declare 
no other source of labour income. The third is that vouchers are not attrac-
tive enough for anything qualifying as non-marginal employment. As we have 
already discussed the first reason, we now turn to the remaining two.
Fraudulent use of vouchers has been feared from the very introduction of the 
scheme. Until recently, in fact, no legal provision was in place to ensure that each 
voucher would be made to correspond to at least one hour of work. Hence firms 
might pay fewer vouchers than the hours they contract, or they might use vouch-
ers to cover up irregular employment. For example, they could pay workers cash 
in hand as a rule and hold a minimum set of vouchers to be exhibited in the event 
of an inspection or when a worker injures herself or himself and needs insurance 
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coverage. At the time of writing, there is little information as to whether this hap-
pens and to what extent. Cicciomessere (2015: 4) speculates that the segment of 
recipients at risk of fraudulent behaviour is likely to coincide with those relying 
on vouchers as the only source of income. However, information may be forth-
coming soon since the Parliament recently approved amendments to existing 
regulations which ensure practically instant tracking of the vouchers’ recipients 
including where, when and for how long they are expected to work.14 If growth 
in the sale of vouchers halts or even reverses in the months ahead, then it will be 
indirect proof that fraudulent use was most likely widespread.
The final explanation, which is not necessarily in opposition to the previous 
two, is that there are insufficient net advantages to resort to vouchers when 
in non-marginal employment. This leads to the third question, namely, why 
a fairly commoditised labour exchange has not spread beyond a labour market 
niche (up to now).
In order to put the matter into context, let us first return to the current 
importance of vouchers within the Italian labour market. A telling indicator 
to this purpose is the number of full-time equivalent employment financed by 
vouchers. Assuming that one voucher actually corresponds to one hour’s work 
and taking the average number of annual hours worked by full-timers as a refer-
ence, in Italy vouchers actually paid for the equivalent of around 65,000 full-
time, year-round employment positions in 2015.15
Conclusions
Although it is still early days to take stock of the Italian experience, it may be 
worthwhile to ask why vouchers have filled only a small niche of the labour 
market and have not become more pervasive in the last eight years. Not only 
do average earnings per recipient amount to ‘pin money’, for both men and 
women, but also, as noted above, vouchers appear to have displaced pre- existing 
labour contracts only to a modest extent. 
Legal restrictions provide a partial answer. For the employer to fill even a 
part-time job requiring 800 hours per year (about half of the average figure for 
full-timers) s/he would need to hire four different workers for each of them 
to stay within their annual ceiling (assuming the price of vouchers is ‘right’ for 
the job). That alone is likely to considerably raise transaction and organisational 
costs. For very short-term, temporary contracts, such costs can be much lower, 
thus increasing the risk of being replaced by vouchers. However, additional 
transaction costs may be relevant. By their nature, vouchers imply that the 
employment relationship can be terminated by the worker or the employer 
 Subsidiary employment in Italy: commodification of labour 163
any day, nay, any hour. Given the asymmetry in bargaining power between the 
recipient and the employer it is more likely that termination is in the latter’s 
hand. But whoever may be more at risk, such risk inevitably lowers trust and 
cooperation, implying additional transactions costs. The aforesaid costs may 
increase with the complexity of jobs, whether complexity is measured in terms 
of hard or soft skills. 
The above example of care services illustrates the importance of soft skills; 
if you need to hire a carer for your elderly parents you will be willing to pay 
more to avoid the excessive turnover of carers, because learning individual idi-
osyncrasies takes time and emotional continuity is especially important in old 
age. Clearly the importance of such transaction costs is bound to vary in different 
market and institutional contexts. Compare, for example the use of vouchers 
for elderly care in Italy and fragmented time practices such as those reported by 
Rubery and colleagues (2015) for UK firms offering elderly care services. With 
respect to time management, Italian style vouchers may be likened to fragmented 
time practices. In the UK, the latter range from employers focusing paid hours 
primarily to high demand and sometimes limiting them to face-to-face engage-
ments in in-person services, to failing to recognise and pay work-related time 
between demand peaks or between direct customer demand (Rubery et al., 
2015: passim). Rubery and her co-authors document a clear relationship between 
fragmented time practices and inferior quality of care services, as well as between 
fragmented time practices and employers’ difficulty of recruiting and retain-
ing staff. They argue that firms using fragmented time practices try putting in 
place Human Resources practices to counteract the shortcomings stemming from 
fragmented time management, but the shortcomings ultimately prevail because 
customers (the elderly clients) do not have enough voice and clout. However, 
this may be different in Italy where families retain a strong role either as direct 
employers or as intermediaries between the elderly and the service firms. Hence, 
the disadvantages of using vouchers to implement fragmented time management 
are likely to be weighed more heavily against the advantages in the Italian context.
Our answer to the third question is therefore that commodification entails 
costs as well as advantages to the employers and it is not a foregone conclusion 
that the latter more than compensate for the former. In fact, the experience of 
Italian vouchers suggests that we may need to carefully identify and evaluate 
such costs in different institutional contexts precisely in order to learn how to 
contain the worst effects of commodification. Within the confines of this chapter 
and the limitations of available data, we are unable to progress any further with 
this analysis for Italy. Hopefully, however, this does not detract from the signifi-
cance of our endeavour and the wider implications of Italy’s policy of subsidiary 
employment.
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Notes
 1 Our translation for la nuova frontiera del precariato, the term used by INPS President Tito 
Boeri in a public speech on 15 May 2015.
 2 This understanding of commodification differs from those of institutionalists à la 
Putterman (1989) but, also from that of Marx. In the former case, commodification 
is simply the existence of a legal contract specifying the terms at which labour is sold. 
As with Marx’s notion, the ‘equilibrium’ (long-run) price of labour power covers its 
cost of reproduction, that is, the market system (or employers) must take charge of 
reproducing labour power in the long run.
 3 We use quotations marks for ‘workers’ to underscore the fact that receiving vouchers 
in exchange of labour service does not affect employment status in Italy. 
 4 Regularising shadow labour was perhaps the main goal assigned to vouchers when they 
were first introduced in Italy; unsurprisingly so, since the original inspiration came 
from French-style CES. In Belgium, too, French-style vouchers are officially hailed as 
a tool to fight shadow employment (see, for example, http://www.emploi.belgique.
be/defaultTab.aspx?id=651).
 5 Expectations that schemes such as vouchers would encourage what may be called 
‘regularisation of employment at the margin’ actually inspired support for the voucher 
system from the International Labour Office, which is very active in fighting employ-
ment precariousness and the demise of the Standard Labour Contract (see, for exam-
ple, ILO, 2013).
 6 Act 276/2003, article 70. The text is available at http://www.normattiva.it/urires/
N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:decreto.legislativo:2003–09–10;276@originale~art70
 7 Employers wishing to pay workers more than the set hourly rate can use more than one 
voucher for an hour of work. However, while this is implicit in the text of the law, it 
is rarely discussed in the literature and is most likely infrequent in practice.
 8 The French population totalled 60.2 million in 1998 compared to 58.8 million for 
Italy in 2008. According to the data reported by the European Monitoring Centre on 
Change (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/case-studies/tackl 
ing-undeclared-work-in-europe/universal-service-employment-cheque-france: table 
1) a total of 101.0 million hours were worked under the CES scheme in 1998, that is, 
more than 8 million per month. In Italy, the total number of vouchers sold between 
August and December 2008 in Italy was 536,321 according to INPS data, that is, just 
over 107,000 per month, assuming that one voucher actually paid for one hour of work 
as the law prescribes (INPS, 2011: table 7.6).
 9 The proportion of families is an estimate based on the assumptions that employers 
officially coded as natural persons (persone fisiche) largely coincide with families (see 
Figure 8.3).
10 According to data referring to the Veneto Region, a large industrial area accounting for 
about 14 per cent of all vouchers sold, 57 per cent of vouchers recipients are workers 
with a regular job, often a standard contract while 11 per cent are young people under 24 
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years of age who are likely to live with their parents. Only for the remaining 32 per cent 
are vouchers the only source of labour income. Reportedly, however, it was not possible 
to separately identify self-employed workers or pensioners cashing vouchers. Netting 
the latter out, Cicciomessere estimates the ‘true’ share of people for whom vouchers are 
the only source of labour income at 25 per cent (Cicciomessere, 2015: 4, 15). 
11 Data on buyers of vouchers allow us to separate out persone fisiche (physical entities) 
from other ‘legal entities’– organisations, firms, professionals regularly enrolled in a 
register and so on (see Figure 8.3). Assuming that all persone fisiche represent house-
holds, in 2015, 70,000 households (15 per cent of all buyers) bought little more than 
5 million vouchers (6 per cent of the total) to engage 128,000 recipients (7.5 per cent 
of all recipients). 
12 Note that 8 euro per hour is currently the black-market rate in the capital city 
of Rome.
13 Note that vouchers count towards minimum earnings to be eligible for renewal of a 
work permit, provided that they are not the only source of income.
14 The Act can be found at the website of the Italian Parliament, Senate of the Republic: 
http://www.senato.it/leg/17/BGT/Schede/docnonleg/32659.htm
15 According to Eurostat data, average hours worked in Italy per week by full-timers was 
40 in 2015, when 25 million vouchers were sold in the country. Assuming 220 work-
ing days per year – as in the standard calculation of full-time equivalent employment – 
annual hours amounted to 1760.With more than 115 million vouchers sold in that year, 
full-time equivalent employment financed by vouchers amounts to 65,386 positions. 
In turn, 65,386 full-time equivalent workers correspond to about 0.3 per cent of the 
23.3  million full-time equivalent employment units recorded for the last quarter of 
2013 (ISTAT, 2014).
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Job quality: conceptual and 
methodological challenges for 
comparative analysis
Agnieszka Piasna, Brendan Burchell, Kirsten Sehnbruch and Nurjk Agloni
Introduction
International development agencies such as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and individual governments have traditionally been more 
concerned with the quantity of jobs – as measured by the rate of unemployment, 
or the rate of participation in the labour market – than the quality of available 
positions (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011; OECD, 2014; Sehnbruch, 2006). 
Much early psychological research on unemployment (e.g. Jahoda, 1982) tended 
to reinforce this simple model of a job being a good thing and unemployment a 
bad thing. But more recent research has taken a more nuanced approach, dem-
onstrating that poor-quality jobs characterised, for instance, by high demands, 
low control over decision-making, high job insecurity or workplace bullying 
might have worse psychosocial effects on individuals than experiences of unem-
ployment (Burchell, 1992; Butterworth et al., 2011; Warr, 1987). One of Jill 
Rubery’s most original and policy-orientated reports in recent years was Smith 
et al. (2013), in which she used, for the first time, the concept of job quality, in a 
holistic manner, to explore gender differences in working conditions. However, 
progress towards articulating job quality in public policy, in terms of not only 
overarching principles but also concrete actions, has been slow. One important 
impediment has been the conceptual confusion and the lack of a shared definition 
to inform both research and policy.
The variety of approaches led to multiple and relatively diffuse concepts 
developing in parallel, which limited their academic and political impact. The 
terminology used creates additional confusion; expressions such as ‘quality 
 Job quality: challenges for comparative analysis 169
of working life’ (predominantly linked to the subjective evaluations of one’s 
job), ‘job quality’ or ‘quality of work’ (often focusing on the job content and 
work environment) and, finally, ‘quality of employment’ (usually also includ-
ing a broader overview of labour relations, policies, participation or equality in 
income and job distributions) are often used interchangeably and without clear 
definitions. This inconsistency reflects the complexity of the whole issue of qual-
ity of work. There are not only multiple facets of jobs that should be taken into 
account, but also multiple levels on which jobs can be analysed, ranging from 
a subjective evaluation of a particular working environment to broad labour 
market systems in which jobs are performed. Furthermore, the definition of 
job quality and the selection of facets of employment via which to measure it 
depend on the perspective adopted. The meaning attributed to job quality will 
be different depending on whether it is viewed from the standpoint of individual 
workers, families, employers or from a societal perspective.
The lack of conceptual clarity crept into institutional initiatives in this area, 
which are rare and have not seen much success either. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO) has attempted to define the quality of work through its 
concept ‘Decent Work’, which was officially launched in 1999. Among those 
institutions influenced by the ILO’s approach, the European Union (EU) insti-
tutions – such as Eurofound (see, e.g., Green and Mostafa, 2012) – and some 
European governments stand out. Another example is an initiative that origi-
nated in 2000 as a series of seminars launched by the joint United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)/ILO/Eurostat task force, which 
after 15 long years published a statistical framework for measuring the quality 
of employment (UNECE, 2015). The framework, however, was developed as 
a complex statistical toolbox rather than an indicator suitable for evaluating and 
guiding policy. Moreover, the OECD contributed to the debate with its work 
on measuring social progress and quality of life – largely following the Stiglitz, 
Sen and Fitoussi (2009) report – and, more recently, has also made a very 
useful proposal for measuring and assessing job quality in its 2014 Employment 
Outlook.
However, the overall impact that the concepts ‘job quality’ and ‘decent work’ 
have had on both research and public policy is extremely limited compared to 
the influence achieved, for example, by the Human Development Index (HDI) 
over a similar period (see discussion in Burchell et al., 2014 and Sehnbruch et al., 
2015). The HDI, published by the United Nations Development Programme, is 
a summary measure of life expectancy, education and standard of living (meas-
ured by gross national income per capita), which has made a substantial contri-
bution towards shifting the policy focus from economic growth to people and 
their capabilities. 
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This chapter explores the reasons for little effective progress in the concep-
tualisation and measurement of job quality (or related terms, such as precarious 
work) through considering the conceptual frameworks used as a basis for analysing 
job quality, the institutional context that encourages or impedes research and the 
availability of data. In what follows, the first section summarises methodological 
considerations of measurement, including the shortcomings in existing measures 
of the quality of employment and their potential for international comparison. 
We further consider the contribution that psychology has made to understand-
ing job quality. We draw parallels with the way in which the Five-Factor Model 
of personality evolved and contributed to the inclusion of personality measures 
in large data sets. This example illustrates that consensus can and should be 
achieved in defining and measuring highly complex phenomena. Against this 
background, in the section titled ‘A multi-level model for the measurement of 
job quality’ we propose a conceptual framework that aims at a better articula-
tion of job quality by positioning it within macro drivers such as employment 
protection legislation, welfare regimes and labour market segmentation. Much 
in the spirit of the societal system approach for comparative analysis (Bosch et al., 
2007; Bosch et al., 2009; see Chapters 1 and 3), we demonstrate how jobs can 
be positioned within complex systems of labour market organisation that vary 
across countries, yet allow for a common evaluation of their quality. We develop 
a metaphor of ‘jobs as vehicles’ to clarify levels of analysis and to establish what 
job quality actually should be measuring. Finally, in the Conclusions, we argue 
that only in Europe, where comparable indicators from harmonised surveys have 
now become the norm and constitute extremely valuable data for analysts, has 
significant progress been made in conceptualising and measuring the quality of 
employment. We conclude that it is essential that this process of data collection 
and methodological consolidation be extended to other regions in the world 
where the quality of employment remains neglected.
Towards a framework for the measurement of job quality: 
methodological considerations
One of the first ways in which the academic literature approached the question 
of what constitutes a ‘good job’ was by focusing on non-pecuniary aspects of 
work and on workers’ subjective perceptions of their jobs (Staines and Quinn, 
1979; Yoshida and Torihara, 1977). Seashore (1974) and Land (1975) defined 
good jobs as those possessing attributes or consequences which are valued by the 
worker and are thus conducive to job satisfaction. Wnuk-Lipinski (1977) subse-
quently argued that job satisfaction is a vital component of quality of life and thus 
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an end in itself. On the basis of the ‘quality of life’ perspective (Bauer, 1966), 
several criteria for assessing the quality of work were devised, encompassing 
both general measurements of job satisfaction and specific measurements of 
workers’ contentment with an array of job facets (Kalleberg and Vaisey, 2005; 
Krueger et al., 2002; Land, 1975; Staines and Quinn, 1979). 
Over the years, a range of primarily psychological theories shifted the focus 
towards identifying a list of ‘objective’ job features linked to workers’ well-
being at work (Warr, 2007). For instance, a considerable amount of research on 
job quality conducted by occupational psychologists has focused on the deter-
minants of subjective well-being and productivity at the level of task charac-
teristics, such as variety, challenge, meaningful nature of the work performed, 
autonomy and teamwork (Hackman and Oldham, 1975). Karasek and Theorell 
(1990) focused on psychological stress and proposed a ‘job-strain model’ based 
on a balance between job control and demands. Nevertheless, no consensus 
has ever been reached on a way of organising a multitude of work dimensions 
into a coherent framework amenable to comparative research. The policy focus 
of most studies was firm-specific rather than comparative, aimed at achieving 
improvements in individual workplaces. In this section, we identify and discuss 
some of the key methodological and conceptual challenges faced by any attempt 
to define and measure job quality in comparative analysis.
Subjective and objective measurements
The development of a measurement of overall job quality based on subjective 
evaluation and job satisfaction proved problematic and was not without its crit-
ics for, depending on workers’ preferences and expectations, similar job char-
acteristics may indeed be valued quite differently (Taylor, 1977). Davis (1977) 
argued, in a similar vein, that the widely differing and contradictory meanings 
attributed to job quality by different groups of workers are to blame for the 
lack of agreement on how to define the quality of work. Agassi (1982) argued 
convincingly that the measure of job satisfaction is the relationship between 
the quality of an employee’s current job and the same employee’s notions of 
what might reasonably be expected of a job. Insofar as expectations vary con-
siderably between countries, it often turns out that a developed country may 
have lower aggregate job satisfaction than a developing one. Analysis based on 
the International Social Survey Programme, for example, shows that a broad 
range of countries show remarkably homogeneous indicators of job satisfaction 
(Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2011, figure 2.1: 10)
Adaptive preferences may also explain why some less-advantaged groups of 
workers (e.g. women) display higher satisfaction levels than others enjoying 
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objectively better working conditions. More-advantaged workers might also 
expect more, in terms of personal satisfaction, from their jobs (see also Muñoz 
de Bustillo et al., 2011), while those in less-favourable employment conditions 
may display a tendency to adapt to circumstances (Comin and Teschl, 2005; 
Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999). While this is an interesting psychological phe-
nomenon, it renders measurements of job satisfaction completely unsuitable for 
comparative research on job quality.
Furthermore, while indicators such as life expectancy and literacy can only 
really be improved by better health and education, there are, in principle, two 
ways to improve job satisfaction: either by changing employment conditions or 
by changing workers’ perceptions of these conditions. Job satisfaction, in other 
words, can be increased either by improving jobs or by lowering employees’ 
expectations. As the latter approach is likely to prove cheaper and easier than the 
former, job satisfaction measurements make poor policy levers.
It should be pointed out that there is considerable confusion with regard 
to the way in which the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are applied, more 
generally, to debates concerning the quality of life and well-being and, more 
specifically, to job quality. ‘Subjective’ is usually taken to mean not only self-
reported, but also pertaining to an attitude or psychological disposition towards 
an  attribute  – such as ‘life satisfaction’. ‘Objective’ is taken to refer to the 
measurement of ‘hard facts’ (Veenhoven, 2002) such as weekly hours of work. 
Nevertheless, self-reporting is the method most frequently used and the basis of 
many survey items. Most would see self-report of objective measures (such as 
hours worked) as unproblematic, except for the fact that it may introduce some 
error and reporting bias, as respondents might misremember or exaggerate 
their hours of work. Self-reporting of subjective assessment (e.g. job satisfac-
tion, work–life balance, perception of health and safety) is more problematic 
as it is shaped by adaptive preferences, societal norms and points of reference, 
which makes international comparisons particularly difficult. While in some 
cases such self-reported measurements of job quality can be compared with 
information from other sources – for instance, employees’ perceptions of the 
safety of their jobs can be triangulated with national statistics on fatalities at 
work – many features of job quality can be realistically measured only by asking 
employees about their work. In assessing job quality we argue that there is a 
prima facie case that workers are experts on their own jobs, even if their reports 
are susceptible to bias and error. 
However, we claim that a distinction that is more central to the development 
of job quality measurement is not whether we measure something by self-report 
or by other means, but rather whether we are interested in the reality and actual 
features of jobs, as opposed to individuals’ attitudes, opinions or evaluations 
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concerning their jobs, such as their job satisfaction. This is similar to the distinc-
tion made between the types of questions used to measure ‘subjective phenom-
ena’, based on their purpose in Turner and Martin’s (1984) seminal book on 
survey questions.
When we, as social scientists, ask questions of individuals we do so for very 
different reasons, even though the questions may appear similar both syntacti-
cally and semantically. Consider the two questions to be answered on Likert-
type scales:
1) How often do you work with radioactive materials? All of the time … 
Sometimes … Never.
2) How often do immigrants make a positive contribution to the labour market 
in the UK? All of the time … Sometimes … Never.
The reasoning behind asking these two questions is very different. The first 
question is asked because we are interested in estimating how often radioac-
tive material is handled in different jobs, and we can calculate means which 
(we hope) represent the level of use of radioactivity across different occupa-
tions, industries and countries. The second question is asked because we are 
interested, instead, in how people think – their attitudes, beliefs and values. 
We would not usually claim that responses to the question reflect the real con-
tribution of immigrants; more likely we would use the results as an indication 
of attitudes towards immigrants, or immigration, or perhaps as an indicator of 
racism. This distinction between psychological measures of individual differ-
ences and survey items measuring the qualities of entities such as jobs is critical 
to understanding the nature of job-quality measurement. Drawing a parallel 
with the literature on well-being, we are measuring ‘objective well-being’, 
that is, we are interested in the job itself – that is, the features of work and the 
various dimensions of working conditions – as opposed to what the employee 
thinks about the job, even though we are usually relying on employees’ own 
reports.
Psychologists are most often interested in measuring people’s internal states 
(e.g. beliefs, attitudes, values, mental abilities), such that we expect each indi-
vidual to score differently on a measure of, for example, attitude or personality 
or intelligence. In contrast, in the case of job quality, we aim to achieve a situ-
ation whereby, if the measures are well constructed and well devised, several 
individuals doing the same job will have very similar scores for the attributes of 
that job.
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Empirical progress
Apart from the issues surrounding the lack of a theoretical framework, as 
well  as  the conceptual confusions, the literature on the measurement of the 
quality of employment has had to tackle yet another significant problem: suc-
cessful measurements require reliable, and preferably also comparable, sources 
of data. 
The availability of comparable data across European countries has thus gener-
ated a virtuous circle in which empirical evidence has expanded the theoretical 
understanding of labour markets, which in turn has increased the efforts invested 
in data gathering. In developing countries, however, where comparable data 
are not available, both empirical and theoretical analysis has stagnated. The 
patchy availability of data has led to a host of studies on one or two aspects of the 
quality of employment or that only look at a single country, while the number 
of studies that have attempted to develop a comprehensive framework taking 
account of multiple job characteristics is limited. It is hardly surprising then that 
policy-relevant, cross-country comparative analysis should have taken so long to 
emerge. Where such studies have been carried out, they tend to be limited to 
groups of EU member states. 
A good illustration of the role of empirical data in conceptual progress is a 
recent outcome of co-operation between academic researchers and Eurofound, 
fuelled by a large-scale data set on working conditions in 34 European coun-
tries: the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). Eurofound has so 
far commissioned several reports to compare particular features of work and 
employment. However, it was not until the 2010 survey that a report was 
explicitly commissioned to undertake a comparative overview of general job 
quality between EU member states (Green and Mostafa, 2012). 
The job quality index developed by Green and Mostafa (2012) draws on lit-
erature in the fields of psychology, sociology and economics. The model incor-
porates four dimensions of job quality: earnings, job prospects, working-time 
quality and the intrinsic quality of the job. Intrinsic job quality is further divided 
into four subscales: social environment, physical environment, skill and discre-
tion, and work intensity. These scales consist of questions designed to produce 
a score to measure ‘objective’ features of respondents’ jobs. Questions on job 
satisfaction (or satisfaction with specific aspects of a job, such as work–life bal-
ance) are not included. A particular employee might well express a desire to 
work evenings and weekends, but this is not the central issue; the point is that 
existing scientific evidence links these sorts of working pattern with stress, poor 
physical health and negative effects on partners and children. The job-quality 
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indicator is constructed by assigning each respondent in the EWCS a score on 
each of its four main dimensions and four subdimensions, with higher scores 
indicating better job quality.
The public availability of the single data set from which the indices are derived 
allows researchers to embark on critical replications of the findings in an effort 
to refine and improve the model (e.g., for a gender critique, see Smith et al., 
2013). The success of this process is based on the simplicity and tractability 
achieved by a clear focus on the features of jobs as well as a synthetic indicator 
that is replicable across a broad range of countries.
It is precisely in the area of data gathering that the debate about the quality 
of employment can learn from other disciplines, in particular from the process 
through which psychologists developed the Five-Factor Model of Personality. 
It was developed to classify an endless set of personality traits, which could be 
combined in innumerable ways. In short, the discipline of psychology found a 
way to arrive at a consensus around the measurement through a synthetic indica-
tor that is at least as complex and controversial as the quality of employment.
Lessons from the Five-Factor Model of personality
Reducing personality to the ‘Big Five’ broad dimensions defined as openness to 
experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism, 
was in fact a largely data-driven process of building empirically based con-
sensus that involved looking for patterns of association between hundreds or 
thousands of possible measures of personality traits. The journey from nearly 
18,000 words describing personality found by Allport and Odbert (1936) 
in the Webster’s dictionary, through 171 terms clustered into 35 and then 
16 dimensions (Cattell, 1957), and then back and forth from more to less 
detailed lists of dimensions (Eysenck, 1991; Mershon and Gorsuch, 1988; 
Paunonen and Ashton, 2001), to the model with only five main personal-
ity dimensions (Costa and McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1997; Goldberg, 1993; 
Tupes and Christal, 1992) took several decades of academic research, driven 
by extensive collection of empirical data. The Big Five model is not without 
its critics, but it has probably come as close to achieving consensus as anything 
in psychology ever has. There are ongoing discussions, for instance, regarding 
the selection of survey items for measuring each dimension of personality (e.g. 
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann, 2003). Yet these are about details, not funda-
mentals; its success measured by the wide application in many fields is undeni-
able. The Big Five has been replicated by researchers worldwide and applied to 
a variety of different languages and cultures, including in Malaysia (Teh et al., 
2011), Turkey (Ozutku and Altindis, 2011), Iran (Erdle and Aghababaei, 2012; 
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Joshanloo and Afshari, 2011), Russia (Gindina et al., 2011), China (Wang et al., 
2012) and Korea (Na and Marshall, 1999). Such is the widespread acceptance 
of the Big Five, it is now often included in large, general-purpose surveys, such 
as the British Household Panel Survey and the BBC’s Lab UK project. This has 
made a major contribution to integrating psychological insights into interdisci-
plinary insights into sociological and economic analyses of individuals’ working 
and family lives. 
Achieving (near-) consensus within the discipline of psychology was clearly 
essential to the Big Five being adopted on such a wide scale. The field of job 
quality seems to be close to achieving a similar level of consensus. But there are 
most likely other features of the Big Five that are also essential in understanding 
why it has been used so widely, and perhaps the field of job quality can learn 
important lessons from the Big Five’s success. For instance, not only has it been 
demonstrated that the Big Five can be measured with a high degree of valid-
ity and reliability, it can also be measured easily with just a small number of 
questionnaire items. While the feasibility of measuring job quality has also been 
demonstrated, more development work is needed to optimise the psychometric 
properties of the dimensions of job quality. In the literature on job quality, there 
has been little discussion of the most economical or ‘short-form’ way to measure 
it on a large scale.
Another prerequisite for such large-scale research is that one measurement 
tool is applicable to all individuals, whether ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’. If job-qual-
ity measures are to achieve anything like the ubiquity of the Big Five personality 
measures, this suggests that it is vital that one conceptual framework and one 
measurement tool are developed that can apply to all jobs, be they very good 
jobs or very bad jobs, or be they jobs in poor countries or rich countries. Such 
conceptual and methodological agreement was a major contributing factor to 
the success of the HDI: it applied to all countries, not just developing nations. 
The debate around the origins of the HDI emphasised from the beginning that 
public policies should involve planning at the global level to achieve interna-
tional progress towards the narrowing of developmental gaps (Ul Haq, 1992). 
As a result, a composite statistic is calculated for each country to position it on a 
global map of development, recognising that better education, longer lives and 
more income are generally desirable in all contexts.
If recent publications are a guide of things to come, the success of the Five-
Factor Model is such that it is starting to break into even bigger territories. 
Advances in big data and machine learning is seeing the emergence of a new lit-
erature based on social network sites (such as Facebook) where the Five-Factor 
Model of Personality test is administered and the test results, along with much 
other information that can be gleaned about users’ online behaviour (or ‘digital 
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footprint’), can be analysed using tens or hundreds of thousands of cases, at very 
little cost to researchers (e.g. Youyou et al., 2015). With many researchers 
predicting that advances in machine learning mean that ‘Big Data’ will become 
as important as academic and official surveys in the near future, this again dem-
onstrates the importance of having measures that are amenable to large-scale 
survey administration. 
A multi-level model for the measurement of job quality
One of the unresolved issues in the literature on the quality of employment 
involves deciding what types of information should be included in measures of 
job quality. In particular, those efforts that have attempted to cover a greater 
number of employment characteristics to reconcile different constituents of the 
policy-making community have failed to distinguish between different levels of 
analysis that are relevant to the labour market. At the simplest and most indi-
vidualistic level, some models only consider the attitudes of individuals (e.g. 
their job satisfaction) and ignore details of the job itself or the context of the 
job. At the other extreme, some models are concerned more with the macro-
level context of jobs, such as the level of legal protection of workers provided 
by the State, types of welfare systems that reduce the costs of job loss, and the 
economic conditions that account for the risk of job loss and unemployment. 
Such approaches that preclude operationalisation at the individual worker or 
the job level have further consequences. Some interesting issues, such as gender 
gaps in job quality and the relative quality of employment of migrants, cannot be 
addressed straightforwardly. Finally, some approaches mix up characteristics of 
individual workers, jobs themselves, the regulatory environment and the labour 
market as a whole.
The most extreme case of methodology that mixes up different levels of 
analysis is the ILO’s ‘decent work’ approach. Some aspects of decent work are 
aimed at the individual worker (e.g. child labour and forced labour), some at the 
work environment (e.g. health and safety) and some at the aggregate level (e.g. 
social protection). The ILO’s ‘Country Profiles’, which analyse decent work, 
look at almost every imaginable employment-related variable. This is not only 
conceptually confusing, but also makes international comparison impossible as 
very few countries have information on such a broad range of variables, while 
ranking countries becomes too cumbersome.
To overcome these difficulties and limitations we propose to identify clearly 
relevant levels of analysis for comparative job-quality research. Conditions 
of work and employment are embedded in, and shaped by, institutional 
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arrangements and the social environment (Bosch et al. 2007; Bosch et al., 2009). 
The outcomes will vary depending on not only the political and historical pro-
cesses, the specialisation of countries or the macro-economic policy, but also the 
interactions between various rules and institutions. Such complexity prompted 
the development of various typologies (e.g. varieties of capitalism, welfare 
state regimes) to facilitate comparative analysis of social models. To allow for 
comparative analysis of job quality, we position jobs in the wider societal system 
(including the legal framework, welfare policy and structural features of the 
labour market), yet draw a line between the context in which a job is performed 
and the attributes of that job.
Different levels of job-quality analysis can be better understood and distin-
guished by using the metaphor of a vehicle for the quality of a job. For cars to 
be useful objects, they do not just need to be of good intrinsic quality (i.e. safe, 
comfortable and reliable); they also need to have good motorists, good roads, 
good services and be driven in a well-regulated setting. But if you ask some-
body what constitutes a good car, it is unlikely that they would reply ‘a quali-
fied driver, comfortable seats, a powerful motor, safe roads and traffic laws 
that are complied with’. However, this is precisely what many methodologies 
measuring job quality have done. In what follows (see also Table 9.1), we 
 discuss each level of analysis that applies to the labour market and, for clarity 
and illustrative purposes, draw a parallel with the car metaphor.
Workers (motorists)
In some measures of job quality much attention is paid to workers rather 
than jobs. This is manifest in two ways. The first issue pertains to the defini-
tion of workers and the conditions under which they are integrated into the 
labour market. Some people should not be working at all, such as young chil-
dren or people forced to work against their will. The eradication of child and 
slave  labour has been a priority for international development organisations 
such as the ILO. They are also quite correctly concerned about discrimina-
tion and segmentation in labour markets, which can exclude groups from jobs 
by virtue of their age, gender, sexual orientation or ethnic group. However, 
differentiation in employment terms and conditions not related to individual 
productivity is influenced by country-specific employment regimes, with their 
rules, institutions and employers’ strategies (Rubery, 1978; 2007). This fur-
ther complicates inclusion of worker characteristics in the evaluation of the 
quality of jobs.
Secondly, we might also be interested in workers’ human capital, such 
as educational attainment, or their internal mental states, such as happiness 
 Job quality: challenges for comparative analysis 179
or  job  satisfaction. However, from the perspective of our analytical frame-
work,  these dimensions should be considered as an important but distinct 
set  of  factors that impinge on labour market outcomes. This is particularly 
relevant from a policy perspective, as a focus on the characteristics of workers 
rather than jobs has been used to push for supply-side actions and policies (e.g. 
promotion of employability) instead of addressing challenges of poor-quality 
jobs.
Jobs (vehicles)
Vehicles are at the heart of understanding a transport system, in the same way 
that jobs are at the core of our job-quality model. However, note that we are 
not interested in what the motorists think of the car. They might think that a 
car is of a high quality for sentimental reasons, or because of limited knowledge 
of alternatives. Thus the role of a job-quality measure is to ascertain the true 
or objective quality of a job, just as a mechanic or vehicle tester evaluates a car, 
bringing their expert knowledge to the judgement. However, as discussed in 
the section ‘Towards a framework for the measurement of job quality: meth-
odological considerations’, this metaphor is complicated by the fact that the 
most feasible way we have to measure job quality is usually through self-report 
of the job holder, and of course self-report is subject to bias. However, the 
important thing is to ask about ‘objective’ job features, such as the ergonomic 
and ambient features of the working environment, not about how satisfied the 
job holder is with these elements. We might expect some correlation between 
the quality of a job and the job satisfaction of the holder, insofar as adaptive 
preferences or differences in expectations would allow, but ontologically they 
are distinct.
Legal framework (traffic laws)
In the same way that road traffic needs to be policed to operate efficiently and 
safely, the quality of employment is dependent on the national legal frame-
work. Therefore, a comprehensive model of quality of employment needs to 
take account of legislation such as employment protection legislation (EPL), 
laws against gender and racial discrimination in hiring, and health and safety 
protection. National legal systems can achieve the same ends by very differ-
ent means, thus it is inherently complex to make quantitative comparisons 
between legal systems. Nevertheless, indices of labour market legislation have 
been created for this purpose and are used in debates on the importance or 
otherwise of EPL in creating efficient and fair labour markets (for a critique, 
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see Rubery, 2011). Furthermore, without inspection and enforcement, labour 
market legislation is likely to be ineffectual. Thus the accessibility of legal 
redress to employees is also important. In some countries, the courts are the 
main enforcers of legislation; in others, enforcement might be carried out by 
trade unions or factory inspectors. 
Welfare policy (road traffic safety)
With a traffic system, accidents will happen from time to time and systems 
are needed to minimise the damage, such as crash barriers and ambulances. 
The same is true of employment: when employees lose their jobs they need 
to be assisted in times of unemployment to give them an income that at least 
partially substitutes their lost wages. When they retire, they need a pension. 
Many countries operate active labour market policies to assist employees in get-
ting back into work through mentoring and training. Some employees will also 
need welfare policies to help them retain jobs, such as parents of young children 
needing childcare provision to remain in work. In addition, welfare policies can 
be used to support low-income earners through such mechanisms as minimum 
wage-setting or earned income tax credits, and affordable childcare subsidised 
by the state can assist individuals and families through the life cycle. Yet the state 
is only one source of support; nuclear and extended families are more often 
providers rather than recipients of welfare and social provision (see House and 
Kahn, 1985).
Structural features of the labour market (roads)
In the same way that cars need roads to operate usefully and avoid traffic conges-
tion and gridlock, we can situate jobs in the context of the supply and demand 
in a labour market through measures such as the rates of unemployment and 
participation rate and the pattern of job vacancies. Without the dynamic systems 
to generate continuously and allocate jobs, whole segments of the population 
can be excluded from access to good-quality jobs, or from the labour market 
altogether. Industrial organisation and labour market composition can impact 
the career structures of individuals, thus influencing access to good or bad jobs 
across the life course and according to fluctuations of the economy. The dis-
tribution of, and access to, good-quality jobs is crucial in describing the condi-
tions of labour markets; this does not, however, affect the evaluation of certain 
features of jobs. A well-paid, secure job in a safe environment and without 
long or unsocial hours can be assessed positively irrespective of the wider socio-
economic structure in which it is performed.
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The model sketched above and illustrated by drawing parallels between the 
labour market and a transport system, introduces a much-needed conceptual 
clarity to the debate about job quality and its measurement. By distinguishing 
a job from its holder and from a wider environment in which it is performed, 
including labour market policies, social provision and structural factors, we can 
arrive at a more focused study object. This way we can arrive at an indicator, 
or a concise set of indicators, that overcomes the difficulty of quantifying the 
contribution of a certain job to wider societal goals of equality, freedom and 
development. 
Starting with the ‘vehicle’ or ‘car’ level of analysis and ignoring the other 
levels of analysis (motorists, roads and so on) has several clear advantages. 
Firstly, it is simpler – and once the analysis has been carried out adequately 
at that level, then other levels of analysis can be added, such as the welfare 
state and legal regulation of labour markets. Secondly, at this level of analy-
sis, any groups can be compared, such as men and women or indigenous and 
migrant workers, whether locally, regionally or nationally. Thirdly, to ana-
lyse labour markets at this level requires only one type of data, easily col-
lected by surveys of employees, making international comparisons relatively 
straightforward. 
Like all metaphors, this model has its limitations. One shortcoming is that it 
treats the employee (or ‘motorist’) in a completely individualistic way, whereas, 
in reality, they are embedded within a context of a family and a community. 
Table 9.1 Model for the measurement of job quality
Levels of analysis Examples 
Workers Age, child labour, forced labour, gender, sexual orientation, 
ethnic origin, level of education
Jobs Health and safety features, ergonomic and ambient features of 
the work environment, accident rates, employment contract, 
job security, autonomy, working hours, work intensity, 
adequate and fair remuneration
Legal framework Right to unionisation, EPL, anti-discrimination  
legislation, equal opportunity legislation
Welfare policy Pensions, unemployment and health insurance, family 
policies, active labour market policies
Structural features  
of the labour market
Unemployment and participation rates, transition rates 
between labour market statuses or employment contracts, 
vacancy rates, macroeconomic environment, efficient hiring 
mechanisms
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One could add the family as passengers in the car, but that might be pushing the 
metaphor too far! The important point is that, as the OECD’s (2011) report 
emphasises, most aspects of job quality have direct implications for the family 
of the worker. For instance, if the worker has economic dependants, their free-
dom from poverty also depends on the income from the job, and their security 
and ability to plan for their future depends upon the worker’s job security and 
prospects. But the most obvious way in which the job affects the quality of family 
life is through work–life balance, which becomes more difficult to achieve for 
low-quality jobs, for instance those involving unsocial and irregular hours or 
with little job security (Lyonette and Clark, 2009). And, as Giele (1996) points 
out, the relationship between employment and family is complex and contested, 
with the employer also benefiting from the support given to the employee by the 
family. A similar point could be made for the worker’s community (Kamerade, 
2009).
Another complicating factor for analysing job quality is where one person 
holds two jobs – typically one with a regular schedule of hours and the other 
non-standard hours, for instance evenings or a zero-hours contract (see Dunifon 
et al., 2013). This emphasises the point that we need to be conceptually clear 
in the distinction between the motorist and the vehicle they are driving at that 
point in time.
Conclusions
This chapter has considered the challenges in conceptualisation and measure-
ment of job quality in comparative analysis. Firstly, we considered the confu-
sions that abound around how we measure job quality, the terms subjective, 
objective and self-report, and quality from whose perspective. Secondly, we 
examined how different levels of measurement in schemes of job quality, both 
academic and institutional, have been mixed together and we use the metaphor 
of cars, drivers and roads to clarify this confusion. We draw parallels with 
the Big Five personality scheme to show how the measurement of personality 
takes a long time to achieve consensus and conceptual clarity but, once this 
is achieved, it becomes feasible to include it in large surveys which facilitate 
progress and impact. 
The review of academic research in this field is revealing. When little inter-
nationally comparable micro-level data in Europe existed, most research was 
single-firm or single-country focused. This limited the scope for conceptual 
progress in defining key and universal elements of job quality and thus no inter-
nationally relevant indicators of job quality were established at that time. This 
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situation changed dramatically in Europe when large-scale data-sets were made 
available, such as the EWCS, the European Social Survey and the European 
Labour Force Survey. Starting with the standardisation of various labour force 
surveys in the EU member states, there followed several initiatives that pro-
vided rich and dynamic data sources for researchers to explore ideas and test 
theories about labour markets. These data sets not only facilitate statistical 
comparisons of national labour markets, but they also provide a fertile environ-
ment for theoretical developments in the understanding of the drivers of job 
quality. 
In this respect, the Five-Factor model for measuring personality provides some 
important lessons. There are two important steps that make this such an effective 
model: the decision of what to measure, and then how to measure it. In this chap-
ter, we argue that the project of the measurement of job quality faltered at the 
first hurdle, as there was conceptual confusion over what to measure, spanning 
micro- and macroeconomic variables, demographic variables and attitudinal vari-
ables (including job satisfaction). As we argue here, this complexity can be dealt 
with by clearly focusing on the job as a unit of analysis. Then, the development 
of universally applicable measures with good reliability and validity can follow, 
focusing on asking incumbents about specific features of their jobs.
Thus we argue that measurement development with solid empirical basis is 
key in the process of building the conceptual and methodological agreement. 
What is needed is availability of comparable cross-national data and conceptual 
clarity in defining the study object and setting boundaries as to what job quality 
is and what it is not.
Only with advances on these two fronts can we anticipate the attention to the 
improvement of people’s working lives that could parallel the attention that the 
HDI directed towards human development. This, together with an openness to 
international comparisons, can create fertile grounds for the exchange and dia-
logue between research on job quality and evidence-based public policy.
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Kamerāde, D. (2009), ‘Part-time work and involvement in voluntary associations in 
Britain’, Sociological Research Online, 14:5, 2.
Karasek, R. and Theorell, T. (1990), Healthy work (New York: Basic Books).
Krueger, P., Brazil, K., Lohfeld, L., Edward, H. G., Lewis, D. and Tjam, E. (2002), 
‘Organization specific predictors of job satisfaction’, BMC Health Services Research, 2:1, 
6.
Land, K. (1975), ‘The role of quality of employment indicators in general social reporting 
systems’, American Behavioral Scientist, 18:3, 304–32.
Lyonette, C. and Clark, M. (2009), Unsocial Hours: Unsocial Families? Working Time and Family 
Wellbeing (Cambridge: Relationship Foundation).
Mershon, B. and Gorsuch, R. L. (1988), ‘Number of factors in the personality sphere: Does 
increase in factors increase predictability of real-life criteria?’, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 55:4, 675.
Muñoz de Bustillo, R., Fernández, U., Macías, E., Antón, J. and Esteve, F. (2011), Measuring 
More Than Money (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
Na, W. and Marshall, R. (1999), ‘Validation of the “Big Five” personality traits in Korea: a 
comparative approach’, Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 12:1, 5–19.
Nussbaum, M. (2000), Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2011), Doing better for 
families (Paris: OECD).
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2014), Employment 
Outlook (Paris: OECD).
Ozutku, H. and Altindis, S. (2011), ‘Big five personality factors and other elements in 
understanding work stress of Turkish health care professionals’, African Journal of Business 
Management, 5:26, 10462–73.
Paunonen, S. V. and Ashton, M. C. (2001), ‘Big five factors and facets and the prediction of 
behavior’, Journal of personality and social psychology, 81:3, 524–39.
Rubery, J. (1978), ‘Structured labour markets, worker organisation and low pay’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 2:1, 17–36.
186 Making work more equal
Rubery, J. (2007), ‘Developing segmentation theory: a thirty year perspective’, Économies 
et Sociétés, 28:6, 941–64.
Rubery, J. (2011), ‘Reconstruction amid deconstruction: or why we need more of the social 
in European social models’, Work, Employment & Society, 25:4, 658–74.
Seashore, S. E. (1974), ‘Job satisfaction as an indicator of the quality of employment’, Social 
Indicators Research, 1:2, 135–68.
Sehnbruch, K. (2006), The Chilean Labour Market: A Key to Understanding Latin American Labour 
Markets (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
Sehnbruch, K., Burchell, B., Agloni, N. and Piasna, A., (2015), ‘Human development and 
decent work: why some concepts succeed and others fail to make an impact’, Development 
and Change, 46:2, 197–224.
Sen, A. (1999), Speech in the 87th ILO Meeting (Geneva: International Labour 
Conference).
Smith, M., Piasna, A., Burchell, B., Rubery, J., Rafferty, A., Rose, J. and Carter, L. (2013), 
‘Women, men and working conditions in Europe’, Eurofound report (Luxembourg: 
Publication Office of the European Union).
Staines, G. L. and Quinn, R. P. (1979), ‘American workers evaluate the quality of their 
jobs’, Monthly Labor Review, 102:1, 3–11.
Stiglitz, J., Sen, A. and Fitoussi, J. P. (2009), ‘Report of the commission on the measure-
ment of economic performance and social progress’, Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress.
Taylor, J.C. (1977), ‘Job satisfaction and quality of working life’, Journal of Occupational 
Psychology, 50:4, 243–52. 
Teh, P. L., Yong, C. C., Chong, C. W. and Yew, S. Y. (2011), ‘Do the Big Five Personality 
Factors affect knowledge sharing behaviour? A study of Malaysian universities. Malaysian 
Journal of Library and Information Science, 16:1, 47–62.
Tupes, E. C. and Christal, R. E. (1992), ‘Recurrent personality factors based on trait 
 ratings’, Journal of personality, 60:2, 225–51.
Turner, C. F. and Martin, E. (eds) (1984), Surveying Subjective Phenomena, Vol. 1. (New 
York: Russell Sage).
Ul Haq, M. (1992), Human Development in a Changing World (Occasional Papers: United 
Nations Development Programme). 
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (2015), Handbook for Measuring 
Quality of Employment, A Statistical Framework, UNECE Expert Group on Measuring Quality 
of Employment (ECE/CES/2015/4/Add.2/Rev.1).
Veenhoven, R. (2002), ‘Why social policy needs subjective indicators’, Social Indicators 
Research, 58:1–3, 33–46.
Wang, J. L., Jackson, L. A., Zhang, D. J. and Su, Z. Q. (2012), ‘The relationships among 
the Big Five Personality factors, self-esteem, narcissism, and sensation-seeking to Chinese 
University students’ uses of social networking sites (SNSs)’, Computers in Human Behavior, 
28:6, 2313–19.
Warr, P. (1987), Work, Unemployment and Mental Health (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Warr, P. (2007), Work, Happiness, and Unhappiness (New York: Routledge).
 Job quality: challenges for comparative analysis 187
Wnuk-Lipinski, E. (1977), ‘Job satisfaction and the quality of working life’, International 
Labour Review, 115:1, 53–64.
Yoshida, K. and Torihara, M. (1977), ‘Redesigning jobs for a better quality of working life’, 
International Labour Review, 116:2, 139–52.
 Youyou, W., Kosinski, M. and Stillwell, D. (2015), ‘Computer-based personality judg-
ments are more accurate than those made by humans’, Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 112:4, 1036–40.
Working longer and harder? Britain in European comparison
10 
Working longer and harder? A critical 
assessment of work effort in Britain in 
comparison to Europe
Alan Felstead and Francis Green
Introduction
Among the many outcomes of the Global Financial Crisis, which ravaged 
employment across Europe from the end of 2008, health problems surrounding 
work are gradually coming to be properly comprehended as a significant com-
ponent of the costs of the economic stagnation. In the UK, which is the focus of 
this chapter, the number of working days lost between 2009 and 2013 owing 
to work-related stress increased by 24 per cent and the number lost because of 
serious mental illness doubled (Davies, 2014). Meanwhile, we know that work-
related well-being fell significantly between 2006 and 2012 according to multi-
ple measures (Green et al., 2016). Long working hours and work intensification 
are frequently cited in media reports as the main causes behind the work-related 
stress epidemic. There is substantive evidence for the detrimental effects of long 
working hours on various aspects of health, especially in cases where workers 
are not able to exercise much choice or control over those hours (Bassanini and 
Caroli, 2014; Kivimaki et al., 2015; Lee and Lee, 2016). Indeed, the European 
Directive on Working Time (which places regulatory limits on working more 
than 48 hours per week) derives in part from the principle that excessive work 
hours are a public health issue. There is also evidence that more intensive work 
is associated with lower work-related well-being (Green, 2008; Green et al., 
2016). 
Yet the supposed linkage between deteriorating health and greater work 
effort is based on a prior assumption that British workers are working longer and 
harder than their predecessors. Furthermore, it is often suggested that British 
workers are exceptional in that they work longer than workers in Europe and 
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beyond. The aim of this chapter is to subject these assumptions to empirical 
scrutiny. 
Typically, long hours and work intensity are both referred to as work effort. 
The section which follows, therefore, delineates the conceptual differences 
between extensive and intensive work effort, with the former referring to the 
amount of time spent at work and the latter referring to the intensity of effort 
expended during those working hours (Green, 2001). The section proceeds to 
outline how these two aspects of work effort can be captured using survey instru-
ments. The chapter then outlines the international data sources and surveys used 
to put the British results in a comparative context as well as outlining the surveys 
which allow us to track trends over time. The two substantive empirical sections 
which follow present the results for these two aspects of work effort. 
The chapter concludes by rejecting the suggestion that workers in Britain work 
longer hours than those working elsewhere in Europe and beyond. However, 
the evidence is that while on average this suggestion is a myth, it does hold for 
one group of workers: male employees who work full-time. On the other hand, 
the evidence shows that workers in Britain work harder than other Europeans, 
that work intensity has risen in recent times and that women working full-time 
have experienced some of the largest rises since 2006. This provides further 
evidence of the persistence of gender inequalities which have been the subject 
of much research over many years (Rubery, 2015; Rubery and Fagan, 1995; see 
Chapter 1). The section also considers how the chapter’s findings might help us 
to understand better patterns in work-related well-being and the sluggishness of 
productivity in Britain in recent times. 
Concepts and measures
Although used in common parlance, the notion of ‘work effort’ has two distinct 
conceptual meanings. It is important therefore that this chapter clarifies both 
these meanings and outlines how they are measured. 
We start, however, by clarifying three concepts – performance, efficiency 
and skill – which are sometimes mistakenly conflated in the popular discourse 
with work effort. Performance refers to the extent to which an individual carries 
out their contractual work tasks and so is synonymous with individual productiv-
ity (i.e. the quantity of outputs produced in a given time period). Performance 
is a function of the capabilities individuals have in carrying out the tasks involved 
and the speed with which those tasks are carried out – that is, the skills of the 
person and the effort they devote to the work process. These two aspects are 
substitutes and need not always go hand in hand (Green, 2006).
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An individual’s performance is ‘efficient’ if it could not be improved without 
an increase in skill and/or an increase in work intensity. A rise in performance 
triggered by an increase in work intensity does not signify an increase in efficiency 
since it comes about by increasing an input into the production process. The 
process of ‘productivity bargaining’ – common in the 1960s – recognised that 
increasing productivity often entailed costs for workers and hence trade unions 
only agreed to changes intended to improve quantitative efficiency in return for 
an increase in pay and/or other benefits (Gordon, 1976). Misunderstanding this 
fundamental, if simple, point is the source of one of the most frequent mistakes 
made in public discourse, with some commentators equating productivity gains 
with efficiency gains. Similarly, some organisations are structured and managed 
more efficiently than others. This occurs where an organisation’s output could 
be increased without altering either the skills of workers or the intensity of the 
work carried out – sometimes characterised as working smarter but not harder.
Work effort, then, comprises the length of time spent carrying out work and 
the intensity of the effort expended during that time. We refer to the former as 
extensive work effort which can be relatively easily calibrated by counting the 
number of hours spent at work by day, week, month or year. Time conscious-
ness and discipline are long-standing institutionalised features of the capitalist 
workplace which swept away pre-capitalist conceptions of time based on the 
seasons and the rhythms of nature, such as harvesting, lambing and the like. 
The factory system, on the other hand, was based on time discipline. Workers 
were expected to be on time and stay until the end of their shift. They were also 
expected to turn up every day without fail. Infringements resulted in loss of 
wages or of the job itself. This was further embedded by the spread of the school 
system, with its emphasis on punctuality and the regulation of activities by bells 
and whistles (Thompson, 1967). The measurement of time was crucial and the 
widespread use of clocks, watches and other timepieces made this relatively easy 
to achieve. Data sources, too, which measure the average number of hours spent 
at work, have a long history stretching back well into the nineteenth century. 
These allow us to chart change in the UK and set current levels of working time 
in an international context (see Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1). In this chapter and 
elsewhere (e.g., Green, 2001; 2006) we refer to this as extensive work effort.
Intensive work effort, on the other hand, is more difficult to calibrate, since it 
entails a mix of physical, mental and emotional demands at work, each of which 
are difficult to measure. Moreover, intensive work effort is inversely linked to 
the porosity of the working day – that is, paid periods of on-the-job inactivity 
between tasks during which the body or mind is at rest. It is also well-known 
that there is gradation of effort expended in completing a task as effort levels 
cannot be at the absolute maximum all of the time. These factors make some 
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types of measurement impossible. Direct measures of intensive work effort are, 
for example, impossible in most practical circumstances as it would require 
minute-by-minute on-the-job tracking. Nevertheless, measuring relative inten-
sive effort levels is achievable by taking a multi-dimensional approach. Indicators 
can be derived from workers’ self-reports of effort levels since it is they, rather 
than managers or work measurement experts, who are best placed to know 
how intensively they work. In the words of Guest (1990: 306), ‘if we want to 
know whether workers are working hard, we should ask them’. It is best to ask 
multiple questions focusing on different aspects of work intensity. To provide a 
robust evidence base requires worker surveys which use carefully worded ques-
tions, repeated over several years and administered on large samples of workers. 
Thankfully, we now have a series of such sources and evidence on which to draw 
(see the next section: ‘Data sources’).
In this chapter, we present data on three ways of measuring intensive work 
effort, all of which focus on objective indicators as reported by worker respond-
ents. Crucially, none are related to personal circumstances and instead focus 
on the job – the requirement to work hard and the various conditions under 
which work is carried out. So, as a summary measure of work intensity, we use 
responses given to the question: ‘please tell me how much you agree or disagree 
with the statement: my job requires that I work very hard.’ If they strongly 
agree, we define the job as involving ‘hard work’. Respondents to several of 
the surveys reported here are also asked to indicate how often they work at 
very high speeds. The response scales used vary a little between survey series, 
but importantly not within, thereby allowing over time or inter-country com-
parisons to be made. If respondents say that they work at very high speeds for 
three-quarters or more of the time (or all, or almost all, of the time), we classify 
them as occupying ‘high-speed’ jobs. If they report working to ‘tight deadlines’ 
for a similar amount of time we refer to these as ‘tight deadline’ jobs. The focus 
of all three measures is on the requirements of the job for intensive work effort. 
This is distinguished from ‘discretionary’ work effort, which focuses on the 
willingness to, or admission of, working unpaid overtime and/or working more 
intensively than required.
Data sources
To make European comparisons we draw on several survey series and data 
sources. They have in common that they are all focused on gathering data from 
the point of view of workers themselves, rather than relying on management 
respondents or work measurement experts. For European data on hours of 
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work, we use the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS). The survey 
comprises a list of common questions, uses a common coding framework for 
the replies received and adopts agreed definitions. From this, the UK can be 
positioned and ranked according to working hours. Furthermore, different cat-
egories of worker can be delineated and a gender breakdown of the results 
presented.1
Data on working hours are also assembled by the OECD. This approach 
draws together sources such as the EULFS and other data sets – such as those 
outlined below – into metadata sets which are accessible online. This chapter 
uses this evidence in order to place the UK working hours in a much wider 
international context. 
To examine UK trends, we use the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) which, as the name suggests, has a special focus on hours of work. It 
is based on a 1 per cent sample of employees on the Inland Revenue Pay As 
You Earn (PAYE) register for February (approximately 187,000 employees in 
2015). While this is still the main basis of ASHE, this sample is supplemented 
by two additional samples. One is drawn from the Inland Revenue PAYE reg-
ister in April – to cover employees that have either moved into the job market 
or changed jobs between the time of selection and the survey date. A second is 
taken from the Inter-Departmental Business Register for businesses registered 
for VAT but not registered for PAYE – to cover businesses that do not have 
employees above the PAYE threshold. Once employees are selected, the ASHE 
questionnaires are sent to employers who supply the requested information 
on the employee’s age, gender, occupation, earnings and hours of work (Bird, 
2004). The evidence taken from ASHE over several years allows us to track 
recent changes in the length of the average working week. These results can also 
be placed in a wider historical context using Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
data stretching back to the late nineteenth century.
We use a similar mixture of data sources to compare levels of intensive work 
effort across countries and to plot change in Britain over time. For the former, 
we draw on data from two sources – the European Social Survey (ESS) and 
the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). The ESS is an academi-
cally driven social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between 
Europe’s changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns 
of its diverse populations. The 2014 survey was the seventh in the series and 
covers over 20 nations. A 120-item module on ‘Work, Family and Well-Being’ 
was included in the second (2004) and fifth (2010) in the series (Gallie, 2013). 
This included data on the intensity of work.
Our second source of European data is the EWCS. The quality of work has 
been a focal point of this survey since its inception in 1991. Furthermore, its 
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content has been expanded considerably since then – from 20 questions in 
1991 to well over 100 in the sixth survey carried out in 2015. Its geographical 
coverage has also extended as new member states have been admitted to the 
EU. The 2015 EWCS was the largest. It included all 28 member states, the five 
EU candidate countries (Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), as well as Switzerland and Norway, making 
a total of 35 countries and involving more than 43,000 workers (Eurofound, 
2015, 2012; Smith et al., 2007). We extract data from the 2015 survey on the 
frequency of working to tight deadlines and at high speed. This is used to rank 
the UK against EU members in terms of levels of work intensity.
Finally, we draw on the Skills and Employment Survey (SES) series to pro-
vide insights into the prevalence, pattern and trends in intensive work effort 
over time in Britain. The 2012 survey was the sixth in a series of nation-
ally representative sample surveys of individuals in employment aged 20–60 
years old (although the 2006 and 2012 surveys additionally sampled those aged 
61–65). The numbers of respondents were: 4,047 in the 1986 survey; 3,855 
in 1992; 2,467 in 1997; 4,470 in 2001; 7,787 in 2006; and 3,200 in 2012. For 
each survey, weights were computed to take into account the differential prob-
abilities of sample selection, the over-sampling of certain areas and some small 
response-rate variations between groups (defined by sex, age and occupation). 
All the analyses that follow use these weights (Felstead et al., 2015). Similarly, 
all the findings reported here make use of appropriate survey weights where 
available.
Extensive work effort
In public discourse, it is commonly assumed that British workers work exces-
sively long hours, making their comparative levels of extensive work effort high 
by international standards. This assumption is often repeated. Since 1990, for 
example, there have been 1,423 references in English-language news outlets to 
this supposed fact.2 However, the evidence is not quite as straightforward. In 
fact, average usual working hours per week in the UK in 2015 was 37.1, put-
ting the UK below the EU28 country average and ranking the UK 22nd out of 
28 countries.
Occasionally, news items nuance their claims by substituting the phrase ‘some 
of the longest hours in Europe’ (329 references). But only rarely do these claims 
refer specifically to those classified as full-time employees, or more precisely 
to male full-time employees. When they do, these claims can be supported by 
robust empirical evidence – male full-time employees work almost three hours 
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a week more than their counterparts elsewhere in Europe (see Table  10.1). 
The validity of the claim was stronger in the early 1990s, when those in Britain 
worked longer and the EU was smaller. Yet the assertion is incorrect if applied 
to the self-employed where typical weekly working hours for both men and 
women are in the bottom third of EU countries. By misrepresenting the high 
ranking of male full-time employees’ hours as applying to the whole British 
workforce, the discourse about ‘Britons’ working the longest hours is not only 
sexist but also factually incorrect.
Academic writers make this mistake far less frequently. In fact, when they 
consider Britain’s hours relative to elsewhere in Europe, they generally get 
it right. For example, it is useful to note men’s long working hours when 
considering their role in family life and work–life balance as well as in iden-
tifying  the  difficulties of constructing meaningful part-time jobs given the 
long working  hours of male full-time employees (Cousins and Tang, 2004; 
Lyonette and Crompton, 2011; Rubery and Grimshaw, 2015; Warren and 
Lyonette,  2015). Occasional attempts by academics and rare tries in the 
press have been made to defuse the popular myth about working hours for all 
Table 10.1 Usual weekly hours of work in the UK and Europe, 2015




































































Source: Data downloaded from European Union Labour Force Survey data explorer found on: www.
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes
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using some hard facts, but with apparently little impact (e.g., Bonney, 2005; 
Green, 2008).
Most myths endure, but why this particular one lasts is unclear. One pos-
sibility is the pull of nationalism; being top or bottom of a country rank is like 
winning a competition. Working more hours is variously supposed to make 
British workers seem more hard-working, yet perhaps less happy and maybe 
less efficient. Nationalist self-deprecation vies in British culture with nationalist 
aggrandisement, each wanting to make British workers somehow special. The 
myth’s survival is helped by its kernel of truth when filtered by the category of 
male full-time employees. At the same time, it provides a ready-made context 
for countless ‘human interest’ features related to the putative effects of long 
working hours, including deleterious stories about sexual appetite (too low), 
office sex (too much), marital infidelity, alcoholism, insomnia and obesity. A 
typical attribution is: ‘Brits work the longest hours in Europe. It’s only natural 
to want to let their hair down.’3 As for explanation, Britain’s supposedly long 
hours are sometimes claimed, without evidential support, to be associated with 
its opt-out from the EU Working Time Directive which restricts working hours 
to 48 per week.
Placed in an even wider international context, these claims of relatively high 
levels of extensive work effort in the UK also appear well wide of the mark. Data 
assembled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) for 2014, for example, shows the wide range in the annual average 
number of hours worked by those in paid work. According to this evidence, the 
UK annual average of 1,677 hours is below the OECD average of 1,770 and well 
short of the extensive levels of work effort expended in Mexico, Costa Rica and 
Korea where the annual averages are around 500 hours higher (see Figure 10.1).
Furthermore, the average number of hours worked has been declining over 
the centuries (despite some periods of stability) and has continued to fall in 
recent times. In 1870, annual hours worked per person stood at 2,984. By 
1913, this was down to 2,624 and continued moving downwards, reaching 
1,489 in 1998. The decline in annual hours can also be seen in the reduced 
length of the average working week. For example, the average weekly hours of 
a manual worker fell from 53 hours in 1943 to 43.5 in 1987 (Lindsay, 2003). 
This pattern has continued. According to ASHE full-time employees – despite 
working the longest hours in Europe (cf. Table 10.1) – have seen their hours of 
work excluding overtime fall from 40.0 in 1997 to 39.1 in 2015. This decrease 
is most notable for men, while women’s hours have remained stable. For men, 
there was a sharp dip between 2008 and 2009, from 40.7 to 40.1, and since 
then they have remained largely stable, not returning to the levels seen prior to 
the 2008–09 recession (see Figure 10.2). It should also be noted that official, 
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Figure 10.1 Annual average number of hours worked, OECD, 2014
Notes: The data presented refer to paid workers regardless of whether they are employees or self-
employed.

















































































































































































































Figure 10.2 Average full-time hours of work, UK, 1997–2015
Notes: The data presented are for full-time employees working 30 hours or more and includes 
overtime.
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employer-reported, data often hide the extent to which people are working 
longer hours than they are explicitly paid for, sometimes while at home (see 
Felstead et al., 2005). While this practice is widespread, especially among mana-
gerial and professional occupations, a similar picture of falling working hours 
since the mid-1990s can also be found in the Labour Force Survey data (also a 
trusted source of labour market information), where hours – including those 
that are unpaid – are reported by workers as opposed to their employers.
In short, extensive work effort in Britain has been on a long downward path 
since the late nineteenth century and has continued unabated over recent decades. 
Working time has therefore been falling not rising. International comparisons also 
suggest that working hours in Britain are on average shorter and not longer than 
elsewhere in the world despite newspaper reports proclaiming the contrary.
Intensive work effort
As previously argued, measuring the level of intensive work effort is difficult 
since there is no agreed yardstick to measure the degree of effort put into each 
hour of paid work. We must rely on proxies instead. One of these is to ask work-
ers how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that ‘my job requires 
that I work very hard’. How this is felt will vary from job to job. Working very 
hard could be: coping with relentless pressure, multitasking, being required to 
concentrate for long spells, doing an emotionally draining job and/or remaining 
alert at all times. Respondents across Europe to ESS 2010 were asked to sum-
marise the level of intensive work effort they were expected to expend using 
a five-point agree–disagree scale. This comparison suggests that UK jobs are 
among the most intensive in the EU. Over a third of UK workers (36 per cent) 
strongly agreed their jobs required them to work very hard – 15 percentage 
points above the EU28 average and far exceeding the 13–14 per cent recorded 
for Denmark and Sweden (see Figure 10.3). Respondents to the survey were 
also asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that: ‘I never 
seem to have enough time to get everything done in my job.’ While this may 
also pick up organisational inefficiencies discussed above, it is telling that the UK 
comes second highest and well above the EU28 average on this measure too.
Estimates of the time spent working to tight deadlines and at very high speed 
(denoted as tight deadlines and high speed for short) offer further insights into 
the pattern of intensive work effort. They focus on two particular features of the 
labour process – its speed and the squeezing of more effort out of the available 
time – which feed into overall assessments of the pressure to work very hard. 
On the tight deadline measure, the UK tops the rankings with almost two out 
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of five workers (39 per cent) reporting working to tight deadlines all or almost 
all of the time (see Figure 10.4). This compares to the EU28 average of around 
one in four.4
By contrast, the pressure to work ‘at high speed’ picks up a different aspect 
of work intensity, and such pressure in the UK is around the European average. 
About a quarter of workers (23 per cent) in the UK in 2015 reported working 
at very high speed all or almost all of the time. This puts the UK neither at the 
top with countries such as Cyprus, Romania, Greece and Spain, where well over 
30 per cent were in high-speed jobs, nor at the bottom with Bulgaria and Latvia, 
where barely one in ten worked in such pressurised jobs (see Figure 10.5).
These international comparisons of the intensive effort requirements of jobs 
should be interpreted with the caveat that worker reports can be influenced by 
cultural expectations and by the nuances of language. It remains possible, there-
fore, that some international differences reflect the different interpretations of 
the questions and response scales, rather than real differences in effort require-
ments. The fact that multiple measures have been deployed goes only some 
way towards mitigating this reservation about our conclusions. When looking 
at how patterns of intensive work effort have changed over time within Britain, 
however, the caveat is further diminished; even though it remains possible that 
interpretations of intensive work might change over time, if multiple measures 
Figure 10.3 Intensive work effort – requirement to work very hard, Europe, 2010
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are indicating change in the same direction we can have considerable confidence 
that they are capturing genuine change. 
To track these changes over time, we use four data points in the SES spanning 
two decades, from 1992 to 2012, to update the earlier analysis of intensive effort 
change given in Green (2006). This is complemented by data collected by other 
series such as the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), although 
over a much shorter time horizon. The evidence from SES is that jobs requiring 
hard work rose by over nine percentage points between 1992 and 1997, but 
remained around that figure in 2001 and 2006. However, from 2006 to 2012 hard 
work rose by around three percentage points – a resumption of work intensifica-
tion after a decade of little change (see Figure 10.6). Both upward movements 
in work intensity – in the mid to late 1990s and then once again more recently – 
followed recessions and therefore provide some circumstantial support, though 
not proof, for the argument that employers use recessions to ratchet up effort 
levels. The most recent increase in work intensity is corroborated by comparing 
the answers given by employees to WERS in 2004 with those given to WERS in 































































































































































Figure 10.4 Intensive work effort – working to tight deadlines, Europe, 2015
Source: Data extracted from the European Working Conditions Survey 2015 data visualisation tool 
on: http://eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/data-visualisation/sixth-european-working-conditions-
survey-2015
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strongly agreed that their job required that they work very hard. Furthermore, 
when asked if they had experienced any of a list of specified changes ‘as a result of 
the most recent recession [in 2008–09]’ while at their current workplace, 28 per 
cent reported an increase in workload. This was the second highest reported 
recession-induced experience (van Wanrooy et al., 2014: 8, 40). 
This pattern is reflected in the time respondents estimated that they worked 
at very high speeds. In 1992 around a quarter (23 per cent) said they worked 
at very high speeds three-quarters or more of the time. By 2001 the propor-
tion had risen to 38 per cent and by 2012 it stood at 40 per cent. Similarly, the 
upward movement in intensive work effort is reflected in the rising proportion 
of respondents who reported that they worked under the pressure of tight dead-
lines. These tight deadline jobs rose from 52 per cent in 2001 to 55 per cent in 
2006 and 58 per cent in 2012.
We can also use the data to examine which labour market segments have 
suffered most or least as a result of the intensification process. Such an analysis 
reveals that the pressure to work very hard has grown fastest among women 
Figure 10.5 Intensive work effort – working to high speed, Europe, 2015
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Figure 10.6 Intensive work effort in Britain, 1992–2012















Hard work High speed Tight deadlines
in general and those who work full-time in particular. This gender difference 
echoes previous findings for the USA (Gorman and Kmec, 2007). In 1992 the 
gender gap was around two percentage points but by 2012 it had grown to eight 
points. Women working full-time appear to have suffered most, with 48 per 
cent of such jobs in 1997 requiring high effort levels rising to 57 per cent in 
2012. This substantial expansion compares to a three-percentage-point rise for 
male full-timers and a two-point rise for female part-time workers over the 
same period. Moreover, female full-timers have experienced some of the largest 
rises in work intensity since 2006 (see Table 10.2).
From 1992 to 2012 required work intensity rose faster in the public sector 
than in the private sector. In 1992 around three in ten of all workers strongly 
agreed that their jobs required them to work very hard. However, by 2012 the 
proportion had risen to over half (55 per cent) of the public sector and around 
two-fifths (40 per cent) of the private sector. Within the public sector it was in 
the health industry where work intensification was especially sharp between 2006 
and 2012 (see also Blackaby et al., 2015). This is possibly reflection of the exten-
sion of ‘new public management’ into the public sector in the 2000s, followed by 
the austerity measures since 2010 which disproportionately affect women work-
ers (Rubery and Rafferty, 2013). Thus nursing and medical professionals have 
seen their jobs change dramatically and have prompted junior doctors to take 
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industrial action in response (Menghji et al., 2015). Parts of the private sector also 
experienced rapid rises in work effort over this period. The proportion of jobs 
requiring hard work in the construction industry, for example, rose by eleven 
percentage points, putting it on a par with education and health.
The requirement to work hard becomes stronger the higher the qualification 
level of worker. So, in 2012, a half of those with a degree or equivalent quali-
fication strongly agreed that their job required them to work very hard. This is 
in contrast to those with no qualifications where around a third (35 per cent) of 
workers made similar claims. This difference has not changed over the last two 
decades, reflecting an enduring and widespread correlation between skill level 
and intensive work effort.
There is also evidence that the ratcheting up of work intensity has continued. 
A subset of those who took part in SES 2012 were re-interviewed in 2014. The 
evidence from this study suggests that, even over a relatively short time period, 
there was a tendency for jobs to become more intense. Increased use of comput-
ers and teamworking appeared to be driving the upward movement with both 
enhancing the level of surveillance possible by employers and/or fellow workers 
(Felstead et al., 2016). 
Table 10.2 Percentage of jobs requiring hard work, 1992–2012
1992 1997 2001 2006 2012
All 31.5 40.7 38.5 42.0 45.3
Gender
Men 30.5 38.8 36.6 39.2 41.6
Women 32.6 43.1 40.7 45.2 49.6
Working time
Women full-timers NA 48.0 47.0 50.1 57.1
Women part-timers NA 36.1 31.4 37.5 38.7
Sector
Public sector industries 36.1 45.6 44.9 49.0 55.8
Private sector industries 29.7 38.9 35.9 38.8 40.7
Notes: To produce a consistent indicator of sector we define those working in public administration, 
education and health as ‘public sector industries’ and those working elsewhere as ‘private sector 
industries’.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Skills and Employment Survey 1992–2012 updating Felstead 
et al., 2013b: table 1.
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Conclusions
Comparing job quality over time and between countries is difficult due to 
the scarcity of data. The studies which do exist tend to focus on particular 
aspects of job quality where data are available. Working time is one such theme. 
Reductions in working time designed to share out declining volumes of employ-
ment and dampen the rise in unemployment following the 2008–09 reces-
sion sparked further interest in this feature of job quality. This labour market 
response received government backing in the case of Germany, and to a lesser 
extent France, but happened without it in the case of the UK (Bosch, 2010; 
Felstead, 2011; Kümmerling and Lehndorff, 2014). Yet even in the context of 
reductions in working time, newspaper commentaries continue to proclaim that 
workers in Britain work very long hours compared to those working elsewhere 
in Europe (e.g., Daily Mirror, 8 February 2014; The Guardian, 18 May 2010; 
Daily Mail, 25 February 2009; The Sunday Times, 10 June 2007). The aim of this 
chapter has been to subject this claim, as well as the associated one that work 
has become more intense, to robust empirical scrutiny. In conceptual terms the 
focus of the chapter is on two dimensions of work effort: its extensiveness and 
intensiveness.
The chapter makes four contributions to the debate. Firstly, it demonstrates 
that, on the whole, workers in Britain do not work the longest hours in Europe. 
However, the claim does apply to men who work full-time as employees, but 
not to all categories of worker. In fact, average hours of work for those who 
work part-time or are self-employed are below the EU28 average. When ranked 
this puts the UK in the bottom third of EU countries. Similarly, when compared 
against other OECD countries, UK working hours are below average and a long 
way short of countries whose working hours are much longer.
The chapter also puts data on the length of working hours in a much longer 
time horizon. It then becomes evident that the trajectory of travel for working 
hours has been downward since the late nineteenth century. This is our second 
contribution with recent evidence suggesting that these reductions have contin-
ued and may have accelerated somewhat with the preference for working-time 
adjustments rather than staffing cuts in response to the 2008–09 recession.
However, with respect to the intensity of work the data tell a different story, 
hence our third and fourth contributions to the debate. The third is that, when 
compared to other countries, the UK is towards the top of the European league 
table according to two out of three intensity indicators and about average for 
the third. The fourth and final contribution is that British workers are working 
harder, faster and to tighter deadlines than they did in the past. However, some 
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have felt these pressures more than others. In particular, women workers and 
those working in the public sector have been hardest hit. 
Based on the evidence concerning the detrimental health impacts of long and 
hard work, it can be inferred that the more intensive work effort in Britain may 
have contributed to at least some deteriorations in mental and physical health. 
According to Baumberg (2011, 2014), work intensification from the early 1990s 
can be linked to rises in incapacity benefit claims from then onwards, with 
those in poor health especially affected by work strain. More recent intensifica-
tions can only have exacerbated this tendency. Nevertheless, by contrast, the 
decline in working hours since the mid-1990s, including in the proportion of 
people working especially long hours, could have been expected to have led to 
an improvement in work-related health problems. Moreover, there are other, 
potentially equally important, sources of rising stress in the workplace, includ-
ing the insecurities that grew after the Global Financial Crisis and the long-term 
decline in workplace autonomy. To illustrate, Green and colleagues (2016) 
found, using a decomposition analysis of the decline in work-related well-being 
between 2006 and 2012, that less than a fifth was attributable to changing inten-
sive and extensive work effort. 
Another negative conclusion can also be drawn, concerning the discourse on 
Britain’s ‘productivity puzzle’. Both the long-term lag of productivity in Britain 
behind similar economies in Europe and elsewhere, and the peculiar stagna-
tion of labour productivity in Britain through the Global Financial Crisis are 
a source of concern and mystery occupying a large volume of researcher time 
(e.g. HM Treasury, 2015). Our findings – along with evidence that the skill 
levels of workers and their jobs in Britain have also increased (Felstead et al., 
2013a) – can be of little help in resolving this puzzle. After all, the quality of 
labour inputs is improving, the skill demands of jobs have been increasing, the 
intensity of work is rising and hours in the long term have been falling. In these 
circumstances, one might have expected hourly productivity to be booming, 
notwithstanding the rising health costs and lost working days that have been 
reported. The solution to Britain’s quest for greater productivity needs to be 
sought elsewhere, for example by raising aggregate demand and by remedy-
ing the lagging levels of investment and management skill, and not in a further 
intensification of work effort. Along with de Jong and colleagues (2016) we hold 
that employers’ interest in combating the pressures of work stems not from 
altruism, but from a self-interested recognition that healthy employees are good 
for business performance.
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Notes
1 While our preference is to report UK results, this is not always possible, with many 
surveys excluding Northern Ireland. Hence, some of the results apply to Britain and the 
UK; this is reflected in the text.
2 These figures are derived from a Nexis database search: https://nexis.com/. All 
English-language news sources were searched using the keywords ‘Britain’ or ‘UK’ and 
the phrase ‘longest hours in Europe/the EU’. The search was restricted to items pub-
lished between 1 January 1990 and 31 May 2016.
3 The Sun, 4 December 2006. Other references are less euphemistic; the Northern Ireland 
edition of the News of the World proclaimed, on 5 June 2011: ‘Too much work and not 
enough play makes his penis feel very dull indeed and British men are particularly vul-
nerable since they work the longest hours in Europe.’ The myth is not confined to the 
tabloids, as illustrated by features in The Times (28 June 2008), the Independent on Sunday 
(10 September 2006) and The Guardian (3 April 1998).
4 It should be noted that the Eurofound data visualisation tool which was used to down-
load these data fails to provide an average; this is an estimate based on the pattern of 
results shown in Figure 10.4. The same applies to Figure 10.5.
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Plague, patriarchy and ‘girl power’
Jane Humphries
Introduction 
The inspiration for this chapter comes from an earlier contribution, written 
with Jill Rubery in 1984, which surveyed theories of social reproduction and 
its relationship to the economy. We argued that the family, notwithstanding 
its extensive responsibilities for reproducing, training and socialising future 
workers, had not been established as an interesting, central and dynamic vari-
able for  economic analysis (Humphries and Rubery, 1984). Instead, across the 
whole spectrum of theoretical approaches, from the neoclassical to the Marxist/ 
feminist, broadly similar methodologies dominated. These methodologies fell 
into two groups: (1) those which envisaged the family system as absolutely 
autonomous, that is, independent of the economy which therefore had to adapt 
and operate within its constraints; and (2) those which framed the relationship 
in reductionist/functionalist terms and so subsumed the family within the broader 
economic system. In the paper, we exposed flaws in both perspectives and dem-
onstrated how several influential analyses failed to adhere to one methodology, 
but often flip-flopped incoherently between positions in order to explain social 
and economic change. 
More constructively, we argued that what was needed was a theoretical 
approach which saw the organisation of social reproduction, taking place through 
the family, though in the modern era increasingly buttressed by educational, 
social and welfare services, as relatively autonomous. The system of social repro-
duction emerged as neither predetermined nor smoothly accommodating of 
economic changes; it must be understood as changing in response to economic 
development but itself subject to other powerful forces and in turn influencing 
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economic trends. Essential to this relative autonomy was the identification of the 
borderlands between the spheres of production and social reproduction as ter-
rain in which working people pushed back against the pressures of the economic 
system and sought space to improve their standard of living and exercise control 
over their own lives.
As a theoretical and position piece the paper has proved durable, providing 
insight into the co-evolution of economic structures and family life in both the 
past and the present. For gender scholars, it has proved valuable in understand-
ing changes in the productive activities and family lives of women who mediate 
between the economy and social reproduction, their allocation of labour time 
often knitting together the ragged edges of the two spheres. Historically, it 
has proved particularly useful in analysing the pressures on family structures 
created by industrialisation, the transition to the so-called ‘male breadwinner 
family structure’ and more recently the time-poor, work-rich households of 
the twenty-first century. This chapter puts the ideas to work to explore another 
historical era which has been interpreted as emblematic both of the absolute 
autonomy of the family system and of its functionalist collapse into merely ser-
vicing the needs of the economy. The era is that of the demographic decimation 
caused by the Black Death. The elimination of up to 40 per cent of the labour 
force was a massive shock from which the economy took centuries to recover, 
not least because the plague made regular return visits, culling survivors of 
earlier bouts and ensuring that population was painfully slow to recover. The 
economic implications of this era have long fascinated historians and recently 
there has been particular interest in the impact on women’s work, opportunities 
and family lives. 
The post-Black Death era has been subject to both absolute autonomy 
and structuralist-functionalist interpretations, as we will see. It has also 
been identified as a historical watershed, setting in train the so called ‘Little 
Divergence’ whereby north-west Europe, defined loosely as a group of neigh-
bouring economies clustered around the southern shores of the North Sea, 
Flanders, Brabant,  Holland and England, embarked on slow but continuous 
and relatively  reversal-free growth over many centuries, leaving behind an 
economically stagnant and prone-to-setbacks south and east, exemplified 
by the once-dominant Italy but including Spain and Portugal and the coun-
tries of  eastern Europe (Broadberry et al., 2015). The relationship between 
the household and the economy and women’s role within both is crucial to 
this new account  of  how the west got rich, and its study illustrates once 
again a  persisting  tension between absolute autonomy and structuralist- 
functionalist  interpretations, neither of which provides a satisfactory frame. 
Seeing the era in terms of the relative autonomy of social reproduction provides 
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a fresh lens on what are increasingly understood as pivotal developments in our 
history. 
The chapter begins with a brief sketch of the ways in which classic theories 
of the family are dominated by the perception of industrialisation as the great 
divide. The pre-industrial era was falsely homogenised and seen as offering a nat-
ural and unchallenged fit between the economy and the household. Of course, 
historians were fully aware that neither medieval nor early modern society was 
as static as these theories suggested. The section titled ‘The Black Death, the 
Golden Age and women’s economic activities’ focuses on a cataclysmic event 
which shattered the calm of the medieval world and had massive reverberations 
for both production and social reproduction: the Black Death. There is a large 
and growing literature on the post-Black Death era and specifically the ways 
in which demographic catastrophe affected women’s economic position. The 
literature is seen to split into two strands with one captured by an absolutely 
autonomous interpretation of the reorganisation of economic and social repro-
duction and the other by a structuralist-functionalist account. In the section 
‘The Black Death, the north-west European marriage pattern and the “Little 
Divergence”’ I show how the latter has been linked to influential readings of the 
‘“Little Divergence”’, providing a woman-centred interpretation of regional 
variations in long-run growth with north-west Europe, with England as the 
paradigm case, enjoying small but cumulative growth in advance of a stagnant 
south and east long before industrialisation. Recent research, including some of 
my own, is then used to trace how these interpretations suffer from an overly 
economistic theoretical frame and overlook the ways in which both the ruling 
elite and working people used the possibilities implicit in the shifting tectonic 
plates of production and reproduction to their own advantage. Women’s roles 
were not cast in stone, but nor did they adapt smoothly to the evolving needs 
of the economy. Individuals and families sought to exploit new opportunities 
for their own advantage and to resist adaptations which they regarded with 
foreboding. They were not always successful, but their agency is at the heart of 
the case for the relative autonomy of social reproduction. Similarly, the state 
reacted to secure social control and protect the interests of the landed elite with 
unintended consequences for gender divisions, reinforcing the subordination of 
women and inhibiting their economic independence. 
Theories of the family–economy interface
Structuralist-functionalist and evolutionary accounts of the household were 
essentially teleological, arguing back from a known present to a generally 
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agreed-upon but imprecisely described and dated past. The historical devel-
opment of the household unfolds as a process of differentiation (Parsons and 
Bales, 1965). A society undergoing economic change necessarily differentiates 
its household-based social structure. New institutions such as firms, schools, 
trade unions and the welfare state perform functions that had previously been 
undertaken in households. Of these, firms, the specialist units of production, 
were the most important. Differentiation drew a line between the household 
and economic activity. Kinship relations also undergo functional specialisation, 
becoming dominated by a system of small nuclear family units. The modern 
‘thin’ family was adapted to the need for social and geographical mobility. The 
primary responsibility for household support came to rest on the male head, 
the ‘breadwinner’, whose ‘job’ linked the family to the economy from which 
it had become separated. The economic transition was accompanied by changes 
in ideas about decency and moral standards. The division of activities allowed 
values, such as selfishness and egotism, essential to the success of the modern 
economy to prevail in the marketplace while others, such as altruism and caring, 
could survive in the home, where they enabled breadwinners to be rejuvenated 
and children to be born, raised and socialised. In depicting the changes in the 
household as successful adaptations to the modern market economy, sociolo-
gists, historians and economists construed pre-industrial households as homoge-
neous, static and traditional. 
Women played a role in these accounts, the pre-industrial household provid-
ing the space whereby they engaged in the subsistence production of food, cloth-
ing and shelter, as well as bearing and raising children and servicing the direct 
consumption needs of other family members. They could produce for the market 
but this was usually as part of a household production unit. With the indus-
trial revolution subsistence opportunities shrivelled and work became limited to 
‘jobs’ accessed via a labour market, organised by an employer and located in dis-
tinct and separate production sites. Once work required a continuous presence 
away from home, married women were left behind. Industrialisation represented 
the major challenge to the hitherto static fit between social reproduction and 
production, and it was this transition that dominated the theoretical accounts.
Not surprisingly, the depiction of the pre-industrial household and its rela-
tionship to the economy as static was consistent with an absolute autonomy 
interpretation of social reproduction. Gender history was home to a version 
of pre-industrial experience built around the ideas of patriarchal and biological 
continuities which were clearly visible in the social, legal and economic arrange-
ments of medieval and early modern societies. Patriarchal continuities ruled 
in the household sphere but were not seen as problematic in the pre-industrial 
world of economic stasis. It was only with the appearance of capitalist production 
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processes, universal labour markets and modern manufacturing that social repro-
duction was transformed and alongside it women’s roles in economy and society.
Both the absolute autonomy and stucturalist-functionalist models of the 
household fell increasingly foul of growing empirical evidence, which suggested 
that the relationship between industrialisation and the household was more 
complex than implied. The idea of family history as fundamentally divided by 
the era of industrialisation was increasingly challenged. Both long-run changes 
and short-run variations in economic conditions shaped the organisation of social 
reproduction. Many operated outside the time frame of the industrial revolu-
tion. For example, wage dependency, an important underlying cause of the high 
frequency of small households in the English countryside, long preceded indus-
trialisation, as did those small households. Surprising evidence demonstrated 
that the English household was not only small and nuclear long before industri-
alisation but also remarkably homogeneous across time and space, with implica-
tions for England’s precocious economic development to which we will return. 
Consistent with the relatively autonomous thesis, the economy was not 
alone in shaping and structuring households. There were other powerful forces. 
Mortality grimly limited family size and shape and contributed to variation across 
time and space. Cultural factors also mattered. Marriage became associated with 
the formation of an independent household and contributed to the rarity with 
which married children lived with parents. These cultural norms were not always 
and everywhere functional for the smooth operation of the economy.
Moreover, polarising the history of the household into pre- and post-industrial 
was increasingly out of synch with the revisionist view of the industrial revolution 
as involving continuity as well as change. The vision of the medieval and early 
modern economies as placing no new demands on the sphere of social reproduc-
tion no longer fit with economic historians’ growing evidence that both eras saw 
significant economic change and many challenges to the relationship between the 
organisation of the family and the functioning of the economic system. None was 
more dramatic than the demographic catastrophe of the Black Death.
The Black Death, the Golden Age and women’s economic 
activities
The initial visitation of the Black Death in 1348–49 killed between 30 and 45 
per cent of the English population. Recurrences meant that by the 1370s the 
population had been halved. The result was a severe and prolonged labour short-
age widely understood to have accelerated the demise of feudal relations and 
provided some of the foundation stones for England’s unique economic path. 
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The ways in which the Black Death nailed the coffin of English feudalism remain 
under discussion but what is not in doubt is that workers, especially but not 
only in agriculture, enjoyed a massive increase in both nominal and real wages 
as landowners struggled to recruit and retain labour. ‘[T]he evidence for a rise 
in both cash wages and real wages in the second half of the fourteenth century, 
coinciding with the sudden and sustained population decline … has been well 
established’ (Penn and Dyer, 1990: 356). Phelps-Brown and Hopkins (1981) 
calculated that the daily wages in cash of skilled building labourers in Southern 
England increased by 66 per cent between the 1340s and the 1390s from 3d to 
around 5d per day while those of the unskilled almost doubled from around 1½d 
to 3d per day. It was a ‘Golden Age’ for the English peasantry now extensively 
calibrated as, for example, in Figure 11.1. 
Medievalists have debated the extent to which women shared in this utopia. 
Some have argued that women’s gains were even more marked than those of 
men as the labour shortage eroded the pre-existing gender division of labour. 



















































































Figure 11.1 The real wages of unskilled farm labourers (by decade)
Notes: The real wage is computed as the annual nominal wage divided by the annual cost of a 
consumption basket (see Humphries and Weisdorf, 2015). The annual wage is obtained by multiplying 
the daily wage rate by 260 days.
Sources: Wages: Clark (2007). Cost of consumption basket: Allen (http://nuffield.ox.ac.uk/People/
sites/Allen/SiteAssets/Lists/Biography%Sections/EditForm/london.xls.)
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men, migrate to towns to work in the growing textile industries or commercial 
service centres, and become members of an expanding class of household serv-
ants and so enjoy ‘a high degree of economic independence’ (Goldberg, 1986; 
1992; see also Barron, 1989). It is not difficult to see this strand of the literature 
in terms of a structuralist-functionalist view, with the gendered division of jobs 
and the patriarchal authority of male heads of households shifting to accommo-
date the economy’s need for labour and specifically the need for workers able 
and willing to work away from home outside household divisions of labour and 
lines of authority.
This rosy view did not, however, go unchallenged. Other historians argued 
that whatever the implications of the Black Death for male workers, the organi-
sation of social reproduction through the household retained women in tradi-
tional roles. ‘[W]omen tended to work in low-skilled, low-paid jobs … This 
was true in 1300 and it remained true in 1700’ (Bennett, 1988: 278; 1996; 
Mate, 1998). The rigid grip of the gender division of labour prevented women 
from seizing or consolidating the opportunities created by the labour shortage. 
In an influential article, Judith Bennett painted a picture not of decline from a 
lost ‘Golden Age’ but of ‘new designs embroidered on a cloth of oppression and 
deprivation’ and suggested that ‘the presence of continuity presents us with the 
discomforting possibility that the roots of women’s subordination are embed-
ded deeply in ourselves and the men around us’ (Bennett, 1988: 279–80). The 
sphere of social reproduction dictated norms and structures, which the economy 
could only exploit not change.
A lively debate ensued about the continuities of gender subordination even 
in a world where labour was at a premium, with feminist historians taking 
an absolute autonomy view and arguing for the ‘triumph of patriarchal struc-
tures … over demographic crisis’ (Bardsley, 1999: 29; 2001). Their opponents, 
in structuralist mode, found it impossible to contemplate a situation where the 
organisation of the household did not give way to the needs of the economy: 
‘a situation where women’s labour was both excessively cheap and reluctantly 
and sparingly used by farmers is hard to sustain’ (Hatcher, 2001: 195; see also 
Langdon, 2011; Rigby, 2000). 
Empirical case studies from the medieval economy were cited in support of 
both views. Caroline Barron found that for medieval London ‘the picture of the 
lifestyle of women … is quite a rosy one; their range of options and prospects 
differed only slightly from those of the men who shared their level of prosper-
ity’ (Barron, 1989: 47–8), though she found the position changing in the course 
of the sixteenth century, when the resumption of growth in the population 
militated against the employment of women, a view shared by other authors 
(see also Casey, 1976; Elliott, 1981). Similarly, P. J. P. Goldberg argued that 
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throughout the Middle Ages women living in towns could support themselves, 
though he too suspected that their independence grew more precarious as the 
fifteenth century drew to a close (Goldberg, 1986). On the other hand, John 
Langdon in a detailed study of Old Woodstock through the ravages of the Black 
Death argued that wage structures reflected ‘deeply entrenched attitudes among 
the suppliers and consumers of labour’ which kept wages, including the gender 
pay gap, largely stable (Langdon, 2011: 29). The debate has simmered on, kept 
alive by fresh empirical interventions which support one reading or another. 
Even more importantly, it has been seized on by other scholars working on a 
larger canvas and integrated into a meta-theory of economic growth that sur-
prisingly has women at its centre. Unfortunately, this female-centred account of 
growth remains trapped between an understanding of the family/household as 
wholly autonomous or as totally determined by the needs of the economy. The 
relative autonomy perspective provides a way forward. 
The Black Death, the north-west European marriage pattern 
and the ‘Little Divergence’
Demographers had long noted a difference in household functioning and struc-
tures across Europe, demarcated by an imaginary line drawn from Trieste in 
the south to St Petersburg in the north. John Hajnal (1965) had reported how 
households in the south and east refreshed their labour supplies through mar-
riage, with young couples moving in with the groom’s parents, while households 
in the north and west relied on ‘servants’, the children of other often unrelated 
households who circulated within the economy working on a contractual basis 
and acquiring skills and accumulating wages. Girls as well as boys, women as 
well as men and the relatively prosperous as well as the poor all participated in 
this circulation of labour, which according to the demographers fitted structur-
ally with a distinct demographic regime. The widespread practice of living as a 
servant away from the family of origin accommodated a prolonged adolescence 
and fostered later marriage. While women in the south and east normally mar-
ried as teenagers, those in the north and west married much later, well into 
their twenties, or indeed never married, with the corollary that population 
growth was restrained. Within this ‘north-west European marriage pattern’ 
(NWEMP), as it became known, marriage involved the formation of an inde-
pendent household, a possibility dependent on prior accumulation by the young 
couple, requiring in turn a period of time in service earning wages and inciden-
tally gathering experience and learning skills. The elements of the NWEMP 
fitted together as a structuralist-functionalist pre-industrial system: (prolonged) 
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life-cycle service, later marriage, accumulation by servants of both sexes and the 
foundation on this basis of independent nuclear households. 
Hajnal emphasised the ways in which women’s involvement in life-cycle 
service broke down patriarchy. ‘While in service, women were not under the 
control of any male relative. They made independent decisions about where to 
live and work and for which employer’ (Hajnal, 1982: 474–5). In this sense, 
the hypothesis of a NWEMP is a challenge to those gender historians who 
saw absolutely autonomous patriarchal households as impervious to economic 
opportunities. 
While the elements of the NWEMP all neatly interlock, combining the organ-
isation of production and social reproduction, the system’s origins and evolution 
were not specified. One recent intriguing hypothesis has linked the emergence of 
the NWEMP to the economic conditions that prevailed in those parts of Europe 
particularly ravaged by plague. In a key article, Tine de Moor and Jan Luiten van 
Zanden argued that the labour shortage that followed the Black Death resulted 
in ‘a strong increase in real earnings especially for women … [and] accelerated 
the general adoption of the NWEMP … particularly among servants’ (2010: 
11). De Moor and van Zanden also linked the new economic opportunities for 
women and their resulting independence to the relatively favourable environ-
ment provided by north-west religious, social and political institutions. 
In positing this ‘girl-powered Little Divergence’ (GPLD), De Moor and van 
Zanden were joined by powerful allies as other authors argued that women’s 
improved position in the post-plague labour market and especially the growth 
of opportunities as servants in husbandry was further boosted by landowners’ 
response to labour scarcity. The latter involved the relative expansion of horn, 
that is, pastoral agriculture in which it was argued women had a comparative 
advantage, versus corn (generically, grain) production in which it was argued 
they did not. The shift from arable to pastoral allegedly pushed up female wages 
and so boosted female labour force participation (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013). 
Alert readers might notice here the oscillation between a structuralist-func-
tionalist approach in seeing women unconstrained by pre-existing patriarchal 
structures in their seizure of the new opportunities and an absolute autonomy 
biological determinism in thinking women possessed a natural advantage in pas-
toral agriculture and disadvantage in crop production. 
Not only were the origins of the NWEMP in the post-Black Death labour 
market, but its spread enabled north-west Europe to escape the Malthusian trap 
that continued to hold other regions to subsistence levels and kick-started con-
tinuous and compounded, albeit low-level, growth. Thus Nico Voigtländer and 
Hans-Joachim Voth see fertility restriction emerging as an indirect consequence 
of the abundance of land after 1348–50. The Black Death, they argued, raised 
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‘land-labour ratios and thus wages … raising female employment opportuni-
ties outside the peasant household’ (Voigtländer and Voth, 2013: 2229). The 
result was an increased average age at first marriage for women which reduced 
fertility rates and ‘in turn lowered population pressure in a Malthusian setting 
and helped to keep wages high’(Voigtländer and Voth, 2013: 2260). The Black 
Death had a silver lining in the north-west’s early break with Malthusian stagna-
tion. Women were the key agents in this great escape. 
Thus marriage-regulated population and precocious escape from a Malthusian 
subsistence equilibrium has come to be seen as a distinctive feature of the 
north-west, which explains why this area began to grow in advance of the 
rest of Europe, and indeed the world, long before industrialisation. Yet these 
ideas were primarily theoretical or based on often contentious macroeconomic 
approaches (Clark, 2007; van Zanden, 2009; Malanima, 2009; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Other empirical evidence did not always seem to justify the 
sharp divisions implied in the nomenclature of divergence (McCants, 2015). 
Moreover, the demographic zones do not seem to presage relative economic 
development in the way predicted (Dennison and Ogilvie, 2014). Yet there 
is an obvious empirical test. If England escaped a Malthusian trap in the post-
plague era because women could earn higher wages as servants and so postponed 
marriage, there should be evidence in the historical record on remuneration. 
The problem is that, unlike men’s wages which have been extensively docu-
mented and measured (see Figure 11.1), there was no comparable wage data 
for women. The reasons are clear. Women’s economic activities are hard to 
capture. Data on their remuneration is fragmentary and difficult to interpret. 
Women were more likely paid as part of a team, by task or in kind. Day wages, 
where they exist, must be compared with annual contracts that usually involved 
board and lodging for which a value must be imputed. Together with Jacob 
Weisdorf, I augmented existing collections of data put together by intrepid his-
torians with additional archival research and compiled a wage series for women 
workers (Humphries and Weisdorf, 2015). Among its uses is the light it throws 
on the hypothesis of a GPLD.
It is relevant here that there were two distinct forms of female employment: 
daily wage labour, often on a casual basis, and the annual service central to the 
NWEMP, which usually involved living-in and so was partially remunerated in 
the form of room and board. We collected and processed observations related to 
both types of employment and so provided two separate series: (1) daily wages; 
and (2) the equivalent remuneration implicit in longer-term contracts (for an 
account of how we imputed values for board and lodging and dealt with other 
problems in making the annual data comparable, see Humphries and Weisdorf, 
2015: 407–17). Both series relate to unskilled women defined according to the 
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Historical International Classification of Occupations (HISCO) and associated 
social class scheme (HISCLASS). Figure 11.2 presents our main findings in terms 
of the evolution of both types of female wages (decadal averages are reported in 
an appendix to the published paper). Male wages are reproduced for comparison. 
The published paper (Humphries and Weisdorf, 2015) explores these trajectories 
in comparison with men’s wages and for what they imply about the length of the 
working year. Here my focus is on the implications for the GPLD. 
Women’s wages and the GPLD
The wage trajectories in the two segments of the female labour market are very 
different and cast light on how both working households and landlords responded 
to the post-plague situation and sought to modify the range and type of women’s 
activities, and so shift the interface between production and social reproduction 
to their advantage. Focusing on the post-plague era, it is clear that women’s 
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Figure 11.2 The daily wages of unskilled men and women (by decade)
Notes: This figure shows the nominal day rates of men and women by decade. Women’s 
remunerations are divided into those paid for casual employment and those paid for annual 
employment. Annual and weekly payments are turned into day rates on the assumption of a five-day 
work week (totalling 260 working days per year). 
Sources: Humphries and Weisdorf, 2015.
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that of men, while wages for women in annual service remained stagnant, even 
allowing generously for the value of perquisites. The rise in casual remuneration 
made day labour more attractive in comparison with annual service. This gap 
was recognised by both contemporaries and labour historians who reported that 
workers in the late Middle Ages preferred employment on a daily or weekly 
basis because it offered the possibility of higher returns and more leisure (Bailey, 
1994: 162; Dyer, 1980: 367–9; Kenyon, 1962; McIntosh, 1986; Poos, 1991: 
218–20). Employers, too, would surely have been keen to take up the cheaper 
ex-annual worker to replace the more expensive day worker. Why movement 
between types of employment did not erode the gap is a key question. 
One obvious consideration is that annual contracts carried with them secu-
rity of employment. If women were unsure of sufficient casual work for their 
support, they would be prepared to accept the drawbacks of annual service. 
Undoubtedly this was partially the case. Several historians have expressed 
doubts as to whether there was enough employment throughout the calendar 
year to match servants’ earnings in cash and kind (Hatcher, 2011; Langdon, 
2011; Poos, 1991). But given that it would only have required half of the year 
at medieval casual rates to match the annual pay (including the value of board 
and lodging) in service (Humphries and Weisdorf, 2016: 418–20), young and 
healthy women might have been persuaded that occasional labouring jobs, in 
addition to seasonal work in agriculture or opportunities in cloth production, 
would see them through. A second consideration hinges on the types of women 
who inhabited the two sectors and the nature of the medieval labour market. 
As the term ‘life-cycle service’ (Laslett, 1965) implies, annual servants were 
understood to be predominantly younger unmarried women. Living-in after 
marriage created problems for both servants and employers. Indeed, in the 
NWEMP it was the exclusion from lucrative service on marriage that prompted 
women to stay single. Although perhaps the empirical evidence suggests a less 
crisp mapping between marital status and labour market segment, with plenty 
of older and most likely married women observed working in service, in general 
this assumption is supported. But even if older married women were institution-
ally barred from annual service, they were not confined to working unpaid in the 
household. In our investigation of wages, we found many mulieri or uxori (older 
women) in casual work and so able to take advantage of the booming wages, 
but they did so in ways which nudged rather than challenged the organisation of 
social reproduction, for many such women accessed their employment through 
their husbands, working alongside them in husbandry, trades or crafts, or 
recruited by them to work for the same employer. They worked in family-based 
production teams transferred from the household to the fields, forests, mines, 
forges, building sites, gentry’s houses and estates of the medieval economy via 
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an accommodating labour market. As a result, they took the authority structures 
of the household into those same workplaces. 
One powerful example comes from a unique source: the weekly account of 
an early fifteenth-century forgemaster, surviving in the records of the Durham 
Cursitor. The bishops of Durham, in their capacity as Earls Palatine during the 
Middle Ages, enjoyed the proprietorship of all mines within the bounds of the 
count palatine of Durham. Such mines were usually farmed out but Bishop 
Langley in 1408 tried the experiment of smelting and working his own iron. The 
resulting account roll survived and was transcribed and annotated at the end of 
the nineteenth century by Gaillard Thomas Lapsley (1899). The accounts record 
the employment of several workmen paid by the piece from December 1408 
to November 1409. The men had clearly defined duties, were paid regularly 
and their output recorded so that both piece rates and average daily and weekly 
earnings can be computed. There was probably also a small body of ordinary 
less-skilled labourers employed under the direction of a ‘forman’. Two named 
women were also employed performing miscellaneous unskilled but onerous 
tasks which varied from breaking up the ironstone (petras frangere) to blowing the 
bellows (belowes sufflans). Although the women’s pay varied, at around 2½d per 
day (Lapsley, 1899: n. 11) it was slightly less than the casual rate but well above 
the annual rate computed as a daily equivalent according to the Humphries and 
Weisdorf series (2015: 431). Moreover, the work seems to have been plentiful, 
although the women did not work continuously. 
Hiring was nepotistic. The two women who had access to this economically 
attractive employment were the wives of the smith and the foreman and although 
sometimes employed on specific tasks and paid individually, the women were 
more frequently employed helping their husbands, in which case they received 
a fixed rate of ½d per blome, that is unit, of iron produced. Their help most 
likely raised the productivity of their husbands and boosted the men’s earnings. 
Finally, although both women feature regularly in the accounts, they did not 
work continuously, enjoying both the many ‘festivals’ – that is, idle days of the 
medieval calendar – and other unexplained absences. Their labour at the forge 
left some time for them to fulfil their domestic responsibilities in the households 
of the smith and the foreman. 
This one example can be replicated from across the economy: in lead mines; 
in building repairs; in shepherding; in arable agriculture; in domestic service; 
and in crafts and trades (for other examples, see Humphries and Weisdorf, 
2015: 411). These suggest that women accessing the Golden Age casual labour 
market often did so as part of a labour unit that was based on the household and 
so did not grant the independence that threatened patriarchal authority; and 
although space and time was left for women to complete unpaid work in their 
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homes, reduced leisure relative to husbands may already have been implied in 
a medieval double shift. Simultaneously, the participation of such husband and 
wife teams within wage labour reinforced and perhaps even spread the nuclear 
family structures from which they emanated. 
What, however, stopped younger women from seeking increasingly more 
lucrative employment in the casual labour market and instead apparently per-
sisting in much less rewarding annual service? The social norms of the era 
discouraged younger women from hiring themselves by the day and moving 
from job to job (Roberts, 2005; Speechley, 1999; Whittle, 2005). Mobility 
and independence branded them as disreputable, even immoral. Annual service 
was considered more appropriate mainly because contrary to Hajnal’s account 
(see above) it was associated with the maintenance of male authority and young 
female subordination. Some independent-minded young spinsters resisted the 
social norms and can be detected in the historical record working for day wages: 
the ‘mayds in the craine’ who worked regularly driving machinery via a tread-
mill on a Chester construction site; and, the women who ‘puled flax’ or ‘brake 
hemp and swynglye’ for the Shuttleworths of Gawthorpe (Harland, 1857: 56; 
1857: 61; Rideout, 1928). Such women sought protection from sexual preda-
tion and charges of immorality as they roamed in search of employment by 
working in teams with other women shearing sheep, swingling hemp, digging 
peats, haymaking, weeding and labouring on construction sites. And often they 
too also carried the family’s lines of authority into the labour market by work-
ing in family-based teams in order to combine attractive wages and untarnished 
reputations. Working alongside fathers, mothers or brothers meant that young 
women could access day wages while remaining within patriarchal or at least 
familial oversight. 
Thus the post-plague labour shortage undoubtedly put pressure on the con-
ventional social controls, but economic rationality was insufficient to break 
down the ways in which women were channelled into different sectors of the 
labour market according to their age, marital status and other circumstances and 
arbitrage away the casual–annual differential (see Figure 11.2). Understanding 
why requires attention to a missing piece of the story: the mobilisation of the 
repressive state apparatus. The persistently low pay of women in annual service 
was a consequence of the intervention of the medieval state acting in the inter-
ests of the landlords with the passing of the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers 
in 1349 and 1351.
Most economic historians agree that the labourers and artificers who survived 
the Black Death, including women, sought to take advantage of their scarcity 
and obtain higher wages for their labour. In England, as elsewhere the ruling 
class’s response to the sudden increase in the peasantry’s power was a mix of 
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concession and repression, with the latter exemplified by legislation to hold 
wages and prices down to levels prevailing before the plague (Putnam, 1939). 
While the extent to which the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers was enforced 
remains debatable, the law’s intentions were clear. Firstly, all able-bodied men 
and women free and bond, without definite means of support, were com-
manded to accept service at the rate of wages that had existed before the Black 
Death: the compulsory service clause. Secondly, reapers, mowers and other 
workmen or servants were forbidden to leave their masters within the term of 
their contracts, without reasonable cause or permission, and other masters were 
forbidden to eloign workers or employ runaways: the contract clause. Thirdly, 
nobody was to give or receive higher wages than were customary: the wages 
clause (Putnam, 1908). The provisions were intended to prevent workers from 
exploiting labour scarcity and holding up employers at key moments in crop 
production. Note that the provisions applied to women as well as men and that 
the contract was to be by the year or other usual term and never by the day.
Even if patchily enforced, these ordinances raised the costs of mobility and 
involved risks for recalcitrant workers, some of whom were whipped, humili-
ated in the stocks, returned to vindictive masters and perhaps ultimately cowed. 
In lists of offenders against the Statute women loom large and were singled out 
for harsh treatment (Penn, 1987; Putnam, 1908; Thompson, 1904). Moreover, 
the Statute was used against female harvest workers seeking to exploit the labour 
scarcity not just for taking excessive wages, but for moving from place to place 
(Poos, 1991). Evidence suggests that the compulsory service clause was particu-
larly oppressive to women, for ‘[e]qual numbers of women and men in present-
ments (court records) probably translated, in the world outside the courtroom, 
into a practice of compulsory service that was predominantly, perhaps over-
whelmingly, female’ (Bennett, 2010: 23). 
The Statute and Ordinance were not intended to bear down with particular 
force on women workers but in practice they were bound to do so for the cat-
egories they evoked were patriarchal and paternalistic and made women offend-
ers easier to identify and charge. Moreover, these laws gave force to a suspicion 
of masterless persons, with unmarried women living and working on their own 
the most mistrusted. This legal prejudice persisted well into the early modern 
era when there is mounting evidence that it was the young unmarried woman 
who was most vigorously forced into service (Bennett, 2010; Middleton, 1988; 
Scott, 1973). Middleton, for example, cites Gregory King’s estimate that there 
were 300,000 women in service in 1695 compared with 260,000 men and 
concludes that ‘the protection which service offered against the uncertainties 
and irregularity of the labour market may have been extended to rather more 
women than men, but it did so only by reaffirming their subservient status’ 
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(Middleton, 1988: 32). So, although the authorities’ coercion of those ‘out of 
service’ back into subordinate employment, and more generally the repressive 
reaction to the presumption of the peasantry, was intended to maintain social 
order and keep general wage levels down, an incidental effect was that women, 
especially young women, bore the brunt of the backlash. Gender subordina-
tion was reinforced as a by-product of class struggle in this dramatic episode 
of English history as it was, too, in other times and places (Humphries, 1977). 
Conclusions
Recent theorisations of variations in long-run economic performance draw 
attention to divergence within Europe – whereby the north-west, particularly 
England, moved ahead – and link this lead to the region’s later age of marriage, 
and slower population growth. This interpretation has been embellished by 
linking the demographic pattern to life-cycle service, interpreting such service 
as a consequence of the Black Death, and positioning women at the centre of 
the account: a ‘girl-powered Little Divergence’ (GPLD). The model is charac-
terised, like many which preceded it, by an inconsistent oscillation between an 
absolutely autonomous system of social reproduction, with biologically deter-
minist overtones, and a completely derivative family system, which changes 
smoothly in response to economic opportunities. It is the latter which is empha-
sised in the GPLD which assumes that women who worked as annual servants 
enjoyed higher wages following the Black Death and that this was the cause of 
their delayed marriage. 
A newly available series of women’s wages observed in both annual and 
casual employment and over the very long run enables this assumption to be 
tested. The results are negative, for female servants’ wages remained stagnant 
over the post-plague period providing no support for the GPLD hypothesis. If 
the Black Death, and women’s response to it, did create the west via the GPLD 
it is not evident in wage patterns. Instead, the latter are interpreted as reflect-
ing a contestation over women’s roles as the relatively autonomous system 
of social reproduction responded to the chronic post-plague labour shortage. 
While workers struggled to improve their position, their responses were pat-
tered by the conventional norms that structured family lives. While employ-
ers sought to repress assertive peasants, their clampdown reflected patriarchal 
ideas of dominance and subordination and was more easily imposed on younger 
unmarried women. 
The post-plague interface between the organisation of social reproduction 
and the economy was not redrawn only by the needs of the economy; nor did it 
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indicate only the continuities of patriarchy. It also reflected how people sought 
to seize opportunities, secure advancement, defend privilege, control subordi-
nates and throw off oppressors – all while freighted with inherited values and 
constrained by pre-existing institutions. Conceptualising social reproduction as 
relatively autonomous requires attention to agency, class, state and history. Such 
a frame explains why the ‘Golden Age’ glittered far less brightly for women. 
As casual workers, they were all too often employed alongside and under the 
direction of husbands or fathers, their productivity and earnings subsumed in 
the men’s remuneration. As annual servants, they struggled to evade legislation 
which required they work at customary wages on restrictive contracts. In the 
long and drawn-out struggle between landlords and workers which followed the 
Black Death, both sides projected patriarchal ideals of dominance and subordina-
tion and exhibited a fear of female autonomy. Not surprisingly then, despite the 
chimera of new opportunities and booming wages, outcomes for women were 
often but ‘new designs embroidered on a cloth of oppression and deprivation’. 
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The two-child policy in China: a 
blessing or a curse for the employment 
of female university graduates?
Fang Lee Cooke
Introduction
The negative impact of the mothering role on women’s participation in the 
labour market has been well examined in the western context, where women 
with childcare responsibilities often assume part-time employment or take a 
career break (e.g. Fagan and Rubery, 1996). Policy attention, albeit with vary-
ing level of success, has been directed to address gender inequality in employ-
ment, particularly in nation states of the European Union (see Grimshaw and 
Rubery, 2015; Rubery, 2013). By contrast, while a significant level of gender 
equality in employment in China has been achieved during the state-planned 
economy period, measured by the extent of women’s participation in full-time 
employment and the relatively small gender pay gap (Gustafsson and Li, 2000; 
Nie et al., 2002), gender discrimination has increased substantially as a result of 
the deepening marketisation of the economy since the 1980s in China (Cooke, 
2012). In particular, labour market discrimination against women of childbear-
ing age, especially against female university graduates, is a salient feature. 
To date, female university graduates’ employment in China and the longer-
term impact of recent social policies on their economic and social well-being 
have received limited research attention outside China. Yet this is not a small 
cohort of the labour force with a relatively high level of human capital. Owing 
to the dramatic expansion of higher education (HE) since the early 2000s, some 
7.7 million students graduated from HE institutions in 2016 compared with 
2.12 million in 2003. In 2014, women made up approximately 52.1 per cent of 
undergraduate students, 51.6 per cent of postgraduate and 36.9 per cent of PhD 
students (The State Council of China, 2015). This has led to the oversupply of 
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graduates who are deemed over-qualified but under-skilled by many employers 
who seek practical skills and work experience. A direct labour market con-
sequence for these graduates is a prolonged period of unemployment, under-
employment and a falling wage premium (Li et al., 2016). According to Huang 
and Bosler (2014), the wage premium paid to HE graduates fell by 19 per cent 
since the late 2000s. 
Women make up 45 per cent of HE graduates and, since the ending of the 
state job allocation system in the 1990s, have encountered increasing sex dis-
crimination in employment largely due to their mothering role (Cooke, 2012). 
While labour regulation is in place to protect female workers against unlawful 
discrimination, non-compliance is the norm, even within the state sector and 
government organisations (Cooke, 2001). For example, in the banking sector 
where more than half the workforce are female graduates, branch managers 
often specify the number of female employees who are allowed to become 
pregnant each year in order to ensure staffing levels. What drives this endemic 
discrimination? What strategy do (some of the) female university students 
adopt, for example, entering motherhood early/prematurely, to enhance their 
employment prospects? And how may this strategy affect others concerned?
In late 2015, the Chinese government ended the one-child policy that was 
imposed on the nation since the early 1980s to allow each married couple to 
have two children (with effect from 2016) in order to address emerging social 
issues related to the ageing population. What impact is this new policy having 
on women, particularly female university graduates? It is important to note that 
university students are relatively young in China, even at the Masters and PhD 
degree level, with the majority still in their twenties upon graduation, and only 
a very small proportion become mothers during their study period. The relaxa-
tion of birth-control policy and the discriminatory response of employers are 
therefore likely to exert further pressure on young female university students. 
What is, then, the broader social cost of the two-child policy? 
At the same time, one labour market consequence of the oversupply of inex-
perienced university graduates is the growth of informal employment,1 a form 
of employment that already makes up over 60 per cent of employment for the 
national workforce. The proportion of university graduates taking up informal 
employment has been rising in recent years. A survey of 2,009 graduates found 
that 22 per cent chose self-employment (自主创业) as their preferred mode 
of employment, a substantial increase from just 6 per cent in 2008. This trend 
might reflect the decline of jobs in the labour market as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis (cited in Liao and Wu, 2013). It indicates that informal employ-
ment has become an important channel to reduce graduate unemployment and 
is increasingly accepted (Wang et al., 2016). 
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The new wave of employer discrimination in the light of the new birth-
control (two-child) policy is likely to push more female university graduates into 
informal employment, with potentially negative implications for their life-time 
employment outcomes, including for example, job security, wage and pension 
income and social benefits entitlement. Given that childcare support has been 
relatively poor in the private sector and work–life balance initiatives to support 
workers with care responsibilities mostly absent, the role of the extended family 
is likely to become even more important than before.2 Will this added require-
ment for family support rekindle some of the traditional Chinese cultural values 
and what social policy implications may this have for encouraging the return to a 
greater emphasis of family values that have been weakened in the marketisation 
of the economy? 
This chapter aims to address the above issues to fill some of the knowledge 
gaps. It argues that, given current gender norms and persistent employer dis-
crimination, the recent amendment of the birth-control policy in China may 
paradoxically weaken women’s bargaining power and position in the labour 
market with long-lasting effects, not just for women but for their family as a 
whole. It draws on interview data with professionals in the public sector and 
banking sector to explore how employers and female graduates are interpreting 
this change of policy and what it has meant for the employment opportunities 
of female graduates. It calls for the need to monitor the labour market effects 
of this policy for women in order to highlight new forms of gender discrimina-
tion that may arise, and mechanisms and interventions that can be put in place 
to ensure that different social policies do not compromise each other, and that 
the enactment of one policy does not undermine the interest of a large segment 
of the population that it aims to protect. It has been cogently argued in the 
European context that it is important to contextualise policy changes within the 
broader social policies and approaches to care, as well as to examine employers’ 
strategic responses to policy changes to assess the wider impact of any policy 
changes, and this chapter adopts a similar approach in examining the impact of 
the two-child policy on university women graduates’ employment prospects. 
Government policy and impact on university graduate 
employment
Two policy initiatives introduced by the Chinese government since 2014 have 
strong implications for women graduates’ employment prospects. One is the 
‘Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ and the other is the full implementa-
tion of the two-child policy. The following section outlines these two initiatives. 
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Unemployment pressure and government initiative
Some 10 million HE graduates competed in the job market in 2016. They 
consist of 7.7 million university graduates in 2016, 0.3 million overseas gradu-
ate returnees and 2 million unemployed graduates from previous years (Wang 
et al., 2016). Flexible employment (e.g. agency employment and temporary 
employment) and self-employment (or ‘entrepreneurship’ as the more sophis-
ticated label) are becoming alternatives for an increasing number of university 
graduates (Wang et al., 2016). As graduate employment is a performance 
indicator for universities, students are often ‘encouraged’ by the university to 
find an employer and sign an employment contract or become an entrepre-
neur (self-employed) before they graduate. The latter deprives these young 
graduates of employment security and other social security protection, despite 
a small amount of start-up subsidies as a favourable policy provided by the 
government. 
In September 2014, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang first mentioned ‘Public 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ (大众创业、万众创新 ‘public entrepre-
neurship mass innovation’) at the World Economic Forum. In March 2015, 
‘Public Entrepreneurship and Innovation’ was officially written into the 
Government Work Report, as a national strategy in response to the aggravating 
unemployment problem (The State Council of China, 2015). The State Council 
and local governments have subsequently introduced a series of policy measures 
to promote HE graduate employment and entrepreneurship. However, gradu-
ate entrepreneurship as a high-profile national strategy for employment and 
economic growth has attracted much skepticism as to how realistic it is to expect 
the youngest, poorest and most inexperienced, with limited entrepreneurship 
training, to become successful business people in a short period of time. The 
encouragement of flexible employment and particularly self-employment sig-
nals the end of the state commitment to formal employment for university 
graduates and may push those most disadvantaged in the labour market into 
insecure work (see Wang et al., 2016). 
Two-child policy and its uptake
As noted earlier, the one-child policy was enforced in the early 1980s to 
 control the rapid population growth in China. The two-child policy was 
partially adopted in 2013 for married couples who are the only child of their 
family as an incremental policy to increase the population to address socio-
economic problems associated with the care and cost of an ageing population. 
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From 2016 onwards, the two-child policy was implemented for all married 
couples. 
The full implementation of the two-child policy has serious economic, insti-
tutional, social and organisational implications for the government, employers 
and families that require social policy attention. Several key issues are high-
lighted below (see Money163.com, 2016; Wang, 2016):
1) Who will guarantee women’s employment rights vis-à-vis the widespread 
gender discrimination in the labour market without penalty to the offend-
ing employers? 
2) Who will provide childcare services? Many grandparents have been looking 
after the first grandchild. As they grow older, they may not be able to look 
after the second grandchild or to look after two grandchildren together.
3) Who will finance the upbringing of the second child? The cost of living is 
increasing sharply in China mainly due to the rising cost of housing and 
raising a child (e.g. education and healthcare for a child, loss of income for 
the mother, and childcare cost). Couples want to provide the best milk 
products, best toys, best schooling and extra curriculum activities such as 
music, arts and sports for their child. Parents also compare and compete 
against each other (Cooke and Xiao, 2014).
4) Where will the child receive education (from nursery to high school)? There 
is a severe shortage of good-quality nurseries and schools. Parents are will-
ing to pay high prices for their child to attend the best nursery/school they 
can afford, thus raising the bar of entry to schools and rocketing the housing 
prices of residential areas with popular schools. For those outside the nurs-
ery/school catchment area, significant resources will be needed to secure a 
place for the first child. For the second child this will be more challenging.
5) And, consequently, what social policy should be introduced to facilitate 
the implementation of the two-child policy (e.g. tax reduction for families 
with a second child, family allowance for nursery and maternity subsidy for 
employers) by reducing the burden of care?
Existing studies of the implementation since 2013 of the two-child policy 
for married couples who are the only child of their family revealed that a much 
lower proportion than anticipated of those qualified to have a second child have 
opted to do so. Three main reasons deter them from having a second child: 
financial pressure, childcare pressure and career pressure for women (Peng, 
2016). According to the Third National Survey of Chinese Women’s Social 
Position conducted in 2010, that is, before the full implementation of the two-
child policy (cited in Song, 2016), women surveyed believed that having a 
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second child would significantly reduce their employment in the urban area. 
Similarly, a survey published by Ganji.com revealed that 76 per cent of career 
women surveyed opted not to have a second child for financial reasons; 71 per 
cent anticipated difficulty in balancing their family and career; and 56 per cent 
admitted that having a second child might affect their career negatively (cited 
in Villarias, 2016). At the same time, some women face pressures from their 
family to have a second child to carry on the family line.
Impact of the two-child policy on employers 
Under normal circumstances, the overhead cost for staffing is 40 per cent for 
an employing organisation, in addition to what is believed to be a rather heavy 
business tax (e.g. Peng, 2016). The cost associated with childbearing and chil-
drearing is the main deterrent for employers to hire young women who have 
yet to fulfil their motherhood role (HRBar, 2016; see Table 12.1 for a sum-
mary of indicative cost). When a female employee is pregnant, the employer 
must continue to pay her salary and benefits, in addition to the cost of hiring 
Table 12.1 A summary of indicative maternity costs for female employees in China
Three periods Length Cost involved Potential problems
Pregnancy 10 months Long-term sick pay (see 
below) 
Overall cost of temporary 
replacement staff
Disruption of work flow
Difficulty in finding 
temporary 
replacement staff
Maternity 4 months 
onward
Maternity wage (including 
wage differential where 
applicable)
Overall cost of temporary 
replacement staff
Resignation of the 
new mother when 
maternity leave is over
Slow arrival of the 
maternity subsidies 
applied by the 
employer, causing 
delays in compensation
Breast feeding 8 months Sick leave of the new mother, 
regular leave of absence 
associated with childcare 
(e.g. child being sick or 
temporary absence of 
childcare arrangements)
Slack performance of 
the mother due to 
legal protection of 
employment rights 
during the ‘Three 
Periods’
Source: Adapted from HRBar, 2016.
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another person to fill the place during the pregnant woman’s absence from 
work (pregnancy checks, maternity leave, breastfeeding leave, leave of absence 
when the child is sick and so on). In addition, mothers of young children may 
be much less flexible in terms of working time due to childcare responsibilities 
(e.g. Li, 2015). This is particularly problematic in China where overtime may 
be required at short notice, often unpaid or under-paid. In addition, as China 
is encountering an economic slowdown, many companies are transitioning and 
upgrading their business. Downsizing to increase efficiency has become an inevi-
table part of the change, which presents a problem for employers as, by law 
(albeit not well enforced), they cannot reduce pay or dismiss female employees 
who are not working during their ‘Three Periods’ (pregnancy, maternity and 
breastfeeding), as defined in Table 12.1.
The author’s interviews with several employers (both public and private 
sector) and female employees in public sector professional organisations in 2015 
and 2016 revealed three types of behaviour from female employees during 
pregnancy and maternity leave that make employers wary. It should be noted 
at the outset that this may not be a widespread phenomenon across the country 
(gaming may be less possible in the private sector with performance-related pay 
or for low-earner families who need the wage); nor is the intention here to jus-
tify employer discrimination against pregnant women. Rather, these incidents 
are intended to demonstrate the two sides of the story/behaviour and how 
these behaviours may impact on the other party in negative ways. The first type 
is gaming behaviour which is the most costly and inconvenient for employers. 
Some women will take sick leave (paid or unpaid) once pregnancy is confirmed 
until childbirth in order to ensure a smooth pregnancy and take full advantage 
of any pay entitlements – one female employee in a public sector organisation 
was disclosing how she took advantage of the system for most of her pregnancy 
and even when she went to work for the limited days, she arrived late and left 
early. Then the new mother will take maternity leave and may extend the leave 
with sick leave or other leave of absence until the company presses her to return 
to work. Some mothers will then quit their job when the employer is no longer 
willing to keep the position open for her. In this situation, employers may lose 
out if the employee did not submit her application for maternity subsidy from 
the social security outlet. The research found that some employers resort to 
stopping the new mother’s wage payment until the maternity subsidy arrives 
to avoid this loss and then will pass the payment directly to the employee on 
maternity leave. A second behavioural scenario that was uncovered from the 
interviews is that the pregnant woman will continue to work but work more 
slowly, forcing the employer to hire someone else to share part of her work-
load. A third type of behaviour reported by managers is that pregnant women 
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may attend work but may be slack in their performance and disrupt others by 
chatting for prolonged periods about their pregnancy experience and so on. As 
a branch manager of a state-owned bank where the majority of employees are 
women remarked: 
Few pregnant staff work as normal to complete their task without asking for special 
treatment or having long periods of leave of absence. The younger generation of 
women are very delicate and cannot endure hardship like the earlier generations. 
Parents and grandparents also treat the baby a lot more preciously these days than we 
used to when we had several children in one family and when everybody had to work 
hard to make a bare living. 
An employer from a private service company shared similar sentiments, point-
ing out the inadequate role of the state in financing the childbirth policy: 
From the government’s point of view, encouraging childbirth and increasing the qual-
ity of the population is beneficial to the country’s long-term development. However, 
employers should not bear the bulk of the cost of childbirth. Such a burden will 
deter employers from hiring and promoting women with childrearing responsibility. 
The government as the policy maker should take more social responsibility, reduce 
taxation for businesses which have a large female workforce, increase maternity social 
security benefits to the individual and the employer, and give special consideration to 
companies that need to carry out business restructuring and lay off their employees, 
including women during their Three Periods. If we hire a young female post-graduate 
who is typically 24 or 25 years of age, train her up and then in 2–3 years’ time, she 
will have a child and then a second one. For those whose family financial situation is 
good, they may choose to quit the job and become a full-time housewife for a few 
years. This will be costly for the business. So we prefer to hire men. 
Even in the public sector where labour costs may be less of a concern, staff 
shortages due to maternity may be difficult to manage for the organisation. For 
example, interviews with school headmasters show that the two-child policy is 
already having an impact on the staffing levels and the workload of the existing 
workforce, particularly at workplaces which are primarily staffed by women, 
such as banks and schools. In one of the schools, where the majority of teachers 
are women, three out of seven school teachers teaching the same year/grade 
were pregnant a few months after the enactment of the policy. Two of them 
have taken long-term leave to ensure a smooth pregnancy and a healthy new-
born. As one of the headmasters remarked, ‘the post-80s and 90s generations 
are physically and emotionally tender’, as most of them are the only child of 
the family, known as the ‘Little Emperor’ (see also Marshall, 1997). This level 
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of staff absence has a major impact and male teachers are facing heavier work-
loads as a result because staffing levels in public schools are determined by the 
government and short-term replacement is difficult. This suggests the need for 
gender mainstreaming policies to protect against gender equality policies being 
derailed from other domains, as was argued in the European context (Rubery 
and Koukiadaki, 2016). 
Impact of the two-child policy on female graduates: employer 
discrimination 
Given the various issues highlighted above, it is perhaps not surprising that 
employment discrimination is one of the many challenges encountered by 
female university graduates (Liu, 2016), a situation that has been steadily wors-
ening since the 1980s with the ending of graduate job allocation by the state 
(see Cooke, 2001; 2009; Woodham et al., 2009). In early 2015, the National 
Development and Strategic Research Institute of Renmin University of China 
released a research report which revealed that for every one job interview invi-
tation a female jobseeker received, male jobseekers would receive 1.42 inter-
view invitations. After changing the gender to male on the application form, 
opportunities for female applicants to receive an interview invitation would 
increase 42 per cent (cited in Zhang, 2016).
According to a study conducted in 2015 by the All-China Women’s 
Federation (ACWF) on female graduates in several universities in three prov-
inces and municipalities including Beijing, 86.6 per cent of the women students 
surveyed felt that they have been discriminated against in their jobseeking pro-
cess (cited in Hou, 2016). In particular, 80.2 per cent of the women studied 
reported the following discriminatory practices from employing organisations: 
‘making gender specific requirements in the job advertisement’, ‘refusing to 
accept female applicants or look at their CVs’, ‘denying women applicants 
written test or interview opportunities’, ‘denying women applicants second 
interview opportunities’, ‘raising the qualification requirements for female 
applicants’ and so forth (Hou, 2016, p.9). The study further revealed that the 
women interviewed were discriminated against on at least 17 occasions on 
average (Hou, 2016). 
Some employers were reported to have blatantly asked women candidates 
if they had plans for having a family soon or if they were considering having a 
second child. So much so that ‘when are you planning to start a family?’ has 
become a ‘must-ask’ question during job interviews with female job candi-
dates (Beijing Youth Newspaper, 2015). If the answer was positive, then these 
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candidates would be dropped in the recruitment selection process (Liu, 2016). 
It was  reported that in graduate job fairs, there is a strange phenomenon in 
which PhD graduates are not as competitive as undergraduates, overseas gradu-
ate returnees are not as competitive as domestically grown graduates and single-
tons are not as competitive as those married with a child (e.g. Money163.com, 
2016). With the full implementation of the two-child policy, some employers 
have escalated, unlawfully but without punishment, their recruitment criteria 
from ‘married with child’ to ‘married with two children’ (e.g. Li, 2015; Sohu.
com, 2016). 
The full implementation of the two-child policy has evidently further under-
mined female graduates’ employment opportunities (Beijing Youth Newspaper, 
2015). According to a survey report released by www.51job.com, a major 
online job advertisement company, on the impact of the two-child policy on 
women’s employment, 75 per cent of the companies surveyed had increased 
concerns over the recruitment of female employees as a result of the two-child 
policy (cited in Huaxia Jingwei Net, 2016). Another survey conducted by the 
ACWF in 2015 also indicated that the implementation of the two-child policy 
for married couples who are the only child of their family has exacerbated 
employment discrimination against women. In addition, professional women 
who already have one child may be passed over for promotion when they have 
the second child (cited in Huaxia Jingwei Net, 2016). 
Despite the existence of legislation that stipulates the employment rights 
of women (e.g. the Constitution; Labour Law, Safeguarding Women’s Rights 
Law; and Employment Promotion Law), enforcement of these laws remains 
problematic and channels to seek remedy are ambiguous – a general problem in 
the implementation of labour laws in China (e.g. Cooke, 2012; Cooney et al., 
2014; Liu, 2016). Therefore, in reality, women’s employment rights are not 
guaranteed for many female jobseekers. 
Employer discrimination against female university graduates, an entrenched 
practice that has been exacerbated with the adoption of the two-child policy, 
has serious employment and career implications for this growing cohort of 
the new labour force. If the socially determined family roles of women, particu-
larly those with care responsibilities, in western societies have to a large extent 
shaped women’s identities as contingent and intermittent workers with under-
valued occupational skill classification and therefore financial reward for 
many (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2015), then the marginalisation of female univer-
sity graduates in the Chinese labour market is arguably a far more serious form of 
‘economic and social exclusion’ (Rubery and Grimshaw, 2015: 328). The choice 
of employment mode for the childrearing graduate women in  China is even 
more restricted to no employment, self- employment, temporary employment 
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or agency employment – but not necessarily part-time employment on a regular 
basis as part-time work is uncommon for skilled jobs.
Individual strategy and impact 
Individual strategy
Under the one-child policy, employers tended to favour university graduates 
who are already mothers instead of those who are single or newly married to 
avoid maternity costs and what employers referred to as other ‘hassles’ associ-
ated with working mothers with young children. Facing employment barriers, 
a small but growing number of female university graduates respond to the 
situation by getting married and having their child during their postgraduate 
studies – in China, Master degree courses are usually structured for a 2.5- or 
3-year period (e.g. Sohu.com, 2016). They can then enter the job market with 
more competitive advantage than their counterparts who are yet to go become 
mothers. For many university student mothers, becoming a mother during 
their university education is a kind of helpless choice. However, the full imple-
mentation of the two-child policy has eroded the benefit of such a strategy, as it 
would be far more difficult to have two children during the postgraduate study 
period. 
Discouraged by employer discrimination, some female postgraduate stu-
dents identify with the strategy of having a child first and then seeking employ-
ment, given that it is more difficult for female postgraduates (older and closer 
to childbearing stage) than for female undergraduates to find employment. 
However, this strategy has its drawback. Those who become a mother during 
their postgraduate studies may have to take a year off from their studies. 
These ‘post-graduate student mothers’ face dual pressures of completing their 
study while going through their pregnancy and childbirth (Zhang, 2015). Early 
parental responsibility means that they may encounter financial difficulties and 
have little time to enjoy life or hone their skills and knowledge before starting 
a family. Pregnancy tends to distract students from their studies which means 
that they may not get the best result, which in turn undermines their employ-
ment prospects. Maternity may also reduce their chance to work as a research 
assistant for their supervisors, which is a good opportunity to gain experience 
and resources beneficial to their studies and future career. In short, moth-
erhood during their postgraduate study period means that female university 
students are, in their mid-twenties, facing the financial, physical and emotional 
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burden of having to raise children, develop a career and pay a mortgage at the 
same time (Li, 2015). 
Impact on other university postgraduate students
The ‘child first, employment second’ strategy adopted by some female post-
graduate students was initially accepted by their peers as a personal choice. 
However, the author’s interviews with several postgraduate students and aca-
demics on their experience about living or working with these new mothers 
showed that such as a strategy may have its downside not only for the mother-
ing students but also their peers and supervisors. Those sharing a dormitory 
– a common accommodation arrangement in Chinese universities – with the 
pregnant student find that their freedom of activities in the dormitory is heav-
ily restricted – for example, by the need to keep noise down (which means no 
music, no visitors, no loud discussion and practically no life) and no late-night 
studying (as lights should be turned off) in order to create a conducive environ-
ment for the foetus to grow and the pregnant peer to rest. As noted earlier, 
Chinese families, coming themselves from one-child families, are very precious 
about their babies and do all they can to provide the best conditions for the child 
right from the start of the pregnancy (see also Chua, 2011; Cooke and Xiao, 
2014). Requests for ‘special treatment’ from a pregnant student may include 
favourable task allocation for group assignments, exemption from housework 
in the dormitory, accompanying hospital visits, assistance in shopping and other 
errands. Emotional support is often needed. All these demands make life diffi-
cult for the young peers and reduce their tolerance level after a while. 
For those new mother students living away from university, their friends may 
be asked to assist with all sorts of tasks such as research assistance, submitting 
forms, notices and thesis, and so on, often at short notice. Being absent from 
the campus also means that the mother student may not be pulling her weight in 
group activities or assignments and be resented for having an easy ride. 
Impact on the family
The twin problem of graduate unemployment and the two-child policy also 
impacts the graduates’ family in a variety of ways, including, for example, 
finding employment, funding for housing and childcare support. In particular, 
grandparents’ financial and childcare support has been a crucial subsidy that 
enables the mother to take up full-time work and for the young married couple 
to sustain a living standard which goes beyond their means. However, such self-
less cross-generation subsidy may have a negative effect on the grandparents, as 
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many of them may spend most of their savings on financing their children and 
grandchildren, leaving themselves vulnerable to poor health (owing to childcare 
responsibilities) and reduced living standards. Who will provide elderly care and 
healthcare to them when they need it? 
Policy considerations
Li (2015) argues that it is unfair to push the bulk of the childbirth cost to employ-
ers and blame them for being irresponsible when they discriminate against 
mothers-to-be. Given the extensive employer discrimination against mothers, 
to avoid staffing ‘hassles’ and the added burden on additional business costs, 
more intervention is needed from the government to prevent further deteriora-
tion of women’s employment and career prospects and to safeguard women’s 
rights and interests (Peng, 2016). This is a challenging task under the marketised 
economic environment. Nevertheless, what can be done to provide better child-
care support and promote gainful employment for women? Peng (2016) argues 
that, as the most important public service provider and resource allocator, the 
government has a responsibility – and the ability – to resource public services to 
faciliate families to have children. A number of government interventions, rang-
ing from positive incentives or facilitation to punitive mechanisms, may be con-
sidered, some of which have been adopted in western countries and have been 
recommended to the International Labour Organization to close the gender pay 
gap (e.g. Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015).
Firstly, tax reduction may be provided for families with children (Peng, 
2016). In addition, better social security provision may be provided for mater-
nity leave to reduce employers’ financial burden, for example, by linking mater-
nity leave subsidy directly to corporate tax reduction or introducing provisions 
whereby only those law-abiding employers will receive subsidies. 
Secondly, the government should put in place better family policy for paren-
tal leave, childcare leave and carers’ leave (Song, 2016). A paternity leave 
policy may be adopted to encourage more men to participate in the childrear-
ing process and share in the housework. Parental leave entitlement may also be 
introduced after guaranteeing adequate maternity leave as a more flexible leave 
arrangement. Paternal and parental leave entitlments will promote a better rela-
tionship for the couple, as housework and care responsibilities are more likely to 
be shared, and promote greater gender equality by reducing the negative impact 
of maternity leave on a woman’s career (Peng, 2016).
Thirdly, the government should strengthen access to early childhood educa-
tion facilities and faciliate affordable private childcare through, for example, 
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extending free school education to pre-schoolers, investing more in pre-school 
childhood education and improving the quality of state-funded school education 
to reduce parents’ financial burden in sourcing good-quality (private) educa-
tion for their children. In addition, the government could introduce favour-
able incentives (e.g. subsidies) to encourage employers and private investors to 
participate in childcare service provision and other education-related services 
(Peng, 2016).
Fourthly, affirmative action measures may be introduced, particularly in the 
public sector. These may include, for example, promoting good-quality flex-
ible employment and reserving job positions to married women with children. 
It is important to note that these measures have their own problems and may 
trigger another set of disadvantaged labour market outcomes for women as 
has been found in the European context (e.g. Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015; 
Rubery, 2015). It has been observed that employers in China have been inno-
vative in creating alternative forms of employment to overcome government 
regulation of particular types of non-standard forms of employment, for exam-
ple using outsourcing to replace agency workers (e.g. Cooke and Brown, 
2015).
Fifthly, state institutions should play a greater advocacy role to promote 
gender equality and the sharing of household responsibilities between wife and 
husband. For example, state-owned enterprises and public sector organisations 
can play a larger role in promoting gender equality practices at workplaces, 
such as promoting work–life balance initiatives and providing affordable and 
good-quality childcare services. As Rubery (2013) noted in the context of policy 
retrenchment in Europe, the public sector is not only an important source of 
quality employment and childcare services, but also a crucial public space to 
promote political ideology of gender equality and the social value of care work – 
not just childcare but also elderly care as the Chinese population ages. Equally, 
the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) and the ACWF, two key 
NGOs under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, can be mobilised 
to carry out more effective campaigns for improved childcare privision at both 
the policy and the operational level. Both ACFTU and ACWF are known for 
their welfare role. 
Sixthly, state institutions should improve the anti-employment discrimina-
tion legislation and enforce compliance more effectively to safeguard women’s 
equal employment rights. This is perhaps the toughest issue to tackle given 
the relatively poor record of labour law enforcement in China as noted earlier 
(Cooke and Brown, 2015; Cooney et al., 2014).
Finally, and more broadly, the full implementation of the two-Child policy 
reignites social debates of the decling tradition of family values and calls for 
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the reconstruction of family policy and the family ethics system (Peng, 2016). 
In the last few decades, the structure of Chinese families has become nuclear 
and many familial cultural traditions have been eroded as a result of greater job 
mobility, the commercialisation of domestic responsibilities and changing social 
values. Filial piety as a virtue has been diluted by individualism of the younger 
generation who were brought up in a self-centred environment as the only child. 
The impact of the two-child policy and the ageing population mean that tradi-
tional family values need to be revitalised in order to fill the gap created by the 
inadequacy of the social welfare system. The tradition of mutual assistance and 
responsibility sharing within the family will resume in becoming the main source 
of security and welfare support as a pragmatic familial survival and advancement 
strategy in response to economic and social changes. 
However, while re-emphasising the role of family as an important thread in 
the social fabric that underpins social harmony, the government should assess 
its family policy to identify what can be done to mobilise family support for the 
implementation of the two-child policy on the one hand, and to use the two-
child policy as a facilitator to remodel family arrangements on the other (Peng, 
2016). It is worth noting that while the Chinese traditional culture places strong 
emphasis on family values to make up for the inadequacy of the social welfare 
system, little has been done by the state in the family policy space to facilitate 
the functioning of the family self-support system. On the contrary, the weakness 
of the social welfare system is perhaps the outcome of a once-strong family self-
support system. It is time that the government adjusts its family policy and takes 
remedial action to support the functioning of other social policies in a more 
holistic manner. Without an integrated set of social policies as a solid founda-
tion, it will be difficult to expect families to operate in a self-sufficient manner, 
leaving those most at need in a vulnerable position and forcing families to adopt 
strategies that will render some of the social policies fruitless.
Conclusions 
This chapter examined tensions in the university graduate labour market that 
have been intensified by different goals of the social and economic policies 
adopted by the Chinese government since the 1980s. Existing evidence suggests 
that the two-child policy exacerbates the labour market discrimination of female 
graduates and in part undermines the enthusiasm of married couples to have 
a second child. If the intention of the two-child policy is to overcome labour 
shortage and the social security pressures associated with an ageing population, 
then the increased labour costs and the consequent employment discrimination 
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related to having a second child are severely undermining its implementation 
and triggering another set of social problems that may be difficult to tackle in 
the short term.
In particular, the full implementation of the two-child policy since 2016 will 
have strong implications for the employment prospects of Chinese female uni-
versity graduates. Employers have become more aggressive in their recruitment 
screening, in a context of rising graduate unemployment and under- employment 
as a result of the expansion of the HE sector in the early 2000s. The adoption 
of the two-child policy on the one hand, and the Public Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation policy on the other, is likely to push graduate women into self-
employment or contingency work that is characterised by employment inse-
curity and work fragmentation, and is under-paid and under-valued. For both 
individuals and the country, it is not only a waste of human capital, but also a 
major setback to the reasonable level of gender equality that has been achieved 
during the state-planned economy period (Cooke, 2012).
The current labour market conditions for female Chinese graduates, in light 
of the two-child policy, exemplifies Rubery and colleagues’ argument regard-
ing the importance of integrating labour market policies and social policies, 
particularly in the social reproduction sphere, for the policies to work effec-
tively (e.g. Rubery and Koukiadaki, 2016). The case of the two-child policy 
and the revelation of both employer and female employee responses to this 
policy  change also demonstrates the utility of Rubery’s analytical approach 
in two ways, if we are to fully understand why this policy will have such 
negative  implications. The first is the importance of contextualising these 
responses in the wider context of economic and social policies of caring and 
employment flexibility to help uncover deeper causes of problems in women’s 
employment and the gender pay gap. The second is the need to put employ-
ers under the spotlight  (cf. Rubery and Urwin’s (2011) argument of ‘bring-
ing the employer back in’) to examine women’s employment opportunities 
to show how the everyday organisational realities are shaped by changes in 
macro policies and how these shape employment opportunities for women 
at the level of the firm in both the private and the public sector. Research on 
women’s employment in China will benefit significantly by adopting this holis-
tic approach. 
In short, the emerging gendered pattern of contingency employment in China 
may mirror the path that has been travelled by several developed countries 
(e.g. Rubery, 2015). There are therefore many lessons to be learned for China 
in terms of enhancing the quantity and, particularly, the quality of graduate 
women’s employment through effective social policy intervention in an integra-
tive manner. Equally, what has occurred in China may have implications for 
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other developing nations, which are at different stages of industrialisation and 
commercialisation but are at the same time grappling with obstructing social 
problems and possible solutions. 
Notes
1 Informal employment includes, for example, agency employment, temporary employ-
ment, fixed-term employment, causal employment and self-employment.
2 The important role of family institutions in social reproduction and in facilitating the 
labour market participation of women with childcare responsibilities has been well rec-
ognised in the western context (c.f. Bosch et al., 2009 on the interrelationships between 
employment regimes and welfare regimes, including family systems). 
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Social reproduction of youth labour market inequalities
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The social reproduction of youth labour 
market inequalities: the effects of 
gender, households and ethnicity
Jacqueline O’Reilly, Mark Smith and Paola Villa
Introduction
Young people have been disproportionately hit by the economic crisis. In 
many  European countries, unemployment rates have increased faster for 
youth  than for prime age groups (O’Reilly et al., 2015). Vulnerability to 
the risks of poverty and precarious employment has been compounded by 
 increasing  economic inequalities and the rise of temporary, part-time and 
zero-hours contracts. Gender differences between young men and women 
appear to have converged on several standard labour market indicators (such 
as employment rate, unemployment rate, share of temporary and part-time 
work) (Eamets et al., 2015), although young women are still more likely 
to be  ‘not in employment education or training’ (NEET) than young men. 
Where there has been a levelling in gender disparities this is largely owing to 
an overall decline in the male labour market and men’s educational outcomes, 
while girls’ performance has improved. Nevertheless, reduced gender inequal-
ities in some cases are the outcome of increased overall precariousness for all 
young people.
Youth labour market vulnerability extends beyond simple gender differ-
ences. The context of vulnerable young women and men in the labour market 
varies across the European Union (EU), but similarities influencing indica-
tors such as NEET rates, youth employment and unemployment rates, early 
school-leaving, and gender pay gaps are found across all countries (Gökşen 
et al., 2016a). Vulnerability to poverty and social exclusion relates to family 
background, a gender segregated labour market and the role of ethnicity. The 
economic crisis has exacerbated these disadvantages. The interdependency of 
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these dimensions subject young people to differing degrees of vulnerability to 
unemployment and precariousness in the labour market, depending on where 
they live and with whom. 
Surprisingly, little attention has been given to bringing together some of 
these distinct strands of research on new patterns of vulnerability and labour 
market segmentation that include an understanding of the impact of different 
institutional environments, the legacy of parental households and the differenti-
ated experience by gender and ethnicity (Zuccotti and O’Reilly, forthcoming). 
We are interested in identifying how new patterns of segmentation in youth 
labour markets are developing. We explore the impact on young  people’s 
trajectories, focusing on vulnerability by gender, ethnicity and parental house-
hold differences. We examine the extent to which policies for young people 
recognise gender differences and, ultimately, the extent to which a gender 
mainstreaming approach has been visible in policies to help young people find 
paid work. 
Our analysis draws on the concept of social reproduction and economic 
production developed by Humphries and Rubery (1984). We consider youth 
trajectories in relation to the employment status of their family households 
across Europe for both young women and young men. Furthermore, we use 
the example of ethnic differences in the UK to illustrate new lines of segmenta-
tion. We then examine the extent to which policy has sought to address these 
inequalities. 
The difficulties faced by young people cannot simply be read off in terms 
of  particular gender, family background or ethnic characteristics. We argue 
that a more integrated approach can inform policy as well as trace patterns 
of  continuity and change in the differentiated experience of young people 
in Europe. We draw on the results from a large-scale European research  project 
on strategic transitions for youth labour in Europe (www.style-research.eu) 
and, in particular, the work of Gökşen et al., 2016a; Berloffa et al., 2015; 
and Zuccotti and O’Reilly (forthcoming). We examine the legacy of paren-
tal employment for young Europeans and, in the UK context, how these 
differences are shaped by ethnicity. We conclude by arguing that in order 
to understand emerging patterns of segmentation in youth labour markets a 
more holistic approach is required. This includes an analysis of the legacy of 
household differences from the sphere of social reproduction to understand 
how these interact with the sphere of economic production. Our analysis 
indicates that a more holistic understanding of the differential effects of these 
dimensions is required if policy initiatives are to be better targeted at making 
work more equal for young women and men from different family and ethnic 
backgrounds. 
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Economic production, social reproduction and youth labour 
market segmentation
In their seminal article, Humphries and Rubery (1984) argued that the concepts 
of economic production and social reproduction captured different organising 
principles, enabling us to understand cross-national differences in female and 
maternal employment. Humphries and Rubery’s (1984) key argument was that 
the sphere of economic production encompassed the interaction between different 
societal institutions, such as collective bargaining systems, vocational and educa-
tional training (VET) systems and employment regulation. The constellation of 
these institutions established a particular employment logic that varied between 
countries and between sectors. It differentiated and segmented workers in terms 
of employment conditions. Employers’ preferences and abilities to recruit spe-
cific types of labour drew on a range of different employment contracts. For 
example, while policies to support shorter working times or partial early retire-
ment were more commonly found in traditional, industrial and male-dominated 
sectors, the use of part-time contracts was predominantly reserved for women 
in feminised sectors of the economy (O’Reilly and Fagan, 1998). This could 
explain why, in some countries, employers’ preferences were more closely 
aligned with the production of well-qualified, highly skilled labour. In other 
countries, and in some sectors where the weakness of the VET institutions 
resulted in a less well-qualified supply of labour, employers were more likely 
to design jobs with inferior employment contracts, and for women these were 
often on a part-time basis. This analysis has been more widely taken up in labour 
market research with a more ‘productivist’ focus, that is, where the attention was 
purely on the public sphere of economic production, as evidenced by the consid-
erable volume of literature dedicated to discussions of the merits of the varieties 
of capitalism (VOC) approach. The Humphries and Rubery (1984) approach, in 
contrast, went beyond this narrower economic focus on ‘production regimes’ 
(Rubery, 1992, 1993). 
Their innovative and significant contribution was to make a much stronger 
link to including a parallel analysis of the sphere of social reproduction (Picchio, 
1992). This referred to institutions supporting the reproduction of labour, 
including the family as well as other significant institutions, such as school time-
tables and working-time norms. The organisation of these institutions, essential 
to the way in which the sphere of social production was structured, affected 
the forms and levels of female labour market participation and the patterns and 
organisation of consumption and leisure. Humphries and Rubery argued that 
we could not assume a symbiotic ‘fit’ between these two spheres of economic 
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production and social reproduction. Instead, they argued, a degree of autonomy 
existed between them. One of the advantages of their analysis was that it could 
potentially identify contradictions and sources of change, particularly in relation 
to the forms and levels of female labour market participation. 
During the 1980s and 1990s this perspective enabled researchers to go 
beyond the traditional scope of labour market analysis that was largely centred 
on the employee–employer relationship, either at the micro- or at the macro-
level. Instead, the analytical framework based on economic production and 
social reproduction provided a conceptual bridge that had links with developing 
approaches in comparative social policy and welfare state studies. This allowed 
researchers to make connections between how state policies shaped labour 
supply through education and training as well as through the provision (or not) 
of childcare services. It allowed an understanding of how, and on what terms, 
women’s labour supply was constituted in different societies (O’Reilly, 1994).
The early debate on the role and position of women within the production 
system put the family at the core of the analysis (Kenrick, 1981; Picchio, 1992). 
This literature conceptualised the family and the labour market as social institu-
tions, with attention focused on their role in the reproduction of labour power. 
In this framework, the state plays a fundamental role in the reproduction of 
labour, its action affecting standards of living (i.e. economic well-being) and 
shaping the legal structures regulating the reproduction and employment of the 
labour force. The state’s intervention takes place through the  distribution 
of benefits and the provision of services, but also through legal structures, 
in the regulation of both the system of social reproduction (i.e. family law) and 
the labour market system (i.e. employment legislation). 
A key tenet of the literature on social reproduction is that the labour force is 
not homogeneous. Individuals differ substantially, not only in terms of educa-
tion and skills but also in terms of personal characteristics and the position they 
occupy in the social structure of the labour market (Villa 1986: 261). Their 
position in the labour market must therefore be explained with reference to the 
existing economic and social differences in the system of social reproduction. 
This implies that differences in the economic and social status of workers (by 
gender, by age or by ethnic group) are a reflection of (1) the social and eco-
nomic position of the individual’s family (crucial in determining access to entry 
jobs, hence occupations and career advancements); and (2) the position workers 
occupy within the family and how this can affect their transition to adulthood. 
Despite the insights this approach has provided to understanding female 
labour force participation, this kind of analysis has not been applied to youth 
labour markets. Conventionally, analysis of youth labour markets has given 
more attention to skill production systems and VET or to the type of labour 
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market transitions young people can make on entering employment. More 
conservative-leaning approaches have focused on supply-side characteristics as 
those requiring a change of attitude on the part of either the young person or 
their family and peers. Yet Humphries and Rubery’s sphere of social reproduc-
tion could be extended to encompass the way in which households and gender 
relations support transitions into employment from the educational system. In 
fact, very little attention has been given to providing a systematic comparison of 
how the characteristics of parental households are associated with youth labour 
market transitions (Berloffa et al., 2015), or the interaction of household char-
acteristics with ethnic differences (Zuccotti and O’Reilly, forthcoming). Yet 
an adapted framework from that initially proposed by Humphries and Rubery 
(1984) can provide an innovative insight into the appearance of new forms of 
inequality in youth labour markets in Europe and its contribution to labour 
market segmentation theory. This more holistic approach allows us to integrate 
both the impact of households on youth transitions and the types of segmented 
labour markets they can access.
The evidence suggests that labour market experience for young people varies 
greatly across European countries. Moreover, these differences have been on the 
increase during the economic crisis. School-to-work transitions vary in terms 
of entry speed into employment, the time required to acquire job stability and 
the quality of employment. First-time jobs are often rather unstable (e.g. tem-
porary contracts) or characterised by short durations (e.g. training contracts). 
For some youth, these ‘flexible’ contracts act as ports of entry into stable jobs, 
but for others they tend to become traps, leading to frequent spells of unem-
ployment experienced between precarious jobs (Leschke, 2012). Some young 
people withdraw from the labour market for prolonged periods of time because 
they are discouraged in their attempts to find work, have caring responsibilities 
or return to education. NEET status for those who are unemployed or inac-
tive is therefore a frequent phenomenon among some young people, and one 
that has increased manifold with the Great Recession (Bell and Blanchflower, 
2011; Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). These differences in youth school-to-
work transitions may be explained by cross-country differences in educational 
and training systems, employment policy and labour market institutions, and 
general macro-economic conditions. However, in addition to individual and 
country characteristics, we argue that family background also plays an important 
role in determining the type of trajectories experienced by young individuals, 
especially in Mediterranean and some Eastern European countries. 
For some young people, unemployment is a frictional experience; for others, 
long-term exposure is part of a generational legacy (O’Reilly et al., 2015). The 
experiences of the parents of today’s children shape the opportunities of young 
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people through the transmission of resources and cultural capital (Warmouth et 
al., 2014). We know from social mobility research that parental unemployment 
can become an ‘unintended’ legacy for their own children, depending on where 
they live and how the economy around them has changed in recent decades 
(MacDonald et al., 2013; Macmillan, 2014).
The growing polarisation of households between the ‘work-poor’ and the 
‘work-rich’ was brought to the attention of policy-makers in the mid-1990s 
(Anxo and O’Reilly, 2001; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1994, 2001). In the UK, 
for example, a range of policies during the 1990s sought to address this disparity 
and reduce the proportion of workless households. However, since the onset of 
the economic crisis of 2008–09, the proportions of work-poor households have 
been on the increase, particularly in countries hard-hit by the crisis (Berloffa et 
al., 2015: 8; Gregg et al., 2010). 
The growth of jobless households co-existed with an increase in households 
with two working parents. Many commentators have evidenced the decline of 
the traditional ‘male breadwinner’ household model (Crompton, 1999), along-
side a rise in non-traditional and single-parent families. The unequal distribution 
of paid work across these different household types not only illustrated growing 
levels of inequality, but also the potential exacerbation and extension of these 
inequalities for younger generations (Atkinson, 2015). The inclusion of house-
hold effects on labour market outcomes brings together the argument made by 
Humphries and Rubery (1984), with implications for identifying new lines of 
labour market segmentation and its inclusion in theoretical approaches. 
Gender, youth labour market transitions and parental 
household characteristics
Gender differences in youth labour markets and school-to-work transitions are 
frequently under-estimated and it is often implicitly assumed that gender gaps 
only open up around parenthood so that younger generations are largely unaf-
fected (Plantenga et al., 2013). These gaps reflect segregation of educational and 
training choices as well as processes in the labour market – including employer 
behaviour – which serve to reinforce gender roles and stereotypes that subse-
quently produce occupational gender segregation. 
The analysis conducted by Gökşen and colleagues (2016a), based on the 
European Union – Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset, 
demonstrate that gender gaps for young people exist across almost all measures 
of educational and labour market statuses used to assess vulnerable outcomes. 
Their cross-national evidence suggests that gender differences open up early in the 
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life course and that the policy environment across European countries is not well 
adapted to addressing these gender differences in the youth labour market. The 
extent of these vulnerabilities varies across different school-to-work regimes but 
is nevertheless present across unemployed and precarious employment statuses. 
Gökşen and colleagues (2016a) compare five country types: (1) universalistic 
(Denmark and the Netherlands); (2) liberal (United Kingdom); (3) employment-
centred (France and Belgium); (4) sub-protective (Spain, Greece and Turkey); 
and (5) post-socialist countries (Slovakia). These country types represent differ-
ent institutional environments and school-to-work transitions regimes for young 
people (Walther, 2006). They find that transitions are somewhat smoother and 
more predictable in systems where the education and training system has already 
differentiated young people both horizontally and vertically into tracks leading 
to different labour market destinations; but significant gender and country-specific 
differences remain. Transitions are found to be more fluid where the flows of 
information between education and labour market are continuous and extensive 
and gender gaps smaller, as in the case of employment-centred regimes (France 
and Belgium); yet migrants fair less well (Gökşen et al., 2016a: 35–6). In regimes 
where education systems are less stratified and where linkages between education 
and labour market are weaker, transitions seem to be more interrupted and gender 
gaps larger (for example, in the UK).
Using the lens of social reproduction we are also interested in understanding 
how households’ characteristics affect youth transitions. Using the EU-SILC 
cross-sectional data, Berloffa and colleagues (2015) focus on mapping the sig-
nificance of this trend across 29 European countries (27 EU countries, plus 
Norway and Switzerland) for different categories of youth (aged 16–24) living 
in the family of origin.1 They were interested in identifying whether there was a 
generational legacy of parental worklessness on employment patterns of young 
people today. Their analysis found that young people growing up in workless 
households are more likely to be unemployed. Indeed, across all European 
countries the likelihood of young people being unemployed was much higher if 
they came from a work-poor household (see Table 13.1). Using data from 2005 
and 2011, they show how during the Great Recession this higher likelihood of 
being unemployed increased across all country groups, apart from in Eastern 
Europe, albeit this occurred at different rates.
The results in Table 13.1 show how the risk of being unemployed for young 
people was generally higher in traditional breadwinner and work-poor house-
holds, and that these risks increased between 2005 and 2011. In the Nordic 
countries youth unemployment has increased most among traditional breadwin-
ner families, and remained high among those where no one worked. In English-
speaking and Continental countries, while the children of working single parents 
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Table 13.1 Unemployment rates of young people (16–24) living in the family of origin 



















































































Notes: The 29 countries have been grouped as follows: Nordic (DK, FI, NO, SE); English-speaking 
(UK, IE); Continental (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, NL); Mediterranean (CY, EL, ES, IT, MT, PT); Eastern 
European (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, SK).
Source: Data drawn from Berloffa et al. (2015: table 4.1a) based upon calculation on EU-SILC cross 
sectional data 2005, 2011.
were most vulnerable in 2005, it is those coming from work-poor households 
who were subsequently hit hardest. The disparities between household types 
were less apparent in Mediterranean countries in 2005. But, by 2011, they had 
increased substantially; the risk of being unemployed for Mediterranean youth 
had risen more for those from the work-poor households, as well as those from 
traditional breadwinner households. Despite this aggregate fall in unemploy-
ment across Eastern Europe, young people from traditional breadwinner house-
holds and the work-poor were at the highest risk of being unemployed in 2011 
(Table 13.1).
Further multivariate analysis by Berloffa and colleagues (2015) demonstrates 
that young people living in households where both parents work generally have 
a lower probability of unemployment/inactivity, with some differences across 
country groups and over time. In particular, living with a working father, all 
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things being equal, reduced the probability of not working in all country groups 
in 2005. However, six years later, paternal employment plays a significant role 
only in Continental and Mediterranean countries. Maternal employment has an 
additional, and often larger, effect in Mediterranean and English-speaking coun-
tries on the likelihood of their children also being in employment. 
In their analysis of the EU-SILC data Berloffa and colleagues also differenti-
ate between the effects of parental employment status on sons’ and daugh-
ters’ employment probabilities (Berloffa et al., 2015; tables 5.2 and 5.3). Sons’ 
status is significantly affected by both parents working. In particular, in English-
speaking countries, living with two working parents has a hugely positive effect 
on the probability of employment; in Mediterranean countries, parental employ-
ment significantly reduces the probability of young people’s unemployment and 
inactivity. In Continental and Nordic countries, the effects were different before 
and during the crisis. In Continental countries, sons of a working mother are less 
likely to be unemployed in both years, while the role of the father emerges only 
for the youngest cohort (i.e. during the crisis), helping to reduce the probability 
of unemployment and inactivity for their sons. In Nordic countries, sons of a 
working father were less likely to be unemployed before the crisis (in 2005); 
and sons of a working mother were more likely to be employed during the crisis 
(in 2011).
For daughters, both paternal and maternal employment is associated with 
a lower likelihood of being unemployed or inactive in Mediterranean and 
Continental countries. In Nordic countries, in 2005, the employment condition 
of both parents is significantly correlated with their daughters’ only, helping to 
lower the probability of her being unemployed or inactive. On the contrary, in 
English-speaking countries, young women’s employment status depends only 
on their mother’s employment status, and only for 2011.
These results provide empirical evidence of an intergenerational persistence 
of worklessness. The effects of the crisis show that inequalities in the risk of 
worklessness associated with the parental occupational structure fell in Nordic 
countries, remained almost unchanged in Continental countries and rose in 
English-speaking and Mediterranean countries. The gendered effects are also 
clear, with a positive intergenerational correlation between fathers and sons 
but, once controlled for mothers’ working conditions, this correlation is small 
in almost all country groups (the exception being the Mediterranean countries). 
Similarly, young women with a mother who had been employed were less likely 
to be inactive. This association is highest in the Nordic countries than elsewhere. 
It also decreases over time in all countries, apart from the Mediterranean group. 
These results clearly indicate how family legacies continue to have a long-term 
impact on the early labour market outcomes for young people. These findings 
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also illustrate the value of examining youth transitions using an adapted approach 
proposed by Humphries and Rubery (1984). This approach goes beyond exam-
ining the trajectories of isolated individuals, but links their outcomes to the 
household and employment opportunities of their parents, within the insti-
tutional settings set up by the state that shape the legal structures regulating 
the social reproduction and employment of the labour force (Humphries and 
Rubery, 1984; Villa, 1986). Taking this approach a step further, we were also 
interested in examining how these effects vary by household characteristics as a 
vector for reinforcing segmentation or protecting young people against the risk 
of poor employment prospects.
Ethnicity, gender and work-poor households
These differential experiences of young people in terms of gender and household 
effects identified above can also vary by ethnicity. The examination of ethnic 
groups across the EU is frequently framed in terms of migration, rather than an 
analysis of native-born, non-white population. Such cross-national comparisons 
of native ethnic differences are complex because of the varied ethnic composi-
tion of national populations, as well as the limited availability of substantial 
comparable data. For example, Gökşen and colleagues (2016b) had to rely on 
county of birth in order to identify ethnic variations using the EU-SILC data; 
second-generation youth were not identifiable and migrants from a variety of 
national origins were amalgamated. Nevertheless, they found strong evidence of 
disadvantage by comparing the intersectionality of youth, gender and ‘migrant’ 
status. A summary of their results for unemployment and NEET status is pre-
sented in Table 13.2. Here we see the gender and ethnicity gaps in relation to 
EU-born young men are evident in all countries, and these gaps have been exac-
erbated, in most cases, by the onset of the economic crisis. Exceptions include 
the case of the Netherlands where the situation of non-EU youth improved 
over time and in the UK where non-EU-born youth tended to fair better than 
men born in the EU. The same was not true for young women who were more 
likely to be NEET. Similarly, NEET rates for non-EU-born women improved in 
France and Belgium but remained much higher than for EU-born men. 
Here we extend the analysis of Gökşen and colleagues (2016a) for ethnicity 
and Berloffa and colleagues (2015) for household impacts on youth transitions 
using the UK as an example case based on the work of Zuccotti and O’Reilly 
(forthcoming). The UK data have the advantage of including more nuanced 
detail around ethnic minority groups that is not available in other EU countries, 
as well as allowing us to include more detailed evidence related to parental 
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Table 13.2 Ratio of unemployment and NEET rates in eight European countries, broken 
down by EU/non-EU country of birth and gender (youth 16–29 years)


























DK 1.00 1.41 2.08 1.08 1.00 0.93 n/a 0.80
NL 1.00 1.45 5.91 7.86 1.00 0.74 2.34 2.32
FR 1.00 1.08 1.51 1.56 1.00 0.90 1.23 2.14
BE 1.00 1.13 2.36 2.72 1.00 0.92 3.23 2.33
SK 1.00 1.07 n/a n/a 1.00 0.97 n/a n/a
UK 1.00 0.63 0.62 0.80 1.00 0.69 0.78 0.90
ES 1.00 1.32 1.37 1.86 1.00 1.02 1.43 1.10
EL 1.00 1.57 0.51 1.60 1.00 1.04 1.07 0.94
NEET
DK 1.00 1.52 1.57 2.82 1.00 1.18 0.05 2.64
NL 1.00 2.07 3.73 6.32 1.00 1.20 1.06 1.80
FR 1.00 1.51 1.51 3.91 1.00 1.01 1.04 3.57
BE 1.00 1.42 2.47 4.55 1.00 1.12 3.13 3.69
SK 1.00 1.50 n/a n/a 1.00 1.30 n/a n/a
UK 1.00 1.73 0.85 2.20 1.00 1.33 0.89 1.72
ES 1.00 1.39 1.45 2.72 1.00 0.99 1.48 1.56
EL 1.00 1.51 0.62 2.78 1.00 1.01 1.49 1.66
Source: Data drawn from Gökşen et al. (2015: tables 3.3 & 3.5) based upon calculation on EU-SILC 
cross sectional data 2005, 2011.
households and their employment levels. For example, the analysis developed 
allows us to distinguish between ethnic minorities who were born in the UK 
or came here when they were very young and more recent adult migrants to 
the UK. 
By using a multi-dimensional, intersectional approach combining household 
and personal characteristics with labour market outcomes, together with the 
inclusion of ethnic minority status, we can develop a more holistic analysis as 
proposed by Humphries and Rubery. It also moves this approach towards a more 
intersectional analysis. Intersectionality stemming from the critical standpoint of 
African-American feminists has been advocated to examine multiple disadvan-
tages and inequality (Cho et al., 2013; Collins, 2015; Crenshaw, 1991). Rather 
than focusing on one dimension or comparing bimodal inequalities of race, 
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gender or class separately, the concept of intersectionality captures discrete 
combinations of multiple sources of disadvantage, which themselves reflect dif-
ferentiated locations of power, domination and discrimination. Applied inter-
sectional analysis focuses on differences between categories, such as between 
ethnic groups, as well as within categories of class, gender and ethnicity. While 
this concept has been extensively discussed in radical feminist forums, McBride 
and colleagues (2015) and Mooney (2016) suggest the application of an inter-
sectional approach to empirical examination in the field of labour studies is well 
overdue. An intersectional approach also brings to the fore new sets of inequali-
ties and how the effects of disadvantage translate for young men and women of 
different ethnic groups (Crawford and Greaves, 2015). This approach generates 
a more differentiated reading of the effects of labour market segmentation and 
the interaction of ethnicity, gender and parental household employment status 
associated with the likelihood of young people becoming NEETs. 
The cross-European analysis of households from Berloffa and colleagues 
(2015) shows that the legacy of parental worklessness continues to touch young 
people. This pattern is also found in the UK; young people who come from a 
work-poor household where no adults in their household were working when 
they were aged 14 have a much higher rate of being NEETs today compared 
to those coming from any other family type. However, this effect varies in its 
intensity in terms of both gender and ethnicity.
When comparing Indian and Bangladeshi young men raised in workless 
households, Zuccotti and O’Reilly’s (forthcoming) analysis of UK data reveal 
that they do noticeably better than their equivalent white British counterparts: 
they are much less likely to become NEET. Adult Indian and Bangladeshi 
men having parents with a low occupational status still have a higher chance 
of acquiring a service-class position than their white British counterparts 
(Zuccotti, 2015), even after controlling for education and other social back-
ground characteristics. 
African men raised in single-parent households where that parent is work-
ing had more chance of being in either education or in employment compared 
to their white British male counterparts coming from a similar household. For 
young women, a different pattern revealed itself: white British and Caribbean 
young women were more successful at finding work than was the case for young 
white British and Caribbean men – they were the least successful at integrating 
into employment in the UK.
Young Caribbean men raised in two-earner households were more likely 
to be NEET compared to their white British counterparts. Young Caribbean 
men do not gain from the advantage of having both parents in employment. 
This may in part be due to difficulties in transferring dominant cultural capital 
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in terms of social networks and habitus to enable them to find formal employ-
ment (Rafferty, 2012), which in turns affects educational and labour market 
opportunities. In contrast, the very low NEET rates found among young Indian 
and Bangladeshi men show that having had workless parents does not necessarily 
have the same expected negative effect for these young people. 
By examining gender differences, Zuccotti and O’Reilly (forthcoming) do 
not find evidence that Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were less likely to 
be NEET than white British women among those raised in one-earner house-
holds. Knowing, however, the very high levels of unemployment and inactiv-
ity of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, Zuccotti and O’Reilly (forthcoming) 
estimated a model excluding full-time students from the analysis finding that 
for young Pakistani women the penalty for those raised in one-earner house-
holds became more evident than for other ethnic groups. For those who do 
not manage to continue in further education, employment opportunities are 
reduced. For those who studied, the chances of obtaining employment and a 
higher occupational status are greater, although not necessarily equivalent to 
those of their white British counterparts. Educational attainment clearly makes 
a bigger difference for some non-white ethnic groups than appears to be the case 
for white British boys. 
Zuccotti and O’Reilly (forthcoming) argue that we cannot simply read off 
from a selection of disadvantaged categories that these automatically determine 
the likelihood of being NEETs. Labour market segmentation for young people 
involves a complex set of mechanisms related not only to patterns of employer 
discrimination, the organisation of the VET system, but also to family charac-
teristics and clearly some of the effects through the education system. Some of 
the explanation for the effect of parental worklessness on young generations has 
focused on (1) the transmission of attitudinal differences; (2) regional dispari-
ties in available jobs; (3) the effects of the benefits system generating a culture 
of dependency; and (4) differences in the cultural and social capital of parents. 
High parental expectations among ethnic minorities might lead to a direct moti-
vation to participate in education and/or employment, which can counterbal-
ance the disadvantages of their social origins.
Taken together these findings from our European comparison of the house-
hold effects on the labour market opportunities for young men and women, 
and how these pan out in different trajectories for young people from different 
ethnic backgrounds in the UK, illustrate new lines of labour market segmenta-
tion that have received negligible attention using an intersectional approach 
to date. They also illustrate how the effects of families vary between different 
communities of young people. There are universally comparable outcomes for 
young people coming from disadvantaged, work-poor families in that their entry 
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into the labour market is more difficult. However, when we compare these for 
different ethnic groups and for young women and men, we can observe that 
transitions into employment are shaped by a complex system of mechanisms. 
For these reasons, policy interventions need to be more clearly targeted for the 
vulnerable groups that this analysis identifies.
Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates the interaction of the gendered dynamics of the 
youth labour market and the interrelationship with ethnicity and the sphere of 
social reproduction. Segmentation remains a powerful tool for understanding 
the challenges that young people face in the labour market. Here the interaction 
between gender, ethnicity and parental households shed light on new contours 
of segmentation that are often overlooked by researchers and policy-makers. By 
integrating the role of parental household into the early labour market experi-
ences of young people, particularly during a crisis, we illustrate how an exten-
sion of the Humphries and Rubery (1984) framework of social reproduction 
acts in the dynamics of segmentation of the youth labour market with variable 
consequences by gender and ethnicity.
The evidence we bring together here from a large-scale European project2 
highlights the emergence of gender gaps in labour market experiences early 
on in the economic lives of young people, in line with other studies that con-
sider gender differences, confirming the higher rates of NEET (Berg, 2015; 
McDowell, 2002) or extended periods of precariousness experienced by young 
women (Anxo et al., 2005). We also show how similar household effects have 
differential outcomes for different ethnic groups in the UK. However, there 
are a wider range of factors that shape outcomes for young people in the labour 
market (Reinecke and Grimshaw, 2015) and the studies briefly reported in 
this chapter demonstrate how the characteristics of the household provides yet 
another influence extending Humphries and Rubery’s sphere of social reproduc-
tion to their influence on the youth labour market. 
The analysis of the policy environment towards young people underlines 
that policy towards youth labour markets is often gender blind and there is 
limited evidence of consistent gender mainstreaming. Gökşen and colleagues 
(2016b) found that although the typologies of different welfare and school-to-
work regimes captured some of the variation in national transitional systems, 
they also leave substantial variation unaccounted for. This partly relates to the 
absence of a comprehensive categorisation of school-to-work transitions, but 
also specific role of gender differences within these institutional environments. 
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Studies that consider ethnic comparisons are even slimmer on the ground. The 
analysis of the policy environment towards young people demonstrates the 
importance of considering the country-specific institutional environment when 
analysing youth labour markets. 
Given the gender gaps identified in the labour market data, policies could be 
more efficient if they recognised gender and ethnic differences in youth labour 
markets. For example, school dropout rates for boys, segregation of training 
opportunities for girls and the interaction of gender and ethnicity in educational 
choices do not receive sufficient attention in more aggregate analysis. Although 
there is some evidence of good practice that recognises gender differences at the 
margins and indeed the intersectionality of youth, gender, ethnicity and other 
forms of vulnerability these policies are very much the exceptions (Knijn and 
Smith, 2012). 
It is perhaps not surprising that policy towards youth has a small gender- 
sensitive component given the low level of gender mainstreaming in policy-
making more generally (Smith and Villa, 2012). Long-term gender inequalities 
need to be addressed earlier, as once they emerge they tend to grow and become 
entrenched. The role of households in perpetuating, or protecting against, 
the consequences of segmentation requires a comprehensive policy approach 
addressing the multitude of factors that affect youth labour market access.3 Our 
analysis illustrates new lines and trajectories in the segmentation of youth labour 
markets along the lines of gender, household and ethnic. These new forms of 
segmentation can, in part, be traced back to some of the effects of household 
patterns of employment and how these affect young people’s opportunities 
in contemporary labour markets. As Rubery (2015) notes, the main thrust of 
labour market policy has failed to recognise the impact upon increasing segmen-
tation of youth, largely by deregulation at the margins of the labour market. 
Unfortunately, the Great Recession has only served to exacerbate these gen-
dered and ethnic lines of segmentation.
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Notes
1 The 29 countries have been grouped as follows: Nordic (DK, FI, NO, SE); English-
speaking (UK, IE); Continental (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, NL); Mediterranean (CY, 
EL, ES, IT, MT, PT); Eastern European (BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SI, 
SK).
2 STYLE: Strategic Transitions for Youth Labour in Europe (www.style-research.eu).
3 To some extent the UK policy on ‘Troubled Families’ could be seen as an example of 
such a ‘linked-up’ approach. This programme, introduced in the UK after the summer 
riots in 2011, attempts to address families facing multiple disadvantages and helps ensure 
that young people from these backgrounds are not ‘left behind’. However, the reputed 
success of this programme has been questioned as being ‘too good to be true’ (Crossley 
2015); and Bawden (2016) claims that ‘cash-strapped councils’ have had an incentive to 
manipulate the evidence to prove their success. Nevertheless, this kind of policy illus-
trates attempts to move towards more targeted approaches to address multiple lines of 
segmentation.
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National models of employment, production and welfare both mediate and 
respond to multiple pressures for change associated with various external and 
internal challenges: increased globalisation, deregulation and financialisation 
of markets, technological change, the ageing of the population and migration 
flows. The analysis of these challenges, their effect ‘in maintaining, reshaping, 
revitalizing or indeed destabilizing national employment models’, as well as 
the interlocking nature of institutions has been at the centre of Jill Rubery’s 
research (Bosch, Lehndorff and Rubery, 2009: 2). The possibility of spillover or 
domino effects from employment to welfare, family and the production spheres 
increases the scope of change and suggests the need for a multifaceted approach 
involving macroeconomic, labour and social reproduction objectives (Rubery, 
2015). 
The Eurozone crisis has rekindled the debate on how to respond to short- 
and long-term change and to the hardships that it produces. The countries 
worse hit by the sovereign debt crises, in particular, have been the targets and 
laboratory of an unprecedented interventionism in the sphere of labour  and 
industrial relations.1 A problem of competitiveness, and specifically of labour 
cost competitiveness, has been diagnosed for their illness, hence the need 
for ‘employment friendly reforms’ to spur productivity and competitiveness. 
Labour and welfare reforms inflicted on, or self-inflicted by, various coun-
tries have been pursued within a deeply recessionary macro-environment. 
Indeed, internal devaluation has become a functional substitute for currency 
devaluation, and austerity-oriented fiscal policies are used to complement and 
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reinforce the structural reforms. Consequently, the landscape of industrial 
relations has deeply changed and the ‘European social acquis’, rooted in social 
dialogue and public systems of social protection, is everywhere in retreat. A 
‘toxic austeritarism’ (Hyman, 2015) ‘has left little or no margin for domestic 
democratic institutions and social actors, downgraded from political to execu-
tive subjects’ (Leonardi, 2016).
The long crisis and the policies that have been implemented in response raise 
questions that transcend a single country to encompass the European institu-
tions. This chapter addresses two issues, analysed from the point of view of the 
Italian case. The first, relates to the increasing inequality in the labour market. 
As observed by Rubery (2015: 2), mainstream economics’ failure to find a 
‘direct correlation between regulation and macro employment performance 
and growth … changed the terms from performance to social justice issues … 
[E]mployment regulation was still considered harmful because it favoured insid-
ers over outsiders.’ In Italy, the increasing dualism of the labour market has been 
depicted as an insider–outsider problem, created by the ‘excessive’ protection 
of standard employment relations. Consequently, the recent legislation aimed at 
reducing the regulation of the labour market has been presented as a necessary 
step towards greater equality. The second issue relates to the search for viable 
models to address the challenges of technological change in a globalised and 
competitive environment. Here again, the decade-long stagnation of Italian pro-
ductivity has been ascribed to the insufficient flexibility and excessive protection 
of the labour market. This chapter also contrasts the short-term competitive-
ness effects of austerity/flexibility policies with the long-term efficiency effects 
deriving from a greater commitment of both the employer and the employed 
workforce. The view of social policy as a productive factor is embedded in the 
conviction that sustained growth and decent working conditions are the result 
of the interactions between macro-policies and labour outcomes, and great 
risks can spring from neglecting the systemic consequences of generalised, pan-
European austerity.
The construction of a dualistic labour market
We can distinguish three phases in the development of Italy’s labour policies 
in recent decades. In the first, in the early 1990s, agreements were targeted 
mainly at achieving wage flexibility; in the second, from the mid-1990s to the 
mid-2000s, legislation aimed at increasing labour market flexibility through the 
liberalisation of a wide range of atypical contracts; since then, and especially 
since 2011, the legislation turned to target the ‘dualism’ in the labour market.
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Until the outbreak of the crisis, labour market reforms in Italy had mostly 
targeted new hirings (the so-called flexibility at the margin), while the firing 
rules for regular contracts were left substantially untouched. This policy was 
originally justified as a means of promoting the participation of youth and other 
hard-to-employ to the labour market (Rubery and Piasna, 2016). Between 1995 
and 2007, despite a mediocre rate of growth of GDP, more than 3 million jobs 
were created (what has been called growth-less job creation), with flexible 
employment, characterised by fixed-term contracts, involuntary part-time and 
bogus self-employed, accounting for most of it. On top of these, and often inter-
mingled with them, Italy also witnessed a great number of informal workers in 
the shadow economy. New hiring has taken place mainly through temporary 
work contracts, and the share of youth in temporary contracts is significant 
(Figure 14.1). At the end of 2012, only 21 per cent of new hiring contracts were 
open-ended, while 58 per cent were fixed-term, 9 per cent collaboration con-
tracts,2 3 per cent apprenticeship contracts and other precarious contracts (tem-
porary work agencies) accounted for the remaining 9 per cent (Table 14.1). In 
an economic slowdown, precarious workers are the first to be made redundant, 
though workers with an open-ended contract are far from shielded. 
Figure 14.1 Share of temporary employment in total Italian employment by age group, 
1998–2005 (%)
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Since the mid-2000s, labour policies moved in somewhat contradictory ways; 
they aimed at reducing the dualism in the labour market by reducing the firing 
costs of open-ended contracts and promoting, through regulation and  subsidies, 
the conversion of certain types of atypical contracts, while, at the same time, 
favouring the growth of other non-standard forms of employment.
Under the concurrent pressure of the markets and EU governors,3 the Monti 
government launched the first attack on the protection of regular employment. 
The Legge Fornero (Law 92/2012) of 2012 aimed at addressing labour market 
dualism by acting on the firing and hiring costs of different types of contracts. 
On the one hand, it reduced the cost of individual dismissal, weakening the 
effectiveness of the ‘Articolo 18’ of Law 300/1970, which regulates firing con-
ditions on open-ended contracts;4 on the other, it tried to limit employers’ use 
of ‘false’ self-employment and ‘collaboration contracts’ and to create incentives 
for the greater use of apprenticeship contracts. Finally, it reformed the system 
of unemployment benefits, extending the coverage to some forms of precarious 
contracts.
In 2014, Law 78/2014 (Decreto Poletti) removed the need to justify the use of 
fixed-term contracts, while still maintaining some limitations: a firm could not 
have more than 20 per cent of its total workforce on a fixed-term contract,5 and 
each contract could only be renewed for a maximum of three years. 
Finally, in 2015, the Renzi government adopted two different policies that 
also aimed to reduce labour market dualism and foster ‘regular’ employment by 
acting on two fronts: lowering firing costs of open-ended contracts and provid-
ing a generous subsidy for permanent hiring. Firstly, a broad-ranging enabling 
law (the so-called Jobs Act) involved the regulation governing dismissals, sim-
plification of contracts and labour law procedures, reformed unemployment 
Table 14.1 Hiring and firing by type of contract, 2012
Hiring Firing
Number % Number %
Premanent contracts 1,788,830 20.9 2,202,341 25.3
Temporary contracts 5,011,019 58.4 4,664,905 53.6
Apprenticeships 277,496 3.2 211,828 2.4
Collaboration contracts 756,582 8.8 832,111 9.6
Other 745,247 8.7 791,384 9.1
Total 8,579,174 100.0 8,702,569 100.0
Notes: ‘Other’ includes agency contracts and job on call also in the public sector.
Source: ILO (2015).
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benefits and active and passive labour market policies, and improved reconcili-
ation between work and family life. The Jobs Act abolished workers’ reinstate-
ment rights in case of dismissal (except for discriminatory reasons), replacing 
it with a monetary compensation (amounting to two months’ pay per year of 
work, reduced to half for firms with less than 15 employees). It introduced a 
new standard open-ended contract for new hires, which reduces the level and 
the uncertainty of firing costs for all new permanent contracts in firms with 
at least 15 employees (the ‘contratto a tutele crescenti’, or ‘graded security 
contract’). Finally, while eliminating some forms of atypical contracts, such 
as project work contracts, it increased the maximum amount of revenues 
that can be received in vouchers from €5,000 to €7,000 per year, thereby 
de facto incentivising the most precarious type of contract (see Chapter 8). 
Secondly, a measure passed in the 2015 Budgetary Law provides a sizeable 
temporary rebate of non-wage labour costs (up to €8,060 per year for three 
years) to new permanent hiring of workers who, in the previous semester, did 
not hold an open-ended position. These incentives are not targeted to specific 
groups of workers, nor are they contingent upon firm-level net job creation, 
that is, firms can use the subsidy to convert a temporary contract into a per-
manent one. 
Assessment of the success of the new law is necessarily still preliminary. 
Using microdata for Veneto, Sestito and Viviano (2016) conclude that the 
two measures contributed to double the monthly rate of conversion of fixed-
term jobs into permanent positions. However, around 40 per cent of the new 
total gross hires with open-ended contracts occurred because of the incen-
tives, whereas 5 per cent can be attributed to the new firing regulations. Fana 
and colleagues (2016) also find that the increase in permanent contracts was 
mostly due to the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. 
Excluding transformations, new permanent contracts (net of dismissals) were 
only 20 per cent of the total contracts activated during the first nine months of 
2015, with a high share of involuntary part-time contracts. A dominant effect 
of fiscal  incentives, especially for big firms, is also detected by the analysis of 
the Central Statistical Office (Istat, 2016: 190–3). If the new firing rules made 
firms less reluctant to offer permanent job positions to yet untested work-
ers, the opportunity of benefiting from the incentives in case of a conversion 
certainly boosted temporary hiring, which came to be concentrated at the 
very end of the period set for claiming the subsidy. The high rate of subsidised 
conversions also raises the issue of the size of the dead-weight loss implicit in 
these subsidies.
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The insider–outsider debate
Flexibility policies were first advocated as the necessary response to the low 
job creation of the 1980s. In those years, ‘jobless growth’ and ‘Eurosclerosis’ 
were imputed to the rigidity of the labour market. Deregulation, it was argued, 
would lead to a net creation of jobs. Similarly, ten years later, the ‘growth-less 
job creation’ was credited to the labour market reforms. A lively debate on the 
employment effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) has accompa-
nied these reforms. If the 1994 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Jobs Study (OECD, 1994) concluded that job creation 
relies on efficient markets, free from institutional constraints, ten years later the 
2004 OECD Employment Outlook drew more cautious conclusions. Noticing 
the general tendency of labour policies towards ‘easing the recourse to tem-
porary forms of employment while leaving existing provisions for regular or 
permanent employment practically unaltered’ (OECD, 2004: 63), the report 
concluded that the net impact on employment is ambiguous. In fact, EPL leads 
to two opposite effects: it reduces exits from the labour market while making 
entry more difficult. Thus, it concluded, employment cannot increase without 
economic growth, but differences in the strictness of EPL for regular and tem-
porary jobs respectively might lead to the rise in the incidence of temporary 
work for groups in a weaker labour market position, such as youth, prime-age 
women and low-skilled workers. In view of this, facilitating the use of tempo-
rary employment while not changing EPL for regular employment may aggra-
vate labour market duality and negatively affect the career and productivity of 
those trapped in temporary jobs. 
Of the two options to reduce dualism – increase protections for tempo-
rary workers or reduce protections for regular employment – eventually the 
latter prevailed in Italy. With dualism worsening, the debate about increasing 
inequalities in the labour market intensified. Various arguments, ranging from 
the insider–outsider to the intergenerational conflict, have converged on attrib-
uting the precariousness of the ‘outsiders’ to the protection of the ‘insiders’ and 
have thus been instrumental in orienting the policies towards the reduction of 
protection. After decades of policies aimed at reducing the supposed rigidity 
of the labour market, compounded by austerity measures implemented in the 
crisis, the increasing precariousness of ever-greater segments of the workforce 
produced by these policies has been used to argue for the need to eliminate the 
excessive protection of insiders that unfairly discriminates against outsiders.
Yet was the Italian labour market as rigid as commonly maintained? The 
indicators of labour turnover have never validated the official accounts of an 
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overly rigid Italian labour market. Research on turnover had demonstrated the 
co-existence of a very high index of turnover with a high share of job positions 
with long tenure. Contini and Trivellato (2005) argued that this apparently con-
tradictory evidence could be explained by the dichotomy between two different 
models of employment – extremely mobile and extremely stable workers – that 
were combined in the index. While the youth account for most of the turnover, 
there are also plenty of workers in other age brackets in perennial flux. Among 
them, women, low-educated people and employees in small firms, low-tech 
segments of the value chain or traditional reservoirs of irregular work (agricul-
ture, commerce, construction, services). These workers experience long spells 
of unemployment, often longer than the periods spent in employment. Core 
workers’ protection had to do more with professional skills, experience and the 
firm’s specific capabilities, making them valuable to the firm, than with EPL. As 
labour market segmentation theory has long made clear, multiple factors lead to 
the differentiation of employment conditions and rewards and it is worker–capi-
tal divisions, rather than employment regulation, which are the main source of 
inequalities in the labour market (Rubery and Piasna, 2016).
With increasing competition from low-cost countries in ‘mature’ products, 
and the swift path of technological change, even core male workers employed 
in sectors no longer protected from competition have come to be increas-
ingly exposed to the risk of dismissal and unemployment (Istat, 2016: 129). 
Meanwhile, the protection of regular employment has been gradually eroded. An 
indication of the decreasing degree of rigidity of the labour market is provided by 
the OECD index of EPL (to be interpreted with caution owing to doubts about 
the reliability of the indicator). The index for Italy fell from 3.82 in 1990 to 2.26 
in 2013, and compares not too unfavourably with an index of 2 for Germany and 
3 for France (Table 14.2). Firing difficulties, which have a great weight in the 
indicator, have been further reduced in 2015 (as explained in the previous sec-
tion). Moreover, thanks to a policy approach of levelling-down equalisation, in 
Table 14.2 Employment protection legislation (OECD index), selected countries 1990; 
1992; 2007; 2013
Italy France Germany Spain Portugal Greece
1990 3.82 2.7 2.92 3.65 4.1 3.62
1999 3.19 2.98 2.34 2.8 3.7 3.62
2007 2.38 3.05 1.93 2.68 3.49 2.62
2013 2.26 3 2 2.31 2.5 2.07
Source: OECD (2017).
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2013 the index no longer indicates the existence of dualism in the Italian labour 
market (Table 14.3). The striking difference with Germany may be due to both 
the reduced protection of regular employment in Italy and the great increase in 
the precariousness of the secondary labour market in Germany.
What can be concluded from the results achieved by labour market deregu-
lation in terms of employment and growth? One tenet of labour market seg-
mentation theory is that flexibility is much more easily achieved by policies that 
support growth, when job opportunities are plenty and workers move between 
jobs. Data on gross labour turnover (hiring and firing) confirm this proposition. 
Labour turnover in Italy was high at the beginning of the last decade before the 
reforms that tackled insiders’ protection, but in fact fell during the crisis when 
turnover mostly involved dismissals (Table 14.4). Once dismissed, adult work-
ers face greater difficulties in re-entering the labour market (Simonazzi and 
Villa, 2007). The absence of effective retraining and activation policies makes 
these workers subject to the loss of human and social capital, increasing the risk 
of long-term unemployment; in 2015, 68.4 per cent of total adult unemployed 
were unemployed for more than 12 months, compared to 55.5 per cent of 
unemployed youth (Istat, 2016: 133). The absence of a correlation between 
labour market flexibility and macroeconomic employment performance raises 
the question of the social and long-term (growth) effects of these policies.
Inequalities, unemployment, precariousness, poverty
Job quality 
The deep and prolonged economic crisis has taken a toll on the labour mar-
kets, with a fall in employment rates, dramatic increases in unemployment 
Table 14.3 Index of protection for open-ended contracts (EPRC) and ratio of temporary 
contracts (EPT) over EPRC, 2013
Italy France Germany Spain Portugal Greece
EPRC 2.79 2.82 2.98 2.28 2.69 2.41
EPT/EPRC 0.97 1.33 0.59 1.39 0.87 1.21
Notes: Employment protection for regular contracts (EPRC); Employment protection for temporary 
contracts (EPT). 
Source: OECD (2017).
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and its duration. Between 2007 and 2014 unemployment doubled, from 6 to 
13 per cent, only partly mitigated by a massive use of short-time schemes and 
wage redundancy funds. Employment and inactivity rates are now among the 
worst of the whole EU. While employment conditions have worsened especially 
for youth, deterioration is common to all age groups. The unemployment rate, 
which has increased across all age groups, reached a peak of 35.5 per cent in 
the 15–24 age bracket and is 9.7 per cent for the traditional male breadwinner 
category (the age bracket 35–49) (Table 14.5). The number of NEETs is also 
especially worrying: 2.3 million aged 15–29 in 2015, 96 per cent of which are 
in the age bracket 18–29. Their share increased from 17.7 per cent in 2008 to 
25 per cent in 2013 (down to 22.3 per cent in the second quarter of 2016) (Istat, 
2016b: 115). 
The crisis has also affected those who remained in employment, remarkably 
worsening the quality of existing jobs and the level of pay. The OECD has devel-
oped a framework to assess the quality of jobs, structured around three main 
dimensions: earnings quality, labour market security and quality of the working 
environment. It is no wonder that all programme/crisis countries – Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain – do 
relatively badly in two or all of the three dimensions of job quality, and none 
performs well in at least one of these dimensions (OECD, 2016). Conversely, 
Germany and the Nordic countries are among the best performers (at least two 
out of three dimensions). Outcomes on job quality across socio-economic groups 
Table 14.4 Gross turnover (hiring and firing/quitting) by firm size and region – Italy, 
manufacturing







2003 29.9 34.2 30.6 27.4 25.8 23.8 31.5 30.0 34.2
2004 26.1 25.5 27.7 24.8 25.7 20.9 29.2 28.3 37.2
2005 24.0 25.4 24.4 23.2 22.3 18.3 24.7 26.7 35.3
2006 25.7 26.5 27.0 24.3 23.8 20.7 26.1 27.7 37.0
2007 26.9 26.1 29.8 27.5 24.2 22.0 28.6 30.3 38.8
2008 24.1 23.5 25.5 23.2 23.3 20.1 24.9 26.4 34.6
2009 17.5 17.4 19.2 17.0 16.1 15.2 17.0 17.8 28.0
2010 18.8 18.9 20.4 19.4 16.5 15.9 19.4 18.2 27.7
2011 18.5 19.3 19.7 17.7 16.7 15.5 18.4 18.2 27.3
2012 17.2 17.8 18.8 15.4 15.8 14.2 16.5 18.3 27.3
2013 16.1 16.4 16.8 14.0 16.2 13.0 16.2 16.5 25.2
Source: Checchi and Leonardi (2015) on Bank of Italy data.
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confirm the evidence on labour market inequalities. The worse off are youth and 
low-skilled workers. Not only do they have the poorest performance in terms of 
employment and unemployment rates, but they also have the worst outcomes 
with respect to job quality: lower earnings quality, considerably higher labour 
market insecurity and higher job strain (especially the low-skilled).
The dynamics of wage inequality depicted in the OECD job quality index 
must be seen against a context of falling ‘average’ earnings. Additionally, most 
of the jobs lost during the crisis were predominantly low-paid (Istat, 2015: 157). 
These two factors result in a deceptive increase in earnings quality. In effect, like 
all other ‘crisis’ countries (but also the UK, see Blundell et al., 2014), between 
2010 and 2016 Italy suffered a reduction in real wages (Figure 14.2). An impor-
tant factor has been the increasingly low levels of entry wages for newly hired 
young workers, due to the diffusion of atypical and apprenticeship contracts for 
first-job seekers (Figure 14.3). There is a persistent wage penalty, of the order 
of 11 per cent, associated with working under a temporary contract. Checchi 
Table 14.5 Employment and unemployment rates by sex, area, age, citizenship and 
education, 2016
Employment rate (%) Unemployment rate (%)
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Total 57.7 66.9 48.5 11.5 10.6 12.8
Area
North 66.3 73.8 58.8 7.4 6.5 8.6
Centre 62.3 70.6 54.3 10.4 9.4 11.6
South 44.0 56.1 32.1 19.3 17.6 22.1
Age
15–34 40.6 46.3 34.7 21.4 20.2 22.9
15–24 17.2 19.5 14.7 35.5 35.1 36.1
25–34 61.0 70.2 51.7 16.9 15.4 18.9
35–49 72.8 83.7 62.1 9.7 8.3 11.5
50–64 58.3 70.0 47.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
Citizenship
Italian 57.5 66.5 48.4 11.1 10.4 12.2
Foreign 59.5 71.1 49.3 15.0 13.0 17.4
Education
Primary 43.1 55.3 29.7 15.8 14.4 18.5
Diploma 64.6 73.9 55.4 10.8 9.4 12.5
Graduate 78.6 83.6 74.8 6.2 5.0 7.2
Source: Istat (2016b).
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Figure 14.2 Development of real wages, 2010–16 (%)
















































































































































Figure 14.3 Relative wage of 30 year olds to average wage – Italy (%)
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and Leonardi (2015) have estimated that it mostly affects workers in the two 
bottom quintiles, while workers in the top quintile are less penalised. Moreover, 
this penalty is halved when individual fixed effects are included, suggesting that 
labour market flexibility increases wage differentials partly by sorting individuals 
according to their unobservable characteristics and partly by changing the wage 
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for less-qualified occupations. This indicates that there are at least two types of 
temporary workers: the ‘professionals’, who take advantage of temporary con-
tracts to increase their market power by enlarging the set of potential employers; 
and the ‘precarious’, who do not succeed in achieving a permanent job because 
they do not have the abilities demanded in the labour market. This same differ-
ence determines the probability to move out of a temporary contract to an open-
ended one. Checchi and Leonardi conclude that whenever a legislative reform 
expands the share of workers under temporary contracts then, other things being 
constant, an increase in earnings inequality should be expected. 
Welfare state retrenchment
The deregulation of the labour market (‘flexibility at the margin’) has been 
accompanied by partial reform of the so-called ‘shock absorber’ systems. A 
truly universal unemployment benefit scheme and income-support schemes are 
still in the making in Italy. The existing unemployment benefit system is based 
on two pillars: the unemployment benefit (divided into ordinary and reduced 
contributions) and the cassa integrazione (a short-time work scheme that keeps 
the worker attached to the firm, divided into ordinary, extraordinary and excep-
tional). The Fornero reform improved the first pillar, addressing two structural 
issues of the unemployment insurance benefits system: the low level and the 
short duration of benefits for workers on standard contracts, and the low cover-
age of workers with non-standard contracts. For workers on standard contracts 
the reform increased the replacement rate to 75 per cent of the previous wage 
and the maximum duration to 12 months (and to 18 months for those over 55), 
leaving unchanged at 52 full-time weeks the eligibility conditions. For workers 
on non-standard contracts, the replacement rate was increased to 75 per cent of 
the wage for a maximum duration of half the number of weeks of contributions. 
Eligibility criteria were reduced to 13 weeks of contributions in the previous 12 
months. As a result, the number of workers covered increased by about 800,000 
between November 2012 and November 2013. Nevertheless, the reform left 
other aspects of the system unchanged, such as the lack of social assistance avail-
able to jobseekers who have exhausted the eligibility period for unemployment 
benefits (ILO, 2015). As for the second pillar, the reform slightly revised eligi-
bility conditions and involved the social partners, through the bilateral funds, in 
the funding of the benefit extended to all firms with more than 15 employees. 
The Jobs Act further revised the unemployment insurance system, setting new 
conditions for the renamed unemployment benefit (NASPI), a new provision 
(ASDI) to cover unemployed workers in distressed economic conditions who 
had exhausted the period (up to 18 months) of normal unemployment benefit, 
280 Making work more equal
and a special benefit covering atypical workers (‘collaborators’, as defined in 
Note 2) (DIS-COLL).6 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) have always had a secondary role 
in Italy. With the crisis, the traditional difficulty in running efficient Public 
Employment Services (PES) and activation programmes for jobseekers has 
proved challenging. Thus Italy prioritised hiring incentives, which are easy to 
implement, even though in most cases the literature identifies significant dead-
weight losses associated with this type of programme. Consequently, most 
ALMPs consisted in introducing and/or modifying the eligibility requirements 
for employment subsidies, according to what were deemed the categories of 
worker in most need of employment opportunities at that particular time (ILO, 
2015: 61–70). These policies contrast with empirical results suggesting that 
employability of dismissed workers increasingly relies on both training and 
availability of jobs. The same report emphasises the point that no ALMP, no 
matter how efficient, can work if the economy is not growing. Since reforms 
in the labour market have been accompanied by draconian cuts in the budget, 
little room has been left for compensatory, active or passive, labour policies or 
welfare expenditure. Budget constraints were added to the notorious scarce 
efficiency of PES in reallocating labour towards equally scarce job opportunities. 
In an ever-deteriorating macroeconomic context, increased flexibility could 
do little to counteract the massive unemployment created by the crisis and the 
subsequent austerity policies. That is why, starting from these premises, it is 
difficult to speak of ‘security’. 
Pension reform
At the peak of the crisis, the Monti government also implemented a pension 
reform, which increased the minimum retirement age to 66 years, eliminat-
ing all forms of flexibility. Having fixed the calculation of pension benefits 
strictly according to contributions paid, it introduced an unnecessary rigidity 
with regard to retirement age. Precipitously and rigidly applied to respond 
to the urgent need to reduce spending and appease the financial markets (and 
the EU and German authorities), this reform left several short-term and long-
term problems open. If, according to international assessment (International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank), after the Fornero reform the Italian pen-
sion system had become the most rigorous of EU systems, it was also the least 
adequate in terms of pension income and the most ineffectual with respect to the 
broader objectives of productivity, growth and employment. Two main trade-
offs, which derive from the interrelation between the pension system, the labour 
market and the welfare state, threaten its long-term sustainability. Firstly, by 
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increasing the retirement age among older workers, the reform had a negative 
effect on youth unemployment (Figure 14.4). By slowing down the substitution 
between workers of different ages, this might have had an impact also on pro-
ductivity, if young workers are more attuned with new technologies. Secondly, 
by allowing atypical workers with low pay and fragmented work careers to be 
inadequately covered, the new contribution-based system has set in motion a 
‘pension time bomb’ when these people reach retirement age. This problem is 
especially severe for women, who are more exposed to the risk of fragmentation 
of careers because of a poor reconciliation policy (Simonazzi, 2015). Subsequent 
laws attempted to respond to these problems by gradually extending the cover-
age to larger sections of atypical workers and re-introducing some flexibility in 
retirement age.
The interaction between the crisis and the labour and pension reforms has 
produced conflicting effects on the female employment rate. While occupa-
tional segregation sheltered women (relative to men) from the first effects of the 
crisis, subsequently female employment has suffered the effects of the fiscal crisis 
Figure 14.4 Employment by age and gender, 2004–15 (%)
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because of an over-representation in public sector employment. While the pen-
sion reform forcibly sustained the employment rate of older women, overall the 
crisis has brought the slowly increasing long-term trend of the female participa-
tion rate (which is still far behind the European average) to a halt.
To conclude, since the crisis growth eluded expectations, unemployment 
grew as did precariousness and insecurity. Income inequality and poverty 
increased. Social expenditure and social investment (education, research and 
development, health and care, training and active labour market policies) have 
all been drastically curtailed because of the fiscal compact. While real earnings 
stalled and mobility among income classes may not have decreased substantially, 
intergenerational mobility – measured across occupational groups (Simonazzi 
and Barbieri, 2016) and income groups (Franzini and Raitano, 2013) –  has 
certainly decreased. The next section briefly discusses the long-term impact on 
growth.
Flexibility, productivity and growth
Structural reforms have their roots in the approach of mainstream economic 
theory that links the market mechanism with efficiency and productivity. 
According to this view, the problem with ‘crisis countries’ is a lack of cost 
competitiveness owing to excessive wage and labour protection. In 2004, the 
OECD Employment Outlook (OECD, 2004: 63) argued that a reasonable 
degree of EPL ‘may foster long-term employment relationships, thus promot-
ing workers’ effort, co-operation and willingness to be trained, which is posi-
tive for aggregate employment and economic efficiency’. However, the 2016 
OECD Employment Outlook (OECD, 2016) turned this argument on its head; 
well-designed structural reforms of product and labour markets may entail 
costly adjustments in the short run, but in the long-run the greater productivity 
of a more efficient allocation of labour will prevail again. Micro-economic fac-
tors buttress the long-run relationship (for a survey of the empirical research, 
see Boeri et al., 2015). In fact, by increasing firms’ costs of dismissal, employ-
ment protection has a negative impact on productivity at the firm level: it 
lowers workers’ effort (poor work performance or absenteeism) because there 
is less threat of lay-off, and it discourages firms from experimenting with new 
technologies with higher mean returns but also higher variance. The report 
concludes that the high employment and wage losses associated with greater 
flexibility in regulation governing the dismissal of workers on regular (open-
ended) contracts would be reversed in a few years. The short-run costs are 
claimed to be less acute in countries with significant labour market dualism 
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(measured as the share of fixed-term employment in total employment), and 
they would be smaller if reforms are implemented in the upswing, though it is 
in a depression that they are politically more enforceable (OECD, 2016). This 
view has legitimised the inclusion of structural reforms as a pre-condition in any 
agreements between the European Commission (EC) and programme or crisis 
member countries.
The results of these studies have not gone unchallenged. The short-run costs 
have been re-assessed and found to be neither small nor transitory, even for 
flexible labour markets such as the US one (Autor et al., 2016). The analysis of 
long-term effects of labour reforms on productivity and growth has been chal-
lenged on two grounds. Firstly, the model is based on the hypothesis of a smooth 
and efficient reallocation of labour. The assumption of a  (full) employment 
equilibrium pre-empts any serious consideration of the costs  of adjustment. 
Secondly, a truly dynamic analysis must consider the effects of  employment 
relations on the factors determining innovation and competition. Specifically, 
competition increasingly relies on the quality and complexity of products, 
rather than on their price (Simonazzi et al., 2013). To be successful, firms must 
innovate their products, processes and organisation. To this end, a skilled and 
cooperative workforce is as essential as the firm’s commitment to invest in 
its labour force. If arm’s-length labour relations can make cost competitive-
ness profitable in the short run, this strategy may not pay in the long run. An 
increasing stream of literature has supported the view that labour market insti-
tutions that favour cooperation between workers and firms prove essential in 
sustaining growth and innovation (Addison et al., 2015; Fana et al., 2016).7 The 
Italian experience provides support to this view, even if on the negative side. 
Concern for ‘excessive’ regulation of the labour market has diverted attention 
from the structural problems at the  origins of the stagnation of the Italian econ-
omy. Deregulation of the labour market has been preferred to an alternative 
strategy based on investing in people in combination with an industrial policy 
aimed at strengthening and upgrading the industrial structure. The result has 
been slow growth and  stagnant productivity, a segmented labour market and 
an impoverished workforce. 
Deregulation and austerity policies in Italy have impacted on macroeconomic 
performance also via their effects on income inequality. The unions’ weakened 
bargaining power has resulted in low or negative real wages. More decentralised 
and individualised wage settings have increased wage dispersion and polari-
sation. Together, these factors have affected the rate of growth of domestic 
demand (consumption and investment). With the fiscal compact barring public 
expenditures, only exports have been left to counter the recession. By sustain-
ing the share of wages and reducing inequality, industrial relations targeting a 
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more equal society might have contributed to economic sustainability, thereby 
sustaining growth. 
Conclusions
Since the crisis, within the European Monetary Union framework, austerity 
measures and structural reforms (i.e. labour and wage flexibility) have been the 
only instruments admitted to address macroeconomic imbalances. Drastic cuts 
in social investment and ‘internal devaluations’ have magnified the dualism in 
the labour market and increased inequality and poverty. The Italian experience 
does not support the view that, if sufficiently flexible, labour markets adjust 
quickly to shocks, so that, in the long run, the benefits of flexibility outweigh the 
short-run adjustment costs. 
No degree of labour flexibility can provide an adequate response to the mul-
tiple challenges represented by technological, organisational and social changes. 
These changes call for coordinated responses in the production, employment and 
social spheres. The diverse experiences of European countries over the recent 
decades highlight the role of social policy as a productive factor. In Sweden, 
technological change has been tackled within a cooperative climate in industrial 
relations; new forms of work organisation and generous policies favouring the 
upgrading of skills and the improvement in the quality of work have turned the 
challenge of technical change into an opportunity (Anxo, 2016). Conversely, 
Germany seems to have co-opted only one part of the labour force, leaving a 
large proportion of low-skilled or fragile workers behind (Lehndorff, 2015). 
Finally, in the Southern European countries, the structural reforms imple-
mented in the crisis have eroded labour rights and weakened labour unions, 
reinforcing a ‘low road’ of wage cuts and precarious work that has priced out 
any alternative attempt of profiting from technological innovation. Wage mod-
eration and low wages could not counter the effects of productivity decline; on 
the contrary, they are at the root of the productivity problem (Ciccarone and 
Saltari, 2015; Tronti, 2013).
This chapter has argued in favour of a different model in which unions, 
firms and the state can interact to devise a long-term industrial policy capable 
of fostering those organisational changes and those patterns of innovation that 
better respond to a shared social model. This calls for a complete reboot of the 
European and national approaches towards macroeconomic, labour and social 
policies.
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Notes
1 See Schulten and Muller (2014) for an analysis of labour market deregulation policies in 
the EU.
2 ‘These contractual arrangements … provide a contractual framework for individu-
als who are not formally employees of the firm and yet provide their regular working 
services (material or immaterial – i.e. consultants) to firms that often utilize them as 
normal employees. Compulsory pension and other social contributions are lower for 
these workers, which makes their labour costs lower than those of regular employees. 
As a result, many firms make great use of this type of arrangement’ (ILO, 2015: 33).
3 See the confidential letter sent on 5 August 2011 by European Central Bank (ECB) 
President Jean-Claude Trichet and his designated successor, Bank of Italy Governor 
Mario Draghi, to the Italian head of government, demanding fiscal tightening and sweep-
ing reforms before the ECB stepped into the market to ease mounting pressure on Italian 
bonds (Il Sole 24 Ore, http://24o.it/eHYLu).
4 This law protected workers from invalid lay-offs, requiring reinstatement in several 
cases. Law 92/2012 weakened this protection but did not completely abolish it. For a 
considerable set of cases, in fact, both the obligation of recourse to the courts in case of 
disputes over a dismissal and the possibility of workers’ reinstatement were preserved.
5 Specific exceptions permitted by the law and sectoral collective agreements can allow 
deviation from this rule.
6 For detailed information, see: http://www.nuovi-lavori.it/index.php/sezioni/504-
jobs-act-cambia-i-sussidi-di-disoccupazione?highlight=WyJzdXNzaWRpIiwiZGlzb2Nj
dXBhemlvbmUiXQ. 
7 Differences in systems of innovations and industrial relations can explain differences in 
empirical results. For instance, it is argued that in the US skills are scouted mostly in 
the market, while in the European systems they are chiefly nurtured within the firm. 
This difference may explain why the empirical literature has found that firms’ innovative 
dynamics are associated with centralised bargaining systems in the European economies 
(Addison et al., 2015) and with decentralised bargaining mechanisms and flexible labour 
markets in the USA (Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). See Fana and colleagues 
(2016) for a review.
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15 
Uncertainty and undecidability in the 
contemporary state: the dualist and 
complex role of the state in Spanish 




When discussing the state and labour regulations, the debate tends to focus on 
the role of the law. From a sociological, or politico-sociological, perspective it 
is often the case that we like to complement such an approach with a greater 
sensitivity to other forms of representation at the level of the state, such as the 
role of ‘social dialogue’ and the role of the various state entities and authori-
ties such as labour inspectors. There is a tendency sometimes to see the state 
as one factor in an array of social and institutional relationships, but this tends 
to obscure the more complex role of the state. In addition, the interests of 
the state and the way it aligns to specific social actors can also be much more 
complex and even contradictory, especially in terms of balancing economic and 
political imperatives when it comes to questions of efficiency and legitimacy 
(Offe, 1984). The state is, as we know, not merely the political arm of some 
dominant economic and social elites (although it can be), but a complex and 
even contradictory space, an ensemble of institutions balancing representative, 
interventionist and institutional dynamics (Jessop, 1982, 2002). The state can 
therefore be seen as ‘a relatively unified ensemble of socially embedded, socially 
regularised, and strategically selective institutions, organisations, social forces, 
and activities organised around (or at least involved in) making collectively 
binding decisions for an imagined political community’ (Jessop, 2002: 40). 
The state can therefore be interpreted, as far as Jessop is concerned, at various 
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levels of activity such as modes of political representation; internal articulation 
of the state apparatus in the forms of modes of intervention and their realisation; 
political projects articulated by different social forces regarding such forms of 
representation and intervention; and broader hegemonic projects that attempt 
to legitimise the state in relation to economy and society (Clark, 2001; Hyman, 
2008; Jessop, 2002: 42; for a further discussion, see MacKenzie and Martínez 
Lucio, 2014). To this extent, the question of coordination of such levels and 
different approaches in public policy and state agencies politically and organisa-
tionally is one we need to be alert to (Crouch, 1993). What is more, the state 
intervenes not just in social spaces but also in ideological ones where specific 
issues, sensibilities and even national debates develop and configure the nature 
and impact of state policies (Locke and Thelen, 2006). Within these social and 
ideological spaces the question of gender and equality is a significant dimension 
which is often missing, but which, when added to any analysis, will allow us 
to evaluate more clearly the extent and failings of labour rights and policy – 
as Jill Rubery and her colleagues’ work points out (Fagan and Rubery, 1996; 
Humphries and Rubery, 1984; Rubery, 2011; Rubery and Fagan, 1995). These 
insights on the ambivalence of regulation and employment relations contribute 
to the approach this chapter takes in terms of looking at the inherent ambiva-
lence in questions of regulation and state policy in relation to different groups of 
workers and social agendas. The ways in which working time, pay systems and 
training are structured needs to be understood in terms of their contradictory 
effects; and while the issue of gender is just a part of this chapter the relevance of 
such studies is that they ask us to focus on different state or regulatory projects 
and how they intertwine and even contradict each other. Meardi and colleagues 
(2016) have similarly argued that a gender-sensitive perspective has enriched 
discussions on the state in labour and employment relations and broadened the 
way in which we seek to evaluate the role of the state across different agendas.1
This approach is important for this chapter because the state in Spain has had 
a series of competing projects and strategies – not to mention narratives – which 
have led to a contradictory set of agendas and developments that have increas-
ingly been at odds and in conflict with each other. Hence, we need to under-
stand the way in which the state has developed and responded to competing 
challenges and issues through its complex and varied institutional make-up. To 
appreciate this, we must also place the question of the state in relation to work 
and employment in a historical context so we can see how these specific issues 
have emerged; how the state has been responsible or not for such issues in the 
past, and if so in what form and through what means; how it has responded to 
them through various projects and different apparatus; and what kinds of narra-
tives and sensibilities, if any, have emerged to frame discussions. This allows us 
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to appreciate the difficulty in clearly delineating any uni-linear or mono-causal 
narrative of the Spanish state as either ‘progressive’ and social or simply ‘regres-
sive’ and neoliberal. In many senses, the state in responding to the develop-
ment of a market-oriented economy and globalisation on the one hand is also 
developing social agendas and political forms of rights at work on the other; 
many observers have stated that the tensions between these since the 1970s 
is quite acute. The challenge of establishing a system of rights and regulations 
after the Francoist regime and of creating organised and established approaches 
to regulation during the decline of the more organised and Keynesian state 
approaches within Europe (Lash and Urry, 1985) has meant that strategic initia-
tives have been important in ensuring – or trying to ensure – the effective reach 
of that regulation. After discussion of this subject, this chapter focuses on the 
way ‘social dialogue’ (a slightly ambivalent term generally, and no less so for 
Spain) from above and forms of intervention and labour market policies from 
below have been used to sustain what has arguably emerged as a fairly success-
ful system at one level, but one which has also presided over extensive labour 
market fragmentation.
Constructing the public sphere in the realm of work and 
employment
In a comparative study of the impact of austerity on Southern European econ-
omies since 2008, Koukiadaki and colleagues (2016) have argued that those 
normally right-wing and/or elite European Commission-based commentators 
and politicians criticising the lack of labour flexibility in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain have tended to ignore the fact that these systems emerged from oppressive 
regimes where you would not have anticipated the eventual levels of institutional 
trust and joint working that has overseen labour relations and work-related 
issues more generally after those periods of authoritarianism. The relative eco-
nomic success that the Spanish system saw in formal terms, and its far-reaching 
coverage in terms of collective bargaining, is something that, in 1981, one 
would not have easily foreseen. In this respect, any analysis has to be mindful of 
the perspectives and predictions that shape our assumptions and views. 
The case of the Spanish state was one where the formal reach and role of state 
organisations were fairly extensive in terms of industry and political life during 
the Francoist dictatorship from the late 1930s to the mid-1970s. The paternal-
istic nature of the state in some sense had a Fordist and authoritarian-regulation 
perspective and was politically supportive of employer interests. However, in 
such a context the detailed organisation of work-related issues – the ordinanzas 
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laborales (labour ordinances) come to mind, as does the state-led system of 
worker representation through the vertical unions – means that the arena of 
workers’ rights consisted of elements which in turn configured some of the later 
legacies of the regime and post-regime period. This curious background became 
a focus of engagement later in relation to state resources for organised labour 
and questions of job classifications. This meant there was a tension between 
the  formal state concern with order in labour relations (pre- and post-1975) 
and the more decentralised realities that existed in the actual arenas of labour 
relations, which had to be resolved in the political domain (Molina, 2006). 
This and the historical context bring to the fore the argument that the state is 
involved in the labour-relations arena in curious ways (Molina, 2014). In fact, 
the role of the political is important in terms of resolving the limitations of the 
state in Spain during certain periods (Martínez Lucio, 1998), yet contrary to 
Molina’s seminal work (see 2014, inter alia) I would emphasise the much more 
contradictory nature of state projects and the vacillation or ambivalence in state 
trajectories as salient factors. In addition, the systematic and strategic features 
of the state seemed limited to a short-term and deferential approach to finance 
capital and to the informal practices of employers (Banyuls and Recio, 2009). 
The state was also relatively inegalitarian in terms of labour market policies and 
inclusiveness for a long period of time – committed to a highly gendered and 
hierarchically paternalist view of work and the role of women (Lopez and Santos 
del Cerro, 2013). 
Yet the first decade or so of the post-Francoist years saw the development 
of a system of formal collective and individual rights which underpinned trade 
union representation and which ensured – what appeared then to be – a robust 
set of constitutional rights for workers through the construction of a collective 
voice, the establishment of majority representation and the power of unions 
through systems of works councils and collective bargaining (for a reflection on 
that earlier period, see Baylos Grau, 1999; see also Alonso, 1999 and 2007). 
The development of election-based works councils (comites de empresa), trade 
union branches (secciones sindicales) and principles of collective bargaining rep-
resentatives contributed to a system which was one of the highest in Europe in 
these terms, although it had one of the lowest memberships. This allowed joint 
regulation to develop, although, as suggested in parts of this chapter, in some 
cases there are question marks over matters of implementation and the role of 
the social content of collective bargaining. 
Within the others spheres of the state, beyond that of the area of the law, 
the development of the public sector has been significantly developed and mod-
ernised in areas such as education and health, with systems of labour relations 
of a more structured nature being enhanced (leaving aside for the time being 
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the question of austerity) in terms of employment stability and collective voice, 
even with the functionary status of the individual employment relation. Public 
sector labour relations have seen relatively important improvements in terms 
of female worker inclusion and the development of what could be termed 
‘good employment relations and conditions’. In this respect, this has been an 
important signalling feature of the role of the state in questions of work and 
employment, although the push to greater flexibility and wage controls since 
2008 has suggested a susceptibility and lack of significant political influence by 
trade unions. What is more, the ongoing extension of the state labour inspec-
torate and its integrated and professional orientation have been seen as a basis 
for the innovation and renewal of state roles (Benavides et al., 2009: Meardi 
et al., 2012; Sesé et al., 2002). The use of elaborate information systems and 
joint working with social partners become features of some aspects of the labour 
inspectorate, although resourcing has always been a concern for the trade unions 
in relation to their views of this aspect of the state, especially when compared to 
certain other European cases (Morillas et al., 2013). In some regional-national 
states (autonomias) within Spain the link between state organisations and social 
partners was more advanced at key points with this space assisting in the coordi-
nation of these different roles.
Nevertheless, a body of collective and individual rights emerged after the 
mid to late 1970s in a context of extensive industrial restructuring and labour 
market change. The role of systematic and detailed policies to withdraw public 
subsidies and restructure key industries was a key feature of the Socialist gov-
ernment’s industrial policies in the 1980s. For some this represented a more 
market-oriented approach to industry and development (Smith, 1998). The 
extent of redundancies was extensive and involved a range of compensation 
programmes and welfare support services which allowed some space for trade 
unions, employers and managers to mitigate some of the negative aspects of the 
changes. The cost of laying people off or making them redundant was relatively 
higher in Spain when compared to other parts of Europe, and, for example, in 
some key industries such as steel there were exceptional payments and support 
provided to specific communities along with retraining initiatives. This restruc-
turing strategy, which was met by various mobilisations and strikes by the trade 
unions, was nevertheless resolved through complex micro-level negotiations 
between the main actors over the conditions and support for restructuring 
(Martínez Lucio, 1998); for some, this has meant that the trade union role has 
been more engaged in facilitating change, as in telecommunications, although 
this led to a labour relations culture of monetising and focusing on the quantita-
tive aspects of change as opposed to the qualitative ones (Rodriguez Ruiz, 2015). 
It also led to labour relations success being viewed as avoiding conflict and 
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facilitating downsizing, albeit with significant remuneration for those affected 
in the more organised and unionised parts of industry and the economy. In 
this respect the nature of ‘social’ dialogue was skewed around particular agen-
das in the 1980s, establishing a particular language of restructuring. The main 
trade unions argued for a broadening of this agenda although the reality of dif-
ferent circumstances forced compromises and a dialogue based on negotiated 
restructuring and downsizing. The state’s key ministries in relation to employ-
ment and industry – working with regional autonomous governments – were 
focused on this reconversion. However, much debate has focused on the cost of 
restructuring and of the payment to workers in high-profile sectors, but as trade 
unions and progressive economists attempted to point out, the nature of the 
welfare state in terms of unemployment payments and social benefits remained 
limited although there were some improvements.2 Working alongside these 
strategies was the state’s conciliation and mediations service, which allowed for 
individual negotiations to take place between workers and their organisations 
during moments of change and thus, while on occasions it did lead to higher 
redundancy payments, also meant that the process could be fast-tracked and 
avoid collective mechanisms of regulation (Martínez Lucio and Blyton, 1995). 
Hence, individual mechanisms of regulation were developed to bypass or ‘paral-
lel’ collective frameworks creating a curious set of dual universes of regulated 
and deregulated realities. 
Another feature of the state which limited the impact of the collective and 
newly formed individual framework of rights at work was the question of the 
under-funded nature and limited reach of the judicial system in relation to work 
and employment issues. The slow and complex nature of the judicial system 
meant that cases concerning health and safety or wages, and not just redundan-
cies, would take considerable time and thus lead to greater use of informal and 
individualised – and non-regulated – solutions between employers and work-
ers. In effect, this would create – perhaps – a form of voluntarism and a more 
deregulated culture even if the system was more regulated in theory. This was 
sustained by an emergent political discourse that steadily consolidated itself by 
extolling the Anglo-Saxon approach to regulation and organisational manage-
ment.3 The current post-2008 austerity crisis also led to a series of reforms in 
terms of collective bargaining that further facilitated management’s opt-out or 
modifications of collective agreements in certain circumstances (see Rocha, 
2014; Fernandez Rodríguez et al., 2016).
In addition, since the 1980s the state has steadily facilitated the development 
of specific forms of temporary and agency contracts. For some this has meant a 
dualist state policy which has led to some of the highest levels of numerical flexi-
bility in Europe and a push to a more fragmented social and economic context in 
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terms of work and employment (Sola et al., 2013).4 For others, this represents 
a situation where Spain has seen the emergence of an insider– outsider labour 
market (Dubin and Hopkin, 2014). Hence, the state has deliberately created 
counter spaces to the collective space of dialogue and regulation it has overseen, 
creating a dualism which has been regulated by different sets of organisations, 
both public and private. For Prosser (2015), Spain is part of a set of countries 
where such changes are as much about liberalisation of labour markets and not 
just dualist tendencies. In terms of gender, ongoing equality measures have not 
been able to stem the dualist traits within the economy in terms of the position 
of women (Lux and Wöhl, 2015). Miguelez and Recio (2010) have pointed to 
the way in which labour market inclusion policies intended to benefit women 
in Spain have not been fully complemented with policies that have created 
more family and working-time support. In terms of social expenditure, the 
country is still below the European norm (Miguelez and Recio, 2010). Even 
before the 2008 austerity crisis, the Spanish labour market was uneven and 
exhibited dualist characteristics. There had been substantially high levels of tem-
porary contracts and there operated an informal dimension of work in sectors 
such as construction and especially agriculture. Young workers and women had 
historically found it difficult to get contracts in permanent core employment 
(Fernandez et al., 2016; Fernández Rodríguez and Martínez Lucio, 2014), and 
these core sectors were not a main employment sector for immigrant workers 
either. Sectors such as agriculture, hospitality, domestic service and construc-
tion sectors have also been prone to higher levels of outsourcing and temporary 
contracting that have created a more precarious experience for migrant work-
ers and the organisation of that employment. In addition, the unemployment 
rate in the past few years for immigrant communities has regularly been above 
40 per cent. Hence any discussion of the labour market needs to account for the 
complex and sometimes contradictory roles of social reproduction (Humphreys 
and Rubery, 1984). The understanding of the role of the state in this regard in 
relation to labour and employment relations needs to be broadened. What is 
more, equal opportunities approaches must be more clearly linked to systems 
of labour market organisation, policy and public discourses (Fagan and Rubery, 
1996; Rubery and Fagan, 1995).
While trade unions have involved groups such as migrants through various 
social inclusion strategies – in some cases with the help of state resources – 
the overall system of welfare and social service support has been constrained 
and uneven. We need to comprehend that these economic and social reg-
ulatory characteristics counter many of the political initiatives that emerge 
from various social and state sources in relation to the politics of inclusion. 
In addition, the extent of ongoing social and organisational hurdles in Spain is 
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very apparent, especially for non-EU migrants due to the sectors they work in 
as well (Solé and Parella, 2003). There are serious mismatches in the labour 
market in terms of immigrants and their skills, for example (Fernández and 
Ortega, 2008). 
To this extent, while the level of collective bargaining coverage was high 
for the past 20 to 30 years, most workers in sectors such as construction and 
agriculture relied on agreements signed at the national and provincial levels, 
with these being known for their limited content and authority in real and 
effective terms (Martínez Lucio, 1998). In addition, the labour market saw 
the entrance of immigrant workers in those sectors which had a weaker tradi-
tion of union organisation and regulatory coverage: hospitality, construction, 
domestic service and retailing (Cachon, 2007). These are sectors that were 
disproportionally affected by the economic crisis in the post-2008 period but 
they were already poorly protected in terms of labour market regulation and 
policy in Spain. 
Yet the irony is that this growing dualism – coupled with the changing social 
character of the labour market in terms of younger workers, women and ethnic 
minorities who are mainly in poorly paid and insecure jobs – has meant that 
the state has had to respond to these forms of development by creating infor-
mational and support services for marginalised workers and intervening on 
questions of training and development alongside social organisations and trade 
unions (see Martínez Lucio and Connolly, 2012). One could argue that trade 
unions have been linked to various state bodies and representative structures, 
although you could not claim that Spain has a strong corporatist system of labour 
relations – however, as discussed later, a debate on this does exist. The link to 
the political parties is much more flexible but relations with the main right and 
left parties up until this time were fluid, with the left relatively united in terms 
of social dialogue (for some, the two majority trade unions had had too strong 
an institutional social dialogue relationship with the right-wing Partido Popular 
from the late 1990s up until 2003): ‘Stronger state–union relations in Spain 
result in more inclusive political action and servicing towards immigrants by 
Spanish unions. By contrast, the multicultural, pluralist nature of the UK labour 
market and public sphere result in British trade unions paying more attention 
to linguistic diversity and community organizing’ (Meardi et al., 2012: 19). Yet 
sectors such as agriculture, hospitality, domestic service and construction have 
been prone to higher levels of outsourcing and temporary contracting, which 
has created a more precarious background for the migrant worker experience 
and labour organisation. The fragmentation of the economy has led to a growing 
disconnect between marginalised workers and trade unions – regardless of the 
institutional efforts of the latter. Increasing government strategies of neoliberal 
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reform, in terms of limiting the workers covered by sector agreements and 
collective bargaining more generally, and of limiting the ability of trade unions 
to challenge management attempts at restructuring over the past decade, have 
undermined the regulation of employment. In effect, the state is caught trying 
to limit and contain some of the problems it creates through the dualist legacy 
it has developed. 
The question of social dialogue in Spain: overcoming 
challenges from above?
While the level of participation in terms of representation at the state level with 
regards to trade unions and employer organisation is not as embedded as that 
of certain Nordic countries, the level of political exchange between the three 
main ‘actors’ (to use the language of the corporatist and neocorporatist debates) 
is intriguing and for some this has represented an important feature of the past 
40 years (Guillén Rodríguez and Gutiérrez Palacios, 2008). The role of social 
dialogue in some form or another has been considered by various commenta-
tors to be a significant feature of Spain’s political dimension and labour relations 
system. In the face of possible conflict – both industrial and political – there has 
been a view that the Spanish system has a capacity for reconciliation and realism 
which tends to underpin the main features of emerging democracy; this could be 
due to the memory of authoritarianism and the civil war, and it may also be due 
to the relatively inclusive nature of the nation-building projects since the early 
1980s with their focus on Europeanisation, modernisation and ‘technological 
progress’. Between 1982 and 2010 (and in some respects up to 2015) the main 
forces of the parliamentary left and right have managed to create a language 
of progress which has been significant in framing national industrial debates, 
and at the heart of such approaches has been the focus on the importance of 
‘democratic consolidation’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Within this context, the 
development of the state has been a key feature of nation-building around the 
main aspects of health, education and transport. There have been question 
marks over the nature of that development and the extent to which it has been 
premised on an uncoordinated and unregulated set of developments in terms of 
the construction and banking industrial sectors; however, in discursive terms, 
the 30 years referenced previously was marked, broadly speaking, by certain 
features of consensus. 
In terms of social dialogue, there is a range of scholars who argue that this 
has been sustained by a flexible but continuous – even if interrupted at times – 
system of national agreements of a neocorporatist nature. Such agreements have 
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varied from tripartite national agreements on wages and employment through to 
specific agreements on questions of training and working conditions (Gonzalez 
Begega, 2015; Guillén Rodríguez and Gutiérrez Palacios, 2008). There has been 
a shift from the tripartite stabilisation and reform-type agreement to the more 
specific and focused agreements between employers and major trade unions, 
with the trade unions managing through their relative power to sustain a system 
of dialogue (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). What is more, trade unions have taken 
to political exchange in terms of institutional roles and regulation as it is less 
of a risk than bargaining over restructuring and change – as was the case in the 
1980s (Molina, 2006) – and this can also guarantee a supportive framework for 
a coordinated collective bargaining system (Molina, 2005). In effect, the focus 
of bargaining has also moved to a supply-side orientation, as it has in issues such 
as training, which we discuss in the next section. 
Hence, there is a curious flexibility to the system of representation and it has 
become an interesting framework for other levels of labour relations regarding 
the role of the political in labour relations (see Hamann, 2011). In fact, during 
the period of austerity and the crisis of joint regulation resulting from the nature 
of labour reforms driven by the right-wing government (2010–15), irrespec-
tive of the presence of short general strikes and political tensions, there have 
been many instances of negotiation and discussion in relation to various aspects 
of labour relations (see Gonzalez Begega et al., 2015) – the system in effect 
‘goes down’ at certain moments, to use a computing term, but it has an ability 
to ‘reboot’ and revert to negotiation quite swiftly according to such authors in 
some cases.
What is more, there are various ministerial and functional forms of tripartite 
engagement in areas such as migration policy and equality. The emergence of 
forums for the discussion of legislation and the use of public resources has been 
a visible part of the state’s structure, which has also reproduced itself at the level 
of regional autonomous states, although the politics and general orientation of 
those levels can limit or enhance such dialogue. The role of the Consejo Economic 
y Social as a national informative and consultative body that includes a range of 
organisations has been important in sustaining forms of dialogue across the dif-
ferent spheres and interests of society, although it was late in being developed by 
various governments. This informational political exchange allows for a range of 
dialogues to exist across various dimensions of the state. 
However, there are views that this system is primarily strategic in orientation 
and not as embedded as would first appear (Martínez Lucio, 1998; Roca, 1991). 
The argument is that the nature of social dialogue has been more about imple-
mentation and less about high-level policy formulation. There has not been any 
consistent engagement in terms of more strategic economic issues or a focus on 
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employment (and within that specific aspects of employment). The more per-
manent or fixed forms of dialogue such as the Consejo Economico y Social have not 
really had the impact some would desire in strategic terms. Some critical voices 
have argued much of this may be due to the nature of social democracy in Spain, 
which has been enthralled with marketisation. There is a view that there is a 
trade-off between strategy and structure – that the collective voice of workers 
has been strategically restricted to specific times and in terms of specific spaces 
(Martínez Lucio, 2000) in order to limit the constraints on the evolution of a 
more globalised and marketised capitalist economy. 
In fact, Molina (2007) has argued that for all the grandiose edifice of ‘concert-
ación’ it has not quite brought in a tightly articulated system of labour relations, 
and, in reality, it is more fragmented than at first imagined. The sector level of 
bargaining has been an uneven feature of Spain and it depends on what sector 
you look at (Fernandez et al., 2016). A recent study by Sola and colleagues 
(2013) has shown ongoing reforms of the labour market and ever greater flex-
ibility and change, which, while in some cases concerted and negotiated, have 
not quite eroded the ever dualist nature of the labour market and work. In part 
this is due to the nature of the left in Spain until recently and the way in which, 
in the 1980s, the Socialists did not institutionally embed labour voice (Sola et 
al., 2013). In effect, the state has used its complex structures to locate labour 
voice in specific ways and in a strategic manner that have allowed broader 
economic debates to be limited and perhaps more closed than some observers 
would prefer to acknowledge. In all fairness, one could argue that trade unions 
and employers’ organisations may have had resource issues when it came to 
playing a fuller role in terms of supporting and implementing public policy 
relevant to them; but any study of the discourse of the years when the Socialists 
were in power would find few references supporting the importance and value 
of organised labour to society, even if the legislation was developed to conform 
with the Western European norm. What is more, the state building project 
was complex since it balanced economic, social and political imperatives in a 
manner that did not emphasise a deep role for organised labour and long-term 
planning. 
The supply-side state and regulation: overcoming the 
challenges from below?
A major feature of the role of the Spanish state in terms of labour relations 
and work more generally has been the emergence of a supply-side state. If the 
space for proactive strategic engagement with social actors such as trade unions 
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was not systematically developed as discussed earlier, it was the question of 
supporting the quality of work and workers in terms of training that was seen 
to be the main focus of regulatory activity and engagement beyond collective 
bargaining. The question of vocational training and general skills development 
has seen the emergence of key tripartite foundations that have been central to 
distributing funds and development training in these areas of activities. Within 
the European Union – especially in some of the most advanced economies and 
political  systems – the role of social dialogue in relation to training has been seen 
as important due to the role social partners can play in developing new forms 
of training and  qualifications relevant to a more service- and information-based 
economy (Stuart, 2007). There are two ways of viewing these types of develop-
ments at the macro and micro level. The first sees this as a new space for the 
rethinking of regulation and organisational roles around the fusing of broader 
economic roles and a new portfolio of flexible work (Castells, 1986). The second 
is more critical and argues that this represents a fragmented and reactive role 
around productivity coalitions – a form of micro-corporatism at best and business 
unionism at worse (Alonso, 2001) – which is about the potential exploitation of 
workers. Nevertheless, within Spain, from the 1990s onwards, the state began to 
expand these new institutional roles in terms of labour relations representation 
and intervention. At the regional and autonomous government level the role of 
local state bodies in facilitating inward investment and longer-term planning did 
see a space for social dialogue in some aspects (Almond et al., 2014). 
The context was clear: in the mid-1990s nearly half the workforce had no 
qualifications (Homs, 1999). The relative exclusion of female and younger 
workers from the core of the labour market also presented a set of challenges for 
the state and the nascent system of labour relations in the 1980s – and through to 
the 1990s as well (Pérez-Díaz and Rodriguez, 1995) – well before the challenge 
of integrating migration during later decades and dealing with training agendas 
at that time. The emergence of new systems of qualification, greater attention 
to access, ongoing support for businesses, and the strategic role of trade unions 
as facilitators and training bodies was key to this formal state response (Rigby, 
1999). Part of the problem is that the employer classes especially at the micro 
level have not been systematic in developing coherent approaches to learning 
and training within their workplaces – particularly smaller firms (Castillo et al., 
2000; Crespo and Sanz 2000) – hence, social dialogue and neocorporatist insti-
tutions have formed a key part of this portfolio of state engagement, especially 
at the sector level (Rigby, 2002), and in relation to new groups of workers such 
as immigrants at the local municipal level as well (Aragon Medina et al., 2009). 
The regional dimension of the state has been equally important in recreating 
such new roles and forms of dialogue. The argument is that the social actors can 
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complement the limited reach of the state and create new spaces for its inter-
vention on such matters, fine-tuning this intervention in relation to changing 
demands, especially beyond the rigid and formal scope of the state’s regulation 
of standard qualifications and learning. This represents a new form of interven-
tion that has drawn the Spanish state into European and supranational dynamics. 
For the trade union movement, it was a chance to enact roles which were not 
voluntarily being developed by employers in many cases, and to support the 
social state and manage specific arenas in the absence of a tradition of coherent 
intervention and attempts to deal with marginalised workers (Martínez Lucio, 
2008). The renewal of trade unionism – its modernisation – was such that it was 
conditioned by this historic obligation due to the limited nature of aspects of the 
state and capital and Spain. 
The problems with this new sphere of regulation and joint intervention have 
nevertheless been significant. Firstly, these new roles bring new questions of 
capacity as wide-ranging projects and agendas are engaged with which require a 
systematic set of structures and internal regulations – let alone cultural changes 
especially within the aims and activities of trade unions. The way in which these 
new functions link to the other roles in such organisations becomes a serious 
question. There is the possibility that the role of the state in learning is inte-
grated but not critically developed, opened up or driven by a more emancipa-
tory view. The agenda is for inclusion into a pre-established system of learning. 
In the UK this has brought significant discussions as to the remit of trade unions 
to deploy public funds for broader and skill-based agendas (see McIlroy and 
Croucher, 2013; Rainbird and Stuart, 2011). Hence the question is not just 
related to Spain but is broader in terms of labour relations. However, questions 
over the use or regulation of state funds themselves are a matter which has led 
trade unions to limit their engagement with such post-industrial shifts in terms 
of state policy – a period of limiting the use of such spaces has been clear due to 
a public and political critique of such funding (one which the author believes fails 
to appreciate the imperative on trade unions to enact training and the ways in 
which they have ensured a greater scope for learning compared to what would 
have been the case without their initiatives). 
In terms of broader state policy on work and employment, the main prob-
lem is that such training or broader employment policies have not always been 
located in terms of a more proactive innovation and technology strategy (Recio 
and Banyuls, 2004), regardless of the social-democratic hype and rhetoric in 
the 1980s regarding the role of new technology and post-industrial possibili-
ties. According to Carvajal Muñoz (2002), such developments in training have 
focused on soft skills and the enhancing of social control over workers – linking 
to a state interest in a pliable post-industrial workforce. So, irrespective of the 
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inclusion of trade unions, employers and others in such processes, there has not 
been a broader remit of social and economic renewal according to the more 
critical voices, and this has shaped a specific type of inclusion. 
The regulatory gaps and inconsistencies of the role of the state 
and the regulation of work
The role of the state in Spain must therefore be located in a context where eco-
nomic and social changes have not fitted any one general pattern of economic 
development and transition (Molina and Rhodes, 2007). There has been a range 
of developments which suggest that the state in general has had to manage a frag-
mented terrain but has also contributed to that fragmentation, given the manner 
in which economic development has been framed. 
In structural terms, while the state has been able to create a semblance 
of dialogue and political exchange at some levels – as noted earlier – there 
have always been concerns about the strategic, partial or momentary nature 
regarding this dialogue, as noted earlier. The problem is that embedding that 
dialogue at the level of state intervention and state welfare policies has been 
fairly constrained beyond the question of training, which in turn has its critics. 
Furthermore, the attempt to balance the creation of a ‘European’ welfare and 
social state has been limited by the more market- and competition-oriented 
features of economic policy; it is as if there is a dual transitional process and 
competing demands or imperatives (Martínez Lucio, 1998). What is more – as 
Miguelez and Recio (2010) point out – the welfare dimension and more proac-
tive labour market aspects of the state have not systematically complemented 
the more formal systems of rights developed by the state since the 1970s. We 
have also seen sectors such as retailing evolve (Royle and Ortiz, 2009) – and 
traditional sectors such as agriculture change – and these have been increasingly 
developed beyond the effective regulatory reach of the project of formalisation 
and democratisation of labour relations, in part due to the nature of employers 
in such sectors.
In political terms, this ambivalence has come to the fore in terms of the 
response to the Global Financial Crisis after 2008 which was based on curtailing 
the role of the state, limiting welfare support in what is already an uneven social 
system in terms of social security and unemployment benefit, and in particular 
focusing obsessively on the reform of collective bargaining, effectively limiting 
its remit (Rocha, 2014). In effect, this has emphasised the inconsistencies of 
the state and created greater gaps in terms of its coverage and remit. It has also 
opened the door to a more coercive state discourse based on the undermining 
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of collective entities as in the anti-union discourse of the Esperanza Aguirre-led 
right-wing Madrid regional government in previous years – although it must be 
said that there are inconsistences and that there are still competing visions of the 
state. 
What we do know though is that the trade union project led by the larger 
unions to enact regulation and to support the state from below in the light of 
its inconsistencies has been undermined. The state relies on political involve-
ment and support from civil society – especially one which seeks an ideological 
hegemony, as any good Gramscian will know. In Spain, trade unions took a 
decision to engage and support key state roles around services to immigrant 
workers and communities, training programmes and inspection as they were 
confronted with a fragmented and less-coordinated employer class and state 
system on such matters which was not consistent socially (Martínez Lucio, 
2007). Yet the last five years have seen a serious challenge to this project on 
the ground due to limitations in funding and problems with credibility and, in 
extreme cases, malpractice. This has exacerbated the crisis and the inconsisten-
cies of the state.
Conclusions 
The role of the state in Spain since the 1970s has therefore been complex and 
multifaceted, and has been configured by a range of factors, both structural and 
strategic. One can begin to judge the nature of the state from various political 
and historical perspectives. Much will depend on one’s starting point and where 
one’s analytical focus or gaze falls when starting the story of the Spanish state in 
relation to labour relations. 
On the one hand, there is a narrative which is mindful of the very deep chal-
lenges facing the state, and the way the inefficiencies of the curiously and quite 
expansively industrialised Spanish economy under the Franco regime had to be 
transformed and renewed in the context of the industrial crisis of the 1970s 
and 1980s – and how a system of social dialogue had to be constructed in 
very politically challenging circumstances. Within this context, a form of social 
 dialogue – that somewhat broad term – and political exchange emerged that was 
able to configure a relatively coordinated set of joint regulations and regulatory 
processes in terms of employment conditions. Within this context there has 
been a regularity in terms of agreements and negotiations – a strategic ability 
to overcome structural challenges (Roca, 1991; Gonzalez Begega et al., 2015). 
Trade unions have been brought into new roles and formal arenas which have 
sustained a system of maturity in terms of regulation. 
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On the other hand, there is a view that social dialogue has been truncated 
and uneven. The increasing decentralisation of the state in territorial terms has 
not necessarily exacerbated this as it has depended on the economic and social 
policies of the autonomous governments in questions.5 There is a belief though 
that the inclusion of a social voice at such a level has been uneven and rarely 
consistent. What is more, the 1980s are seen as a period when the opportunity 
for labour inclusion – and the development of a systematic counterpoint to the 
narrative and fetishising of post-industrial narratives – could have created a more 
balanced and deeper system of social dialogue and change. The relentless pursuit 
of industrial change in terms of ‘la recoversion industrial’ and the emergent stig-
matising of trade unions as political actors configured a system which was more 
attuned to marketisation even when the state was developing itself significantly 
(Smith, 1998).6 Much has been bound up with the nature of the social democratic 
tradition in Spain – and the crisis of the left overall beyond it – which contributed 
to a stigmatising of the ‘protected worker’ and his or her ‘protecting organisa-
tions’ as a discourse limiting broader social engagement (Fernández Rodríguez 
and Martínez Lucio, 2014). The related problem is that, as Rubery’s work has 
consistently shown, the question of social reproduction, gender and equality 
remains a major challenge in the way we conceptualise the role of regulation and 
the way we provide broader narratives of the limitations of contemporary public 
policy and social partner actors regardless of their  rhetoric of ‘inclusion’.
However, as we know, history is rarely made in a context of our choosing. 
The social democratic agenda of the 1980s and 1990s established a model of 
development and piecemeal accommodation to a neoliberal set of agendas which 
configured the general imbalances in terms of the state roles which later govern-
ments simply formalised. Hence Spain can be seen as a case of competing projects 
of change where the social dimensions of the state had to be developed at a time 
when the market and neoliberal policies were in the ascendancy (Alonso, 2007; 
Martínez Lucio, 1998). Academically, we need to broaden the lens of our analy-
sis in historical and regulatory terms; we need, as Jessop (1982 and 2002) has 
reminded us, to focus on the broader and sometimes contradictory role of the 
state itself in terms of different apparatus and different political projects. As my 
colleague has noted, also in relation to the role of the state in the current context 
of austerity, we need to be also mindful of believing that the state will be easily 
reconfigured into a ‘neoliberal’ or ‘withdrawn state’ in terms of the economy as 
the emerging social tensions and contradictions in social and employment terms 
will draw aspects of the state back into new roles (Rubery, 2011). Perhaps given 
the role of the coercive and juridical spheres of the state in the current context it 
will be a more direct form of state role, but it will also be one that will not escape 
new social agendas so easily as they take the shape of new voices and movements 
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in and against the state. In this respect, a greater degree of fragmentation of the 
state is likely and a more dualist social context. This in turn forces us to think of 
the state in broader terms and realise its contradictory features. 
Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was published in Sociología de Trabajo Spring/Primavera 
2016 45–67: ‘Incertidumbre, indecisión y neoliberalismo emergente. El papel dual 
y complejo del Estado Español en las relaciones laborales y de empleo.’ I would like 
to thank Carlos Fernández Rodríguez for his comments on the earlier version and his 
support. 
2 All this was happening at a time when trade unions were having to consolidate their 
legitimacy and when membership had declined since the peaks reached soon after the 
death of Franco (Jordana, 1996). 
3 For a discussion of the impact of neoliberal Anglo-Saxon language and methods in man-
agement read Ferner and Quintanilla (1998) and Ferner and colleagues (2001). 
4 Although much depends on how you define numerical flexibility and what the legal 
framework for temporary contracting is.
5 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to review the importance of the Basque state in its 
ability to inculcate stronger forms of social engagement and dialogue; greater attention 
in future is needed in terms of internal comparative analysis within Spain.
6 To be able to open a more systematic debate on this key period, the nature of industrial 
policy in the 1980s and early 1990s would have to be studied carefully and the finan-
cial accounts of key companies (public and private) that were closed or ‘restructured’ 
would have to be scrutinised closely. The extent and role of subsidies and the use of the 
discourse of Europeanisation being associated with the removal of them would have to 
be considered. The author’s opinion, as someone who studied labour relations in Spain 
during this period and who was also present during the equivalent processes in the UK 
at that time, would be to question the economic assumptions of that period and the cri-
tique of state support for what were officially considered to be failing industries. 
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Work and care regimes and women’s 
employment outcomes: Australia, 
France and Sweden compared
Dominique Anxo, Marian Baird and Christine Erhel
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to analyse how national care regimes interact 
with the employment regime to influence female employment outcomes. We 
do this with a comparative analysis of Australia (population 24 million), France 
(62 million) and Sweden (9.5 million), three advanced market economies that 
have distinct and contrasting employment and care regimes. For the employ-
ment regime, we focus on paid work across the life course and we focus on 
parental leave and childcare as indicative of the care regime. The chapter draws 
on the theoretical framework developed by Rubery and colleagues (1999, 2001) 
and Rubery (2002). This theoretical tradition emphasises that the gender divi-
sion of labour between employment and unpaid care and domestic work is 
structured by the articulation of family policies and the organisation of employ-
ment and working time, as well as other elements of the welfare state regime 
such as the taxation system. This approach has drawn attention to important 
societal differences in the shape and degree of gender inequalities. Comparative 
studies of time (see, for example, Anxo et.al., 2011) have clearly shown that 
the gender division of labour between paid work, care and domestic activities is 
strongly dependent on prevailing societal norms and the institutional and soci-
etal contexts. 
Australia is regularly referred to as a liberal welfare state even though the 
Australian system does not fit easily into the standard Esping-Andersen (1990) 
typology. For most of the twentieth century Australia had a centralised mech-
anism to set wages and working conditions, leading to Australia also being 
referred to as the (male) wage-earners’ welfare state. As a consequence, the 
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provision of leave entitlements has been a result of the industrial relations system 
rather than welfare policies (Baird, 2005). Having had a strongly oriented full-
time male breadwinner/female carer model, the care and employment regimes 
in Australia have not kept pace with the social changes in female education 
levels, gender roles and expectations nor with the demographic changes in the 
workforce. This has resulted in an ‘institutional lag’ and, since the turn of the 
millennium, the need for a fresh focus on work and family policies (Baird and 
Williamson, 2009).
In terms of social protection models, France belongs to the Continental 
model, including quite high levels of social redistribution and a well-developed 
family policy. Until the 1970s, it was characterised by a male breadwinner 
model, encouraging mothers’ inactivity through the tax system and through 
the under-development of formal childcare for younger children (under the age 
of three). The necessity to increase employment rates to finance social protec-
tion, as well as the increase in women’s education level, has led to a progres-
sive development of childcare, although some incentives to maternal inactivity 
remain in public policies. Gender equality at work (in terms of wages, but also 
employment conditions and job quality) has also emerged as a policy goal over 
recent years, partly influenced by European gender equality policies.
Often presented as the ideal type of social democratic welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), Sweden emphasises the principles of universalism, egalitari-
anism and individual rights. The Swedish model is also founded on a strong 
political commitment to the goal of full employment. Sweden stands out as pro-
viding one type of societal system based on high employment rates, with only 
a small gender gap; a high incidence of dual-earner households; extensive and 
generous family policies; strong welfare support systems for childcare, paren-
tal leave and elderly care; and egalitarian wage structures, including relatively 
low gender wage inequality. Furthermore, the overall political context, which 
is characterised by gender mainstreaming combined with high female involve-
ment in the political process and institutions (government bodies, parliament 
and labour market organisations), creates an institutional set-up conducive to a 
more balanced gender division of labour and responsibilities over the life course.
Two propositions guide the chapter: the first is that policies relating to care 
are changing in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries, even in national regimes that are very different (such as 
Australia, France and Sweden); the second is that policies do impact on women’s 
labour market activity across the life course in relation to both overall participa-
tion and hours of work. To consider these propositions, the chapter proceeds 
in the following way. The first section of the chapter considers women’s key 
social and labour market features in each of the countries, highlighting current 
 Work and care regimes and women’s employment outcomes 311
employment outcomes. The second section provides an overview of the work 
and care policy regimes in each country, with a focus on parental leave, child-
care and hours flexibility. This section demonstrates the different policy trajec-
tories of each of the three countries to date. For consistency, OECD data are 
used where possible, mainly from the family database (OECD, 2016b), supple-
mented by official country-specific statistics. We conclude with a discussion of 
the relationship between the policy regimes and female employment outcomes, 
suggesting some similar policy issues and trends are occurring in Australia and 
France, but not to the same degree in Sweden, the country with the longest 
 history of gender equitable policy goals. 
Female and maternal employment rates 
In this first section, we characterise the three countries and their employment 
regimes using a gender perspective, building on empirical evidence about gender 
gaps in employment rates, working time, earnings and job quality.
For the past 40–50 years, two of the most salient features and persistent 
trends in Sweden, France and Australia have been the rising education levels of 
women and the increased feminisation of the labour force, with a related shift 
from the single male breadwinner household towards the dual-earner house-
hold. This feminisation of the labour force has occurred despite very different 
policy frameworks in each of the three countries. Both France and Australia have 
experienced a gradual and marked growth in female employment from around 
the late 1980s. The trend shows that for the prime working age population 
(25–64) in 2014 the employment rates for women in both France and Australia 
is approximately 68 per cent, with the surge in female employment beginning 
early in the 1980s for France and a few years later for Australia. 
Sweden stands out as the exception among the three countries, with female 
employment rates consistently higher since the 1970s. In 1985, for example, 
the female employment rate in Sweden was 79 per cent compared to France at 
54 per cent and Australia at 44 per cent. By 2014, the Swedish female employ-
ment rate was still higher at 81 per cent, although France and Australia are 
narrowing that gap as their female employment rates grow. Interestingly, as 
Table 16.1 shows, education outcomes for women are considerably higher than 
for men and higher than the OECD average in Australia and Sweden yet, as we 
later discuss, this investment is not reflected in higher employment rates or pay 
outcomes for Australian women. 
Observing these trends, it would seem therefore that the economic and 
social shifts of the 1980s in all three countries, including more human capital 
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investment for women and economic and industry restructuring from manu-
facturing to services, are associated with increases in female employment rates. 
Shifts in government objectives are also noteworthy. The need to increase 
employment rates in order to finance social protection has been an incentive for 
national policies to encourage female labour force participation in Sweden and 
France (see Rubery et al., 2001; Rubery 2002). In Australia, the need to increase 
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female employment rates has been driven by the perceived need of governments 
to increase the size of the labour market and gross domestic product.
By international standards, Sweden is characterised by high employment rates 
at the two ends of the age distribution, high employment continuity over the 
life course and relatively low gender disparities in labour market integration. 
This has not been the case for Australia and France. In Sweden, neither couple 
formation nor childbirth impacts on women’s employment rates, with the latter 
positively correlated to female labour market participation (Anxo et al., 2011). 
The main impact of childbirth in Sweden is therefore a combination of a period 
of parental leave followed by a temporary reduction of working hours to long 
part-time hours while children are young (preschool children) rather than a 
reduction of employment rate.
In France, maternal employment stands at a relatively high level, above the 
OECD average. However, important barriers and disincentives to employment 
remain for mothers, especially for the lower qualified. Indeed, in terms of moth-
ers’ activity rates, important differences emerge according to the age and the 
number of children. Labour market participation is lower for mothers of young 
children and decreases with the number of children. In 2013, 78.6 per cent of 
mothers of one child (aged 0–14) were active, as well as 73.1 per cent of moth-
ers of two children, but only 53 per cent of mothers of three or more children.1 
Part-time employment is also more developed for mothers of young children, 
and at least partly results from constraints in the availability or the cost of child-
care. In France, 15.1 per cent of women still declare that their inactivity or 
part-time work is due to a lack of care services (Eurostat, Compendium 2010).2 
Lower maternal employment rates are the distinguishing feature of female 
employment in Australia (see Table 16.2). Relative to other OECD nations, 
Australian maternal employment rates for mothers with a child under 15 are 
Table 16.2 Population and female and maternal employment rates, 2015
Country Population Female employment 
rate 25–64 (%)
Maternal employment 
rate child <15* (%)
Sweden 9.5 million 80.7 83.1
France 62 million 68.2 72.4
Australia 24 million 68.7 63.5
OECD average 63.3 66.8
Note: *Year 2013 for Australia
Source: Employment rate: OECD (2015). Maternal employment rate: OECD (2016e), Data for 
Chart LMF1.2.A. Maternal employment rates.
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lower, at 63.5 per cent compared with the OECD average of 66.8 per cent. The 
rate is even lower for mothers of children younger than three years. In Australia, 
female employment has been closely associated with family formation. The 
major shift in the last four decades has been that, rather than withdrawing 
completely from the labour market after childbirth, Australian women move to 
part-time hours (Baird, 2016). 
To summarise, despite some convergence among the three countries in terms 
of increasing female employment rates, there continues to be considerable 
divergence in relation to maternal employment rates for women with children 
under the age of 15. Sweden stands out with relatively high maternal employ-
ment rates. It is in relation to maternal employment therefore that we see the 
impact of the differing policy frameworks most profoundly, which we discuss in 
the next section. 
Figure 16.2 displays the age–employment profiles of men and women in 
the three countries. As illustrated, Australia, compared to France and Sweden, 
exhibits the largest gender gap in employment rates across the life course. In 
contrast to the two other countries, Australia also shows a slight decrease in the 
female employment rate during the period of childbearing (around two percent-
age points between 25 and 39 years old). Sweden has the highest female employ-
ment rates across the life course and exhibits the smallest gender employment 
gap with, as in France, high employment continuity over the life course. In 
2013, according to the OECD (2016b), Sweden had also the highest incidence 
of dual full-time earner couples: 45.6 per cent compared to 41.4 per cent in 
France and only 23.4 per cent in Australia. 
One of the most interesting developments in these countries since the 1970s 
is that children are no longer associated with a permanent or temporary with-
drawal from the labour market. The continuity of female employment patterns 
conceals, however, large gender disparities in working time. Motherhood still 
implies a significant reduction of female labour supply. The presence of young 
preschool children significantly increases the incidence of part-time work, 
implying a significant reduction of working time. This is most pronounced 
in Australia, where 48 per cent of mothers work less than 35 hours (with 
the vast majority of these working less than 30 hours), compared to 31 per 
cent and 35  per cent in France and Sweden respectively (see Table 16.3). 
In France only  a small proportion of women work less than 35 hours. The 
share of short part-time work (1–19 hours) is low in Sweden and France (less 
than 10 per cent), contrasting with Australia with a share of short part-time 
work above 20 per cent. By contrast, for men in all three countries, father-
hood entails an increase  of labour supply in terms of both participation and 
working hours.
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Table 16.3 Working time distribution among Australian, French and Swedish women 
with at least one child under 14 years of age, 2014 (%)
Working-time band Australia France Sweden
1 to 19 hours 21.0 9.1 8.2
20 to 29 hours 17.4 13.2 10.1
30 to 34 hours 9.7 8.7 16.4
35 to 39 hours 23.4 46.3 17.4
40 hours or more 28.5 22.7 47.8
Source: OECD (2016a).
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Job quality and gender gaps
Job quality has been introduced among policy goals at the international level 
since the 2000s, and has received attention in the comparative literature, 
together with the development of specific indicators (Davoine et al., 2008; 
Green et al., 2013). Job quality is usually considered as a multi-dimensional con-
cept, including pay and earnings, employment quality and the type of contract, 
training opportunities and working conditions. Here we focus more specifically 
on wage and part-time employment for which gender gaps are particularly 
important, before presenting a more global perspective on job quality by gender 
on the basis of OECD data.
As noted above, part-time work has been developing in the three countries 
since the 1990s, for mothers of young children but also more generally for 
women. In 2015, 38 per cent of employed Australian women were working 
part-time, well above French and Swedish female part-time employment rates 
(22.3 per cent and 18 per cent respectively). The gender gap in part-time 
employment rates is higher in Australia and in France than in Sweden (almost 
24 per cent in Australia, 15 per cent in France and 7 per cent in Sweden in 
2015).3 The links between part-time and job quality are ambiguous, as they can 
be seen as a way to reconcile family and work or as a constraint for women, 
resulting either from insufficient childcare or from bad labour market con-
ditions. The concept of involuntary part-time work may help differentiate 
between these different situations, although it mainly reflects labour market 
and care constraints. According to OECD data, involuntary part-time amounts 
to 39.2 per cent of part-time employment in France for women and has been 
strongly increasing since 2012 (in a context of high-level unemployment), 
whereas it stands at lower levels in Australia (25.5 per cent) and in Sweden 
(28.4 per cent). Thus involuntary part-time does not directly connect with the 
level of part-time rates; in the Australian case part-time may be considered by 
women as a way to stay in the labour market when then have children, whereas 
most French women would prefer to work full-time in a more regulated 
labour market (with a 35-hour legal working time) and in a context of quite 
well-developed childcare. However, part-time work has a direct incidence 
on women’s earnings and gender pay gaps, and may also affect future career 
prospects.
Given existing OECD data, it is only possible to compare gender pay gaps 
of full-time employees. According to OECD data (Table 16.3), the three 
countries have persistent pay gaps, with the gender pay gap being highest in 
Australia. Additionally, according to OECD data, the gender wage gaps stand at 
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a relatively high level for tertiary educated workers in all three countries, even 
for the prime-age cohorts (35 to 44). 
The causes of the persistence of gender pay gaps are varied, but as argued by 
Rubery and colleagues (2005), the wage structure of economies and labour market 
segregation are understood to be important contributors, and more so than indi-
vidual characteristics, such as educational attainment. Sweden is a pronounced 
example of this; from the early 1970s up to the early 1990s, the creation and devel-
opment of a modern and encompassing welfare state and the related expansion of 
public sector employment in Sweden contributed not only to the feminisation of 
the labour force and the increase of the overall employment rate, but also to the 
upgrading of the job structure in Sweden. By contrast, although Australian women 
have high educational attainment, it also has a highly sex-segregated labour market 
which may explain the relatively higher gender pay gap in Australia. 
To characterise women’s employment position, it is also important to adopt 
a job quality perspective, that goes further than a wage perspective and includes 
other dimensions of job quality, such as employment conditions (especially job 
security) and working conditions (such as, physical constraints, stress). When 
disaggregated by gender, such analyses show that women are generally disadvan-
taged in terms of employment conditions but that men experience more oner-
ous working conditions on average (Fagan and Burchell, 2002).
Several multi-dimensional indicators of job quality have been developed over 
recent years, but here we refer to the OECD index as it is the only one that 
includes information for Australia. The OECD job quality index is composed of 
three main dimensions (Cazes et al., 2015): earnings quality is measured by an 
index that accounts for both the level of earnings and their distribution across 
the workforce; labour market security takes into account both the coverage of 
unemployment benefits and their generosity; and quality of the working envi-
ronment is measured by the incidence of job strain, which is a combination of 
high job demands and limited job resources.
Table 16.4 Gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees
2000 2006 2012/2013*
Australia 17.2 16.7 18*
France 14.6 14.0 13.7 
Sweden 15.5 14.6 15.1 
OECD average 18.2 16.1 15.2
Note: *Year 2013 for Australia
Source: OECD (2014)
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For all three countries, the results confirm that women are penalised in earn-
ings quality (level and distribution), whereas their protection against unemploy-
ment is very similar to men’s. Job strain is higher in France than in Sweden 
for both men and women, but its level is higher for men in both countries. 
(Australia is not included in the job-strain index.) This is related to the type of 
jobs that men hold; as noted above they are over-represented in the industrial 
manufacturing sector. However, according to national data for France, work-
ing conditions have been declining for women: 58 per cent of muscular-skeletal 
disorders hit women (42 per cent men) and stress at work (resulting from high 
demands and low autonomy, following the Karasek model) affects 28.2 per cent 
of women (19.6 per cent of men) (Lemière, 2013). Similarly, for a larger set 
of European countries, Burchell and colleagues (2007) also found a reduction in 
gender gaps in exposure to some physical risks. The OECD index does not take 
into account the problem of involuntary part-time employment that concerns 
more women than men, as mentioned above. 
Job quality gaps are observed throughout the life course. According to a 
French study, young women, even the well-educated, face a lower job quality 
when they enter the labour market (the gender wage gap amounts to 20 per 
cent for a Master’s degree and above); older women (over 50) tend to make 
more frequent transitions towards inactivity (Lemière, 2014). These differences 
by gender tend to persist despite a general and significant increase in women’s 
education levels in all three countries.
Figure 16.3 OECD job quality index by gender, 2010
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In summary, the three countries have experienced an overall increase in 
education and female employment rates, continued occupational and industry 
segmentation and persistent gender pay gaps in favour of men. The divergence 
in women’s employment between Australia, France and Sweden is evident in 
rates of maternal employment and part-time working hours. In this respect, 
Australia stands in sharp contrast to Sweden and France, with lower maternal 
employment and considerably shorter part-time work hours. These patterns 
may be explained, at least in part, by the policy regimes in each of the countries, 
which we discuss next. 
Policies and work-care regimes
The differences in labour market outcomes for women have to be understood 
in relation to the nation’s institutions and public policies, including parental 
leave, childcare and flexible work policies, as well as social and fiscal policies and 
labour market regulations. The differences in the care regimes in the three coun-
tries are summarised in Table 16.5 below. Sweden exemplifies the dual earner-
carer model, whereas in France and Australia institutional arrangements favour 
Table 16.5 National policy frameworks compared
Parental Leave Childcare Flexible work
Australia 12 months per parent 
of unpaid parental leave 
with 18 weeks paid for 




system for preschool 
children (aged <5), 
some government 
subsidy and mix of 
formal and informal 
care
Right to request 
(RTR) flexible work 
arrangements for 
parents and carers 
France Two years’ leave with 
an allowance, extended 
by a year if fathers share 
the care
Government subsidies 
for formal care for 
children aged <3 and 
free preschool for all 
children aged 3–5
Right to request part-
time in the public 
sector. In the private 
sector depends on 
collective agreements
Sweden 480 days’ parental leave 
with payment, 90 days 
ring-fenced for each 
parent 
Publicly financed 
childcare facilities for 
children aged 1–5
Large possibilities of 
reversible time options 
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a maternalist model, with policies only more recently encouraging fathers’ 
involvement in care. 
Australia
The current care regime in Australia has emerged relatively recently. Although 
community and political debates relating to parental leave and childcare policies 
have been high on the agenda in Australia for the past 20 years, it was not until 
the election of the Labour government in 2007 that any substantial reform was 
introduced. Previous governments had adopted a neoliberal, market-based phi-
losophy, relying on individual employer–employee negotiations or employer–
union bargaining. This situation resulted in polarised outcomes in the labour 
market. Higher-skilled workers in certain industries and with higher bargaining 
power had better entitlements than lower-skilled, less-powerful workers. For 
example, in relation to employer provision of paid parental leave, women in the 
finance and higher education sectors were much better off than those in the retail 
or hospitality sectors (Baird et al., 2009).
The childcare system in Australia is complex and under review. The delivery 
of formal childcare and school education is the responsibility of the state and 
local governments, but funding is from a mix of state and federal governments. 
Preschool education (that is under five years) tends to also be organised at the 
state level, and out-of-school-hours care is generally a local or state government 
responsibility. Formal childcare for 1–3 year olds is even more mixed, being 
offered between private and public providers; and although public expendi-
ture on childcare has been increasing, it still remains at less than 1 per cent of 
GDP (OECD, 2016b). Approximately 30 per cent of preschool-age children 
attend formal childcare services in Australia (Australian Government, 2014) 
and for working families, grandparents provide the bulk of informal childcare 
for children aged 0–12. There is a commitment to provide access to one year of 
preschool education for all children; however, this has not yet been achieved. 
The review of the childcare system has a focus on early childhood education and 
care and, as well as concerns about the provision of adequate and quality child-
care, there is debate about the availability of trained care workers, including 
‘ nannies’, and their working conditions.
Australia’s paid parental leave system is also a relatively recent policy inno-
vation. Introduced by the federal Labour government in 2011, it provides for 
18 weeks’ pay at the national minimum wage. Eligibility is wide and covers those 
with the equivalent of one day’s work a week for the ten months prior to birth. 
Self-employed women can also access the scheme. Use of the scheme, however, 
is inflexible and the 18 weeks must be taken in one block and before the child’s 
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first birthday. Although called parental leave, the scheme is aimed at the primary 
carer and has been overwhelmingly used by mothers (Whitehouse et al., 2015). 
The paid parental leave scheme is underpinned by a right to unpaid parental 
leave in the labour legislation, the Fair Work Act. Unpaid parental leave has 
been available to women since 1979, to adoptive parents since 1980 and to men 
since 1990, and each parent is now eligible to 12 months’ unpaid parental leave 
and a job guarantee, or up to 24 months for one parent. In addition, employers 
may supplement the government scheme with their own paid parental leave 
scheme. Approximately 50 per cent of employers do this, although provisions 
are more generous in certain sectors such as finance and education. Public sector 
employees also have access to between 12 and 14 weeks paid parental leave at 
replacement wages, which can be taken in addition to the 18 weeks noted above. 
In 2013, a modest scheme of two weeks’ pay at the national minimum wage 
was introduced for fathers and same-sex partners. This might be seen as the first 
policy step to directly address gender role behaviour and an attempt to encour-
age fathers to share the care load.
Although it can be argued that parental leave and childcare policies are now 
embedded in the macro-policy framework, aspects of the policies remain highly 
contested. For example, the current government is proposing to reduce the paid 
parental leave scheme and the proposed changes to the childcare and tax trans-
fer system remain unresolved. Income tax in Australia is based on individual 
incomes, whereas many welfare benefits are based on family income. Combined 
with the costs of childcare this creates a disincentive for women with young 
children to return to work. Furthermore, there is ongoing disagreement about 
the best way to resolve Australia’s dilemma of low maternal employment rates, 
with an explicit aim of the federal government to increase female participation 
rates (see Baird and O’Brien, 2015). 
Overall, in relation to work and family public policies, Australia has shifted 
ground in the past 10 years from a conservative neoliberal position to a greater 
focus on the role of government in addressing labour market and gender equality 
needs. It is important to note that the policy rhetoric is typically couched in busi-
ness case arguments rather than equity goals or welfare needs. More attention is 
also being paid to the deficit of women in leadership positions and the persistent 
gender pay gap, with the government’s Workplace Gender Equality Agency 
taking a lead in this regard. Reporting on gender participation and pay gaps in 
firms with 100 or more employees is obligatory, but targets rather than quotas 
are the preferred method of addressing the leadership gap.
There continues to be significant gender gaps in the labour market and these 
are of concern to all stakeholders – individuals, employers, unions and govern-
ments. As noted above, the participation and employment rates of women, 
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and especially of mothers, are lower than men’s, there is a large gap in terms 
of hours of work, and there remains a significant gender pay gap and care gap 
between men and women. While there are major public policy debates under-
way, there is also a considerable debate among employers and in the labour 
movement about how best to reconcile the pressures of working and family lives 
for men and women. 
However, work and family public policies tend to remain maternal in focus 
and there is little attention to shifting the dominant male full-time worker/
female part-time worker model to a more shared-work and care model. 
France
France is characterised by a well-developed childcare system that has been 
expanding through a diversification of childcare for children under the age 
of three (including childminders and different forms of private childcare). 
However, several features of the French social protection and tax system are still 
inherited from the male breadwinner model that was predominant until the end 
the 1970s. After a brief description of the components of the French ‘model’, 
and of some persistent contradictions, we focus on new trends in gender and 
employment policies that focus on labour market inequalities.
The French childcare system is based on free pre-primary school starting 
at the age of three (and two for a minority of children) and on a set of subsi-
dised childcare solutions for younger children. Indeed, the originality of the 
French childcare system for young children (0–3) is that its growth relies on 
the development of both public ‘collective’ childcare and ‘individual’ childcare 
(childminders working at their home, or at parents’ home). All these childcare 
types are sustained by public financing, including ‘individual’ childcare arrange-
ments for which parents benefit from specific allowances (income-related) and 
tax cuts. The result of this system is that 99.6 per cent of children aged 3–5 go 
to school on a full-time basis, and that 49.7 per cent of children aged 0–2 are 
enrolled in formal childcare or preschool services.4 For younger children, the 
growth in childcare supply results mainly from the development of childminder 
and individual childcare. 
However, despite the development of childcare, French social and labour 
market policies are inherited from the male breadwinner model, and are still 
wavering between a goal of protection for women (and mothers) and incentives 
to work. Firstly, as far as mothers of young children are concerned, the French 
family policy provides inconsistent incentives for some women; although wom-
en’s labour market participation is a policy goal, low-wage (i.e. low- qualified) 
mothers with two or more children are encouraged to stop working or to take 
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a part-time job through the parental leave programme. This parental leave can 
be quite long (three years until 2014; two years since 2015), which creates dif-
ficulties in returning to work (even when the working contract is maintained). 
A reform implemented in January 2015 introduced an incentive to ‘share’ the 
leave between the two parents: the allowance is now limited to two years, 
unless the father also takes a leave (in which case the allowance can be received 
until the child is three years old).
Secondly, the French tax and social policy system is family-based and cre-
ates an incentive for the specialisation of one spouse in market activities if he/
she has a higher income. In practice, 75 per cent of women earn less than their 
husband, which places them in a situation where their incentive to work or to 
increase their working hours is lower (Lemière, 2014). Major social policies 
are also family-based, such as the minimum income – the Revenu de Solidarité 
Active (RSA). The RSA is work-oriented and provides a differential allow-
ance for beneficiaries who are working (under a certain income threshold). 
Although the issue of individualised income tax is not yet a priority (and still a 
debated issue), gender equality has been promoted to a major policy goal over 
recent years. 
The law on ‘real equality between men and women’ (loi pour l’égalité réelle 
entre les femmes et les hommes) was voted in in July 2014. It includes two important 
and quite innovative tools, in addition to the reform of parental leave (already 
mentioned above). Firstly, it creates an obligation for firms to bargain on the 
topic of gender equality at work (wages, careers, access to training). Firms who 
do not comply will be unable to contract with public administrations. Secondly, 
it reinforces existing quotas that nominations for directors in public adminis-
trations and CEOs for large firms should include at least 40 per cent of women 
after 2017 (to reach an actual share of 40 per cent in firms over 250 employees 
in 2020).
Other recent measures were intended to improve women’s labour market 
situation, although they were not gender-specific. Concerning part-time work, 
the social partners and the government introduced a threshold for part-time 
jobs of 24 hours a week in 2013 (the reform Accord National Interprofessionnel), 
to avoid the development of part-time with limited number of hours worked 
(less than 25  hours) in France. However, there are many limits to its actual 
implementation, as the employer can depart from the minimum 24 hours if the 
employee agrees. Besides, branch-level social bargaining can also modify the 
24-hour threshold and introduce a lower minimum duration, which happened 
in 48 industries (until March 2015), so that 44 per cent are now covered by an 
industry agreement setting a shorter minimum duration.5 As a consequence of 
this bargaining process, the 24-hour threshold adopted in 2013 can be expected 
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to have only a limited impact on part-time duration in France and on the inci-
dence of part-time contracts including those with less than 25 hours for women. 
To encourage work–family reconciliation, childcare is still in a process of 
development, with some efforts to reduce territorial inequalities. Thus French 
policy has evolved over the last 10 years; it is now focusing both on work–family 
reconciliation and on gender equality in the job, mixing services supply, social 
dialogue and quota policies for nominations. 
Sweden
The Swedish childcare regime is a mixed system of outsourcing and insourcing 
(in-house provision). During the first two years of age the majority of children 
are cared for in the home within the framework of a generous and flexible 
parental leave system (see below). After the leave period, childcare is mainly 
provided by day-care centres. Childcare in Sweden is highly subsidised and 
financed and administrated by local authorities, with parents co-financing child-
care activities by paying a fee. The continuous growth of publicly financed child-
care facilities has contributed to the growth of female labour supply. In the early 
1970s, only 30 per cent of preschool children (1–5 years old) were enrolled in 
public-financed childcare compared to 83 per cent in 2015. Since the mid-1990s 
Swedish municipalities have the obligation to provide childcare facilities for 
working fathers and mothers. 
The Swedish parental leave programme, introduced in 1974, has clearly 
sustained the feminisation of the labour force and contributed to the changes 
in women’s behaviour in the labour market, specifically halting their with-
drawal from the labour market. The length of parental leave was initially 
six months  but was successively extended to 16 months (480 days) in the 
1990s, with full job security on return.6 The level of compensation is 80 per 
cent of gross earnings for the first 390 days. For the remaining 90 days, parents 
receive a flat rate of 180 SEK.7 It is interesting to note that the parental leave 
system is one of the few social/citizen rights that is not fully individualised. 
In order to favour a more equal gender distribution of absence, a designated 
non-transferable leave benefit of a month for each parent was introduced in 
1993, a second month was introduced in 2002 and a third in 2016. This rule 
constitutes, therefore, a strong incentive for fathers to use their right to paren-
tal leave for at least 90 days. The gender division of parental leave remains, 
however, unevenly distributed; in 2015, 74 per cent of the total number of 
net compensated days were taken by mothers (see Swedish Social Insurance 
Agency, 2016).8 
Since the amount of income-related benefits is based on the income during 
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the six months immediately preceding the birth of the first child, this consti-
tutes a strong economic incentive for parents to be gainfully employed and 
work full-time prior to childbirth. This benefit system has, therefore, a great 
influence on labour market behaviour and working-time patterns for presump-
tive parents. Typically, young, childless, cohabiting, employed women and 
men work full-time before childbearing in order to maximise their income 
level during parental leave. Also worth noting is the fact that their working 
time increases smoothly in order to maximise pension benefits after retire-
ment.9 This strategy appears to be an efficient tool to secure women’s labour 
market integration, foster employment continuity and improve gender equal 
opportunities.
The question of how to raise men’s take-up rates of extended leave and 
other working-time adjustments over the life course and bring about a stronger 
involvement of men in unpaid domestic and care activities is a crucial political 
issue and could provide a policy instrument for reducing gender inequality in the 
division of labour and income development over the life course.
To a considerable extent, the positive employment outcomes in the Swedish 
economy during the last three decades, particularly the high and growing female 
employment rate, are clearly related to the creation of a modern welfare state; 
strong public involvement in the financing and provision of healthcare, social 
care, childcare and education; and the related expansion of public employment. 
An individualised taxation system in a context of high average and marginal tax 
rates has also reinforced the dual breadwinner model. 
Conclusions
Rubery (2011) convincingly argued that researchers and policy-makers should 
not take for granted ‘the argument that regulation hinders outsider groups such 
as women’ and urges us to examine more closely ‘how gender differences may 
interact in specific and varying ways with employment and social regulations’. In 
this chapter, we have canvassed the impact on women of differing labour market 
and care regime forms of regulation and show that there is indeed a difference 
between men’s and women’s employment outcomes, which may be said to 
advantage the ‘insiders’, that is, men. Taking a closer look within gender, how-
ever, we also show that by comparing the data on female and maternal employ-
ment, hours of work and job quality in each of the countries, the interaction of 
care and employment regimes influence women’s and mother’s employment 
outcomes differently. Australia’s lower maternal employment rates and high 
part-time work rates reflect that country’s strongly regulated industrial male 
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breadwinner legacy and less-developed parental leave and childcare regime. In 
France, the regime has produced relatively high employment rates for women 
and mothers, although with some inequalities among mothers but there are still 
clear gender wage and job quality gaps. By contrast, Sweden’s long-term gender 
equity approach and supporting parental leave and childcare policy regime 
are reflected in high employment rates and longer hours of work for Swedish 
women, including mothers, over the life course.
The interaction of care and employment regimes is ever more significant as 
women’s labour market attachment increases. At the same time, care regimes 
are in transition in each of the countries, and especially so in Australia and 
France. Australia appears most concerned with female labour market attach-
ment, but from an economic rather than a social or gender equality perspective. 
It also has the most market-oriented care regime of the three countries. France 
sits in the middle, with a mixed welfare-economy orientation, and Sweden is 
the most gender equitable and welfare-oriented country. Our overview suggests 
that some policy change is occurring in Australia and France, both in response 
to, and leading to, a modest decline in the pervasiveness of the traditional male 
breadwinner model. Policies such as providing leave for parenting, addressing 
childcare demands and encouraging fathers to actively participate in care are 
becoming more evident, although the emphasis on changing gender roles is still 
in its infancy in France and nascent in Australia. By contrast, policies to encour-
age more gender equitable care outcomes have been a feature of the Swedish 
system for many years. 
Our analysis demonstrates that the institutional context and the interaction of 
national care regimes with the employment regimes in each of the countries have 
influenced female employment outcomes. Furthermore, social context is impor-
tant. For instance, attitudes to motherhood and increasing education rates of 
women in all three countries suggest the need to pay more attention to the inter-
action of regulation with social norms and trends. The comparison of Australia, 
France and Sweden shows that, despite differing policy regimes, common across 
all three countries are persistent gender pay gaps and the continued dominance 
of female caregiving. While this situation remains, the reduction of gender dif-
ference and inequality remains elusive under both welfare-oriented and more 
market-oriented regimes. As Rubery (2011: 1104) has eloquently said: ‘what 
is required is both a more gendered analysis of institutions and a more social 
analysis of gender as the starting point for the more positive task of analysing how 
reregulation could be used to reduce gender difference and inequality.’ 
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Notes
1 All the figures cited here come from DREES (Direction de la recherche des études, de 
l’évaluation et des statistiques), except when another source is indicated; data avail-
able at http://www.data.drees.sante.gouv.fr/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?s CS 
_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=fr.
2 Care services might also correspond here to elderly care. Note that the average propor-
tion in the EU stands at a higher level (27.9 per cent).
3 Figures: OECD (2016a). 
4 OECD Family database (2016b). 
5 Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle: ‘Bilan de la loi de 
sécurisation de l’emploi du 14 juin 2013 au 03 avril 2015’ (Review of the law on employ-
ment security), http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/CONFERENCE_THE M A T I 
Q U E _ D U_3_AVRIL_2015_-_Bilan_de_la_loi_de_securisation_de_l_emploi.pdf. 
6 The parent leave system is associated with full employment guaranty and the employ-
ment contract is not suspended during the work absence.
7 Parents not in employment before the birth or adoption of their child are entitled to a 
flat rate of 180 SEK (1 SEK = 0.11 Euro; 1 Euro = 9.15 SEK).
8 The incidences of fathers taking parental leave and the average duration of the father’s 
absence have, however, continuously increased since the introduction of the parental 
leave system: from 1 per cent of compensated days in the mid-1970s to 26 per cent 
in 2015 (corresponding to around 80 working days of absence; see Swedish Social 
Insurance Agency, 2016).
9 It should also be stressed that the Swedish pension system takes into consideration the 
diversity in patterns of labour market integration over the life course and the uneven 
distribution of risks by limiting the cost of necessary work interruptions linked to par-
enting, care activities and involuntary employment disruptions such as unemployment, 
disability or sickness. The time that workers devote to higher education, to small chil-
dren or to national military service, as well as absence due to unemployment and sick-
ness, also gives rise to pension rights. In other words, future entitlements to a pension 
are currently not only related to work history and earnings but are also linked to other 
forms of activity and periods of benefit receipt, including parental,  unemployment, 
 sickness and partial disability benefits. 
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Minimum wages and the remaking 
of the wage-setting systems in Greece 
and the UK
Maria Karamessini and Damian Grimshaw
Introduction
The steady encroachment of a more neoliberal set of market principles among 
advanced capitalist countries has not necessarily been accompanied by a declin-
ing role of the state. This is as true with respect to the state’s role in wage-
setting as it is in other areas of economic governance, such as social transfers, 
product market regulation and corporate governance (Streeck, 2014). Since the 
economic crisis, government minimum wage policy has played an increasingly 
interventionist role in many countries, albeit with divergent goals, including 
responding to falling living standards, adjusting unit labour costs, compensat-
ing for falling welfare budgets and substituting for collective wage negotiation. 
Such interventions may adapt the minimum wage up or down, reflecting (and 
shaping) a constellation of competing interests and political and economic 
conditions, as well as pay equity goals (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2013; Rubery, 
2003). 
Theoretical ideas about the crowding out of participative wage-setting 
(Aghion et al., 2011), legitimation of marketisation processes (Koçer and 
Visser, 2009) and a neoliberal shift (e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Hermann, 
2014; Hyman, 2015) are helpful in revealing both the underlying reasons for 
state interventions in minimum wage fixing and the interrelationship with 
national  industrial relations systems and conditions of employment. In this 
chapter, we develop these ideas through a comparative empirical analysis of 
two countries that are to some extent at the opposite ends of Europe’s mini-
mum wage policy approaches observed since the economic crisis: Greece and 
the UK.
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Minimum wage policy in Europe since the economic crisis
At the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, 20 of the 27 European 
Union (EU) member states had a generally applicable statutory minimum wage. 
With Croatia, which joined the EU in 2013, and Germany, which adopted a 
national minimum wage in 2015, by 2016, 22 of the 28 EU member states pos-
sessed statutory minimum wage systems. 
Since the beginning of the crisis, many countries have sought to contain 
the impact of minimum wages on average wage developments and labour 
costs, especially those where austerity policies were scrutinised by the Troika. 
However, a significant number of countries have continued to rely on mini-
mum wage increases to conduct their wage policy (ILO, 2015a). The con-
trasting approaches reflect new momentum in old debates about the role of 
minimum wages in labour markets, fuelled by evidence of a slowdown in real-
wage growth, persistent high shares of working poor and long-run increases in 
earnings inequality (OECD, 2015). The introduction of a statutory minimum 
wage in Germany in 2015 further triggered debates across Europe, especially 
in countries without a statutory minimum wage (Eurofound, 2016). However, 
in most of these countries (for example, in Austria, Finland and Denmark) 
there was a consensus among the main actors to stick to the collectively agreed 
sector or occupational minima. In Italy, the government included the possibil-
ity of introducing a statutory minimum wage in the reform of its Jobs Act, 
but decided not to implement it for the time being, following criticism from 
the trade unions. In Cyprus, where a statutory minimum wage applies to nine 
occupations, the employer organisations insist that this should be abolished or 
drastically reduced (Eurofound, 2016). Although, the combination of sector 
minimum rates and high levels of collective bargaining coverage can, at least 
from a pay equity perspective, be regarded as a functional equivalent to a 
statutory national minimum wage (Garnero et al., 2015), the long-standing 
erosion of bargaining coverage well before the economic crisis, its significant 
retreat during the latter in many countries (ILO, 2015b) and the expansion of 
low-wage sectors in most economies bring minimum wage policy back on the 
European agenda. 
The most important changes in minimum wage policy during the crisis took 
place in those EU countries that had to ask for financial assistance from interna-
tional institutions.1 In exchange, they had to implement economic adjustment 
programmes dictated and supervised by their creditors. A key macroeconomic 
tool was to use minimum wage cuts as a mechanism to depress wage settlements 
through the whole economy. For example, Ireland reduced its hourly minimum 
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wage by 1 euro (around 12 per cent) in early 2011 in response to Troika pres-
sures, although quickly reversed this decision after strong union campaigns. The 
Greek government was pressured even further by the Troika and implemented 
a radical 22 per cent cut in its national minimum wage. Similarly, in implemen-
tation of their loan agreements, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Portugal and Spain 
(as well as Greece and Ireland) all imposed freezes of their minimum wage for 
several years. All the above countries increased the minimum wage once the 
period of freeze was over – the last being Ireland in 2016 – while the freeze 
is still ongoing in Greece. This is why no other EU country except Greece has 
experienced a decrease in the nominal value of a minimum wage over the eight-
year period 2008–16 (Figure 17.1).
It follows, therefore, that Europe witnessed contrasting trends in the real 
value of minimum wages. Of the 15 countries with trend data for 2008–
15 (Figure 17.2), it increased significantly in eight (as much as 35 per cent 
in Poland), stagnated in six countries (Czech Republic, Spain, the UK, 
Figure 17.1 Change in monthly minimum wages at current prices, national currency 
2008–16
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Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands) and dropped in one country (Greece, 
by 20 per cent).
During the period 2008–15, median wages increased less so than minimum 
wages in all EU countries with a statutory minimum wage, except Ireland where 
the opposite occurred, and in France, Belgium and Spain the national minimum 
wage and median wage grew at the same pace. In Greece, the minimum wage 
reduced more than median wages. As a result of the above trends, the rela-
tive minimum wage – as measured by change in the Kaitz index – decreased in 
Greece and Ireland, remained stable in France, Belgium and Spain, and rose in 
the other EU countries shown (Figure 17.3). The developments in the relative 
minimum wage have therefore narrowed earnings inequalities at the bottom end 
of the wage distribution in countries where the Kaitz index increased since the 
beginning of the crisis and widened earnings inequalities in the few where it has 
fallen –namely, Greece and, especially, Ireland.
Overall, the different patterns can be collected into four groups of change 
Figure 17.2 Real annual minimum wages, 2008–15, at 2014 prices (US$ PPP)
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over the period 2008–15 according to trends in real minimum wages and rela-
tive minimum wages (Table 17.1). The largest group of countries – seven of the 
15 countries for which we have complete data – have experienced upwards tra-
jectories in both the real and relative values of their minimum wages. A second 
group of five countries, among them the UK, experienced either limited change 
(flat trend) in both values or upwards change in one of either real or relative 
values. A third group experienced a drop in one of the indicators, experienced 
by Ireland during the period shown. And, finally, Greece occupies the group in 
which both real and relative values fell significantly during the period.
Explaining state policy towards minimum wage fixing
Evidence of divergent minimum wage trends reviewed above is further compli-
cated by a likely variety of economic and political thinking that underpins the 
Figure 17.3 Change in the Kaitz index (minimum wage relative to median earnings), 
2008–14
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policy approaches. If we consider theoretical rationales for state interventions 
to raise or cut the minimum wage, then we can identify five possible frames 
of analysis, each of which considers the intersection with collective bargaining 
(Table 17.2). It may be, as the writings of Aghion and colleagues (2011) suggest, 
that states intervene to raise the minimum wage as a direct response to a per-
ceived erosion of trust and cooperation in labour markets (especially between 
workers and employers). The problem is that there is a strong tendency for 
a self-perpetuating dynamic such that, on the one hand, the higher minimum 
wage under stringent state control discourages the formation of trust (by limit-
ing opportunities for workers and employers to build experience at cooperating 
in wage bargaining) and, on the other, sustained experience of non-cooperation 
Table 17.1 Patterns of change in real minimum wages and Kaitz index, 2008–14/15
Kaitz index
Down Flat Up
Real MW Up C. --- B. --- A. Estonia, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia




Down D. Greece C. --- C. ---
Notes: Up is for rises of 5%+ (Real minimum wage (MW)) or 1.5+ points (Kaitz) and Down is for 
falls of more than −5% or −1.5 points. The cells are grouped into four categories, A–D; ‘—’ signifies 
no country examples.
Source: Figures 17.2 and 17.3.
Table 17.2 Five frames for understanding state policy towards wage-fixing
Collective bargaining:
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generates demand by citizens for stronger state intervention in setting minimum 
wage standards (Aghion et al., 2008). In other words, the active state-controlled 
minimum wage policy in this view crowds out collective forms of wage nego-
tiation (for the case of France, see Gautié, 2011). Some states may even seek 
purposefully to undermine the foundations for collective wage bargaining while 
simultaneously actively raising the minimum wage; this is in other words a 
strongly non-participative approach to distribution.
A second frame of analysis is that states are in fact responding to the problem 
of legitimation as identified in O’Connor’s (1973) early study on the fiscal crisis 
of the state. The idea is that any capitalist state must respond to dual pressures 
both to foster private capital accumulation and to legitimise (to citizens) the 
unequal and destabilising effects of accumulation through policies of income 
redistribution and social protection; it can be interpreted as a struggle between 
providing for market justice and social justice. As capitalism becomes more and 
more disorganised in a race to accumulate, then raising the statutory minimum 
wage may bolster support for (or subdue resistance against) the liberalisation 
project (Koçer and Visser, 2009). Unlike the crowding out frame, the thesis of 
legitimation is (in our interpretation) ambivalent about the procedure for rais-
ing the minimum wage: it may be achieved through trusting, tripartite forms of 
social dialogue – deliberative negotiation rather than stringent state control – 
since the distributive result is what matters for legitimation. There is a limit to 
redistribution of course, since it must not constrain employer profitability in 
this perspective; similar to flexicurity packages of reforms post-crisis, states pare 
back protections while sustaining full respect for the imperative of business flex-
ibility (Heyes, 2013). Moreover, it may also be complemented by deregulatory 
labour market policies that provide employers with ‘exit options’, by strength-
ening employer discretion to adjust other employment conditions (Jaehrling and 
Méhaut, 2013).
We describe a third more positive policy frame as ‘participative distribution’, 
inspired by the writings of Sen and the Webbs on the potential for virtuous 
circles between equality and development. This type of policy action suggests a 
state finely attuned to the intricacies of a strongly complementary institutional 
setting, involving tripartite consideration of the conditions for, and effects of, 
minimum wage rises, a strong and coordinated trade union role in collective 
bargaining (in low-wage sectors especially), highly engaged employers (e.g. 
as members of industry associations) and quite possibly a proactive, egalitarian 
approach to issues of pay equity.
At the other end of the spectrum, ‘neoliberal shift’ describes the purposeful 
actions of a nation state (or pan-national authority) designed both to reduce the 
wage floor and to curtail the reach and effectiveness of collective bargaining 
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in a determined effort to shrink labour’s share of national income, possibly to 
depress real wages in an effort to boost competitiveness and also to accelerate 
labour market deregulation. In Howells’ critical analyses (2015, 2016) there is 
a sense that stronger state actions, via a raft of legal regulations, are intended 
to incrementally disembed markets from society –to undo welfare rights, to 
shift the balance of public and private governance of economic activity, and in 
particular to rule out collective interference over employment organisation. 
The restrictive control of minimum wage policy alongside a dismantling of 
collective bargaining has the effect of substituting legal regulation for collective 
regulation. This is in direct opposition to our fifth frame of analysis shown in 
Table 17.2, that of collective self-regulation, or ‘collective laissez-faire’ to use 
Kahn-Freund’s description of post-war UK where social partners assume full 
authority for wage-fixing backed up by state support for participative (that is, 
collectively negotiated) standards (see also Bosch and Lehndorff, chapter 2, this 
volume).
In the following analysis, we apply these different policy frames to the cases of 
Greece and the UK. In particular, we argue that in response to an attack on pre-
vailing institutions (rather than incremental, path dependent change) Greece has 
experienced a radical change in minimum wage policy approach from one char-
acterized by ‘collective self-regulation’ to its opposite form, that of ‘neoliberal 
shift’. The UK, by contrast, appears set on a ‘crowding out’ policy approach, as 
we explore below.
Greece: minimum wage policy as ‘neoliberal shift’
Greece is currently living through its ninth year of recession during which 
GDP has fallen by 26 per cent, disposable income by 30 per cent and the aver-
age wage by 26 per cent, while unemployment reached more than a quarter 
of the labour force (27 per cent) and the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
more than one in three of the population (36 per cent). Since the eruption of 
the sovereign debt crisis in late 2009, Greek governments have been obliged to 
implement three Economic Adjustment Programmes (EAP), under the super-
vision of the Troika and currently the Quartet,2 as a prerequisite for the loans 
granted in 2010, 2012 and 2015 by Eurozone partners and the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Prior to 2012, Greece’s minimum wage was determined by national-level col-
lective bargaining and was a core feature of its wage-setting system. In 2012 and 
2013, the Greek government introduced radical changes in the determination 
of the minimum wage as a final step in the complete recasting of the pre-crisis 
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wage-setting system. The government first bypassed the national collective bar-
gaining by unilaterally imposing a lower statutory minimum wage (and a new 
subminimum for workers aged under 25 years old) and then abolished collective 
bargaining on minimum wages altogether. State intervention in minimum wage 
policy is only one component of the neoliberal attack on labour rights that has 
been orchestrated under the first two EAPs adopted in 2010 and 2012 respec-
tively (Karamessini, 2012). The attack had two core goals: (1) to reduce nomi-
nal unit labour costs and restore losses in price competitiveness after Greece’s 
entry in EMU; and (2) to recast the wage determination system in order to make 
wage developments conducive to export-led growth.
Minimum wage policy pre-crisis: ‘collective self-regulation’
Before 2012, the national minimum wage was an integral part of collective bar-
gaining and a key instrument of wage determination in Greece, which was one 
of three EU countries (with Belgium and Estonia) to set the national minimum 
wage through bipartite negotiations (Schulten, 2012). National-level bargaining 
on the minimum wage was a core element of the post-war collective bargain-
ing system established in 1955. The General Confederation of Greek Labour 
(GSEE) and peak employer organisations regularly signed the National General 
Collective Agreement (NGCA), which not only determined the minimum wage 
but also set the floor for various employment conditions and workers’ rights. 
National-level bargaining on sectoral or occupational minima was the second 
most important feature of the Greek collective bargaining system. Company-
level bargaining was added after 1974 and improved upon sector and occupation 
minima. 
While for most of the post-war period minimum wages were fixed jointly by 
employers and unions, there were periods of state intervention. In 1982, the 
government raised the national minimum wage by 48 per cent (23 per cent in 
real terms) with subsequent annual adjustments fixed by inflation-linked indexa-
tion. This indexation system was abolished in 1990. At the same time, a new law 
on ‘free’ collective bargaining replaced compulsory state-controlled arbitration, 
effective since 1955, with independent third-party mediation and arbitration. 
The Greek wage-setting system of the 1990s and 2000s combined bipartite 
negotiation of a national minimum wage with relatively high collective bargain-
ing coverage (65 per cent in 2009). The latter was achieved through both the 
regular use of extension mechanisms by the Minister of Labour and a system of 
articulated, multi-layered and coordinated collective bargaining. As in Spain 
during the 1990s and much of the 2000s, the national minimum wage oper-
ated in ‘distant coexistence’ with the basic wage rates negotiated in collective 
 Minimum wages and wage-setting systems in Greece and the UK 339
agreements (Grimshaw and Bosch, 2013: 59) such that its coverage in the official 
labour market was very low: less than 1 per cent of employees in firms with 10 
or more employees were paid up to 105 per cent of the minimum wage in 2010 
(OECD, 2015: figure 1.13) and this rate would remain low even if employees 
from small firms were included. However, national bargaining on the national 
minimum wage was extremely important in two respects. First and foremost, 
minimum wage increases functioned as a minimum standard for national sector – 
and occupation-level bargaining. Depending on their bargaining power and the 
particular conditions in their industry or occupation, unions customarily set 
their target increases somewhere between minimum wage increases and those 
achieved by the most powerful public utilities and banking federations. This cus-
tomary union bargaining behaviour explains the uninterrupted fall of the Kaitz 
index from the early 1980s right up to the crisis years (Figure 17.4). In the late 
1990s, the bargaining rounds between management and the strong unions in 
public utilities and banking were decoupled from the bipartite fixing of the 
national minimum wage. A basic mechanism of articulated bargaining and wage 
drift was thus broken (Ioannou 2000). However, public utilities and banking 
remained in the 2000s – as in the 1980s and the 1990s – the strongholds of the 
Figure 17.4 Trends in the real minimum wage and Kaitz index in Greece, 1981–2015
Notes: MW refers to minimum wage.
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union movement and dominated the leadership of GSEE. General strikes sup-
ported by these unions were often used to reinforce GSEE’s bargaining power 
during negotiations on the minimum wage. A second reason for the importance 
of the national minimum wage during the 1990s and 2000s was that it consti-
tuted a reference point for individual bargaining on pay in the relatively large 
informal labour market, similar to evidence in other countries of the ‘lighthouse 
effect’ of minimum wages (Boeri et al., 2010).
Alongside constant and robust productivity growth, the above-described 
wage-setting system allowed for an uninterrupted increase in both the real mini-
mum wage (Figure 17.4) and the real compensation per employee in the period 
1993–2009 equal to 29 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively (in cumulative 
terms). The multi-layered and coordinated system of collective bargaining led to 
important wage inequalities, especially between the public and private sectors, 
but at the same time reinforced the middle of the wage distribution through 
national bargaining on sector and occupational minima and established relatively 
low inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution; the pre-crisis Kaitz 
level was still higher than the EU average in 2008 (Figure 17.3). As for the real 
value of the minimum wage (purchasing power), this was also above the EU 
average at that time (Figure 17.2).
Minimum wage policy, internal devaluation and deregulation of the wage-
setting system
Reducing labour costs in the business sector of the economy was one of the 
key goals of the first EAP (2010–11) that considered it central to the process 
of  internal devaluation intended to boost price competitiveness and reduce 
the external deficit. This goal became an explicit and quantified target under 
the  second EAP (2012–15), which necessitated a 15 per cent reduction. To 
achieve it, the first EAP imposed measures designed to decentralise collective 
bargaining (Dedoussopoulos et al., 2013; Ioannou, 2012; Karamessini, 2012, 
2015; Koukiadaki and Kokkinou, 2015), including suspending the extension of 
collective agreements by the Minister of Labour to non-signatory firms, ensuring 
that firm-level agreements prevail over sector and occupational agreements by 
abolishing the ‘favourability’ clause and allowing ‘associations of  persons’ (non-
union organisations usually set up by employers) to sign firm-level  collective 
agreements instead of unions. 
Despite the reforms, the pace of wage reductions during 2010 and 2011 was 
deemed too slow. The Troika and the Greek government pinned the blame 
on continued rises in the national minimum wage (equal to inflation for the 
Eurozone region), which had been agreed by the NGCA in July 2010. In their 
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view, such rises conflicted with the goal of labour cost reduction (Kanellopoulos, 
2015). The government launched a tripartite dialogue to discuss national mini-
mum wage developments compatible with boosting competitiveness and pre-
serving employment. But the Troika considered the results of this dialogue 
unsatisfactory since they did not ensure ‘the quick responsiveness of wages to 
the fall in economic activity’ (European Commission, 2012: 38). Koukiadaki 
and Kokkinou summarised the views of the social partners as follows: 
‘During the discussions, the employers’ associations opposed the reduction of the 
minimum wage but were in favour of a three-year freeze in wage and maturity 
increases and the reduction in social insurance contributions. On the other hand, the 
GSEE [unions] rejected any change in relation to wage costs and stated that the discus-
sion should focus only on non-wage costs.’ (2015: 145)
The stalemate led the Troika and the government to design, in 2012, a series of 
measures building on two pillars: an immediate and drastic reduction of wage 
floors and the completion of the 2010–11 reforms to radically recast the wage-
setting system. The 2012 measures can be grouped as follows:
• Legislative reduction of the minimum wage by 22 per cent followed by a 
freeze until the end of 2016.
• Introduction of a lower minimum wage for young people under the age of 
25 years, at 87 per cent of the reduced minimum wage followed by a freeze 
until the end of 2016.
• Further dismantling of the collective bargaining system through the reduc-
tion to three months of the after-effects of collective agreements and 
freedom to negotiate individual contracts thereafter; the elimination of 
unilateral recourse to arbitration and its restriction to ruling only the basic 
wage; the freeze of all seniority bonuses provided by law or collective 
agreements; and the removal of ‘tenure’ from all existing labour contracts.
• Invitation to social partners to simplify the NGCA by establishing a single-
rate statutory minimum wage and to abolish the multiple minimum wages 
according to type of work, education, marital status and seniority. The 
subsequent failure of the National Committee for Social Dialogue, set up 
in September 2012, to agree a reform led to a government-imposed (fol-
lowing consultation) national minimum wage from January 2017, which is 
said to be fully compatible with a decentralised and individualised system of 
industrial relations.
These decisions were taken with the goal of encouraging sizeable reductions in 
nominal wages across the whole economy and thereby generate the 15 per cent 
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contraction of labour costs specified in the second EAP as needed to reverse 
losses in labour cost competitiveness of domestic production during 2000–09. 
Having increased by 10 per cent between 2008 and 2011, the nominal minimum 
wage fell abruptly by 22 per cent in 2012 and remains at the same nominal level 
at the time of writing (mid-2016). Adjusted for prices, the real value of the 
minimum wage fell by 24 per cent between 2010 and 2015, bringing to an end 
a long period since the mid-1990s of steady real gains in the wage floor for the 
Greek workforce (Figure 17.4). Average nominal earnings data show annual 
declines of between 2 and 7 per cent during 2010–15 (Table 17.3), resulting in 
a cumulative loss of 18 per cent.
As well as forcing through major cuts in nominal wages across the whole 
wage distribution, the reduced minimum wage and the new subminimum for 
youth (with the notoriously high ‘adult’ age of 25 years old) were also explic-
itly intended by the authors of the second EAP (European Commission, 2012: 
38) to (1) send a strong signal to employers and unions bargaining wages in 
other sector- and firm-level agreements (2) reduce informality and undeclared 
work by pulling the latter into the formal labour market; and (3) widen dif-
ferentials at the bottom end of the wage distribution, thought to price out of 
employment the low-skilled who might receive payments at or above the mini-
mum wage. In fact, because average earnings have been in continuous freefall 
since 2010 (owing to the depressed macroeconomic climate and the dismantled 
collective bargaining system), the bottom half of the wage distribution has 
become more compressed following the one-off minimum wage cut in 2012. 
Table 17.3 Wage developments, Greece 2008–15
Annual rates (%), nominal









Notes: * Nominal compensation per employee; total economy.
Source: Authors’ calculations from Eurostat online minimum wage database; European Economy, 
Statistical Annex, Spring 2016 for average wage.
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We can identify four successive periods (Tables 17.3 and 17.4): (1) 2007–09 – 
the Kaitz index increased as a rising minimum wage outpaced average wages; 
(2) 2009–11 – the Kaitz index again increased but this time owing to steady 
growth in the minimum wage alongside falling average earnings; (3) 2012 – the 
one-off cut in the minimum wage produced an unprecedented nine-point drop 
in the Kaitz index; and (4) 2012–14 – as the nominal value of the minimum 
wage was frozen in 2012 and average wages have declined each year since, the 
Kaitz index increased, which is absolutely contrary to the desired goals of the 
second EAP.
During this period, the deregulation of the wage-setting system has led to the 
individualisation of wage bargaining and, ultimately, under conditions of mass 
unemployment, to a compression of wage differentials towards the minima. 
It is noteworthy that the number of sector and occupational collective agree-
ments and arbitration awards has fallen from 101 in 2009 to 23 in 2015, while the 
coverage of employees by collective agreements fell from 65 per cent in 2009 
to 40 per cent in 2013 (ILO, 2015b); forthcoming data will undoubtedly reveal 
an even lower rate. Moreover, the institutional deregulation identified with the 
‘neoliberal shift’ in Greece has caused not only huge wage devaluation, but also a 
rising share of low-paid workers since 2011 (Table 17.4) even when we use an 
indicator that refers to a depressed median wage.
Under the third EAP (2015–18) a commission of high-level international 
experts was formed in March 2016 to make independent recommendations 
and other reforms in industrial relations. The commission has not concluded 
with a unified proposal. Nevertheless, a majority of its members have recom-
mended a return to bipartite negotiations of the national minimum wage with 
automatic erga omnes effects, but only after consultation with an independ-
ent group of experts, and the replacement of the special minimum wage for 
youth by experience-based subminimum wages for a maximum of two years 
(Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity 
2016: 2–3).
Table 17.4 Wage inequality indicators, Greece 2004–14
  2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014
Kaitz index 46.5 46.8 48.7 52.5 43.5 45.3 46.1
Low pay incidence 20.0 15.1 15.1 12.3 11.8 13.9 17.9 
Notes: The incidence of low-paid workers is defined as the share of full-time workers earning less 
than two-thirds of gross median earnings of all full-time workers.
Source: OECD statistics online (data extracted on 21 August 2016).
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The UK: a case of ‘crowding out’?
The UK is quite different: the government intervened in 2016 to raise the 
minimum wage over a medium-term period in order both to arrest the stagnant 
trend in real earnings growth and to reduce public expenditures on in-work 
benefits claimed by many millions of low-wage workers. At the same time, 
however, the UK policy approach shares similarities with Greece in the policy 
interactions with participative forms of wage-fixing, albeit displaying a passive 
disconnect with collective bargaining rather than an outright ‘frontal assault’, as 
Marginson (2014) puts it for Greece. We explore these issues here.
Prior to its introduction of a national statutory minimum wage in 1999, the 
UK had, for several decades, applied a complex system of minimum wage pro-
tection that was jointly regulated by unions and employers without state inter-
vention. These ‘Wages Councils’ (founded in 1909 as ‘Wages Boards’) operated 
in 66 sectors at their peak, covered around 3.5 million workers and fixed over-
time and holiday entitlements as well as wage rates (Burgess, 2006). The gov-
ernment abolished them in 1993 as part of a wider deregulatory labour market 
policy approach.3 The problem, however, was that it left a considerable hole in 
wage protection, since the 1980s had witnessed a significant drop in collective 
bargaining coverage; the near-comprehensive collective bargaining  structures 
of the period 1950–80 had quickly collapsed to a minority of the private sector 
workforce already by the early 1990s (Brown, 2010: figure  11.1). As such, 
the early-twentieth-century rationale for the introduction of Wages Councils 
– namely, that many workers were employed in sectors without collective rep-
resentation and deserved protection from wage exploitation – was once again 
true and paved the way for unions’ newfound positive support, leading even-
tually to a government determination to establish (under the Labour party) a 
national statutory minimum wage (effective from 1999). 
Nevertheless, while the policy approach was inclusive of employers and unions 
in the process of minimum wage-fixing – via the reputable, independent Low Pay 
Commission (see Brown, 2009) – it was not accompanied by policies designed 
to prop up collective bargaining or to establish stronger ‘participative standards’ 
in the UK labour market.4 Collective bargaining coverage continued to decline 
during the 2000s (down to an estimated 16 per cent in the private sector by 
2015). From the outset, therefore, the minimum wage policy approach gener-
ated a clear risk that wages would cluster around a single regulated wage rule 
at the very bottom of the wage distribution (Grimshaw, 2010). Figure 17.5 
displays the characteristics of the UK’s ‘isolated’ minimum wage policy visu-
ally, showing the falling private sector collective bargaining coverage (from an 
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already very low level), the steady rise (except the crisis years) in the minimum 
wage and the persistent high share of the low-wage workforce, averaging around 
21–22 per cent throughout the 20-year period shown.
Compared to the situation in Greece (see Figure 17.4), the pre-crisis decade 
of real minimum wage gains in the UK looks similar in terms of the positive 
upwards trend, although the UK delivered higher real gains overall: OECD data 
show that for 2000–09 the real minimum wage recorded a 33 per cent rise in 
the UK (Figure 17.6) compared to 21 per cent in Greece. Thereafter, of course, 
the two country narratives are completely divorced. While the UK slowed 
down minimum wage rises during the crisis, which translated into a cumula-
tive 5 per cent real cut from peak to trough (2009–13), the minimum wage in 
Greece went into a tailspin following the Troika’s instructions, amounting to a 
26 per cent real cut in the same period (OECD data). Trends in each country’s 
relative minimum wage value also differ, with a notably steady upwards trend 
Figure 17.5 Trends in the minimum wage, collective bargaining coverage (private 
sector) and the incidence of low pay in the UK, 1996–2016
Notes: Low-wage incidence defined as share of employees earning less than two-thirds median gross 
hourly earnings; MW refers to minimum wage.
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings for low-wage incidence (authors’ estimates from 
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in the UK (from 41 per cent to 48 per cent of median earnings) and a fluctuat-
ing trend in Greece punctuated by the steep drop in 2012 (from 53 per cent to 
44 per cent of median earnings). What seems clear for the UK, therefore, is that 
low-wage workers have benefited from a relatively reliable statutory minimum 
wage instrument. It delivered large-scale gains during the good economic times, 
did not over-react during the crisis (although Greece is not necessarily a fair 
comparator) and has gradually shifted the position of the wage floor upwards 
relative to the wage distribution’s mid-point; 2014 data place the UK just below 
the OECD 18-country average – Kaitz measures of 48 per cent and 50 per cent 
respectively (see Figure 17.3 above).
Nevertheless, the persistently high share of low-wage employment suggests 
all is not well in the UK’s labour market. If the wage floor is rising against 
median earnings and the share of workers earning between the minimum wage 
and a threshold of two-thirds of median earnings is high and stable, it would 
appear that the rising minimum wage is not generating a sufficiently strong 
ripple effect in the bottom half of the wage structure. Instead, it seems that in 
the UK’s weak and perforated industrial relations context – absent of other 
wage standards set for example by industry collectively bargained rates – the 
statutory minimum wage acts as a dominant ‘external key rate’ for many 
employers and proves far more important than productivity or human capital 
Figure 17.6 Trends in the real minimum wage and Kaitz index in the UK, 2000–15
Note: MW refers to minimum wage.
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factors in wage-setting. Bryson and Lucchino (2014), for example, find almost 
one in three UK workplaces mention the minimum wage as an influence on 
their largest occupational group. The result is that very strong ‘wage contours’ 
around the minimum wage are generated in many segments of the labour 
market (after Dunlop, 1957). We would expect the UK to mirror to a large 
extent the situation in the USA. There, research finds evidence of minimum 
wage contours in several sectors, suggesting wage structures for many occupa-
tional groups are more closely tied to minimum wage trends than other factors 
such as changing skills and work experience (Levin-Waldman, 2002; Rodgers 
et al., 2004). 
We interrogate the UK data here by examining what has been happening 
with levels of pay just above the minimum wage for male and female workers – 
namely, at earnings up to 10 per cent, 20 per cent and 30 per cent higher than 
the minimum wage. Table 17.5 presents earnings data for these three ‘wage 
contours’ for the period 1999–2012. Three findings are significant.
1) The 2003–12 period of a rising minimum wage (nominal and Kaitz, see 
above) was consistent with a growing concentration of both men and 
women in all three low-wage contours shown. This strongly supports the 
thesis that the minimum wage became an increasingly dominant ‘external 
key rate’ during the period. It also points to weak wage spillover effects 
(see also Dickens and Manning, 2015; Stewart, 2012).5
2) The three observed minimum wage contours are far more strongly embed-
ded for women than for men; in 2012, 15 per cent of women and 8 per 
cent of men (adults) were paid in the first wage contour of very low wages 
(minimum wage plus 10 per cent, equivalent to a gross hourly wage of 
£6.08–£6.69 at the time); and at the second wage contour (minimum wage 
plus 20 per cent) we find almost a quarter of all women employed (23 per 
cent) and one in seven (14 per cent) men. 
3) There has been a diminishing of the gender divide since 2003. For exam-
ple, while in 2003 women faced almost three times the likelihood as men 
of being paid in the second wage contour, by 2012 this had reduced to 
less than twice the risk. However, the risk for both groups increased sig-
nificantly and by a similar size in terms of numbers affected: both wit-
nessed a rise of approximately 1 million (1.01 million male workers and 
0.98  million female workers) paid in the second wage contour (minimum 
wage plus 20 per cent) over this nine-year period.6
Furthermore, the increasing segmentation of low-wage workers in minimum 
wage contours during the pre- and post-crisis periods have exerted a significant 
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downwards drag on median earnings. Adjusting for prices (using the Retail 
Price Index), real wages for the UK workforce came to a standstill in the period 
2003–08, rose during the crisis year of deflation in 2009 and then went into 
freefall (dropping 10 per cent) until 2015 when they picked up a little. While 
other factors were certainly in play, it is notable that GDP per capita increased 
substantially in 2003–08 and, after a fall in 2008–09, resumed at a fairly steady 
rise thereafter (Grimshaw and Rafferty, 2016: figure 11). As such, we need to 
look at factors other than long-standing problems of slow productivity growth, 
weak capital investment and poor innovation performance that are features of 
Table 17.5 Minimum wage contour trends in the UK: the share of female and male 
employees in pay bands above the minimum wage, 1999–2012
1999 2003 2008 2012
First wage contour 
(MW + 10%)
 Women  11.9%  9.5% 12.7% 15.0%
 Men  4.1%  3.2%  5.7%  8.4%
Second wage contour 
(MW + 20%)
 Women 20.7% 16.7% 20.4% 23.2%
 Men  7.6%  6.0%  9.7% 13.6%
Third wage contour 
(MW + 30%)
 Women 27.7% 24.9% 26.4% 30.1%
 Men 11.3% 10.0% 13.2% 18.4%
Minimum wage as % 
of median pay
47.6% 47.5% 52.4% 54.2%
Median pay as % 
of minimum wage
MW+110% MW+111% MW+91% MW+84%
  % women paid below 
median pay
61% 60% 58% 57%
  % men paid below 
median pay
39% 40% 42% 43%
Notes: MW refers to minimum wage; the minimum wage level in April for each year was £3.60 
(1999), £4.20 (2003), £5.52 (2008) and £6.08 (2012); data referring to the three tiers refer to adults 
aged 22+ (1999-2008) and 21+ (2012); median pay refers to all employees on adult rates (male, 
female, full-time, part-time) and was £7.57 (1999), £8.85 (2003), £10.54 (2008) and £11.21 (2012) 
(gross hourly, overtime excluded, nominal.
Source: ASHE earnings data (ons.gov.uk), ‘Distribution of low paid jobs by 10p bands’ and ‘Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings: Table 1 All employees’; authors’ original compilation.
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the UK’s private sector. Our suspicion is that the near-absence of other regu-
latory arrangements for wage-setting, especially collective bargaining, denies 
workers and employers an important ‘beneficial constraint’ (Streeck, 1997). If 
workers had more ‘voice’ in negotiating and defending wages (as in France and 
Germany, for example) then this would allow them to leverage minimum wage 
gains further up the wage distribution (Grimshaw et al., 2014). Instead many 
low-wage employers appear to be responding by fusing job grades at lower 
levels, collapsing customary wage differentials between supervisory and non-
supervisory grades and using the minimum wage as a standard rate rather than as 
a floor against exploitation.
As well as acting as a drag on median earnings, a high share of workers in 
low-wage jobs imposes a significant cost on the welfare state in the form of 
in-work benefits (‘tax credits’ in the UK). Partly in response to this issue, the 
government introduced a new higher adult minimum wage (for workers aged 
25 plus as in Greece) fixed initially in 2016 at approximately 7 per cent higher 
than the rate for 21–24 year olds. More radically, the government said it would 
require the Low Pay Commission to raise the new premium adult rate to £9.00 
(from the 2016 £7.20 rate) or 60 per cent of median earnings by 2020.7 This 
intervention is significant for two reasons. Firstly, for the first time since the 
establishment of the tripartite Low Pay Commission in 1999, the government 
has asserted control over the fixing process, thereby strengthening govern-
ment power and diminishing the voice of employer and trade union organisa-
tions. Secondly, it sets what appears to be a very ambitious target for the wage 
floor, which ought to contribute to reducing the share of workers in low-wage 
employment. 
As estimations in Figure 17.7 show, the two targets generate very differ-
ent results: the £9 target would take the minimum wage above the low-wage 
threshold by 2018, while the 60 per cent target would set in train a slower set 
of annual rises converging with where the previous minimum wage would have 
been by 2020. However, it is understood that the £9 target has been quietly 
shelved and that when the Low Pay Commission makes its report in October 
2016 it will recommend a 2017 rate in line with the 60 per cent target.8 As such, 
it will continue the past trajectory of minimum wage rises with a slow closing 
of the gap between the wage floor and the low-wage threshold. Nevertheless, 
without complementary policy reforms to strengthen participative standards, 
the high share of workers paid in narrow wage contours above the minimum 
wage is unlikely to change.
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Conclusions
While in 2012 the Greek government cut the minimum wage by 22 per cent 
as a main plank of its wage devaluation policy approach in a context of relent-
less economic recession, the UK minimum wage enjoyed small but steady rises 
during employment recovery, followed by a potentially radical statutory inter-
vention that promises to deliver a succession of minimum wage rises during the 
period 2016–20 in an effort to cut welfare benefits paid to poor workers. Our 
two-country analysis has revealed diverging effects on labour costs and the shape 
of the wage distribution. In Greece, the real value of the minimum wage today 
is below its level recorded in 1981, according to the OECD’s purchasing parity 
measure; this is an extraordinary indictment of the country’s economic manage-
ment since the 2008 crisis under Troika control. The share of low-wage employ-
ment has increased, but this is secondary in significance to the plummeting real 
Figure 17.7 Projected minimum wage trends with alternative 2020 targets (nominal 
value)
Notes: Median pay is for all employees, gross hourly pay excluding overtime, nominal value; NMW 
is the national minimum wage (adult rate) for April each year; projected median pay for 2016–20 
applies the annual average rise recorded for 2010–15 (1.2%) and the projected NMW trends assume 
steady rises in rates during 2017–20.
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value of earnings for all workers. The UK’s pay problems are different. Here we 
find a rising wage floor and a flat trend in real median earnings, coupled with a 
persistent high share of low-wage employment and a growing concentration of 
workers, especially high among women, paid within ‘wage contours’ just above 
the minimum wage.
A key failing in both countries’ minimum wage policy approaches is their 
isolation from potentially complementary wage-setting institutions, namely 
collective bargaining. The Troika-led interventions in Greece were designed to 
dismantle long-standing processes of bipartite negotiation in minimum wage-
setting by substituting unilateral state action for social partner regulation. We 
characterised this policy approach as a ‘neoliberal shift’. The policy goal was to 
establish low-level coverage of collective bargaining and individualised indus-
trial relations and to fix the minimum wage as a safety net via a frontal assault 
against collective bargaining and labour rights at large. It should be stressed, 
though, that the Tsipras government managed to place the revival of collective 
bargaining as a core plank of industrial relations reforms under the third EAP. 
As a result, it has been recently agreed between the government and the Quartet 
that both the favourability clause in collective agreements and the extension 
mechanism will be restored in September 2018. In the UK, the radical 2016 
policy reform diminished the remit of the tripartite Low Pay Commission by 
unilaterally fixing the 2020 adult rate so that scope for interaction with social 
partners in fixing the minimum wage is reduced. The weak presence of collec-
tive bargaining in the UK’s private sector workplaces means the role of social 
partners in the minimum wage-fixing process had been important. As such, 
this statutory intervention acts to ‘crowd out’ participative decision-making 
over wages. Both countries therefore have witnessed ruptures to pre-existing 
intersections with the national industrial relations model, although this is of 
a far greater scale in Greece and as the result of far more explicit concerted 
actions. The contrasting cases support the need for better policy approaches 
that engage with collective bargaining and participative minimum wage fixing 
processes since these facilitate a more robust approach to sustaining real wage 
gains and a pay equity approach that supports a wider approach of making work 
more equal. 
Notes
1 The so-called Troika comprises the European Central Bank (ECB), the European 
Commission (EC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
2 Namely, the EC, ECB, IMF and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
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3 With the exception of the Wages Council for agriculture, which was abolished some 
years later in 2013 (again by a Conservative government).
4 See Chapter 2 in this volume for a full elaboration of the notion of ‘participative 
standards’.
5 While the studies by Stewart (all sectors) and by Dickens and Manning (elderly care 
sector) find no evidence of wage spillovers from minimum wage rises in the UK, 
Butcher and colleagues (2012) find spillovers up to the 25th wage percentile. The differ-
ence is explained by the different time periods examined and the different counterfactual 
wage distributions used in models (McKnight et al., 2016).
6 During the period 2003–12, the total male workforce increased from 11.44 million to 
12.46 million and the total female workforce from 11.14 million to 12.25 million (as 
recorded in the ASHE earnings database).
7 In its revised remit for the Low Pay Commission, the government states: ‘The 
Government estimates that the level of the combined national minimum wage and the 
premium in April 2016 will be 55 per cent of median earnings and has set out an ambi-
tion that this should continue to increase to reach 60 per cent of median earnings by 
2020, subject to sustained economic growth. The Government’s objective is to have a 
National Living Wage of over £9 by 2020’ (BIS, 2015: 2).
8 The 60 per cent target is likely to be estimated against median earnings for workers aged 
25 and over, which raises the median slightly and therefore raises the eventual minimum 
wage by 2020 compared to the line plotted in Figure 17.7.
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